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jSTIBKNEaLlCr,
What %B meahtr;% the oq#ept 6f miracle? fhatlB- 
a miracle? The purpose of thie thesis la to try to olarify 
these questions and, to some ext&mt at least, to. come to ; / 
satisfactory answers.
When one reads the works of oontemporàry theolo'# 
glans on the subject of the concept of mlracl^ differences 
immediately become apparent. I have divided^  those-fdifferm. 
enoes into nine argumentai and a chapter is devoted to Caol 
In each chapter the argument is presented in a straights* ' 
forward manner, largely drawn from the representatives iof .z, : 
it. The view is also criticised and evaluatedi .-this ' 
criticism and evaluation is largely my own# , ■
The three traditional interpretations , of the...■uoncei 
(as mirrored in their contemporary representatives) -'are/':' 
presented and criticized in Part One of the thesis, Which ;' 
consists of three chapters# The contranaturàlist/''believoB^^^^^^^ : 
that a miracle is unlawful and inexplicable *  ^and:'this not'.4' 
only at the time of its ocourreno©, but forever so# The^  
proternatural1st believes that a miracle is inexplicable 
at the time of its occurrence, but it need not .remain sq,.-, 
and (in contradistinction to contranatursilism) it': IS- cate-'/', 
gorically denied that a miracle is unlawful# The sUpeV- 
naturalist believes that there can be no adequate--imder*-/’
- 1 - "/ / ':'
sttuiding of miracle without due consideration being given 
to the person of Jesus Christ: and that the divinity of
Christ makes miracle natural and necessary. In order to 
criticize these and other views % use Tillich/a definition 
of thé^logyt a soimd theology is on© which is 1) faithful 
to the eternal truth of the message and which is 2) meaning­
fully applied to the questions and claims of the temporal 
situation. The three traditional views fail on both counts  ^
All three are unbiblical and all three are scientifically 
unaati afactory♦
In Part Two I consider three important present-day 
theological movements which, while not dealing exoluaively 
with the concept of miracle, are nevertheless of considerab] 
importance for this concept. Karl Barth attempts to give 
a purely scriptural view of miracle without consideration
for modern views of science and philosophy. Porm criticism 
be
may/roughly defined as the attempt to apply the results 
reached by students of folklore literature to the early 
Christian tradition as it is preserved in the synoptic 
gospels. The demythologist believes that the message of 
redemption which is contained in the lew Testament is 
embedded in mythological language which can neither be 
fitted into the world view of modern man ~ nor do justice 
to the message of redemption itself. The various move-
^ '2 ^
mente in Part Two are unsatiafaotory for atrlotly different 
reasons* Barth Vs theology, hecause it is so strongly 
oriented to the truth of the eternal message, is ohliviouB 
of the claims of the temporal situation* Perm critioism 
errs on the other side: in attempting to speak to one
partioulai? area of the temporal situation, it seems to 
almost oompl'ètelÿ loké the truth of the eternal message * 
Oritios of the demytholdgioal movement are wont to say 
that demythologista miss the truth of the eternal message 
in attempting to present the gospel in terms understandable 
to modern man* In essence, I do not think that this is 
true, though the demythologist♦s attack on many forms of 
expression of traditional theology does lay him open to the 
charge of being merely negative*
In Bart Three I px^ eeent and evaluate three views 
of the concept of miracle which take cognizance of the fact 
that the growth of the scientific attitude has forced alters 
tiona in the x’esilme of philosophy and theology* The ration­
alist is anxious to construct a comprehensive world-pioture 
to replace the out?/orn supranaturaliam of traditions! 
theology* The linguist is convinced that the oontempoxwy 
philosophical interest in language can be so developed as 
to provide a nove3- inroad into the problems and oontroversie
*H» *f*
of theology, illuminating its claims and reforming its 
apologetic# The existentialist is likewise interested in 
making the gospel intelligible to contemporary man, and the 
synthesis between eternal message and temporal situation 
is effected by employing many forms of expression drawn 
from the philosophy of existence# These three contemporary 
views in Part Three are truly theological and truly apolo­
getics that is, all three earnestly attempt to do justice 
both to the truth of the eternal message and the claims and 
questions of the temporal situation# I am personally con­
vinced that the view of Ihe/existentialië^ t is mo3?e suoceas-
fuL in this attempt than the other two ,
In the conclusion I state my personal and positive 
views of the concept of miracle, using as a framev/ork 
Hume * s famous final paragraph in his '-essay on miracles# . 
Wore I to sum up my own view of the concept of miracle in 
one sentence I should say this: a miracle is any event in
which the faithful participant becomes aware of God^s 
activity in Christ#
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PEEmOE
aim and purpose in this thesis is to come to 
a more or loss independent understanding of the concept 
of miracle* In order to do so, I propose to summarize 
and criticize various interpretations of that concept 
as these interpretations appear in the works of modern 
theologians* I do not intend to write a history of the 
subject, but to limit the discussion to views which are 
held amongst contemporary theologians# Nor do I intend 
to discuss the historical veracity of any miracle or group 
of miracles, though the Hew Testament events traditionally 
called miracles will always be in the background and some­
times in the foreground of the discussion*
The classification of different approaches to 
the concept of miracle has arisen out of the.reading of 
various works of miracle apologetic* In each of the nine 
chapters representatives have been chosen for their par­
ticularly clear presentation of the view under considera­
tion# At the same time, no one representative fits 
perfectly into any one argument: Bultmann represents
three views, Richardson two, and many authors are cited
a
in more than one chapter. In selecting/representative,.
I have attempted to seize upon -hiS’ most fundamental 
conviotiono. In so doing, I am not unaware of other
- ill - -
aspects of hié ■ approach, hut have found it necessary 
to elicit and expound his " salient positions.
The plan of each of the nine chapters is basically 
the same, Pirst of all, there is a straightforv/ard presenta­
tion of the argument drawn largely from the representatives 
themselves; secondly, there is a criticism, more or less 
my own, of that same view* The choice of chapter titles 
is meant to give a slight indication of the contents, 
but in each case the title v/ord is defined and used through­
out the argument in its restricted sense.
As to references, the main works of the repre­
sentatives - the primary sources - have been assigned
1abbreviations# Reference to the work of a representative 
in his own argument is designated by this abbreviation 
only, and is embodied in the text* In other chapters, 
the abbreviation is maintained, but the author is given 
as well, and the reference takes the form of a foot-note* 
References to the works of non**representativos, or to 
subordinate works of the representatives - secondary 
sources - are given in full in foot-notes* Vifhere avail­
able, I have used translations of non-English works * 
Gtherv/ise, the translations are my own, with the original
&3T a list of abbreviations and the works to which they 
refer, :lcf. below, vi# * ^
- iv -
In foot-notes* Unless otherwise indicated, scriptural 
quotations are from the Revised Standard Version*
I take this opportunity to thank my professors 
in Garleton, Queen’s and Glasgow Universities* The members 
of the staff at Mitchell Library, Glasgow, have been most 
helpful and courteous in the course of this study. And 
I am most thankful for the love and understanding my wife 
has afforded me in the preparation of this work. Finally, 
it is a pleasant duty to acknowledge my great indebtedness 
to Professor Ronald Gregor Smith, whose advice on many 
points has been quite invaluable, and who has been so 
generous with his time, patience, and maderstanding in the 
guidance of this thesis*
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1Introduction#
"The haunting problem of miraclee invitee a repeated and 
Buetained attempt at ite solution, Even a email advance 
is yet advance. * # . For this is the one crucial question 
which brings to a head and inoludeB all the rest."
William Sunday#
«  2 «■
What is meant by the oonoept of miracle? What 
is a miracle? These are the questions I seek to clarify, 
and to some extent at least, to answer. If one carefully 
reads the works of contemporary theologians on this axibject, 
differences immediately become apparent* But are these 
differences apparent only in modern times? This is only 
partially the case* Even traditional theqlogy seems to 
have inherent inconsistencies in its formulation of the 
concept of miracle* It is reasonably evident that there 
are at least three positions in traditional miracle apolo­
getic# There is the view of the oontranaturalist, who is 
convinced that a miracle is an event inexplicable in terms 
 ^of natural laws inexplicable, not only at the time of its 
occurrence, but forever so# The proternaturalist softens 
this rather crude view by saying that a miracle is only 
inexplicable at the time of its occurrence, but that it 
need not romain so# Fui? thermo re, it is explicitly denied 
that the event must always evade natural explanation#
The supernaturalist retreats a step further: he demands
that any consideration of the concept of miracle must give 
due place to the person of Jesus Christ# The supefnaturalist 
believes that the divinity of Christ makes miracle natural 
and necessary# These traditional positions are mirrored 
in their contemporary representatives, and in Part One
of this thesis (the first three chapters) i present and
criticize these traditional positions* On the whole, the
positions are found wanting: consequently, I reject them;
1I reject supranaturalism. Yet supranaturalisra - that is,
a combination of these three views - despite internal incon-
almost
sistencies, held/complete sv/ay over the theological field for 
fifteen hundred years ; whereas at present this is no longer 
the case. What brought about this significant change?
The greatest single factor v/as undoubtedly the 
growth of the scientific attitude whose efflorescence may 
be said to have begun in the sixteenth and seventeeth 
centuries, end which has continued to our own day. "The 
scientific revolution . * * outshines everything since the 
rise of Ohristianity and reduces the Renaissance and Refor­
mation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal dis-
*1
In this thesis, the word supranaturalism is used as a 
term to designate any theology which is based on the 
nature-supranature schema* Therefore, the contra-, 
the prêter-, and the supernatural views are all part 
of supranaturalism* And the word supranatural is 
used as a term to designate, in a general way, that 
v/hich is related to, or deals with, or is charac­
terized by what is above nature. Of. in this 
regard Onions (ed.), The Shorter Oxford English 
pictionarv# II, 2083 and 2088. I reserve the 
liberty' to render the word ’supernatural’ by the 
word ’supranatural*, for in this thesis the word 
supernatural is used as a term to describe a certain 
specific theological position, particularly in 
regard to the concept of miracle.
placements, within the system of medieval Christendom."^
Such a revolution has had far-reaching effects. "Science 
has changed the conditions of man’s life. . * • The ideas 
of science have changed the way men think of themselves and
n
of the world." One of the immediate effects of this 
revolution in the field of miracle apologetic was to 
sharpen the traditional miracle concept, hut at the same 
time made it increasingly difficult to hold.
But the growth of science wrought results in other 
directions : and one of the results was a change in the
treatment of the Bible. The scientist demanded the right 
to investigate everything, no sphere was outside his interest 
and scope. The Holy Scripture: itself^ was. given over
to the keenest scrutiny: subjected slowly but surely to
the tests which all books of antiquity must meet. Source 
criticism is in many ways the forerunner of form criticism, 
which is the attempt to apply the results reached by students 
of folklore literature to the early Christian tradition as 
it is preserved in the synoptic gospels. I give a critical 
evaluation of form criticism in chapter five* And the 
chief aim of demythologizing (chapter six) is to make the
^Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, viii.
2 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding. 1
essential kerygma of the New Testament intelligible to 
man whose thinking is so lB,rgely determined by the scientific 
attitude. But this view also maintains that the kerygma 
itself demands interpretation, that science has been of 
service in fostering an attitude which in many ways is 
demanded by faith itself*
These two chapters (on form criticism and demytho- 
logizing) form two of the three sections of Part Two : the
other section (chapter four) is devoted to a study of the 
theology of Karl Barth* Barth is placed at the beginning of 
Part Two, partly because of certain superficial resemblances 
to supranaturalism, partly because he fits conveniently 
into no other place. Barth’s views on miracle are in no 
way apologetic: he considers miracle neither in relation
to nature (as do all the traditional views in Part One) 
nor with consideration to the views of modern science (as 
do all the contemporary views in Part Three). But Barth’s 
theology, in common with form criticism and demythologizing - 
and this indeed is the raison d’etre of Part Two - is an 
important contemporary theological movement which, while 
not dealing exclusively with the concept of miracle, is 
nevertheless of considerable importance for that concept.
The growth of the scientific attitude has forced 
alterations in the realms of science and philosophy: and
—' 6 ”*
in Part Three I examine truly contemporary views of miracle 
which, while trying to remain faithful to the fundamental 
ineigiits of the Bible, yet attempt to render the concept 
of miracle intelligible and meaningful to modern man. In 
chapter seven we see that the rationalist attempts to con­
struct a comprehensive world-pioture to replace the tradi­
tional obsolete supranaturalism and at the same time to 
include and embrace the results of recent scientific research# 
Logical empiricism has been greatly influenced in its origins 
by the clarity of expression and economy of statement of 
science. In chapter eight, we examine the attempt of the 
linguist to make theological language meaningful: to locate
terms like ’God’ and ’miracle’ on an coverall language frame­
work. In spite of their profundity, I reject the views of 
both the rationalist and the linguist because each tends to 
enmesh God and his activity in a this-worldly setting; be­
cause each tends to construct an inclusive Wei tans ohauun/}: 
which actually throttles and thwarts adequate theological 
expression# And the existentialist’s view (in chapter nine) 
has been affected by the scientific attitude as v/ell# Here, 
in this view, we see that an ’objective’ miracle is denied, 
God’s transcendence maintained: and this without any attempt
to stay or to oiroumsoribe the scientific attitude.
What is meant by the concept of miracle? What is
^ 7 “
aiiitraole? These are the questions I seek to clarify, 
and to some extent at least, to answer. The clarification 
is attempted in the nine chapters: and although these nine 
divisions do not purport to exhibit all possible views of 
the concept of miracle, taken together I believe that they 
represent the majority of present-day attempts to grapple 
seriously with the subject. The answer is attempted in the 
conclusion: where I give my personal and positive views
of the concept of miracle.
8PART QNljl - Traditional Tiewa#
Chapter -.1..  ^.The Qontranatural View.
nù"L,LAww4.MtkêF*Vii#;wii#n^
"A miracle is above nature, against nature, besides nature."
Thomas Aquinas.
"Revelation is miraculous an,d miracles are the proof of it*"
Bishop Butler#
ELM “ Mozley, J.B* Eight Lectures on Miracles*
M ^ Lewis; O.S* Miracles*mm» ' —————————
•MSA* w Ijiinn, A. "Miracles «• A Solentifio Approach.",
g —
To the oontranaturalist, the essence of a miracle 
is that it is unlawful and inexplicable* Being contrary to 
or agaimt nature, a miracle cannot be subsumed under a 
law of nature at the time at which it happens or at any 
other time *
The chapter is divided into two parts: the
first part bei% devoted to a presentation of the contra- 
natural position without comment; the second part being 
concerned with a criticism of the contranatural viewpoint.
A miracle to be so must be contranatural in the 
strictest mnse of the term, incapable of being scientifi­
cally explained now or at any time* If the miracle is 
to have the evidential value oontranaturallsts ascribe 
to it, it must not be merely extraordinary, but inexplicable : 
and eternally inexplicable, in terms of natural law or 
natural causation* "Miracles are contradictions of known
laws: contradictions which no amount of further Icnovf-
1ledge will or can explain." A problem immediately .arises: 
some events, once thought contranatural, are now deemed 
quite natux'al. The healing miracles of Jesus, once thought 
completely inexplicable, seem now at least partially capable 
of being subsumed under scientific categories. "The dis-
*1Of. Farmer,,"Physical Science and Miracle", 74
T 1 0  -
covery of natural means of producing effects which once
pasBed for miracles does not logically imply that bygone
marvels were not wrought by supranatural means; but it
removes all ground for logical certainty that they were
1so produced»** The contr©naturaliat replies to such an 
objection by saying that there has been a mistake in 
classification* So Lunn: "If phenomena be divided into
those which are due to natural agents, and those #iioh are 
due to supranatural agents, it is inevitable that mistakes 
in classification will be more comon in an age of primi­
tive than in an age of advanced science* If there be 
genuine miracles, we should expect to find that some 
phenomena once regarded as miraculous will later be explained 
within the framework of natural law. # * # The point at 
issue is whether there remains a residuum, of phenomena 
which the advance of science does nothing to explain"
(’MBA*, 242)* There are still a number of phenomena for 
v/hioh no natural explanation can be given, these alone are 
contranatural, these alone strictly miracles* Probably 
no one saw this more clearly than Mozley, who has given the 
modern classical statement of the contranatural position*
He saw that a miracle to be of evidential value must be
1 Tennant, Miracle and its Philosophical Pro supuo sit ions. 3:
^  1 1  -
utterly without procèdent, in this sense contranatural♦
Mozley rejected two natural explanations which, by the
use of analogy, sought to make miracle loss offensive
to scientific minds. Babbage employed the analogy of
the calculating machine, which completely naturally but
very rarely produced formations radically different from
1its usual results. This supposed aid to miracle apologetic
earned this remark from Mozleys "T|ie recurrence, with
whatever intervals, of miracles with the same invariable :
antecedents would constitute a new order of nature" (ELM,
xv), Such an event would have no evidential value, since
it is not strictly contranatural♦ Mozley also rejects
the analogy of the activity of a man who in lifting: a
book seems to suspend a law of nature.
It is quite true that we see laws of nature any day 
and any : hour neutralized and counteracted in par­
ticular cases, and yet do not look upon such counter­
actions as other than the most natural events: but
it must be remembered that where this is the case, 
the counteracting agency is as ordinary and constant 
an antecedent in nature as the agency which it counter­
acts, • , , But where the counteracting power to W. 
law ofraiature is an unknowKî. power, a power not in 
nature, then the counteraction or neutralization of 
a law of nature is not a natural fact, being deprived 
of its ordinary and constant antecedent, and coupled 
with another and new antecedent* * * , In all these 
cases the question is not whether a law of nature has 
been counteracted, for that does not constitute a 
fact contrary to the laws of nature; but whether
^Babbage, Thé Ninth BridiSiewater Treat is#, 33f *
% 1 2  "
it has been counteracted by another natural law#
If it has been, the conditions of science are ful­
filled# But if a law of nature has been counteracted 
by a law out of nature • . * a new ponjùBction of 
antecedent and consequent, wholly unlike the con- 
jimctiono in nature, has taken place# The la?/s of 
nature have in that instance not worked, and an 
effect contrary to what would have ieaued from those 
laws has been produced# This is ordinarily called a vio* 
elation or suspension of the laws of nature (ELM, xiii).
Bo the terms violation, suspension. Intervention, inter­
ruption are rightly key-notes of the contranatural posi­
tion* "By definition, miracles must of course interrupt 
the usual course of Nature" (M, 74) # The contranaturalist 
can concur with John Btuart Mill’s definition of miracle#
"To constitute a miracle a phenomenon must take place 
without having been preceded by any antecedent phenomenal 
conditions sufficient again to reproduce it# , # # The 
test of a miracle is; fere there present in the case 
such external conditions, such second causes we may call 
them, that whenever these conditions ot causes reappear 
the event will be reproduced? If there were, it is not 
a miracle; if there were not, it is a miracle, but it is
not according to laws it is an event produced, without,
1or in spite of law#"
A miracle such as this proves the existence
"^Mill, Three Essays on Eeli^ion. 224^25
13 -
of a radloally separated other world and it is the sole 
means of any knowledge of it. "If miracles can be proved 
to occur, the supra*nattiral is not as the materialists 
vainly declare, a figment of man’s mind. ♦ . * Miracles, 
so Ghrietlans believe, are evidence provided by God to 
demonstrate the existence of a divine order" (’MBA’, 242) # 
Miracles bridge the gap between the natural and the supra- 
natural, more than that, they provide the only means of 
converse and communication between the two. "There 
being two worlds, a visible and an invisible, and a, commu­
nication between them being wanted, a miracle is Hie instru­
ment of that c ommmi c at ion" (ELM* IB). Miracle is the 
single rivet allowing the intellect to bind these two 
worlds together* "A miracle tes a foot, bo to speak, in 
each world; one part of it resting upon the earth, while 
the other goes beyond our intellectual reach into the depths 
of the invisible world" (BLM. 101) # The argument from 
miracle is the clinching hypothesis which allows ua to be 
convinced of the supranatural # "A miracle is In perfect 
order and place as the medium between two worlds" (ELM*
19) * But what ia meant by this divine order, this other 
world, this supranatural? Very briefly, the non-natural.
"We mean by the supranatural that which is out of the 
order of nature* God, angels, departed spirits, heaven
-  14 -
mid hell, are out of the order of nature hecauee they are 
not in nature at all ; a iiiiraole ie in nature in the senee 
of visibility, but is not in the order of nature; the 
Invisible world therefore, and Miracles are supmhatural# 
But life, the hUMan soul, conscience, reason, will are 
natural because they are in the order of nature or part 
of our constant experience** (BM, 68)* Small wonder that 
**mlraoles and the supranatural contents of Christianity 
stand or fall together** (BM, 13) #
A miracle proves the existence of (%od, it is 
indeed a revelation of him# **God has willed that to the 
internal aids of the Holy Spirit there should be joined 
external proofs of His revelation, namelyî divine facts, 
especially miracles and prophecies which, because they 
clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge 
of God, are most certain signs of a divine revelation, and
“I
are suited to the intelligence of all," "Miracles are 
messages addressed from God to men to draw attention to 
his Almighty Power" 245) * Wlioreao the activity
of God is not openly displayed in the ordinary course of 
events, that activity revealed in miracle# "God is 
hidden in the laws of nature # He is revealed to all men
‘^Ben^lnger; i (ed,), fhe Sources of Oatholic Do^ma# 
mdccxc, 445»
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Xin the miracles,"" "A miracle shows design and intention, 
i#e# is the act of Personal Being# Borne one, therefore,
4
there is who is moving behind it, with whom it brings 
us in relation, a spiritual agent of whose presence it 
speaks# A mira,ole IS thus, if true, an indication of 
another world, and an unseen state of being, containing 
personality and will? of another world of moral being 
besides this visible one? and this is the overawing and 
impressing consideration in it" (gBM, 56)# Miracles alone 
truly and irresistibly reveal God $ "It ie of the nature 
of a miracle to give proof, as distinguished from mere 
surmise^ of a Divine design" (BLM# 7) # Mosley expmids 
this doctrine# "There is one great necessary purpose, then, 
which divines assign to miraclep vis#, the proof of a 
revelation* And certainly, if it vms the ivill of God 
to give a revelation, there are plain and obvious reasons 
for asserting that miraelea ar© necessary as the guax’antee 
end voucher for that revelation# A revelation, is, properly 
speaking, such only by virtue of telling us something 
which we should not know without it# But how do we Imow 
that that oomunioation of what is undiseoverable by human 
reason is true? Our reason cannot prove the truth of it,
^Everts, "Jesus Christ* Ho Bxoroist", 360*
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for it is by the very supposition beyond our reason#
There must be,, then, some note or sign to certify to it . 
and distinguish it as a true oominunication from God, 
which note can be nothing else than a miracle" (BLM, 5)* 
Miracles prove the existence of God, are oommunioations 
or revelations from him* howls remarks : "If we admit
God, must we admit miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no 
security against it" (M, 128)#
A miracle proves the existence of God* It sets 
a seal on any domment of revelation^ it verifies end 
demonstrates the truth of any doctrine# A aupranatural 
doctrine cannot stand on its own feet, it must be attested 
to by a supranatural miracle * "Miracles are the direct 
credentials of a revelation? the visible supranatural 
is the appropriate v/itnese to the invisible supranatural — 
that proof which goes straight to the point, and, a token 
being wanted of a Divine communication, Is that token*
We oamiot, therefore, dispense with this evidence* * * •
A supranatural fact is. the proper proof of a supranatural 
doctrine? v/hile a supranattiral doctrine, on the other hand, 
is certainly i^pt, the proper proof of a eupranatural fact"
(ma, ,15).
A miracle proves the existeaoe of (Jod, it is 
indeed a revelation of him. It is interesting to note
:■'  ^17 - 
how the oontranaturalists differentiate between miracle 
and providence, or between miracle and prayer# To Moaley, 
"the one [a providence] ie an interference of the Deity 
with natural ca.uees at a point removed from our observation; 
the other [a miracle] being the came brought directly 
home to the senses" (BLM# 167)# lewis holds that vdiile 
it is possible to prove that a miraculous event is caused 
by the activity of God, "it is never possible to prove 
empirically that a given, non-^miraoulous event was or was 
not an answer to prayer# Since it is non^-miraoulous the 
sceptic can always point to its natural causes, and say, 
’Because of these it would have happened anyway’" (M, 215).
A miracle proves the causation by God or other 
supramundane being.;? \fhatever may be criticised in the 
oontranatural position, it is mfair to say that it presents 
the miraculous as that which is uncaused # "A miracle is 
emphatically not an event without cause or without results# 
Its cause is the activity of God" (1, 73)* Other contra'* 
naturalists * Dunn, for example ** extend the causation to 
supranatural agents# If a phenomenon be inexplicable as 
the effect of natural agents, it "must therefore be ascribed 
to supra natural agents" (’MBA’, 242) # Implicit in this 
position is the traditional distinction between primary 
and secondary causation# "God normally workë through
' 18
secondary causes. The seed is sown, the wheat shoots
up and matures, and the haker oonverts the wheat into
bread# But in rare and exceptionai cases God suspends
for a moment the operation of those laws of nature which
owe their existence and validity to him alone, and expresses
his will more directly, and performs without the aid of
secondary causes what he is continually doing by means
of. secondary causes* ’Just in, tbe millionthh instance
he mxiLtiplies bread instead of multiplying the wheat,•
and feeds the five thousand without the intervention of
"1secondary causes*" This direct unmediated activity of 
God or other supramundane being is an example of primry 
causation# Lewis, without using the distinction between 
primary and secondary causation, substitutes the more 
refined but essentially similar idea of appropriateness#
"In all these miracles alike the Incarnate God does suddenly 
and locally something that God has done or will do in 
general# Each miracle writes for us in small letters 
something that God has already written, or will write, 
in letters almost too large to be noticed, across the 
whole canvass of Mature# They focus at a particular point 
either God’s actual, or His future, operations on the
^Lunn, The Third Bay# 13
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wniverse. . . . Their awthentioity is attested by their 
style" (M, 162).
A miracle proves the causation by God or other 
supramundane being. Thecontranatura$ position is based 
upon a cleavage: and hence there is a well-defined boun­
dary betvireen the separate domains of nature and suprahature. 
And so for its strength and evidential character, contra- 
naturalism depends upon the integrity and fixity of natural 
law# A miracle can only be a miracle when it ie contra* 
natural, and to be certain that it io contranatural, the 
natural muot be firmly fixed# "Belief in miraclea, far 
from depending on an ignorance of the laws of nature, ie 
only poBsible in so far m  those laws are known’* (M, 58) #
And Lmm remarks that "the greatest service which a scientific 
student of the natural order can render to laanlcind is to 
demonstrate the existence of phenomena which cannot be 
explained within the framework of the law of nature" (’MBA', 
241)#
Since a miracle is caused by God or other supra* 
mundane being, and is thereby contranatural, one should
1 This statement is not true of Mosley, who partially 
bases his argument on the Humian contention that 
natural law is but custom and so not trustvzorthy 
for adverse criticism of this aspect of Mosley’s 
position cf# Huxley, Hume# 130ff#f and Bruce,
The Miraculous Elemen¥ ¥n the Gospels# 44ff #
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not expect an abundance of miracles# "for nineteen cen­
turies those who called themaelvee Chriotians have main* 
tained that a mira.ole was a moat unusual and uncommon 
event" (’MSA’, 245)* Lewis admoniahea his readers not to 
be concerned if they themselves have never witnessed a 
real miracle, because "God does not shake miracles into 
Mature at random as if from a pepper-caster" (M, 201)#
Their rarity ie apparently one indication of their sanctity# 
"If the miracles were offered us as events that normally 
occurred, then the progress of science, whose business 
it ie to tell us what normally occurs, would render belief 
in them gradually harder and finally impossible" (M, 58).
A miracle tends to demonstrate the divinity of 
. the human performer# Hero note must be talcen of a difference 
amoug contranaturalist s $ a difference between Homan 
Og.tholic and Protestant contranaturalists* Pour points 
may be made in this regard# Pirst, all contranaturalists 
hold that the miracles prove the divine origin of Christi­
anity # Secondly, al,l. contranatural 1sts hold that no person 
can properly be called divine who does not perform miracles 
to attest to his divinity# But, thirdly, Protestant contra­
naturalists restrict miracles to the one person and the one 
time # And, fourthly, Boman Oatholic contranaturalists 
allow that miracles have happened down through? the ages#
”*'21
All contraiiatiirallata hold that miraolee prove
the divine origin of Ohristianity* "If j^nyone shall have
said that # * * the divin© origin of the Ghrietian religion
cannot be oorreotly proved by them [miracles]: let him
ibe anathema#" Again, "the claims of Ohrièt were too 
great to be believed unless they were supported by miracles* 
The question is not, are the miracles historically credible, 
but is the gospel without the miracles historically credible* 
* * * The internal evidence, the evidence of the moral 
character of Christians, ie used to make the miracles 
credible, but it is the miracles that make the moral ohar*^ .- 
acter of Christians possible*"^
All contranaturalists hold that no person can 
properly be called divine who does not perform miracles to 
attest to his divinity* At the very least, miracles are as 
the clanging of bells pronouncing the entry on the stage 
of history of a divine herald* Hevman remarks that "the 
respective claims of the Kings and Priests wore readily 
ascertained, * * * whereas Extraordinary messengers, as 
Moses, Baanuel and Elijali, needed some supmnatural display 
of power to authenticate their pretensions*"^ At most.
^Denssingar (ed*), on# cit.. mdcccxiii, 450*
^Everts, OP* cit** 360-61*
^Hewnan, Two Issava on Biblical and Ecoleslastleal Miraoleg
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miracles absolutely demonatrate the divinity of the miracle 
maker* "The men whoso lives were trsinsformod by Christ were 
Ohristiane who believed that God for us men and for our 
salvation came down from heaven, and that Jo b u s  proved 
hie astounding claims by the miracles which he wrought 
and above all by the supreme miracle of the Resurrection" 
(’MBA’, 244)* Thus the one indisputable attestation to 
Christ’s divinity is his ability to perform miracles: 
this supplies the one indispensable element in the fotmda- 
tion of the faith# And the ability to work miracles places 
Christ above the pseudo-divinity of other religious founders# 
"The belief of the Christian is # # * a rational belief, 
v/hich the Mohammedan’s is not, because the Christian believes 
in a supranatural diapensation, upon the proper evidence 
of such a dispensation, viz., the miraculous# Antecedently, 
indeed, to all examino;tion into the particulars of the 
Christian evidence, Christianity is the only religion in 
the world which professes to possess a body of direct 
external evidence to its having come from God# Mohammedanism 
avows the want of this? tod the pretensions of other 
religions to it are mockery" (ELg, 24) *
Protestant contranaturalists restrict miracles 
to the one person and the one period# Once a group of 
miracles proves the divinity of the human performer,
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establishes the truth of any complex of doctrines, further 
miraolee are mmecesoary and even offensive # Bo miracleo 
are clustered "on great occasions? they are found at the 
great ganglions of history" (M, 201)* "Though the original 
miracles are necessary for the proof of doctrine, subsequent 
miracles cannot plead the same necessity; because when that 
doctrine has been once attested, those original credentials,
I
transmitted by the natural channels of evidence, are the
permanent and perpetual proof of that doctrine, not wanting
,
reinforcements from additional and posterior miracles? 
which are therefore without the I particular recommendation 
to our belief, of being necessary for the great result ' 
before us * * * , First credentials cannot be dispensed 
\rlth, but second ones can" (Mil# 156), This position, as 
Mosley frankly acîoiowledges, "amounts to saying that per­
manent miraculous evidence to any religion is an impossible 
contrivance" (Ell* 184)*
Homan Oatholic contranaturalists allow that
1miracles have happened down, through the ages* Later 
ecclesiastical miracles#..among other things, "demonstrate
p
the reality of the supranatural#"
The Third Day* 13ff# 
h w m  and Joad, 332.
[
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By a miracle, the epectator is cowed, ooBBtrained 
and coerced into belief: the event is aa a stone hurled
from heaven without which man could not believe in 
heaven at all# Lewis says that "Ohristianity is not a 
series of disconnected raids on Mature but the various 
steps of a strategically coherent invasion - an invasion 
which intends complete conquest and ’occupation’" (M, 131) * 
Another contranaturalist states that "the miracles of the 
Mew Testament were at once exhibitions of divine power 
as well as divine love# As such they were, in many who 
actually beheld them, direct begetters of faith# Further­
more, they were intended, among other things, to have just 
that effect'.'* A miracle is "a; supm'ïiatural fact, a 
comnnmicatlon from the other world, it is a potent influencé? 
it rouses, it solemnises, it is a strong motive to serious 
aotion” (BltM. 133) * ïo the oontranaturalist it is not 
of course necessary that every man see a miracle in order 
to know all that a miracle purports to prove. It ^  necessary, 
however, that we believe that such mid such miracles did 
actually occur at one time. If we so believe, vje know, 
even as the oi’iginal spectators, all that a miracle demon­
strates. The Bible is thus of greatest importance in this:
^Young, *"Jîhe Matter of Miracles”, 70
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that it onchrines and attests to the supra'natural, "It 
contains a distinctively sup ranatural element* Among 
its siipra/natural elements are those of prophecy and miracles# 
Furthermore, it is on such things that our knov/ledge and 
salvation thereof depend # Thus, belief that a miracle 
occurred «s belief in the pov/er and activity of God =: sal­
vation# As Mosley says: "If a miracle is incorporated 
as an article in a creed, that article of the creed, the 
miracle, and the proof of lit by a miracle, are all the 
one thing" (ELM# 17)#
The contranatural convictions must be criticised 
from several points of view# From the scientific stand­
point, it is not justifiable to say that because an event 
is inexplicable now it must always remain so# Luna, the 
only scientist of the representative contranaturalists, has, 
in spite of the title of his essay, produced a quite 
unscientific approach to the miraculous* It is true, 
as Lunn says, that "the determination to regard the natural 
world as a closed system is a dogma which is entirely 
sterilising in its influence on research#" Then he adds, 
very significantly, "miracles might be defined as ’pertur­
bations’ inexplicable in terms of known natural forces"
^Yotmg, OP. cit.. 87-8
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(♦MBA’, 243* italics'mine) * But is it not poseible that 
those forces may some day he known? At any rate, it is 
clearly un.Gcientifio to claim that because certain phenomena' 
cannot now be explained scientifically, they must always 
remain unexplained* There is always the possibility that 
science may be able in the future to offer an explanation 
which, though couched in terms as yet unknown to us, remains 
strictly scientific* One hundred years ago, the miracles of 
healing were deemed completely inexplicable* Nor can we, 
in our c m  day, explain these events in the scientific 
terminology of a hundred years ago* But the scientific 
method has acquired now knowledge, new scientific dimensions 
and new terminology* These new aspects enable the scientist 
to penetrate at least some aspects of this particular 
group of miracles* And Luiin’s ©scapo-device of mistakes 
in classification hardly averts the difficulty* From the 
contranatural position the mmber of classification 
errors is likely to increase, and the residuum due to 
suprahatural agents to continually decrease* The contra- 
naturalist may rightly say, on the authority of science, 
that a particular phenomenon is at present inexplicable.
But it does not follow that the phenomenon will for ever 
eécape the categories of the scientific method*
Nor is it justifiable to say that because an
- 27 "
event is inexplicable as the effect of natural agents, 
it raust therefore be due to suprscnatural agents* Even 
were it granted (?/hioh is not possible) that an event 
will never be amenable to the sclentifio method, it is 
not aciontifioally justifiable to attribute the causation 
of that event to a supranatiiral agent. Lunn declare a 
that it is on the scientist’s authority "that we declare 
that a particular phenomenon is inexplicable as the effect 
of natural agents and must therefore be ascribed to supra^ - 
natural agents" (’MBA’, 242)# That is a most unscientific 
statement# It is, in fact, not a scientific statement at 
all, but a philosophical one# It may well be that no 
kno\m scientific method or hypothesis will explain a 
particular phenomenon* To say that it is inexplicable 
as a result of natural agents is bad enough, but to say 
(supposedly on scientific grounds) that it must be ascribed 
to supranatural agents is to say something that no one 
could possibly have the right to affirm on the basis 
of the evidence alone* Again, "when acionee records 
facts without being able to account for them, the reason 
is that the laws at work transcend the human under standing ; 
they are extraordinary laws, or better still, eupranatural#"
1
* Grandmaison, Twenty Curtis at Loux^des* 241
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It Would be difficult to find a more imecientific utterance*
Boience does not conclude that facta at present without
 ^ '
explanation must therefore be oupranatural * If any man 
reporte an event m  a miracle, he is g(feing beyond the 
immediate evidence: he is reporting a fact and giving
a particular interpretation of that fact* The truth of 
this contention was clearly seen before Mosley gave his 
Bampton Lectures# Powell had written: "Mo testimony can
reach to the suprmatural? testimony can apply only to 
apparent sensible facts; testimony can only prove an extra­
ordinary and inexplicable ocourrehce or phenomenon: that
it is due to supranatural causes is entirely dependent
1on the previous beliefs and assumptions of the parties*"
But Mosley fell into the trap from which Powell had attempted 
to rescue contemporary theology, and the contranaturalists 
have perpetuated the mistake to our own day# In the 
testimony to any alleged miracle, there is always fact 
plus interpretation* That is to say, there is always 
the standpoint of the witness to be considered: his situation,
his previous assumptions, will almost certainly determine 
whether for him a particular event can be called a miracle*
From the philosophical point of view, the evidential
^Powell, "On the Study of the Evidences of Ohristianiiy", 
Essays and Reviews. 107*
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-'yiluè- ' mixaeles 1b undermined by the fact that 
every religion has its stock of miracles, every religious 
leader has had miracles attributed to him. Hume gave 
powerful voice to this objeetioa, and we may follow Broad’s 
clarification of the Humian argument. Let and Eg be 
two inoompatible religions. And lot it be supposed that 
miracles only occur in connection with true religion#
(This la the suppressed promise of this argument)# Then 
the assertion ’Miracles ooour in connection, with E^’ implies 
that is true; this implies that Eg is false and this 
ImpiieB that miracles do not occur in connection with Eg. 
Similarly, the assertion ’Miracles occur in connection 
with Eg’ implies that miracles do not occur in connection 
with E^# Now both those assertions are made (though of 
course by different sets of people)# The compomid propo­
sition implies its own contradictory and Üher'èf ore : mUst 
be false, miâ therefore one of the separate assertions 
may be false, and both may be# This argument needs, how­
ever, the premise that miracles only occur in connection 
with true religion# ‘ Mosley bases his belief in the / - 
superiority of Ghrist and Ohristifmity over Mohammed and 
Mohmmedanism on the fact that Christ worked miracles #
^Broad, "Hume’s Theory of the Credibility of Miracles", 93-
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Mohammed did not effect miracles, Mphammedanism cannot boast 
a miraculous origin; and the pretensions of other religions 
to such a miraculous origin are, according to Mosley, nothing 
but a mockery* That is, the oohtr#^turallst must condemn 
non-Ohristian miracles from some arbitrary standpoint which 
he himself denies when it is used as a basis for attacks 
on Christian miracles# The same arbitrariness is evident 
in those contranaturalists who deny any miracles in the 
later history of the church* The apologist who rejects 
the validity of the a priori negation of Ohristian miracles 
must not himself fall into the same error by rejecting 
miracles in all other religions on similar grounds* And 
if the alleged non-Ohristian miracles be once admitted, 
the absolute proof of miraolee falls to the ground* If 
men are taught to believe in Christ upon no other groimds 
than because he attested his claims by works of wonder, 
and that they are therefore bound to do so, how shall they 
consistently refuse to believe in any other, who may come 
along attesting his claims by miracles? We can only conclude 
that a miracle does not prove the truth of a doctrine, 
or the divinity of the person who brings it to pass*
There is no philosophical justification for the 
Protestant contranatural contention that although miracles 
‘were once necessary for the faith, they are no longer
^ 31 -
neoesBary. This Protestant contranatural view implies that 
Ohrictianity is an Isolated phenomenoni if connected to any­
thing, then only to the Old Teetmient faith and history which 
preceded it? that Christianity is completely unrelated to all 
other religions* As against this, we must insist that though 
we believe that only in Christ does God truly reveal himself, 
this does not mean that there is no relation of man to God 
outside Christianity* If there is not some relation between
the gospel and ’natural man’, then the gospel is meaningless 
1to that man* The Protestant contranatural view assumes that 
God acted at certain specific periods in past history, end tha* 
he cannot act at any other time: that intervention was , ; ‘ f
justified only at a particularly momentous period in the past. 
As against this, we must insist that God’s activity in Christ 
cannot be restricted to a certain specific period in the past, 
however momentous* Have not some succeeding ages been equally 
momentous? Protestant contranaturaliem assumes a strange 
auperoiliousness;: it hasihe pro suasion t3 speak about a
situation in which God’s activity is not necessary. As 
against this, it must be declared that man’s sinfulness always 
demands an outside power to aid him in his plight, and that in 
this sense, miraculous happenings are necessary and essential.
1 for an elaboration of this nation, of* below, 266; 441ff.
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Aa against the Protestant contranatural contention, the
B'trlcturoG of both Niebuhr and Kierkegaard seem justified*
"A faith, not quite sure of itself, always hopes to suppress
its scepticism by establishing the revelatory depth of a
fact through its miraculous character* This type of miracle
*1
is in opposition to true faith." And, "a dead faith dares 
not have anything to do with contemporary miracles#"^
The contranatural position must be criticised 
from a theological point of view: it presents a primitive
pioture of the activity of God# "Y/liatever has loomed upon 
the world of [man’s] ordinary concerns as something terrifying 
and baffling to the intellect? whatever among natural occur­
rences or events in the huitian, animal, or vegetable kingdoms 
has set him astare in wonder and astonishment - such things 
have ever aroused in man, and become endued with, the
’demonic dread’ and ’numinous’ feeling, so as to become
%
’portents’, ’prodigies’, and ’marvels’." Bett tells of 
the African explorer, who, when he got into trouble with 
the natives, took out his glass eye, flung it into the air, 
caught it and replaced it, whereupon the astonished natives
^Niebuhr, Faith and History. 167*
'^Kierkegaard, The Journals of Sj^ ren Kierke«g:aard* 
moxlviii
^Otto, The Idea of the Holy* 66#
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1grovelled at M s  feet and worshipped him. Brov/n tolls 
of the Peruvian king who is reported to have said of the 
sun that it oould not he a god, because if it were, it 
would not repeat the same course day after day* The 
stories a.r© characteristic* To primitive man arbitrary 
power appears inherently excellent, and the stranger and 
more unusual an event is .-the more it contradicts convention 
and defies public opinion - the more divine it appears to 
be* Consistency is a noble attribute for ihe subject, but 
inconsistency is the mark of the sovereign. To do as you 
please without giving a reason is the supreme prerogative 
of the deity, at least to primitive man^^ The same attitude 
appears in Homer* Circe with her wand turned the mariners 
into swine and might have done the same to Odysseus, had 
it not been for the protection afforded to him by Hermes’ 
magic potion* 0?his potion, Homer naively observes, was 
prepared from a herb which was awkward to dig up, "at any 
rate for a mete man. But the gods, after all, can do anything*" ^  
Karl Barth seems to concur with this Homerian opinion.
To Barth, fallen man still remains human - ’he is still
"The Theory of Miracle", 93*
^Brown, "The ■ PermaiienlJ,:. .'Signlfioanoe of Miracle for 
Religion", 318.
though Cf. helow, 8,4; ' Corner, The Odyssey, x, 167
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1man ami not oat’, as he quaintly expresses it, hut hie 
humcmity has been so totally corrupted by sin that no more 
than a oat is he able to hear God’s voice, unless God in a 
miracle of sheer omnipotence hurls Ohrist into the human 
situation# "Willing as we are to allow the possibility of 
God’s revealing His will, and imparting His grace to beings 
(such as stones or animal beings) hitherto devoid of all 
capacity to receive them, we are unable to feel that in 
His approach to us in Ohrist we have actually to do v/ith such 
an an act of oimipotenoe# There is miracle enough in what 
God does for us in Ohrist, but it is not a miracle of this 
kind^ It is, in fact, not a miracle of sheer omnipotence,
P
but a miracle of grace*" A somewhat amusing incident 
illustrating this, contranatural attitude may be cited from
a debate on the question ’Do Miracles Happen?’ held in
%
London in 1914# Mr# Joseph McGabe was replying to Mr#
G#K* Ohesterton’s plea for miracles and he said: "If Mr#
Ohesterton should rise in the air, I shou3.d not go searching 
for natural causes and agencies that would bring about such 
a phenomenon; I should fall down and.worship Mr# Chesterton
‘**0f # Brunner and Barth, Iat;aral Theology. 88* 
^Baillie, Our Knowledge of God* 24» 25#
'^ Ohe start on (and others), Do Miracles Hannon?
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at once." No doubt this was said with a smile, none the 
less it is illustrative: it manifests the ment^^4lity ^
of much ^htrgiatural apologetic, in that it construes 
divinity in terms of abnormality of power# The oontranaturalis 
stresses the arbitrariness, the unusualness, the incon­
sistency of God’s activity#
The contranatural position must be criticised 
from a theological point of views it presents an tmbiblical 
view of the activity of God* In the first place, the Bible 
never denies that others than Jesus could work miracles ? 
for such are even the sign of Antichrist# "For false Christs 
and false prophets will arise and show great signs and 
wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect"
(Mt* 24*24)# "The coming of the lawless one by the activity 
of Bat an will be with all power and with pretended signs 
and wonders" (II These* 2*9)* "It [the beast] vjorks great 
signs, even making fire come down from heaven to earth in 
the sight of men" (Rev# 13*13), Instances are also given 
in the stories of Simon (Acts 8*9ff*) and of Blymas the 
sorcerer (Acts 13»6ff#)# It is therefore clear that miracles 
do not prove the divinity of the humm% performer, from the 
biblical point of view# "for many of the contemporaries 
of Jesus the miracles may have had . * # significance as 
a sign of the mystery of His person, and may have drawn
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attention to Hlm and to His secret* But many who were 
witnesTOs of these miracles, in spite of this, did not 
believe in Him#"* "From the moment they took place they 
were interpreted otherwise than as proofs of the Word of
p
God#""* Tillich correctly rejuarks that popular piety is 
"wrong in wanting a God, walking on earth, participating 
in history, hut not involved in the oonfliots of existence 
and the mmhiguitleB of life# Popular piety does not want 
a paradox hut a ’miracle’" , not a person hut a prodigy, 
not a man hut a monstrosity# Bocondly, the contranatural 
position assumes that arhitraa^ jLnoss end power are the key­
notes of the activity of God# Richardson, who has strong 
affinities v/ith the contranaturalists, says that the "problem 
of miracles must always be conducted from the standpoint of 
the power of God#"^ Binoe the object of the miracle is 
to prove or demonstrate, the greater the display of mere 
power or arbitrariness, the greater the effectiveness of 
the miracle itself# Those miraolee would be best which vmre 
of the nature of naked signs, stripped of every attribute 
except conspiouousness, staring, undeniable Stupefaction:
IN#
2
Brunner# Revelation and Reason# 304-05*
GD 1 /1 , 188. ^ T i l l ic h ,  gT I I ,  166,
'^ üiohardson, ”MiraclQ", A Tlieologloal Word Book of the 
M M G , 155.
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the miracle the Jews wanted when, unsatisfied and unconvinced
hj the works of the healing ministry, they demanded a sign
from heaven (it# 16*1) ♦ Matthew Arnold made this arbitrary
theory look ridiculous when he postulated the supposed miracle
*1
of the pen changed into a pen wiper# Though the case 
supposed is certainly trivial, it ie not irrelevant. The 
supposed miracle very clearly lacks utility, dignity or 
ethical character; yet essentially the pure contranatural: ; 
miracle lacks just these qualities. Thirdly, the contra­
natural position assumes a distinction between nature and 
supmmature : a division unlmown and alien to the Bible
itself. In biblical times the strict conception wiiioh the 
oontranaturalist attaches to the word, miracle was as yet 
unknoim; such a conception arose only with a knowledge 
of the lav/s of nature and their general validity. Ho one 
can feel anything to be an interruption of the order of 
nature who does not yet know what the order of nature is*
To biblical man there vms no hard and fast line drawn 
between nature and aupranature. A conceptual law of nature 
was, of course, developed in Greek philosophy (particularly 
perhaps in Btèioism and leo-Blatonism) and the Aristotelian- 
Thomism of the Middle Ages: in each of these cases the
T *■
Arnold, Xiitez*ature and Dogma. 128
natural law wa.s an a') priori notion, inc oontradietinction 
to the supposed a posteriori natural law of the eighteenth 
, and nineteenth centuries# With the advent of natural law 
(whether of an a priori or a posteriori kind) the oontra­
natural position stiffened: a miracle, in order to possess
evidential value as to divine intervention, now needed to 
he conceived as unaoooimtahle and inexplicable in terms of 
natural law. The conception belongs pre-eminently to the 
eighteenth century, when science threatened to control the 
whole of life, though it was clearly stated as early as 
Aquinas. The eighteenth century apologists assumed that 
miracles were the best method of proving a revelation, and 
their opponents assumed that it was necessary to disprove 
the miracles in order to disprove the revelation. But this 
is far removed from biblical times. All this is not to 
say that biblical personalities and biblical writers did 
not recognii^ e an unusual or extraordinary event. "Joseph 
knew just as well as any modern gynaecologist that in the 
ordinary course of nature women do not have babies unless 
they have lain with men" (M, 57). The point is that the 
notions of eupranature and miracle, as these terms are 
viewed by the oontranaturalist, are unlmov/n and alien to 
the Bible. The oontranaturalist tends to emphasise the 
teras. the miraculum aspect of miracle. Yet such a view
est 3 9
completely eradioates the ethical content of miracle and
replaces it hy bleak astonishment or mere ama2;ement# As
Headlam remarks^ *’ït is unfortunate that the word habitually
used in English * miracle as in German  ^V/under ^. should
be one that emphasises the abnormal character of the events
without any accompanying spiritual and ethical associations
1such as are always present in the Gospels*** Fourthly, 
the contranaturalist assumes a distinction between primary 
and secondary causation: there is again no biblical foundatioa
f or this contention* God * s sway extends over everything:
"the very hairs of your head are numbered" (Lk* 12*7) #
Speaking of the works of nature, the psalmist remarks:
"He established them for ever and ever; he fixed their 
bounds which cannot be passed" (Ps. 148*6)* God, *in 
whom there is no variableness, neither shadow which is 
cast by turning*, is a God of order* '*While the earth 
remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and 
winter, day and night, shall not cease" (Gen# 8*22)* It 
is no indication of a developed religious consciousness to 
declare that God is only, or especially, manifest in primary 
causation; or in the breaches of nature * s orderly processes.
The contranatural: position must be criticised
*1
îîèadlam, The Miracles of the Hew Testament* 6
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from' the theological point of views it presents a demonic 
view of the activity of God. Oontranaturalism splits 
reality into two mutually exclusive realms, hut tenuously 
joined together through the media of miracles. God is split 
from his creation, acts arbitrarily through so-called 
primary causes to negate and abrogate so-called secondary 
causes. Ihe only logical outcome is a dualism philosophically 
untenable and religiously meaningless, if not positively 
harmful. Barth rejects the idea that God is split within 
himself, "That God could break through or even suspend a 
real, an ontic law of the created happening, is naturally 
out of the questions that would signify that in His will 
and work He is disunited with Himself."^ And Tillich says: 
"Miracles cannot be interpreted in terms of a supranatural 
interference in natural processes. If such an interpretation 
were true, the manifestation of the ground of being would 
destroy the structure of being; God v/ould be split within 
himself, as religious dualism has assorted. It would be 
more adequate to call such a miracle 'demonic*, not because
^Barth, Die Mrkliehe Doematik. III/3, 146. "Dafi er
dabeT'ein wïïSÏ  ein ontisohes GeaetEi des
gOBOîiÇpflioIaen GeeohehenB diarchbreohe oder gar 
aufhebe, let natürllch ausgeeohlossen: das würde
3a bedeuten, daB or insoinen Wollen imd Wirken 
mit elch aelbot mnelnig wSre*"
"Q 4-1
It is produced by *demoue*, but becauee It discloses a
T* otruoture of deetruotion*•"
We my conclude that a contranatural miracle, one 
that evidentially proves the existence and causality of God and 
the divinity of the human performer, must be abandoned*
The fact is that a miracle, if there be such a thing, must
be relative and not absolute* "The visibility of miracle
o
in no way * coerces* one into faith*" Marvellous phenomena
but
may cause faith,/they cannot absolutely demonstrate the 
truth of the doctrine they accompany, the divinity of the 
miracle maker, or that divine activity was concerned in 
their production. At most, miracle is an event which suggests 
divine activity, it certainly does not prove it. The contra- 
natural position must be rejected as being philosophically 
imsound, as well as being destructive of some of the best 
insights of both science and theology* As Sohleiermachor 
puts its "It is commonly supposed that an event v;hioh lies 
outside the fixed order of nature and which cannot, there­
fore, be accounted for by natural causality, has a special 
religious value because the Divine causality is demanded
m^iich, sæ I, 116.
Thielicke, "Das Wunder", Theoloj^ ie der Antechtung. 113
"Die Bichtbarlceit des''WuM'ers^   keîneswegs
sum Glauben*"
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for Its explanation# But this is to suppose that the 
religious sphere lies outside the universal order of relations, 
making the religious synonymous with the arbitrary and 
exalting the q.uality of arbitrariness to the rank of a 
Divine attribute# Hay, it does more; it separates God 
from the world and makes a religious view of the world 
impossible# It is destructive of science and of religion 
too*"^
\
^0f# Gross, The Theolo^v of Sehleiermacher# 159"-60
—  43
Chapter II. The Preternatural View#
"A miracle is not contrary to nature, but only to what is 
known of nature." Augustine.
"A miracle then I take to be a sensible operation, which, 
being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his 
opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is 
taken by him to be divine." John locke,
OA R3 Richardson, A. Christian ApoloCTtios*
» Bolenoe. History and Faith.
RgL = Bett, H. The Reality of the Religious Life
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To the preternaturaliat, the essence of a miracle 
is that it is inexplicable at the time at which it occurs* 
Being ' beyond v/hat is known of nature, it is at the time 
of its happening inexplicab|.e, but it need not remainnso.
In contradistinction to contranaturalism, it is categorically 
denied that such a miracle is unlawful «
This chapter is divided into five parts* Attention 
is dra?/n to the fact that contranaturalista tend, at some 
point of their analyses, to take up a preternatural posi­
tion: this position, herein called oontra-preternaturalism,
is first of all presented* Secondly, the pure preternatural 
position is advanced* Before either of these standpoints 
can be properly evaluated, consideration must be given 
to the scientific termri*natural law’, and various related 
matters, and this is the third division* Fourthly, the 
contra-preternatural position is evaluated; and this is 
followed, fifthly and finally, by a criticism of pure 
proternaturalism #
All of the oontranaturaliste, at some point or 
other, deny that a miracle is contrary to nature* This 
portion of their views is here called contra-preternaturalism 
Customarily the Augustinian dictum - that a miracle is 
not contrary to natural laws, but only to what is known 
of them - is followed* Pure oontranaturalism, when forced
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to its o\TO logical conclusions, %)r0sents an unscientific, 
unpliilosophical and untheologioal concept of miracle#
Even the contranaturalisto tried to avoid the 1 harsher 
aspects of their ovm thinking# Side by side with their 
contranatural statements, they tried to soften the blow, 
they tried to order the chaos into which their more fun­
damental views had plunged them# Bo I»unn says; "A miracle 
is just as ^lawful ’ • # # as an ordinary event # 3îîvery- 
thing v/hich happens, happens in accordance with natural 
law# The supranatural also has its laws# A cricket ball 
is hit into the air# and falls tov/ard the ground under 
the law of gravity# A fieldsman catches the ball and 
the further fall is averted# The law of gravity is not 
violated but its consequences have been modified by human 
v/ill# When God works a miracle he does not violate the 
laws of nature but modifies some of the normal effects of
those laws by a process analogous to that by which the
1human will inflxiences nature#" lewis remarks that "when 
Christ stills the storm He does what God has often done 
before# # # • I myself can still a storm in a room by 
shutting a window#" Ag careful a thinker as MoeJley who, 
as we have seen, was the strongest supporter of pure contra*
^Luma, »MSA', 241. l^ev/is, M, 169.
c- 45 —
naturalism, fell into the eatae apologetic trap*
The constitution of nature disproves the incredibility 
of the Divine suspension of physical law; hut more 
than this, it creates a presumption for it* For the 
laws of which we have experience are themselves in 
an ascending scale* First come the laws which regulate 
unorganised matter; next the laws of vegetation; then 
by enormous leap, the laws of human life, with 
its voluntary motion, desire, expectation, fear; and 
above those again the laws of moral being which regulate 
a totally different order of creatures* * . * All 
this progressive succession of laws is perfectly 
conceivable backwardisand an absolute mystery forward; 
and therefore when in the ascending series we arrive at 
man, we ask. Is there no higher sphere of law as much 
above him as he is above the lower natures in the 
scale? analogy would lead .us to expect that there
was, and supplies a presumption in favour of such a 
belief* « * * If so, every miracle in Bcripture is 
as natural an event in the universe as any chemical 
experiment in the physical world*
And if man can violate, the laws of nature, can not God?
"It is incredible that God is imprisoned in His own system*"^
Trench puts the matter more strikingly still: "Were there
no other purpose in the miracles than this, namely to
testify the liberty of God « * » were it only to break
a link in that chain of cause and effect, which else we
should come to regard as itself God, as the iron chain
of an inexorable necessity, binding heaven no less than
earth, they would serve a great purpose, they would not
have been wrought in vain*"^
^Moaley, BLM. 130-31. ^Y/eatiiGshead, MHi, 44.
"^ T^fench, Motes on the Miracles of our Lord* 22-3*
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The ao-oalleû miracle a of eynohronlg^ fation or 
sympathy or coincidence illustrate the same oontrë-'Pretor- 
natural motif* "The two events [the erosBing of the Jordan 
and the fall of the walls of Jericho], though perfectly 
explicable by natural laws, may none the leb o  be regarded 
as miracles, in that both occurred at the precise moment 
when they were needed, and according to the Biblical record, 
at.i?the precise moment when God had previously declared 
that they would occur* The miracle is thus one of synohron- 
iziation*"^
The chief merit of the pure preternatitralists 
is‘ that they recognlsîo the impossibility of oontranaturalism 
and try to fonmilate a concept of miracle v/hich, while 
retaining some of the contranatural elements, is a genuine 
attempt to establish a new and more acoepta,ble view#
First of all, the proternaturalists emphasiiEîO 
the imperfect state of man’s knowledge of nature* Bo 
Richardson: "The concept of miracle, as theologians have
understood sjad defined it, involves a healthy admission 
that our knowledge of the woiMd and its processes 10; far 
from complete, just as the déniai of miracle (aa the Christian 
tradition defines it) involves a dogmatic claim that we
^Of t Wright, "The Place of Miracle in Modern Thought 
and Knowledge", 30 *
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already îaxow all the prooesses of nature" (SHF, 104)#
Jesus’ healing miraoles, if they be admitted to be natural 
in our own time, were not so nineteen hundred years ago.
"If modern psychotherapists have been able upon occasion
to effect (certain remarkable curés, is it not all the more 
remarkable that Jesus exercised an even greater mastery 
over peycho-physioal diseases many hundreds of years before 
Freud was born?" (SHF, 100)« The miracle must be supra­
natural at the time it happens: that is the important
element, though this is not to deny that it may someday be 
completely natural, for "no one will be foolish enough to 
think that we know everything about the universe yet, there
must be many more forces and laws that are still unkiiovm,
■ \
but that will one day be discovered" (BEL, 37). Again,
"while miracles are not to be understood as contrary to
nature, they may transcend our knowledge of nature, so as
to be quite inexplicable by any knownlaws* « # « In
saying that miracles transcend our knowledge of nature,
we do not and need not, affirm that they must for ever
remain inexplicable."
The theologian, when confronted with a miracle in 
which he believes, no more attempts to suppose an 
inconceivable account of it than the scientist would,
^Morrison, "Natural Law and Miracle", 139
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when confronted v/ith some inexplicable fact. Like 
the scientist he says: Here is a hitherto xihaccoimt-
able fact which must fit in somewhere into the imiversai 
order: it must have some cause and it must obey some
law# But he does not forget, as the scientist sometimes 
does, that we do not yet understand all the causes 
and laws that are at work in the universe, and he does 
not conclude, as the scientist sometimes does, that the 
miracle must be explicable entirely in the terms of 
normal physics, or else be denied as an impossibility.* 
He refers the miracle to the operation of a higher 
cause and a higher law, which are not yet understood 
by our limited human intellect* He is quite willing 
to believe that some day we may be able to understand 
the cause emd the law which govern the miracle: ?/hether
in some future age by the progress of scientific dis­
covery, or in a higher world, when we know even as v;e 
are known# Here or hereafter we shall learn to see a 
miracle as a consistent, and, so to apeak, regular 
detail in the whole of the ordered regularity of the 
universe (HBL, 35-*6)#
Secondly, preternaturalism stresses the relativity 
of miracle : what is miracle to one man is not necessarily so
to another, particularly if that other lives in a later 
and more sophisticated age# According to this view, then, 
there are no miracles in the sight of God* "From God’s 
point of view there are no miracles, since he obviously 
knows how all things work and nothing can be contrary to his 
knowledge of natural processes" (BHF* 104). But from the 
human standpoint, "there is much in nature which in view 
of our limited knowledge in the fieîld of empirical science 
must be deemed miraculous? from the standpoint of science 
certain things are miraculous to-day which may not appear 
miraculous to the scientists of to-morrow" (GA, 54-*5)#
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It la therefore the state of a man’s knowledge which largely 
determines what he calls a miracle* "If someone in the 
Elizabethan age had been told that a family in Glasgow 
could watch on a screen attached to a certain instrument a 
play of Shakespeare’e being enacted in London, and could 
switch it on and off by turning a knob, he would assuredly 
have called it a miracle* « * * The idea of a miracle is 
always relative to a person’s îmowlodgo and experience*"^ 
"One would have thought that it was perfectly obvious that 
nothing could be a miracle if only we knew all the laws and
Q j
forces governing it." Mo praternaturalist stresses the 
relativity of miracle more than Bett* "The supranatural 
in the only sense in which the word can have any warrantable 
meaning, is relative to human experience* The wireless 
would be supranatural, in the strictest sense of the vzord, 
to a savage* It would be something entirely beyond his 
experience, and entirely beyond his understanding m*- a fact 
that he had never encountered before, end that he could 
not explain when he did encounter it* I do not say that 
it would seem to be a miracle to him; I say that it would 
be a miracle to him, in the most rigid meaning of the term"
^Barclay, And He Had Qompasslon R?' Them. 9-10 
^Bett, "The Theory of Miracle", 99*
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(BMt» 38). So, in view of our limitod taaowledge, and even 
making "the fullest allowance for all the aohieveraents 
of man's soientifio discoveries, it is probable that the 
concept of miracle will be necessary for a long time to 
come" (OA, 155).
Thirdly, this preternatural position ties the 
term miracle so strongly to one’s knowledge or understanding, 
that a specifically religious connotation of the term 
miracle is excluded, "A miracle is relative to some limited 
power, or some restricted experience, or some partial 
knowledge." Of course, such a statement need not apply 
to a religious situation at all, BTor does the definition 
that a "miracle is something which no man can perform and 
which no man can explain or understand. The simplest 
definition of a miracle is something which defies human 
skill to perform and which baffles human wisdom to explain." 
Such a definition could apply even to the phenomenon of 
homing pigeons. "How does a pigeon make its way home after 
having been carried for a hundred or more miles in a basket 
on a train? When scientists can answer this question, the 
homing feats of pigeons will no longer be a miracle from
^Bett, "The Theory of Miracle", 100,
^Barclay, oo. cit.. 11.
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tîie point of view of our definition" (BHF* 103) # It ie 
true that euoh an understanding of the miraculous can . : 
apply to the religious situation, but it need not* It is 
also true that such a connotation of the term is often 
encountered in every day speech: when one reads, for
instance, of the ’miraculous’ recovery of West Gei*many 
in the post-war period, or of the ’miraculous’, rise In 
the Gallup Poll of the fortunes of the Oonscrvative party.
Fourthly, preternaturalists seize upon the dictum
♦familiarity breeds contempt’ as an aid to miracle apologetic*
"#mt is repeated and regular and habitual* we call natural;
what is isolated and irregular and unfamiliar we call supra*- 
1natural*" And no matter how wonderful and awesome and 
unusual an event is at first sight, repetitions mar its 
marvelousnesa; familiarity breeds contempt# "Our minds are 
BO constituted that vzhen anything happens repeatedly and 
regularly, and we become used to it, we forget the wonder 
of it" (HRL* 112)* Thus, if even the most ordinary event 
happened but once in history, the event would certainly 
be a miracle* "If this were a world in which men rose 
from the dead every day, but in which it was alleged only 
once or twice in history that a child had been born (and
^Bett, "The Theory of Miracle", 94*
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many people were doubtful as to whether that event had 
ever happened at all) we should regard the birth of a child 
as miracle and the résurrection of b dead man as a most 
ordinary event" (HEtt# 113) # "Anything, absolutely any­
thing, that can happen in this universe would be a miracle 
if it only happened once * ♦ g' # And anything, absolutely 
anything, that can happen in this universe would cease to 
be a miracle if it happened repeatedly &md regularly"
(BEL, 114-15)#
Finally, pretermturalism attaches importance 
to the idea that there is mystery in all things, mystery 
even in nature itself* "The miraculous is that which 
arouses in us the feeling of wonder, of awe, and even of 
humility in its presence" (OA, 155) * The sight of the 
starry heavens aroused such emotions in the Hebrew psalmist 
and in Immanuel Kant# It is the response men feel when 
they have made a new discovery; scientific knowledge increases, 
rather than decreases, the sense of vzonder and the appreciation 
of the mystery of things# -Bo "a gra^mphone or radio set 
is no less miraculous to a %%an of science than to ai savage, 
if we use the word mix'acuXoua in this sense" (OA, 155) *
The whole universe is mysterious and . ' miraculous, and 
oven man is so# If we - can appreciate the mystexy in all 
things, we cannot logically refuse to believe in the truth
'
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of a his*torical miracle because it seema mysterious to us.
All miraclea are a part of a grand miracle* Within Richard- 
son’s sphere of special revelation, the groat miracle is 
Jesus Ohrist, from which other lesser miracles flow.^
Bett maintains that there is the same inherent mystery 
in all things, except that* blinded by repetition, most men 
have no appreciation of this mystery. "When we have in 
some measure the naive mind of the child* or the sensitive 
mind of the poet, the detached outlook of the philosopher, 
or the faith of a disciple, the strangeness of the world 
is always with us, and when we know that we live in a 
universe of miracle, we are not so ready to deny a wonder 
merely because it is a wonder" (HRL* 115).
Before the oontra-p:reternatural ■ and pure preter­
natural positions can be evaluated, there must be a clari- 
floation of termst natural laws, causation* necessity, 
possibility* Following a discussion of these terms, the 
scientific method, the scientific attitude* and the limits 
of science are analysed# The further question must be 
asked - does scientific terminology exclude the term miracle?
First of all, what is me&mt by the terms nature 
and natural law, when these terms are used in a scientific
1 Of. belowçÿ gOff^
oontext? The two are closely llnîcecl together, for when 
one is mentioned, the other is almost certain to occur#
To wderstand the one is to mideratand the other; if not 
synonymoua terms, they are closely parallel to one another*
The chief meaning that is attached to the concept of nature 
in modern times is that Itiic the realm of natural law - 
the region where things happen in accordance with what 
we call laws of nature * Wliat then , are the ].aws of nature?
The word ’laws’ in the] phrase ’lavze of nature’ can be 
at least
mislëadingia/threemys# The concept of law more rightfully
belongs to the sphere of human conduct than to the realm
.First then,
of scientific knowledge*/ .as Bett points out, the word law 
means first of aJLl a %)orsonal ooimnand, which, as a second 
element, has a moral quality about it. There is the further 
idea that there is an effective authority behind the command, 
in consequence of which, as it is generally obeyed, becomes 
a standard of behaviour* Wlien, however, the word law is 
applied to the physical world# the terra has scarcely any of 
these connotations# It is not a personal oomand, nor a 
comand at all, it has no moral quality, and it has no 
effective authority behind it, unless one brings in the belief 
in God, and this is passing from the sphere of sdence to 
the sphere of theology* All that remains is the last 
element in the analysis - a standard of behaviour, which
Vh
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v/hen applied to the physioal world must he altered to
express regular behaviour (ŒL# 60)# That is all that
a lav; of nature can possibly mean - that is, a pattern of
regular behaviour# Secondly, as Farmer indicates, the
phrase ’the laws of nature’ suggests a law-giver who has
decreed beforehand that whatever v;ill happen shall happen
in a certain v;ay in accordance v/ith specifio, never-to-
1be-broken laws# The laws of nature thus receive a pseudo- 
ontological status, and it is thought blasphemous to pre­
sume that anything : could happen other than in accord with 
such iron-clad laws* But when it is remembered tlmt a 
law of nature is but an observed pattern of regular events, 
this pseudo-ontological status falls to the ground# Thirdly, 
as Farmer again points out, the phrase ’the laws of nature’ 
suggests that an observed regularity in events is also an 
observed immutable necessity*^ Because any book that 
I have pushed off any table top has dropped, I say it 
must drop - all books pushed off table tops must drop — and 
this for all time* This notion is harmless enough in eveiy- 
day life, but it is certainly not a philosophical or scientific 
principle ; no one saw this more clearly than Hume# Thus, 
scientists can never predict with logical certainty what
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v/ill or v/hat must happen# Even such wide and seemingly
axiomatic generalizations as the law of the conservation
of energy do not so much describe or explain nature as that
they regain from nature ,what mind at first postulated to
be the case# But science is v/illing to grant that its
generalizations are relative only, but it also believes
that, in principle, generalizations are always possible and
that it is the duty of science to search them out and to
establish them more securely#
I'rom this bhalysia, It can be seen that the phrase
’laws of nature* does not mean that there is a closed sphere
in which events are bound by a necessary causal sequence#
"We must get rid of the idea that nature is a sort of cast-
iron system dominated by a single set of invariable laws,
instead of a system admitting of the constant interplay of
extremely diverse forces, by which new and hitherto undreamed*
1of results may from time to time be produced," A law of 
nature attempts to express a pattern of regular behaviour#
A law of nature is but a generalization, it is* but a v/ell— 
eatabliehed hypothesis* Such a lav/ is not irrefragable, a 
new fact alters a hypothesis, it breaks it only in a 
figurative sense# "Scientific laws are always being broken,
Beet, ghe Migaolea of Christ in the Llalat of our 
Pr&eenij 'l)av K^owrële;e'.'"'^2,
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and they are ae easily mended.'''^  A nev/ law aocon^pdates 
the apparent exception, nfeter tooils at 100 degrees Centi­
grade ». Yet it is found that when water is boiled in deep 
shelters or on tall mountains, the original law is found to 
be inadequate, ‘broken*, and it is then altered and expanded 
to reads 'Water boils at 100 degrees Centigrade at normal 
pressure*. Wherefore no event, however exceptional, breaks 
a law of nature in a literal sense, "Whe only things broken 
are erroneous conceptions of law and causality."^
From this understanding of natural law, it is 
evident that no ontological status can be given to the 
conception, For is there any necessity involved in it*
Both such notions are hang-overs of the now-outmoded mechan­
istic view. From the proposition that all bodies are heavy, 
it follows that every body heavier than air must fall. This 
is a necessity we deduce from our idea. But in nature all 
we have is the fact that things actually are so. Events 
themselves do not manifest a trace of the constraint char­
acteristic of the reasonings which preside over observation. 
Phenomena are what they are, and of •necessity* in itself, 
they know nothing whatsoever.
^Hamsey, EL, 144.
Wendland, Miracles and Christianity. 12
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Oanzation iz another term over %?hleh much mis- 
understanding often arises# The notion of causation is 
derived from imm’s own experience and from there projected 
onto the world of nature* TO speak of cause and effect is 
simply to recognize that all things in the universe are 
Interconnected and interdependent * Like the phrase the 
laws of nature, causation is still often associated with an 
out-moded, mechanistic view of nature # With this latter 
view there was often associated the image ■ of the billiard 
ball universe, where the action of one round particle had 
fore-ordained and necessary consequences throughout the 
whole# No such simple naive image is satisfactory in our 
own day, when the complexity of nature is better understood 
than formerly* "An event is not brought to pass by a single 
cause: it is brought about by a mu3*tiplicity of causes
acting together in a very complex way# The picture needed 
in our minds is not something like a string of beads, but 
something like a game of chess* The pattern of causation 
is not linear, but reticular* it is not a straight line in 
which one effect follows from one cause in a single series 
which is fixed, but an Involved netv/ork in which an effect 
follows from a multiplicity of causes, in a multiplex series 
which is continually changing" (REL, 45) # Once again, the 
concept of causation expresses man’s confidence in the
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inter-relatôdness of events; but, as Hume saw so clearly, 
one muot not go on to say that there Is an inherent neoeseitv 
in the interconnection of any complex of event s #
Granted such a free, non-mechaniotic interpreta­
tion of natural law, it is plainly dangerous to speak about 
any particular event being impossible or Inconceivable, 
at least on scientific grounds* "We thinlc and talk easily 
enough about the possible and the impossible, but as a 
matter of fact no one can set limits to what is possible and 
what is impossible, except in the logical sense that nothing 
can both exist and not exist at the same time" (RHL# 18) •
The older mechanistic view of natural law could with a 
reasonable degree of confidence assign limits as to what 
was possible and v/hat vzas not* But this was a philosophical 
position, not a scientific one, and both the science and 
the philosophy of to-day recognize that it was not a par­
ticularly outstanding example of either: it was indeed
pseudo-science* It is now admitted that'impossible* and 
'inconceivable' are dangerous words to employ in this context: 
there are a large number of things which have been said to 
be impossible or inconceivable v/hich have afterv/ards proved 
to be quite possible* Wallace lists a number of such cases* 
The discoveries of Galileo, Oopernious and Harvey were 
violently opposed by their scientific contemporaries* But
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there are other more snoaern lllustrâtioas. XÛien Benjamin 
franklin taronght the suhjeot of lightning conûuctora before 
the Royal Sooiety, he was lan#.ed at as a dreamer, and his 
paper not admitted to the fhilosonhioal ïraneaetions* When Ste 
proposed to use locomotives on the Liverpool and 
Manchester Railway» learned men igave evidence that it 
was impossible that they oould go even twelve miles an hour.
$he french Aoademy of Bolenoes ridiculed the great astronomer 
Arago when he wanted to discuss the subject of the oleotric 
telegraph* Thomson reminds us that even Oomte, who so 
dogmatically maintained that the age of dogmatism Was past, 
declared that men could never know anything as to the 
chemical composition of the heavenly bodies* lov^ell-Sralth 
informs us that he has "knom a very distinguished physicist 
to explain that Dr. Rhine's experimental results in 'para­
psychology' must be false because such things just cannot 
happen*”^
The terms 'impossible' and 'inconceivable' must 
therefore be used with the utmost care. Many who employ 
them seem still to be under the questionable influence of
^Wallace, Miraclea and Modern Suiritualism. 17-8.
Thomson, The System of Animate Rature. IS,
%ov/oll-Smith, "Miracles", Hev/ Essays in Philo so lohioal 
TheoloCT. 243.
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a meobenlatlo philosophy, a philosophy which we have al­
ready called psoudo-scienoe. And, "so far as natural
science is concerned, more possibilities lie open than
*1
pseudo-science is v/ont to recognize*" Lewis admonishes 
his readers to develop a nose like a blood-hound for 
those steps in any argument which depend not on a laaow- 
ledge of history and language, but rather on the concealed
assumption that unusual events are either impossible
'2.or inconceivable * Yet it would appear that just these 
assumptions do manifest themselves in theological witing* 
lüashdall, for instance, writes : "The disappearance or
absolute aionihilation, the réanimation, or the sudden 
transformation into something not quite material and yet 
not quite spiritual, of a really dead body, would involve 
the violation of the best ascertained laws of physics, 
chemistry and physiology# Were the testimony fifty times 
stronger than it is, any hypothesis would be more possible 
than that." Here, law carries the old pseudo-scientific 
connotation. As we have seen, laws cannot be ’broken’, 
they cannot be ’violated’ in this sense, they can be altered
1Tennant, Miracle and itphilosophical Presuppositions. 99
%'ewlB, 1, 198»
3 ”Of. Headlam, The Miracles of the New Testament. 258-59*
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or expanded to Include the apparent mxomaly# Thus, no
testimony can L oonvince Raehdal,! of the veracity of the
alleged event, for such a phenomenon 1b ’impossible’»
"It la, I ami persuaded, impossible to rega3?d the story
of the raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical 
1events*" "That the earth In its course stood still; that 
a ehe-^ asB spoke ; that a atom was quieted by a v/ord, we do
p
not believe$ and we shall never again believe*" To the 
modem mind, says Harnaok in effect, such things are ’im­
possible*» Or from Bultmnns "It is impossible to use 
aloctric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of 
modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same
time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and
%
miracles [Gelater- und Wmdcrweltl*" "An historical event 
which Involves a resurrection from the dead is utterly 
inconceivable ! fpenn was fdr ein historisches faktum kSmie 
es sein, dessen Yfirkliohkelt mit der Totenauferstehung 
zuaammonli8n,f5:t?1 * " ^ Such statements seem to imply that certain 
events are impossible or inconceivable * It is to be noted
^Burkitt, The Gospel Btorv and its Transmission* 223. 
^Harnaok, What is Qhristianity?* 28 *
^Bartsch (ed#), M, 5* I have slightly altered Fuller’s 
translation of this sentence*
4bia.. 39f
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that we are not here pleading for the historioal veracity 
of one or all of these alleged events: the point ie that
they seem to he ruled out by the above authors in an arbi­
trary, non-soientifio and a priori manner# Christian 
apologetes who approach their work with a presupposition 
against so-called ^impossible’ events seem to be still 
living and labouring under the influence of opinions which 
belong to an out-moded mechanistic philosophy, and such 
influence should have lost much of its force with the decline 
of that pseudo-scientific philosophy*
Science depends for its success and progress 
upon a method and an attitude* Its method is to find and 
categoriî30 patterns of regular behaviour* Its aim is to 
determine natural laws, or, more correctly, to specify 
well-established hypotheses: and these are based upon
evidence, the media beings testings in experience, fhe 
scientist, as Huxley reminds us, *sits down before the fa,cts 
like a little child*. $his is one-half of the scientific 
method: to remove all a prioris* all prejudices. "Be
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly
wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall
1learn nothing." But there is another element, of equal,
1Huxley, life and Letters of Thomas Henry I-Iuxlev* I, 316*
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if not greater importance* That is the intellectual intuitional
leap employed hy the good scientist to grasp a connection
or theory for which, as yet, there is no concrete proof.
"Science, as well as religious faith, is at bottom the
substantiation of things hoped for, the pragmatic evidencing
3.of things not seen," facts are meaningless until interpreted 
by and into theories, "Scientists - that is, creative 
scientists - spend their lives trying to guess right.
They are guided and sustained therein by their heuristic
p
passion." ' According to K.R, Popper, typical scientific 
procedure is to invent hypotheses, test them as severely
as possible, accept them until they are rejected, and reject
%
them if and only if they are falsified. ^ And any scientific 
law must be based on evidencej it must be of the general 
type ’under such and such conditions, so and so v/ill happen*? 
and it must be capable of testing in experience. But in 
order to establish any such law, what is the attitude of 
the scientist?
TO be brief-,' ■. the scientist begins his task 
with the conviction of the inter-relatednesg of phenomena,
1
on. oit*. 21.
^Folanyi, X^ersonal Knov;ledfi:e* 143*
^Cf. f/ollheim, "â View of Science", 20
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with the belief that order prevails: and that it is his
particular task to trace out that inter-relatednese and
to lay bare that oxyder. Science, then, Involves a faith -
a faith that the facts and events in nature have a rela,tion-
ship $ She scientist refuses to believe that any phenomenon
cannot be explained according to the scientific method*
Lunn thus fails to understand the scientific attitude when
he writes that the greatest service that any student of
science can do is to demonstrate the existence of phenomena
which cannot be explained within the framework of natural 
1law# A scientist, who starts with the assumption that any 
event cannot be naturally explained, is a failure at the 
commencement of his career# The scientist v/ill not demand 
that all phenomena be explained in ; terms of current scientific 
categories (though, as we have seen, some scientists have 
been guilty of this offence), but he will demand that every 
phenomenon be explained in terms of some scientific category. 
This fierce determination to discover tmà describe is not 
constrained or stayed by an apparently inexplicable fact#
Bett seems to think that an inexplicable event would stop 
the heuristic passion of the scientist# "If a scientist 
were confronted v/ith an undeniable miracle, all that he
^Lurm, »MSA‘, 241
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ooulcl say would be a *Here is a unique event in the presence 
of which my methods are useless * Doubtless it is governed 
by some law, though the law entirely escapes my knowledge. 
Doubtless, it falls into place, somehow and somewhere, in 
the regular scheme of universal existence, but I cannot 
see how and where, for I cannot fit in into any recurrent 
series known to me, and that is all I have to say*” (RED. 93) 
Buoh a quiescent attitude is not the mark of the creative 
scientist* Huxley strikes the more typical note# "If a 
piece of lead were to remain suspended of itself, in the 
air, the oecurrenoe would be a ’miracle', in the sense of 
a wonderful event, indeedj but no one trained in : the methods 
of science would imagine that any law of nature was really 
violated thereby* He would simply set to work to investigate 
the conditions under which so highly unexpected mi occurrence 
took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify 
his hitherto unduly narrow conceptions of the laws of 
nature*" The task of the scientist is to explain all 
phenomena, no matter how unusual, extraordinary or seemingly 
inexplicable they m$a.y be* The vocation of the scientist 
is to frtme categories or natural laws broetd enough to 
include all the members of any constituent field of science.
^Huxley, Hume# 132
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natural laws have been usefully likened to natural species#
"We do precisely the seme thing when we speak of natural 
laws as when we apeak of natural species# The only difference 
is that when we speak of things in their static relations 
we speak of species, and when v/e speak of things in their 
dynasiio relations we spealc of laws# In other words we 
generaliM what things are by the concept of species, or 
resemblances in kind, and we generalise what things d£ by 
the concept of laws, or resemblances in action# In each 
case we select some likeness between things and disregard 
all the differences, and then say ’these things are 
alike in this respect: they belong to the same species',
or 'these things are alike in this respect: they follow
the same law*" (Rll# 78**9)# It must be remembered again 
that the concept of law does not raaîce things act alike, 
it simply states that in one respect they do act alike? 
just as the term species does not make things alike, it 
simply states that in one respect they are alike# But 
does the determination to subsume every phenomenon under 
a natural law mean that there are no limits to the scientific 
method? It does not? and for three reasons#
First of all, it must be remembered that in forming 
its laws, science is highly selective and higlily abstract#
The more individual phenomena are gaced under one category,
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the more those individuals lose those elements which do 
make them individuals* Science deliberately ignores many 
features of the situation it is concerned to describe*
The scientist, abstracts from the richness and varie^ ty of 
individual instances in the interests of a general or universal 
law* Bcientists can predict with almost complete certainty 
how many individuals will die in the city of Glasgovf in any 
particular year, but they cannot toll whether my fripnd 
will be one of those individuals* "Every natural law is a 
short, compressed, useful and abstract statement of one 
aspect of fact# reduces the actual variety of things 
to a level line of resemblance in one respects it treats 
them for one purpose, as if they were all alike and equal 
membovB of a regular series# It does not give us a comp#- 
lets account of the events concerned* It does not make 
the thing happen so* It does not explain why the thing 
happens so. It states that normally, and as regards this 
one particular aspect of a  thing, it does happen b o * Every 
natural law is thus an abstract statement of some resemblance
and recurrence in nature, some regularity which we have
' ^
deduced from nature which looks mechanical because it is 
regular" (REI* 81)# Secondly, in forming its laws, science 
says nothing about the ultimate interpretation ofihcts or 
events* "The scientific description of an event does not
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say everything about it* • For example, if I explain that
an ootave in muaio sounds pleasant beoauBe the frequenoies of
the two nates are exactly in the ratie of 2si, I may be
giving a Boientifie deaoriptIon of what ia meant by harmony,
but I am certainly not saying all that a musician can any
about it# If I claim that when two people lose their temper
with each other there is an accelerated r0lea.ee of adrenalin
into the blood I am making a perfectly correct observation?
but it la hopelessly inadequate as an explanation of anger*
If I watch the loving care with which a mother looks after
her baby I may describe it scientifically m  one of the
devices by which the race ia preserved* I shall be quite
right, but it v/ould be quite preposterous to say that that
1was a complete understanding of mother-lovev" To attempt 
an ultimate interpretation of facts whould be for science 
to go beyond its province and enter the domain of ultimate 
considerations# Philosophy and theology may properly enter 
this domain, but science as such is excluded# Science 
describes, but it does not explains science per se asks 
only how, not why# Thirdly, in forming 'à:ts laws, science 
is always incomplete* lo matter how many phenomena are 
correlated as a category is expanded, no matter how uni-
‘^Ooulson, "The Gospel Miracles", 90
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veroal scientifio concepts become, any particular law — 
no matter how far advanced - is always incomplete * Farmer 
expresses this idea by saying that science has to accept 
any group of phenomena as a going concern#^ Into every 
situation there enters a complex of contributory causes, 
many of which science ignores, and some of which would 
always escape its scrutiny even should science decide to 
Investigate. The psychologist can unravel to a certain degree 
the various factors and causes which go to make up the 
personality John Smith* But the scientist cannot comp­
letely unravel these factor:^ , and even if he could, he could 
not trace all of them to their ultimate roots*
With this understanding of the scientific method, 
the scientific attitude, and the limits of science, consider­
ation must now be given to the attitude of the scientist 
to the concept of miracle* There are tv/o reasons why science 
has nothing to say#out miracle, and even excludes the term 
from its vocabulary altogether#
First of all, science approaches its task with 
the conviction that every phenomena - without exception - 
admits of a natural explanation* For if miracle means 
causation by something or someone outside the natural order,
I  . . . .
^Farmer, WG, 153.
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them Boiemoe repudiates at the very outset any suoh claim* 
The movements of the planets were studied hy the famous ■ 
French astronomer, La Place* It is said that once, when 
trying to explain the subject to the first lapoleon, the 
latter interrupted him with the questions 'But where does 
God 003116 in?* to which La Place replied? *Bire, I have 
no need of that hypothesis#* "The word *God* does not 
work as a high-grade sozlentific word at all* It is not a
'hypothesis* * God-sontencee do not helojag to the logic of 
science*" " - And what is true for the scientist is also true 
for the historian* Historical Boionce, as a soienoe, works 
on the necessary aseumptiom that events are explicable, 
and for historical soionoe to accept the contranatural 
idea of miracle - as an event with no relation to the past 
which preceded it - is for that science to stultify itself# 
Even the most unusual and extraordinary event the historian 
must Investigate in the faith that it can be exx>lained, 
and he must resolutely malntEdua this faith in the face of 
those apologetes for miracle who say that any particular 
event is not to be so explained# "The seientifio historian 
ia bound to leave a blank in hie construction rather than 
bring in what for him is an illegitimate transcendent
l^îtmsey, Mir. 9.
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factor*" When he rightly rejects and excludes from 
his vocabulary the term miracle, the scientist must be 
careful that he does not reject as false or untrue so- 
called miracles or ao-called miraculous events^ simply 
for the reason that they have been termed miracles* His 
business is to find out if the alleged miracle has any 
factual basis, and he must not deny any reported event 
simply because there is no scientific explanation readi­
ly available* And the same ideal holds for the historian 
as well* As Barth says: "'Historioal' knowledge * * •
must be really impartial * It must be a consideration 
of what the texts say (and do not say) in their attesta­
tion * * • without prejudice as to what is possible 
or impossible*"^ Or, as Tillich says: "The historioal
method approaches the miracle stories neither with the 
assumption that they happened because they are attri­
buted to him who is called the Christ nor with the 
assumption that they have not happened because such 
events would contradict the la,ws of nature. The 
historioal method asks how trustworthy the records 
are in every particular case, how dependent
^Mackintosh, "The Ten Best Books on Miracle", 419* 
^Barth, OD IV/2, 150.
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they are on older sources, how much they might be influenced
by the credulity of the period, how well confirmed they
are by other, independent sources, in what style they were
written, and for what purpose they are used in the whole
context* All these questions can be answered in an 'ob-
leotive* way without necessary interference of negative
1or positive p r e j u d i c e s The scientist must therefore
x^ emember that nothing is impossible, and he must always
demand that any event, however unoonventional or unusual,
is capable of being scientifically explained: if not in
current categories, then in categories yet to be discovered*
As Huxley says; "In truth, if a dead man did come to life,
the fact would be evidence, not that any law of nature had
been violated, but that those laws, even when they express
the results of a very long and uniform experience, are
necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be
held only as grounds of more or less justifiable expeo—
Ptation*" It is common in our own day to accept as true 
Jesus' healing miracles, but to reject the so-called nature 
or cosmic miracles, in spit© of the fact that "miracles of the 
one class are not inferior in attestation to those of another."^
^miloh, sæ II* 119-20* %îuxley, op. oit.. 135.
^Sanday, The Life of Ohrist in Heeent Research. 223*
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One of the reasons seems to be that authentic modern parallels
can be produced for these healing miracles: but can the
same be said for the nature miracles? Grookes takes three
specific examples - jestis' prophecy of the fall of Jerusalem,
the stilling of the storm, and the walking on the water —
and produces rouglaly analogous modern parallds. She writes:
"®he conclusion that may be drawn from the records quoted
above is that we do live in the kind of a universe where
the type of miracle recorded in the gospels is at least
conceivable." Another writer daims modern parallels for
such a phenomenon as a virginal conception* "îhere is no
evidence that in the normal course of nature one conception
in 10,000 or more is not a virgin conception." Even the
phenomenon of healing at a distance is not without modern
parallels, according to one author.
Father Ivan Kronstadt was well known throughout Russia 
because of his power to heal at a distance* One well- 
attested instance of his effectiveness dates from 
October 1889, when two children contracted diphtheria 
in a certain household, She disease rapidly took a 
serious turn, and the decision had to be taken whether 
the operation which is done on the wlnd-pipe in desperate 
cases ought to be performed, tPhe worried parents 
telephoned first to father Ivan who was in Kronstadt 
several hundred miles away. He received the message 
before the morning service, and at once concentrated
1GrookOB, "Miracle© and the Supernormal", 236*
Taylor, The Fourfold Vision. #
his powers of faith upon the healing of the two ohildren* 
At the very time, nine in the morning, when he did 
this, the doctor who was at the children's bedside 
in Moscow, noticed a quite unexpected improvement in 
both patients* At two in the afternoon when the operation 
was due to be performed, he dedared that it was not 
necessary* And in three or four days both children 
had recovered#
It;might still be insisted that there is no modern parallel 
to the speed with which Jesus accomplished his cures* But 
a medical essayist writes that most of tlae ailments of 
blindness, lameness, paralysis, fever, possession and madness, 
and apparent death "can be cured or alleviated very suddenly
o
in some cases without a 'miracle' in the supra natural sense*"
As we have noted, in the reporting of any alleged miracle, 
there is always fact plus interpretation, there is an cVent 
which is interpretated by the participant as coming from 
God*^ It is the scientist's task to determine whether the 
phenomenon described did actually occur as reported to him* 
Secondly, science excludes the concept of miracle 
from its vocabulary because, as we have already seen, science 
attempts to give no ultimate explanation to the system of 
facts which science describes * The task of the scientist 
ia to observe, classify, and relate various patterns of 
behaviour# It is true that certain philosophies (1*0.
^Of, Heim, iESWY. 185.
Frayne, "Miracles of Healing", 325.- ^Cf. above, 28,
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Vitalism and mechanism) may claim a soientifio basis, and 
a eoientist m#y believe in one or other of these philosophies* 
But they are philosophies, and in adhering to them, scientists 
cease to be scientists ner sa» Science does not, in itself, 
attempt to give an over-all Weltbild: Jaspers has correctly
pointed this out in his debate with Bultmann*^ Science « 
cannot and does not attempt to give any final meaning W  
the nature which science faces* That is why the inter­
pretative aspect of any event is outside the realm of 
science and science has nothing to say about it* A man. 
might admit as true all the so-called miracles of the Bible 
without in any way admitting that they are of religious 
significance, much less that they are acts of God, Three 
instances may be cited, "The evidence for works of healing 
[in the Bow Testament] is good evidence, but it is not
p
evidence for miracle *" Again, "before he left Lourdes 
%ola recited hie credo to the President of the Medical 
Bureau* 'Were I to see all the sick at Lourdes cured, I 
would not believe in a miracle'#" But most striking of 
all: "I would reject the evidence of my senses rather
^Bartsch (Ersgr*), Kervama imd Evthos* III, 12ff 
'’"Thompson, Miracle a in the Bow Testament* 41# 
^Lunn, The Third Bay, 7*
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than aooept literally a physioal miracle. # * « I may some day 
conceivably be forced to believe, if the evidence is strong 
onou^, that a man has walked through a stone wall, or been 
wafted up into the clouds, or that he has been changed into a 
fox, or even that he had belatedly risen from the dead after he 
had begun to rot, like Laeiarus, But admittingihefactual occur­
rence I will still denytaat a miracletee occurred*"^ Mmitting 
the most unusual events, a man may refuse to place anyieligious 
significance upon them: andkxüiis attitude he remains strictly
scientific# For although science attempts to categorise all 
phenomena, it does not attempt to explain the ultimate signifi­
cance of. a single phenomenon, or of the totality of jhenomGna#
To sum up, science demands the right to say something about 
everything, but it cannot say everything about anything.
In the light of the above analysis, the contra-preter* 
natural position can now be criticised. The various attempts 
of the pure contranaturalists to nationalise the supra- 
natural (thus becoming oontra-preternaturalists) restÿ 
upon the assumption that man suspends or violates the order 
of nature in the same way as God, This shifting of ground 
is most interesting# In the pure contranatural position, 
the term nature excludes God, but includes man and the
n
Oeabrook, Jungle Ways, 117-^ lB
I
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physical order beneath man. But in the oontra-preternatural 
flew, the term nature excludes man and God, and includes 
only the physical order beneath man, The oontra-preter-
*t'bnatural argiment runs thus: if man has inj^ t^lve and freedom,
surely we can ascribe no less to 0o.d himself* Bow this
argument has a certain validity provided that too much
is not claimed for it* Freedom in mmi is one of the essential
elements of his being* At the same time, man enjoys no
unlimited fx’eodom* He can subdue nature, but only by
obeying her# He cannot be said to violate laws or even
to interfere with them? thou^i he can utili:se them* Man's
activities do not suspend or interrupt laws# It Is olear
that "the human v/ill can nmvcr go beyond or produce any
event which transcends her [nature's] power* This view,
therefore, can never explain how God acts in working an
event which transcends nature* It can never go beyond
simply pointing to an analogy between man's action on
nature and God's providential control of nature, and even
1this analogy is most imperfect*"
The contra-preternatural attempt to naturalise 
the supra*natural rests on the assumption that the supra- 
natural is itself lav/ful * "Laws are indicated which dis-
^Lodge, "Wîaat is a Miracle?", 236*
1)000 of the notion that the forceo of the spiritual vrorld
Xare arbitrary or capricious•" But then, what ia meant 
by the term laws? There are many different kinds
of scientific laws - physical, chemical, biological, psycho­
logical and so on* If supranatural law is another group 
along side of these, it is not necessarily unscientific*
And do the exponents of the contra-preternatural position - 
even in their naturalising - offer evidence of such a law?
If there be such a law, it must be capable of application 
to new phenomena# To say that God's interventions in the 
natural realm are lawful, but that we cannot utilise these 
laws for prediction is to retreat into ignorance and to use 
the word law in a most ambiguous manner* The contra-preter- 
natural explanation involves saying "'known laws and factors 
will not explain this phenomenon? there 3nust be something 
outside? but I cannot tell you what this ie or how it 
operates* * An explanation must explain |xow an event comes 
about? otherwise it is simply a learned (or a tendentious)
p
name for the phenomenon to be explained#"** Olaiming that 
the supranatural is lawful is mi apologetic attempt to 
win the support of the scientist* But the claim, when
^Bolwyn, "Belief in Miracles", 271# 
^Wowell-Smlth, op. cl;b*. 251*
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investigated, turns out to be momainglesB# In point of 
fact the supranaturaX ie not a scientific category at all: 
like miracleI it lies on the interpretative side of any 
event ♦
The eontra-pj^eternatural attempt to natural is;© 
the Bitpranatural rests on the æ sumption that the chief 
oharaoterietio of that realm is power or omnipotence#
V/hen anyone speaks of God being tied to his own system, 
that individual seems to have in mind the aut-moded mechanism 
long since discarded by both science and philosophy* It 
cannot indeed be denied oh any grounds that the supranatural 
does have effects on the natural, but it is scientifically 
unîmowable, and theologically questionable, since it is 
taken to mean that power is the chief note of supranaturo*
God is conceived as/first and foremost omnipotent: , this
of God
attribute/is tihe major premise in all areas of theological 
discourse ; ethical considerations are oast aside or sub­
ordinated to this notion#
How can the pure preternatural position be criti- 
cisied? Clearly, one can only concur with the preternatural 
emphasis on the imperfect state of man's knowledge, This
does lead, however, l;o a marked relativity of the concept,
the concept of
only bolstered by Richardson's quaint remark that/miracle; 
will still be necessary for a long time to corae* Yet if
'
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we take the siîpranâ.tux’al to be that which lies beyond the 
order of the natural, it is obvious that the grov/th of know­
ledge will transform the situation, and the supranatural will 
gradually slip away and disappear* That v/hich once was supra­
natural or miraculous, becomes by degrees natural, and that 
which is miraculous to one person is no longer such to another* 
As a result the natural will com© to mean the explicable, while 
the incomprehensible will be called the supranatural, ready 
to fill the gaps that knowledge has not yet discovered, but 
being forced to vacate more and more of these temporary posi­
tions* The scientist will clearly not ascribe any religious 
significance to the merely incomprehensible * And from the 
theological viewpoint, this preternatural position is open to 
the same criticism that was levelled against the pure oontra- 
naturalistST: namely, the rather supercilious view of
assuming that sinful man does not need or will not need a 
power outside himself to save him in his helplessness*
The pure preternatural definition of miracle excludes 
any specifically religious connotation. Yet surely the term 
miracle Should be particularly a religious word* The meaning 
of the word miracle, as Farmer insists, is only clear in the 
context of a complete religious understanding* Miracle
^Gf. above, 31*
:
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cannot be approached from a solentiflo or philosophical 
standpoint. "Miracle being fundamentally a religious 
category and not a scientific or philosophic one, the
proper place to begin is within the sphere of living religion
1itself#" We muat first ask what ia the Bignifioonce of 
miracle for a living religion, not attempt to fit the 
concept into a aoientifio or philosophical world-view*
If coneiderfd from the religious standpoint of a vital 
faith, then "whatever else it may he, miracle is an event 
or complex of events through which a man he comics aware of 
God as active towards himself in and through his personal
p
situation." We must retain tthe concept of miracle to 
dOBorihe an experience within the context of a living faith: 
if miracle does not do this, the term can he discarded as 
meaningless. That is another reason why ‘ miracle must 
not simply he equated with an inexplicable event# Modern 
man does not attach religious significance to the inexplicahlo 
occurrence# "Indeed, as Dr# Orchard once rather frivolously 
remarked, 'If I saw someone walking on the sea I should not 
say, 'This man is divine'? I should say, 'Excuse me, do 
you mind doing that again? I didn't see how you did it'
^Farmer, W ,  108, %bid., 110.
%eatherhead, His Life and Ours# 26#
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Hor 1© the primitive always religiously impressed when 
confronted v/ith an inexplicable occurrence,^ as the following 
incident would seem to indicate# "During the First World 
War the writer lived with Arabs who could not believe that 
a message could be sent from Basra to Baghdad faster than 
an Arab horse could run# The electric telegraph was a 
'miracle', but I do not remember anyone imputing divinity
p
to the telegraphist#"
In insisting as it does upon the rarity of miracles, 
preternaturalism stresses the well-worn dictum that familiarity 
breeds contempt# There is a certain truth in this conviction, 
but it does leave out of consideration entirely the personal 
element in miracle # That is to say, a very ordinary, oft- 
repeated event may become of deep religious significance 
to me because that event confronts me personally in a new 
and dynamic situation# There were seventy babies born in 
Giasgov; on March 5, 1958# As a newspaper statistic, this 
means practically nothing; the birth of a baby is one of 
the most oft-repeated events of nature# But the situation, 
the concern, the possibility of deep religious significance 
is altered if on that particular day I became the father 
of a little daughter, born in the same city of Glasgov;.
:'/v( T!bGUgK.:ôf . 53. ' W^estherlieacE., PBW, '96.
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God can and does speak to man in and through an ordinary
events ordinary# except that it is personally oriented#
And nObtruly religious person loses the sense of amazement
at the forgiveness of sin offered hy a loving Heavenly
Father, no matter how often it is repeated# The genuinely
religious mind could not Id so the sense of God's providential
direction of events in relation to his own person, no matter
what scientific researches later revealed of the various
series of natural causes involved# In short, the most
ordinary, Cft^repeated phenomenon can he the hearer of
revelation - and in that sense a miracle - if in and through
it God spealîs to me personally# "The more intensely personal
and individual the succour of God is felt to he, the more
appropriate and inevitable the word miracle hecomes on
1the religious man's lips*"
There is also a great deal of truth in the preter­
natural contention that mystery surrounds all things, and 
hence that the miraculous surrounds all things# There is 
undoubtedly a mysterious element about every single pheno­
menon# We have already had occasion to note that the 
scientific method is uninterested and tumble to trace out 
every single root and cause of even the most uncomplicated
^ F a r m e r ,  W G ,  118#
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event i But it is fallacious to argue that because ordinary 
events have an element of miiracle about them, therefore 
the historical veracity of miracles is substantiated♦
Writers as opposed to the idea of miracles as Voltaire 
have emphasised the myatery in the most ordinary# "The 
stupendous order of nature, the revolution of a hundred 
millions of worlds round a milliop. of suns, the a,ctivity 
of light, the life of animals, all are gr&md and perpetual 
miracles." The fact of such emphasis by writers of Voltaire's 
stamp shows clearly that there is no necessary connection 
between recognising the Jiaysteriousness of ordinary events 
and arguing for the historical truth of specific miracles#
From tb.e theological point of view, the mystery in all 
things would seem to make all things miraculous: all
events would then be occasions for God apeeücing personally 
to man# This undoubtedly ought to be the case, but even 
(and especially) the most saintly would deny that such is 
the case# In principle, every event may bo the occasion 
of God's speaking to me, but in practice this is simply 
not so. The only person who could say such a thing in earnest 
would be the pantheist, but her© it is a case of philosophical 
theorizing amounting to BClf-consoious attitudinizing :
]
VoltaireI A Philo soohloal Plotlonary. II, 219
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which is entirely different from, if not in complete oppo­
sition to, the religious attitude to miracle* "If there 
is one thing quite certain in this oonneotion it is that 
the word miracle on the religious man's lips indicates
something distinctive which is not applicable, even after
1reflection, to all events indisoriminately*"
The preternatural position makes a specific advance 
over the crudities of oontranaturalism and contra-prater- 
naturalism, although that does not save it from certain grave 
difficulties’f) ; of its own* From criticism of preternaturalism, 
certain points are established* The notion of absolute 
miracle has been dealt a death-blow, the miraculous and 
the supranaturgil are discarded as scientific categories, 
the concept of miracle is found to be meaningful only within 
the context of a living faith, and the activity of God and 
personal participation must be emphasized in any satis­
factory statement of the concept of miracle#
^farmer, WG, 119.
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Chapter III. The Supernatural View*
"It ought not to he a matter of wonder that a miracle 
was wrought by God; the wonder would be if man had wrought 
it* # # * The Word of God, which is also the Son of God, 
took to himself, in a manner entirely different from that 
in which He is present to other creatures, the soul and 
body of a man*" Augustine.
D II = Brunner, B. Dogmatics* Vol. XI.
BE Cairns, D.S* The Faith that Eebels.
MSG - Richardson, Â* T3ae Miraole-Stcries of the Gospels
PRIi- « Weatherhead, L. PsyoholOCT. Religion and Healing*
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$he Bupornatitralist believer; that there omi he
no adequate understanding of the concept^miracle without
due consideration being given to the person of Jesus Ohriet,
The essence of supernatural!sm is that the divinity of
Ohriat makes miracle natural and necessary* And the super-
naturalist further believes that, in principle, the same
sources are open to the present-day Christian as were open
to Christ himself#
This chapter is divided into three sections#
I’irst of all, the connection between the supernatural view
and the two preceding is noted# Secondly, the convictions
of the Bupernaturalists are advanced? and this is follov/ed,
thirdly, by a critical evaluation of the supernatural
argument# It is to be noted that this chapter includes
moreover,
widely differing theologianss /the four taken as représenta­
tives do not wholly adhere to the complete supernatural 
position as it is here presented# Other authors are deployed 
to represent other parte of this view#
In this supernatural view, earlier arguments are 
both continued and reversed* Whereas both the contronaturalist 
and the preternaturalist tended to use the miracles to prove 
the divinity of Christ, the supernaturalist tends to use 
the divinity of Christ to prove the historical veracity of
g o -
the miracles# This fundament of supernaturalism is clearly
seen in the oontranaturalist Lewis* "It Is unphilosophical,
if you have once accepted the Grand Miracle [the Incarnation],
1to re;]eot the stilling of the storm*" And the prater- 
naturalist Bett shows the same supernatural tendency#
"We do not believe in Christ because of the miraculous deeds 
Ho is said to have done# We believe in His miracles beca^ use
p
we believe in Him, and know Him to be the suprojae miracle # "
And v;e could still believe in every miracle worked by Jesus,
though all of these miracles were to be naturally explained
and easily repeatable (at a much later date) ; the point
is that Christ wrought them* "One of our Lord’s miracles
would still be a miracle as wrought by Him two thousand
years ago, even if two thousand years hence men could
achieve the same results by what to them were natural 
%
means#"
But it is Richardson - whom I have chosen to be 
ibotli a preternaturalist and a supernaturalist - who points 
out the difference between the supernatural position and 
the two preceding# When ho is defending with much per­
suasion the oontranatural-preternatural position, he writes: 
"To-day we frequently hear it said that we do not believe
Hewis, M, 169. %ett, ERL. 124. ^Ibld.. 35
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in the Ohristian revelation beoause it wae attested by 
miracles in the giving of it, but that v/e believe in miracles 
(in so far as m  'believe in them at all) because we are 
convinced ‘on other grounds* of the fact that a revelation 
took place. . . . ïhis modern view is, of course, the 
precise opposite of the traditional view. . , . Aquinas, 
Luther, Hooker and Mosley were right in their fundamental 
contentions supranatural revelation must be attested by 
miracle." In this statement, Richardson is supporting the 
miraeles-prove-the-divinlty-of-Ohriot argument* But there 
is another and contradictory strain in his thought on this 
matter* "It is Ohrist himself, rather than any of the 
things which he did, who is the chief attestation of the 
truth of the biblical revelation*"^ And, "the historian’s 
answer to the question about the miracles of Jesus will 
depend upon his answer to the prior question, what he thinks 
Of Ohrist*"’^ In these two latter statements, he is supporting 
the divinity-of-Ohrist-proves-the-hlstoricity-of-the-miracles 
argument * And in one of his latest books, Richardson admits 
that the contranatural-pretornatural position is imbiblioal, 
"It has been traditional in Chrietian theology down the
^RioHardsoa, GA, 162, 167. %bld.. 156
'’Richardson, SHR, 105.
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centuries to regard the miracleb of Ohriet as proofs of / 
his divine nature* It is anachronistic to read hack auoh 
an attitude into the lew Testament records*"' But much 
earlier, in the hook which hoot mirrors Richardson as a 
su%)ernaturalist, he had written in a similar vein* "Ror 
a long time it was widely believed amongst Christian people 
that the Gospel lairaolea were best understood as the rati­
fication of the claims of Jesus to possess divine authority*
• « * But it ought perhaps to have been obvious that.* « # 
in lew Testament times the ability to work miracles v/as not 
in itself regarded as a proof of divinity" (MSG, 20-1)*
The point that is hero being made - the difference 
between the contranatural and preternatural positions on 
the one hand and the supernatural position on the other - 
is neatly summarized in the following statements* "It is 
a fundamental mistake to desire to support our belief in 
the Divinity of Christ by an appeal to His miracles, * * .
We believe in the miracles of Jesus when we already believe 
in Him, but nofe* before" (D II, 169, 192)# "The power to work 
miracles could never prove its possessor to be a person so 
extraordinary as we conceive Christ to be; but Christ once 
conceived to be the extraordinary Person we believe Him to be,
McHardson, Aa Intyoduotioa to ths gheoloCT of the Hew 
geataEient. 95.
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miracles become to Him both natural and necessary
If Christ be divine, supranatural acts are to him 
entirely natural* And "mankind has always felt that here [in 
Jesus’ life], if anywhere in history, they are face to face 
with a supreme manifestation of a life which is utterly and 
wholly supranatural." "It is clear that the Mew Testament 
writers regard ^ Christ’s pov/er as none other than the power of 
God; Christ is the power of God in action" (MSG* 16). "Prom 
the standpoint of faith it would be remarkable if the God—Man 
did not do unusual things; if He who is wholly Mew, in all He 
is, in all He says, were not accompanied by an action which 
points to his uniqueness" (D II, 169)* "I # , . assume the 
divinity of Christ. . . • His unique relationship to God 
made Him at home in the spiritual world, and when He broke into 
a situation of human pain and distress, of body or mind, He 
brought with Him the energies of the plane on which He himself 
lived" (PRH* 39, 41)* Gore states this point most succinctly. 
"The argument runs thus % If Christ truly was, what his 
disciples came to believe Him to be, the eternal Word or 
Son of God, Himself very God, made man or ’flesh’, there
^Mairbairn, Studies in the Life of Christ. 151,
^Taylor, "The Miraculous and the Supernatural", 247*
As terms are used in this thesis, Taylor’s article 
actually refers to ’The Miraculous and the 
Supranatural’* In this regard, of. above,3.
was thereby oonstituted a mew thing in nature, a new reve­
lation of the Creator Spirit, the Spirit of Life, to matter, 
a new level Im the evolution of life, such as would naturally 
exhibit hew phenomena# from this point of view ’the works’ 
of Christ are natural in his case - the natural outflov/ings 
of the new power which He alone, or at first, possessed*
It was ’natural* that He, being what He was, should so heal
the siok, should so control nature# should be b o  raised
1from the dead, as is related in the Gospels#" The oorollary 
of this supernatural contention is that the acts of Jesus 
do not admit of a natural explanation: explanation from
a merely human or from a merely soiOiitifio point of view*
"It is true that all seven of St# John’s miracles are stu­
pendous feats of supranatural power, admitting of no.natural­
istic or rationalistic explanation" (Mg£, 115-16). Illlng^forth 
likewise demurs to the idea that the miracles "are capable
P
of naturalistic explanation#" Others are more careful in 
utterance, but the underlying approach is the s^ae* "It 
may be true that we cannot state precisely what happened 
when Jesus encountered a hungry multitude by the lakeside 
or a demented outcast among the tombs, yet there 'is:still
'm p m w w  u jwtf m m 'i '.ms «mew»*, \
^&or©, Belief la God. 241. 
‘^ Illingworth, DiYine Immanence, 97
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a residuum v;hloh faith can and must affirm" (MOG* 129). "After
Btudying the matter for many years I oa,miot ooiapletoly fit
the healing miracle a of Ohriet into the categories of modem
psycho therapeutic practice * The latter is illmined by the
former, hut the former are not explained by the latter" (PHH. 40]
According to another writer, the peychothorapeutio '’expiai#
ation’ of the healing miraclee is poasibla only if they are
3greatly reduced in magnitude# ' To attempt to explain Jeeue*
miracles on a purely scientific basis is regarded by another
Pas an attempt to "eliminate the miraculous*" Or again, 
some vi/ritera acknowledge that events broadly analogoûe to 
those reported of Jesus nowadays occur, but cling to the notion 
that Jesus’ miracles were much greater* "WC have had in 
recent years many indications of parallels and analogies to 
the miraculous power of Jesus in the nev/ly-disoovored methods 
of suggestion and hypnotism, in telepathy, ’action at a 
distance’, and (in my opinion) animal magnetism* All these 
Buppositiona may be accepted without misgiving, only with 
this addition, that what Jesus did passed gradually far 
beyond anything Imown to us in these fields#""^
'^Hyle, "$he leurotio Sheorjr of the Miracles of Healing", 
572ff,
O
'^ Davlea, The Miracles, of Jesus# IB#r -rmrrr i f ' rf,:,rr-, "r'  r . r - -,,inrr-
Otto, The Idea of the Egly* 214*
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The Buperhaturalist tends to ascribe to Jesus 
he attribute of oismiscience." "An honest profession of 
the Divinity of Ghrlst neeessitatea the admission of omni­
science in His divine intellect*"^ To this writer, the 
attribute of omniscience held^  only of the divine nature 
of Jesuss it mm not true of his himan nature* "Jeb u s  
Christ possessing two natures, and therefore two intellects, 
the huBxan £ind the Divine, the question as to the knowledge
found in His Divine intellect is identical with the question
%
concerning God’s Imowledge*" The human intellect of Jesus, 
though not omiisoient, was clearly supex’ior to that of other 
men# "God infused into Christ’s human intellect a Imow- 
ledgG similar in kind to that of the angels# This is 
knowledge which is not acquired by experience, but is 
poured into the soul in one f l o o d A s  to Jesus’ know­
ledge acquired by experience, "it must have been at least 
equal to the knowledge of the most gifted of men; it appears 
to us wholly unworthy of the dignity of Christ that his
iThis attribute, though properly a corollary of the 
supernatural position, is but rarely found#
Brmmes? o^ks, "Was the knowledge of Jesus limited 
by human conditions? In the light of the evidence 
given UB in the ..Bible we must answer deoidedly: 
’Yes’" (D XI, 324)#o
Maas, "Knowledge of Jesus Christ", 675
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powers of observation and natural insight should have 
been less than those o f other n a tu ra lly  perfect men,"^
And f in a lly , although the Imowledge In  the human soul 
of Ghrist v;as not In f in ite , i t  was most perfect and embraced 
the widest range»”
fhe supernaturalist tends to ascribe to Jesus 
the a ttrib u te  o f omnipotence.'' To those who believe that 
"Christ is  the power of God . , . the mere size of the 
m iracle involved . » , could be no stumbling block” (MSG. 121), 
!Co some, Jesus is  ”the d irec t channel o f omnipotence,"^
Or, "Jesus’ power is  portrayed as sovereign, personal , . , 
due ne ith er to medical e k ll l  nor prayer."* The eaaie author 
w ritee that " in  every healing instance, i t  is  a sovereign 
power of which Jesus is  calmly sure, and which knows no 
lim its  except those he v o lu n ta rily  sets to i t ."  ^ Whereas 
the men of the Old Govenant had d if f ic u lty  in  bringing the 
wonder-work to pas*:f, "the miracles of C hrist are always
^Maas# on. o i t * . 676# I^ ,b id .
^Though not as rare as the a ttrib u te  of omniscience,
th is  a ttrib u te  of omnipotence is  not found expressed 
in  a l l  BUpernatUralistSf Brunner, fo r instance, 
says : " In  Jesus we fin d  neither divine omni­
potence nor omniscience" (D I I ,  360).
"^ Of * W right, M iracle in  H istory and in  Modern Thought. 110
"^McGlnley, Rorm-Grit 1 oiam of the Bynoiptic Healinjrg 
N arratives, lÿ s T ' '.... •..... '
^ Ib ld .. 84.
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acoompliohed w ith the highest ease; He speaks and i t  is
done." What JesuB* humanity was unable of itself to 
achieve was pOBBlble for him by what one writer has called
9
"the over-ready concurrence of Hie divinity^" Hence,
"Ho was able of His free will to work mii’acloo as often
%
as He judged It expedient#""^ Moot of the above vnritors 
aacribe to Jeaua pure omnipotence, unqualified power#
"If anyone aaya that the Lord Jeaua Ohriat was glorified 
by the Spirit, aa it were using through Him a power belonging 
to another, and that He received from Him the power to 
work against unclean spirits, and to perform miracles 
for men, and does not say rather that the Spirit through 
which He worked the miracles was Hie ov/n; let him be ana­
thema*"'^ ' lor was Jesus’ power limited by a lack of faith 
on the part of those he healed* "The gospels nowhere suggest 
that Jesus could not have worked a miracle if the belief 
that a cure would be effected had been lacking" (MSG, 63)*
Many other supernaturalista feel that Jesus’ power v;as 
dependent upon faith in other men’s hearts* This is dealt 
with later in a separate paragraph*
1'Trench, Notes on the Miracles of our Lord* 37*
^Devine, "Gift of Miraolee", 351. ^IMd.
^Bensinger (ed*), The Bources of Oatholic Do^ma. oxxi, 51
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The supernaturalist ascribes to Jesus the attribute 
of sinlessness* This oharaotoristic of Jesus finds all 
Bupernaturalists in agreement# "We know of no situation 
whioh could shake the truth of these v/ords: ’Yet without
sin’" (D II, 324). "Jesus seems to have had no sense of 
sin#" "Mo miracle of Christ equals the miracle of his 
sinless life. To be holy in all thought and feeling? never 
to fail in duty to others, never to transgress the law of 
perfect love to God or man, never to oxoeed or to come short • 
this is a condition outstripping the power of iinagination 
and almost of belief*"^ Again, "it is here indeed that we 
come on what for many must be the one really convincing 
proof of the miracles # It is the belief that Jesus was like 
us in all things, except in sin. low if a person is sinless 
two things are surely certain. Rirst, he v/ould acquire and 
achieve power whioh a sinful man could never reach. • . * 
low in all men there is some essential weakness, more or 
less; but not in Jesus Ohriet. He was without sin and there­
fore the way was open for Him to acquire and to:achieve what 
sinning man can never rise to. Second, He could be entrusted 
with powers with which the ordinary sinning man could never
^Woatherhead, His L4fe and Ours. 30.
Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ. 
597.
"V'
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be entrusted# • # # Jesua was ainleaa and therefore there
ooiiia reside in Jeaua power which other men could never
have. In the last analyale Jeaua did the things He did
*1because He was the person He was." "The sinlessneso of 
C hrist meant complete se lf-âe to rm im tio n , completely free  
operation of the v /l l l;  unmoved a lik e , as we see in  h is to ry , 
by bodily appetite or fe a r, by s p ir itu a l ambition, by the 
f la t te ry  of frien d s , or by the h o s tility  o f foes." By 
most supernaturalists, ainlessness is  equated w ith moral 
and s p ir itu a l perfection . " I f  Christ was the Son of God 
Inoarnate, He must have liv e d  a l i f e  s p ir itu a lly  perfect 
in  a l l  i t s  human features and re la tio n s ."^  Donald B a illie .        fattributeB which
who dropB all the other/supernaturalLstB: aserihe Jeaue 
BB being mmeceaeary and even inimical to the otatement of 
a sound Ohrietology, yet clings to thia attribute # Sin- 
leosneas la that attribute without which Jecue would not
be the Heaaiah.
To the faith of the Ohurch Jeaua Ohriat ia ainleaa 
inc-aplrit, unerring in aplritual ineight, original 
ae a religioua teacher; in the atriotoat aenae a moral 
miracle# Hie character ia the one miracle vitally 
important to faith# Believers could part with the
XBarclay, And He Had Compassion on Them. 31-2 
^Illingworth, The Go a pel Miracles# 128# 
"^ OHiomaon, The System of Animate Mature# 157#
'^ Baillie, God Was In Ohriat# 17
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physical miracles of the Gospels if science or exegesis 
demanded the sacrifice; hut if a sinless Christ were taken 
from us on the plea that the moral order of the world knows 
only of imperfect men, all would he lost* Nothing less 
than a sinless, infallihlo, incomparably original man is 
demanded by the titles and functions ascribed to Christ*
The Con of God must be holy, as God is holy* The Redeemer 
of sinners cannot Himself be a sinner* The Light of the 
world can have no share in the world’s darkness* The 
Xnaugurator of the new era of grace cannot be a commonplace 
man, the creature of Hie time, in all Hia thoughta a mere 
echo of current opinion* Wo could not believe such a man 
to be^  the lessiala - officially great, personally insignifi­
cant.
In the light of the previous attributes, many 
Bupernaturalists ascribe to Jesus the attribute of suprahuman 
existence : elevating Jesus to an organic level beyond man.
"The miracle of revelation [God in Christ] * * * is a 
’miracle’ in the proper sense of the word, the miracle of 
the freedom of God. The ’miracle’ of the organic life is the 
feoomprehensible phenomenon of the organic spontaneous element 
contrasted with the mechanical and causal* The ’miracle* of 
human intellectual life is the incomprehensible phenomenon 
of the freedom of man, contrasted with the limited pov/ers of 
nature* The miracle of revelation, however, is the miracle of 
the freedom of God contrasted with the limited powers of the 
creation as a whole* It is the miracle of the personal presence 
of God in the world of man and nature* It breaks through,
^Bruce, m e  Mlraculom..mmqai:. In the, Goepele., 320
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therefore, the sphere of human Intellectual freedom, just 
as the organic breaks through the mechanical, as the human 
mind breaks through the sphere of nature # # * # Revelation 
* . * is the aeries of acta in x€aioh God makes Himself 
present in the Unique Event.#" ‘ The aarae suprahuman quality 
of Jesus’ exietenoe is encountered in other writings of 
Brumier. He makes a distinction between the ’personality* 
of Jesus, as an observable historical phenomenon, and His 
’Person*, which is a hidden supraliistorioal mystery* The 
former is purely human, the latter is divine* The former 
is simply the ’human nature* assumed by the Second Person 
of the Trinity, taking the place of the human ’person* in - 
Jesus* "We may therefore assime that personality, in our 
human, historical sense of the word, bebnge to the humanity 
of the Bon of God, not to His deity* Personality - as the 
element which is accessible to everyone - is the human 
aspect of His Person which can be known by every good 
historian; it la the incognito of His deity, whioh, on the 
contrary, oaimot be known by the good historian, but can 
only be Imown by those to whom it is ’given** His person­
ality, probably even His ethical and religious personality, 
has been more or less known by all; even our classical
•^Brutmor, 302
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writers, who rightly recognized that iÆiey did not hold 
the Christian faith, too?; this. They did not perceive 
the mystery of His Person, the 'only begotten Bon,* Hie 
Divine Nature and authority, the revelation*"
But other ?;riters, xwLth supernatural tendencies, 
show the sojEe characteristic of moribing to Jesus the attri­
bute of aupmhuman oxietonoo# It is expressed in the phrase 
’the impersonal humanity of Christ* and ?;aa interpreted 
fearlessly by Newmans "though Man, Ho is not, strictly 
speaking, a Man.**  ^ Thornton, too, elevates Jesus to an 
organic level beyond man. "In each ne?; level ?;hioh appears 
all the previous levels are representatively taimn up and 
included; so that at the summit of the series man is in 
some sense a microcosm of the whole, including within him­
self all levels of the series# The series is thus taken 
up in man on to the level of spirit # But it does not reach 
its end in man, because he shares the unfinished character 
of the aeries* Ho?; if the Incarnation brings creation to 
its true end In God, this must mean that the cosmic aeries is 
gathered up into the human organism of Jesus Christ* # # •
As the series is taken up into the human organism, so in
^Brunner, She Mediator. 266. Of. 265ff., 318ff,, 345ff. 
^Of. Baillie, on « Bit «. 15. I am iïiûeBiîed to Baillio
throughout this paragraph
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Christ the himan organism Is taken tip on the 'level* of 
1Deity." Hodgson, who refuses to employ the terms 'im­
personal humanity * or 'not a man hut Man* concerning Jesus, 
nevertheless declares that the doctrine underlying these 
phrases Is essential to any adequate Ohriatology.^ "We 
should thinjc of the Incarnation as the entry by One who is 
divine upon an experience of life under certain conditions, 
naiaoly, those which are involved in being the subject oi 
experiences mediated through a body in this world of space 
and time ? for to be subject of such an experience is to bo 
hUBian#"'^  "What we laean by manliood in its most spiritual 
essence, its nous (to use Apollinarius* term), is to bo the 
self-conscious subject of experiences modiated through a 
human body", and "the Incarnation is to be thought of as 
the entry upon experience dSuchca‘tXife,;..byathe divine 
Logos Hodgson seems to imply that Jesus was not a man 
at; 0)11, but simply the divine Bon of Qoü having experience 
through a human body: the only 'subject* of the experience
was- God the Bon.
Many Bupernaturalists emphasiœ the element of
^Thornton, The Incarnate Lord. 225#
“Hodgson, "The Incarnation", Essaya §n the Trinity and 
Incarnation, 383. . c>y •).
379. h h ^ ,  387.
[
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faith present in every miracle in the New Testament* By
this two different (though not neoeoearily exclusive) things
are meant* First of all, faith was neoeesary in the people
with whom Jebub dealt, if any miracle was to take place*
"In the methods of Jesus faith played a vital part in cure"
(PRIT, 36)* "The first point to notice Is the extraordinary
emphasis put hy Christ everywhere in the synoptic narratives
of the necessity of faith" (FR, 67)* Again, "the power in
the Son was correspondent with something [faith] in those 
1about Him*" SupornaturaXists readily admit that faith is 
not always specifically mentioned, but go on to say that it 
may always be assumed* "Believers alone are eyewitnesses 
of the Resurrection. , , * The miracle of revelation can 
only be seen by faith" (D II, 168). "It is generally supposed 
that faith was present as a prerequisite in the miracles of 
healing which the gospels record# Mention of faith is, as 
a matter of fact, absent from many of our Lord’s miracles*
It is, however, often noted and almost as frequently implied.
p
The supposition is therefore not unreasonable *" As to the 
nature of this: faith, some supernaturalists would simply 
equate it with trust or confidence. "The faith required
^Vaughan, "How we may ’think of the Trinity*", 135-36.
^Shaw, "Faith in the Healing Miracles of the Synoptic 
Gospels", 291.
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for healing 1b not, and never has been, theological in its 
character, # , , It has been expectant trust in a person" 
(Fill, 36). 33ut other supernaturalists - by far the majority * 
think the faith required for healing by Jesus was theolo­
gical in character# "X wish to contend that it is a recog­
nition of #10 MoBBiah, or at least of his attribute8, v;hich 
releases Ohriet*s healing power| and that this recognition 
only, according to the Gospel narrative, is the content of 
the faith of those ?;ho are healed." Richardson concurs 
with this theological view of faith, while strongly attacking 
the theory of psychological faith or mere confidenoe#
It should bo abundantly clear that the stress upon 
faith in healing miracles bears small relation to modern 
payoEblogioal exemples of faith-healing, The modern 
use of the word "faith" in the psyohologieal sense 
has little in common with the fàith of which the gospel- 
writ ers are speaking; that isj a saving, personal 
believing relationship with Christ* The gospel miracles 
of healing are not examples of "faith-cures", and 
attempts to explain them along these lines are far 
removed fx**om the spirit of the gospels, The modern 
mind whioh professes to find belief in the healing 
work of Jesus easier on account of the succèsses of 
modern psychotherapy is still a long way removed from 
the Mew Testament faith in Christ the Saviour, The 
Epileptic Boy and Jairue’ Daughter are not restored 
by their own "faith", but because of the potentialities 
of true Christian faith exhibited by their respective 
fathers, ?;hioh gives significance to the acts whioh 
Jesus perforïïxst , . , Jesus is obviously not referring 
to faith in the sense of auto-suggestion. His reference 
is rather to that kind of faith of which He said that 
it "x^ emoves mountains" (MBG, 63-4),
1,'Shaw,
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Secondly, as the other faith-oloment necessary in any New
Testament miracle, xixany supernatural 1 ats emphasize that
faith was an essential an,d never-ahsent. ingi*edient in the
make-up of Jesus himself: faith here meaning theological
faith# ‘ "The assimption is that the miracles of Jesus were
acts of faith, and that by our Lord Himself His own miracle-
working was regarded exercise of a personally inherent
Divine attribute or prerogative, but as a feature of Hia
1human Messianic vocation." "The acts of Jesus on earth, 
especially His miracles, are the works ?/hich God has done 
through Him" (M8G# 16), Again, "as far as it is revealed 
to us, His greatest v/orks during His earthly life are 
wrought by the help of the Father through the energy of a
o
humanity enabled to do all things in fellowship with God," 
Hodgson ?;3i?ites, finally ; "The miracles of Ohriet are ¥/orked 
through faith, " ^
Many aupernaturalista omphasiœ the saving or 
redemptive aspect implied in every lew Testament miracle.
"The Biblical miracles , , , are all seen in the light of 
* Saving History’ (HeilBgosohiohte); they are miracles of
-^Hogg,
^Westcott, Epistle to the Hobye\?g, 66, 
^Eo dg a on, And Was Made Man, 140,
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revelation and aalvation" (D II, 167)# Sickness and guilt 
were closely associated in the outlook of the first century 
Jews: "healing and forgiveness of sins are inseparable in
the teaching both of the Synagogue and of the early Church*" 
For that reason, the power to heal xneant the power to break 
sin, "In the story of the Paralytic, Jesus deliberately 
implies that His healing work authenticates His power to 
forgive sins" (MBG* 66), The church, in the name of its 
Lord, claimed to be able to forgive sins and heal the sick. 
Thus, according to the supernaturalists^ all of Jesus’ 
miracles have this rodemptlve*-healing element, though this 
is most evident in the healing miracles* "The outstanding 
purpose of the healing miracles was redemptive. They ?/cre 
meant to bring forgiveness to the sinful disordered spirit,"^ 
"Since all disease was regarded as due to sin, the miracles 
of healing would have double significance in the eyes of 
Christ’s contemporaries* They would not only be regarded 
as a healing of the body, but also as the forgiveness of 
sin* They would be symbolic demonstrations of God’s for­
giveness" (PRH, 48), To the apologists of the first century, 
the miracles of Jesus "were the supreme sign that the tragic
 ^Bacon, Studies in Mat they;* 391,
^Growlesmith, "Modern New Testament Scholarship and Psycho* 
logy in regard to the Miracles of Healing", 56*
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powers of both sin and death were broken" (FR, 126),
Arising out of their previous conviction - that 
theological faith was an essential and over-present factor 
in the personality of Jesus - there is an extension: the
same sources are open to the present-day Ohristian as were 
open to Christ himself* If we could develop the same faith 
as Jesus, miracles would again abound: our lack of faith
keeps us on lower levels of Christian action and witness.
"The New Testament teaches that God’s power is delegated 
through Christ to those who believe on Him" (MBG. 1?). 
Supernaturalists stress that at the point where faith was 
highest - that is, in Jesus himself - miracles were most 
plentiful. Until the end of the Apostolic age they "are 
regarded as the glories of the faith, and, in so far, the 
uniform view of the New Testament and the early age is 
maintained. # . # They are the normal accompaniment of the 
lives of the saints, and are miracles of judgement and of 
mercy designed to awakenn and increase faith" (FH, 21).
But adverse conditions changed this situation. "No longer 
has the church all things in common# No longer la it of one 
heart and mind# No longer is there the same degree of pov;er 
in prayer" (PRK. 87)# Theological controversies, often on 
barren topics, increased in the church; worldlineaa and the 
grasping of political power developed at the expense of things
1 1 0  -
spiritual# The conversion of Oonstantine in A*D# 325 was
a piece of statesmanship rather than of religion* From that
moment the church hecmae more and more a movement allied
with the state rather than a living movement of the human
spirit towards God# Inevitably but slowly, the gift of
healing died out* Augustine, in the closing years of the
fourth century, complains that though miracles did happen,
they were sporadic and unusual# By Outhbcrt’s time (A#D#
635-67), though holy water and oil were used to cure siolmess,
the procedure was tinged with magic, having come a long way
'lfrom the gospels and the Apostolic church# According to 
the supernaturalist a, faith and miracles, which were at full 
tide in Jesus, . finally ebbed a?;ay# "We can oonoelvo the 
order of retrocession to have been in this way: that divine
pov/er which dwelt in all its Byliness and intensity in Ohrist, 
was first divided among his Apostles, who, therefore, indivi­
dually wrought fewer and smaller works than their Lord. It 
was again front them further subdivided among the ever-multip­
lying members of the Ohurch, who, consequently, possessed not
p
these (gifts in the saane plonitucl© as the twelve." But were 
we to revert,to the attitude of the Apostolio age, then 
"the primitive energy of faith [would he ours] able to move
^Cf* Grovflesmith, on, cit.. 56, ^ïrenoh, op. cit.. 59»
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mountains in the world of oirourastamces as v/ell as in the 
world of Spirit" (M, 32), "What is needed is that the 
Ohurch, easting aside the theological prepossessions whioh 
hinder her from sharing the primitive Ohristian attitude 
toward miracle-working, should restore to the Mew Testament 
miracles their demonstrative experimental value by exhibiting 
broadly analogous modern triumphe of faith*" There is a 
natural law in the opiritual world but our lack of faith 
prevents us from using its energies* "We shall not be able 
to release the energies referred to by Ohrist, and whioh w© 
might call the energies of the Kingdom, by purely scientific 
research# Rather are we likely to find them when the quality 
of spiritual apprehension releases them as normally as 
energies of a physical and psychological nature are released 
on a lower plàn© * # « « On such a spiritual plane law 
undoubtedly reigns, but it may be a law of a different order, 
to be discovered less by intellectual effort than by spiri­
tual discipline and insight" (3?I^H* 41^2) « And, "Ohrist was 
as much at home on the plane in which those immense spiritual 
energies were at work, as we are at home in a world where 
gravity and relativity operate# We too?; of their operation, 
and use the energies involved, even though we do not tech-
ou* cit#. 170*
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Hiloally understaad their action" (PHH. 45) »
$0 the supernaturalist, the person of Jesus Ghrist 
makes miracle natural and necessary. And, theoretically at 
least, the same sources are open to the present-day Ohristian 
as were open to Ohrist himself. 3)ho supornalural position is 
neatly summarised in Cairns’ paragraph. "Do we, indeed, expect 
to return to the ago of miracles? « * • As the word is 
usually employed, it would mean, Do we expect that the time 
is at hand when men will do the things which Jesus did? I 
would say, ’Assuredly, no.’ She whole argument implies that 
these extraordinary aoîstevements of prayer were due to His 
extraordinary spiritual personality which was so entirely 
at one v/ith the will of the father that the father v/as able 
to do extraordinary deeds of hlessing, through Him* fhe 
difference between His achievements and the greatest of other 
men’s achievements is a measure of the spiritual difference 
between Him and them. . . .  But if by ’miracle’ we mean 
something inexplicable in terms of physical Mature, I would 
say, ’Assuredly, yes.’" (fR. 154).
It is now possible to pass to a critical evaluation 
of this supernatural argument, It will be seen that there 
is considerable biblical evidence for each of the various 
claims of the supernaturalists., At the same time it will 
also be shown that the evidence is by no means imiaiablguou^ .
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and -feexte can bo quoted against the convictions of the
supernaturalistB as well as for them# The point then is
that it is obvious that one’s presuppositions will colour
the way one reads the lew Testament ; one’s Fragestellimir
will determine the answers found? one’s Ohristôlogy will
tend to emphasize one group of low Testament statements
and tend to suppress the other#
First of all, let us consider the attribute of
omnieoienoe ascribed by some supernaturaZlsts to Jesus. In
their favour, we are told that Jesus knew ?/hat was in man
(Jn# 2*25) 3 he knew, for instance, the past history of the
woman of Bamaria (Jn* 4*17f#)» According to John, Jesus’
"testimony is true" (Jn* 8*14)* Near the end of Jesus’ earthly
life, hie disciples are constrained to say to their Lord:
"low we know that you know all things" (Jn# 16*30)* Many of
these statements v/ould lead one to believe that Jesus had at
least unusual knowledge, and the last statement is the clearest
evidence of omniscience* Yet side by side v/ith these, there
would seem to
are other statements ?;hich/show that Jesus was not omniscient# 
Luke ascribes to Jesus growth in wisdom, as well as in other 
aspects of development (Lk* 2#52)# Jesus from time to time 
asked questions to ©licit information: -regarding the size of 
Lazarus’ tomb (Jn# 11*34), the number of loaves (It* 15*34), 
and the nemie of the demented Geras one (Mk# 5*9) * There v/ere
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thing(3 in Bian, too, that onrprlQeé him (%# 6.6; Mt, 8.10); 
so also things in nature (Me. 11.15). Bven v/ore these 
ihstanoea attributed to his human intellect, Jesus lays no 
claim to Imowing a fact which might properly he called divine ; 
namely, the time of, the Barousia. "But of that day or that 
hour, no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the 
Son, but only the leather" (Mi# 15*32). Dhe issue as to the 
omniacienoe of Jesus cannot be decided on the biblical evidence 
alone, for this is manifestly contradictory# The supernatural 
claim that Jesus was oranisoient is here rejected because of 
the moral difficulty involved, if for no other reason. As 
fairbairn remarks? "If He had such knowledge, how could He 
remain silent as He faced human ignorance and sav; reason 
wearied v/ith the burden of all its unintelligible mysteries?
If men could believe that once there lived upon this earth One 
who had all the knowledge of God, yet declined to turn any 
part of it into science for man, would they not feel their 
faith in His goodness taxed beyond endurance?"
What as to the attribute of omipotenoe ascribed by the 
Bupernaturaliats to Jesus? îEo the supernaturalist, the many 
unusual deeds recorded of Jesus and the many good effects 
emanating from his power, constrains him to say that Je sue
F^airtoaira, fee .Plap.e . of gtels-l; in jgoae.m iTheolPCT. 353.
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wao omnipotent * The lemptatlon narrative seems to indicate 
that Jesus was truly onmipotent, able to do whatever he willed 
(Mt # 4#l""ll). "What manner of man, is this, that even the 
winds and the eeea obey îaim?" (Mt# 8*27)* "With authority and 
power" Jesus commanded the unclean spirits and they came out 
(Lk. 4*36). "(The crowds sought to touch him, for pov;er came 
forth from M s  hand and Mealed them all" (Lk. 6*19)* When 
the apparently unnoticed woman with ah<^  issue of blood touched 
him, Jesus insisted that someone had really touched his gar-* 
monta, "for I perceive that power has gone forth from me"
(Ilk* 8*4^) • Jesus had power to lay down his life and to take 
it again (Jn* 10*3,8) ; God has given Jesus power over all 
flesh (Jn* 17*1)* It is not easy to find stafemente which 
would show that Jesus was limited in power# !Bhe most illust- 
. riouB example is the narrative concerning Jesus* return to 
lajsareth. "And he could do no miglrlywork there, except that 
he laid his hands upon a few sick people and healed them*
And he marvelled at their unbelief" (Mk* 6*5f*)* It would 
seem from this quotation, that Jesus* power was not i^nlimited, 
but that it was qualified by the necessity of faith* The 
quotation is open, however, to another and opposite explaiia-* 
tion* Aoeording to this opposite explanation, the statement 
is intended as a severe reprimand, addressed to the inoredu-* 
lity of the people of hasaroth* Ihe greatness of the inoredu**
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lity shows not that Jesus coulcl not do there hut a few 
healings, it signifies only that no one sought his help.
He was certainly able to heal, had the occasion been given to 
him: that is the explanation of the phrase ♦he could not*
Yet even this exegesis limits Jesus* povfor to a degree: 
the occasion had to present itself, one had to ask in order 
that Jesus might heal* However, there is little doubt that 
supernaturalism om% claim much biblical evidence for, and 
very little evidence against, this particular attribute*
"It appears that the whole synoptic tradition presupposes 
that in Jesus there dwelt an unlimited supranatural power. 
Though there is no claim of the supernaturalists for which 
there is so much strong biblical evidence, the idea of omni­
potence has been rejected by many of the supernaturalists 
themselves, and rightly so# The apologetic which refuses 
to construe Christ *s knowledge through the notion of omni­
science must also refuse to construe his works through the 
notion of omnipotence#
All aupernaturalists ascribe to Jesus the attribute 
of sinlesenese# Sinlessness may mean, first of all, unity
^Pridrlohsen, Le Problème du Miracle* 52.
^Ibid. "II va de soi que toute la tradition synoptique 
suppose ches Jésus comme une puissance surnaturelle 
illimitée."
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with Hod* So Jesus is reported to have said: "I and the
lather are one" (Jn* 10.30)# But against this, there is the 
cry of dereliction from the dross: "My God, my God, why hast
thou forsaken me?" (Me# 15#34)* Sinleasnoss may mean, secondly 
moral purity# There are at least three statements pointing in 
this direction. Jesus asks the Jews the categorical question 
"Which of you convicts me of sin?" ( Jn* 8*46). The answer 
dearly expected is *lo one*. The writer of the letter to the 
Hebrews declares that Jesus "has been tempted as we are, yet 
without simaing" (Hob* 4*15)* In the first letter of John, 
there is the open claim that "in him there is no sin" (I Jn. 
3*5)* But against the supernatural conviction of the sinless— 
ness of Jesus, there is the latter’s own remark: one
is good but God alone" (Mk# 10*18). And if sinlessness means 
moral purity or moral perfection, this characteristic has 
not always been self-evident in the personality of Jesus 
tor readers of the Hew Testament* Speaking of the *woe’ 
passages (Mt* 23*13-'26), Havet remarks: "The truth is that
the Gospels, of which men commonly speak as if one found in 
them nothing but love and charity, are sometimes full of hat­
red* . . * Where are the suavities of the iermon on ihe Mount?. 
Where are the beatitudes? Where tie order to bless 1hose\iio curse yoi;^ ^
^Of* Montefiore, The Synoptic Gospels* II, 731
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More Bpeoifically,
I do not think that Jesus was always oonsistont# He 
urged his disoi#s to love their enemies, but so far 
as we can judge he showed little love to those who 
opposed him* He urged that the lost sheep should be 
actively sou#t out; but except in the way of sheer 
abuse and vituperation, he did nothing to win over to 
his own oonoeptio3ii of religion the Pharisees and Rabbis 
who ventured to criticise and dislike him, To the 
hardest excellence of all even Jesus could not attain* 
for it v/as far easier for him to care for the outcast 
than to care for his opponent, especially when the 
outcast was ready to acknowledge that he was sent and 
inspired by God, and the opponent took the liberty of 
denying it# * * * V/e are bound to note that of those 
whom he denounced many, in all probability, did not 
deserve his censure* Bo far, however, as others were guil 
of sin, it was the selfm^righteous formalist, the proud 
and sanotimonious observers of the ceremonial enactments 
of the Law,' who either neglected, or but formally and- 
negatively obeyed its moral commandments# that found 
.no mercy at his hands * To them, except in the way of 
stern rebuke and vigorous vituperation, he was no 
physician# For these special failures of legalism he 
had no pity, he forgot that they too, however sinful, 
were created, like himself, in the image of God; that 
they too, like himself, were sons of the same divine 
Pather, m%& that the same sun shone upon them as upon 
himself* '
One conservative supernaturalist has his difficulties with 
one of the activities of Jesus; this difficuliyis all the
more remarkable when the siriC of a miracle is no stuiïiblinÆ
block to Richardson* Speaking of the miracle at the wedding 
of Gana, he says, "We must frankly face the difficulty that 
to create such a quaiatity of good wine ’when men have drunk
^Montefiore, The Religious Teaching of Jesus* 53^ *4'
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freely’ la hardly an aet of eomion aenae, and makes a poor 
♦beginning of miraoloa’ for the Good Teaeher of the Christian 
tradition" (MSG, 121)* Again# it would seem that Jesus did 
not possess moral perfection# when judged against the standard 
of the Sermon on the Mount# The ’men of bid’ had warned 
against certain overt acts# hut Jesus declares unto his hearers 
that v;hoever entertains even the thought of these overt mots# 
is condemned# How if the Temptation narrative he given any 
weight at'all - and if in any sense the temptation.was a real 
temptation# with all the elements of enticement and allurement • 
then Jesus himself must have at least the thought of turning 
stones into bread# of casting himself from the temple# of 
ruling the whole world* But apart from all this, the convic­
tion that JeBUB is sinless is not one to foe read off the 
evidence, however good, for only God secs the heart# Again, 
in the Bible itself, "there ie no enumeration of special 
sins which he did not commit, nor is there a day-by-day 
description of the ambiguities of life in which he proved 
to be unambiguously good#"^
Is there a more positive approach to this question 
of the sinlessness of Jesus? Karl Barth has written that 
it was "fallen huinasi nature" that Ohrist assumed at the
m  II, 145,
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Incarnation, and maintains this is wîxat is meant by the 
Viford becoming not only man but fleah»^  This is not an
altogether new, but it is still an unorthodox position*^
I' -myself maintain^ that the concept of the sinlessness of 
Jesus is designed to express a real characteristic of our Lord 
and to meet a real need of thctfaith, but that ’sinlessness’ 
is an inadequate and unfortunate expression of that charac­
teristic and that need# Tillich substituâtes for sinlessness
his own complex terminology and calls it "the conquest of
%
estrangement of the Hew Being in Jesus.Faith is assured 
on its own grounds (neither wholly substantiated 1:; nor 
completely refuted on the basis of historical ovidenoo) 
that the lew Being has conquered the old being.Tillich 
is clearly right when he declares that "Protestantism demands 
a Ohristology of the participation of the Ohrist in sinful 
existence, including, at the same time, its conquest."^
It seems to me that the philosophy of existence is better 
equipped than the traditional philosophy of substance in its 
attempt to express the essential truth in the inadequate
^Barth, CT l/2, 16?ff
. Baillie, op. cit.. I6f#; Bruce, The Humiliation of 
Christ,
^Tillich, BT II, 145t
%or elaboration, o.f« belo% 294f. ST II, 172,
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phrase’the BinleesnoBB of Jesus’# It would go something
like this; at every moment of his earthly life, Jesus,
like every other man, was faced with the decision: to
live authentioally (by faith, in the light of things invisible,
from God) or to live inauthontically (in unbelief, in the
light of things visible, for himself) * The temptation
experience was not confined to a single episode in the life
of Jesus, but actually faced him throughout his earthly
existence* Therefore at évery moment, Jesus, empowered by
the grace of God, himself decided to live by faith# Baillie
1states the paradox very powerfully# On t|i;o one hand, all 
Jesus’ words and all his choices depend upon the Father;
"I can do nothing on my ovm authority; as I hear, I judge; 
and my judgement is just, because I seek not my own will 
but the will of him who sent me" (Jn# 5.30). "My teaching 
is not mine, but his who sent me* # ♦ * He who speaks on 
his own authority seeks his own glory; but he who seeks the 
glory of himt who sent him is true, and in him there is no 
falsehood" ( Jn* 7*16,18) # "I have not come of my own accord; 
he who sent me is true, and him you do not know# I know him, 
for I come from him, and he sent me" (Jn* 7*28f.)* But on 
the other hand, there is Jesus making his own human choice
^Baillie, OP. cit.. 126-27.
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from moment to moment, a choice on which, in a aenee, every­
thing depends* "He who sent me is with me; he has not left 
me alone, for I always do what is pleasing to him" (Jn# 8*29) 
"for this reason the father loves me, because I lay down my 
life, that I may take it up again* %  one takes it from me, 
but I lay it down of my own accord* I have power to lay it 
down and I have power to take it again; this charge I have 
received from my father" (Jn* 10#17f*)* That is to say, 
on the one hand/ Jesus was empowered by God to live authen­
tically; on the other Jesus himself decided so to live# 
Arising out of the attributes of omniscience, 
omnipotence and sinlessness, many supernaturalists ascribe 
to Jesus the attribute of suprahuman existence* There is no
direct scriptural evidence for this claim, although a com­
at tributes which
bination of statements supporting the other/supernaturalists 
- ascribe to > ' Jesus might easily lead to this last one - the 
attribute of the supràîUManity of Jesus# Against this claim, 
the famous kenotic passage may be quoted* "Have this mind 
among yourselves, which you have in Ohrist Jesus, who, though 
he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God 
a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form 
of a servant, being born in the likeness of man# And being 
found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient 
unto death, even death on a cross" (Phil# 2*5-8)# And
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clearly, if the Incarnation is to he what the terra implies, 
theology must hold fast to the conviction that Jesus* humanity 
is essentially the same as ours. As to the supernatural 
aiotum of the ’impersonal nature of Jesus’, it is obvious that 
"human nature which is not personal is not human nature,"
"In the domain of reality, there is no such thing existing 
independently as humanités, or ’man in general *. . . . lo 
one can represent a man who also i£ the nature common to all
p
members of the class ’man’*"" In opposition to all attempts
to elevate Jesus to a level above man, Baillie writes? "Burely
whatever else Jesus was, He was a member of the human race,
the human species, a man among men, or one man among others,"'^
attributes which 
As we have seen, the/supernatura'listb,:,.ascribe rto
Jesus are neither entirely supported by, nor completely
opposed by, the New Testament scriptures themselves. Super-
natura]. claims have been partially built upon scriptural
foundations and partially upon the supposed needs of a sound
Ohristology. And it appears to me that popular piety, rather
than sound theology, has been determinative at this point.
Popular piety wants a Sod, v/alking on earth, participating
in history, but not involved in the conflicts of existence
Mcberly, Atonement and Personality. 93*
^Mackintosh, op. cit.. 87. ^BaOlie, op. cit.. 87
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and the ambiguitios of life* Popular piety does not - want 
a paradox; but a miracle, not a person but a prodigy* As 
against the diotim of the suprahumanity cf Jesus, it must be 
affirmed that it was Jesus* relationship with God, renewed 
from moment to moment, whloh constituted his full humanity.
Many supernaturaliats emphasise the element of faith 
present in every low Testament miracle* A host of texts 
supports this conjecture (for instarxce, It* 9.22; Me. 5*34; 
hk* 8,48) * In some of the Hew Testament healings the faith 
resides in the person té be healed (for example, the woman 
with an issue of blood, Lk* 8*38-48), in other instances the 
faith resides in the family or group about the sick person 
(for example, the centurion who asked that Jesus heal his 
servant, Mt* 8*5-13) * But at the same time, not all the 
reporte of miracles mention faith, and, in the face of the 
lack of positive evidence, the supernaturalist must assume 
it* I feel myself that the assumption is warranted*
More Interesting, perhaps, is the question as to 
?;hat type of faith was mco,nt: theological faith or psycholo­
gical faith* Theological faith means a positive relationship 
to God through Jesus: psychological faith means simply trust
or confidence in the person of the healer, Jesus of Harareth# 
Theological faith is grace from God enabling man to believes 
psychological faith is a determination by oneself to trust
1 2 5  -
In the power of a certain poraonality* In theological faith, 
the initiative lies with God: in payohologioal faith the
initiative lies wholly in and by man* Ab to which 1b most 
prevalent in the Hew Teotambnt, the evidone© does not point 
conclusively one v^ ay or the other* It seems to me that 
within the Hew Testament itself, there is evidence of both* 
Shaw argues persuasively that theological faith is definitely 
implied by the na:ï?tatives of blind Bartimaeus and the Byro- 
Phoenician woman: but he is on less solid ground when he
tries to extend his thesis to all the recorded healings*
There is at least one healing narrative v/hioh would seem to 
suggest that both types of faith were present# Jesus, when 
he met the ten lepers, and in answer to their pleas for mercy, 
commanded that they should go and show themselves to the 
priest* On the way, the ton were healed: but only one
returned (Lk* 17*llff*)* It might be supposed that the 
nine had merely psychological faith, owhea^ eae the one had
theological faith or, psychoMgieai faithimd beenirankforiSiéd în- 
to theological faith* Though it cannot manifestly based 
upon direct evidence, it is necessary for the person of faith 
(as X see it) to believe that Jesus desired that those to 
be healed should have theological faith, or that psychological
^SHaw, OP. Pit.. 291-97
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faith should give rise to theological faith: though this
desire may actually have been fulfilled in but a few instances# 
Many supernatural!sts emphasise the redemptive as­
pect or salvation-element present in every Hew Testament mir­
acle* Yet the story of the paralytic (&. 2*1—12) is the 
only miracle recorded where a physical miracle is brought into 
direct connection with the proclamation of the forgiveness of 
sins* And some critics conclude that in this instance the 
connection between the two elements was the work of the 
editor-evangelist• But Fuller urges further indirect support
o
for this connection between healing and salvation* In
5*34 and Mk* 10*52 (and parallels) Jesus says to one whom- he 
physically
has/healed: "Your faith has made you well'#" The Greek
verb ’to make well’ could of course refer merely to 
the physical healing* But this verb is also used in a 
perioope which does not involve a physical healing at alls 
the perioope referred to is found in Ik# 7#36ff* ( the 
woman who was a sinner)* And the use of the verb ’to 
malce well’ in Lk* 7*50 after verse 48 ("your sins are 
forgiven") shows that in this instance, at any rate, it 
(the verb ’to make well’) is synonymous with the forgiveness
^Bo Taylor, The Gospel According to Mark* 191* 
uller, The Mission and Achievement of Jesus* 41 *
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of sina.^ It la thus possible that we are meant to take 
the verb ’to make well*, when used in conneotion with 
the healings, in this wider sense* It seems to me likely 
that Jesus desired the healings to have this redemptive 
aspect, "While it is true that healing played a large part in 
Ohrist’s earthly ministry, it would also seem plain that His 
main and primary concern is to bring men and women to reoonei— 
liatiomwith God; a reconciliation which means eternal life as a 
present possession irrespective of any physical condition what- 
soever*" At the same time this desired reconciliation mayh^< 
actually occurred in but a, few of Jesus’ healing miracles# 
Something might be said at this point about the
phenomena of faith-healing and Roman Catholic centres of
«%
healing, the most notable of which is Lourdes*"^ Several 
points should be noted.
First of all, the number of physical healings is 
usually exaggerated.'**' This can bo duo to one of, or any
1In Lk# 7*50, the Greek verb ’to make well’ is rendered 
(in the Revised Standard Version) by ’to save’: 
"Your faith has saved you#"
^Spiritual Healing;. 8*
’■^I am here partially indebted to Perry’s "On the 
Reporting of Miracles", 104-09*
official sources, the number of cures at Lourdes 
is not exaggerated! if anything, the opposite 
is the case. But many less cures do take place 
than the mass of people believe#
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combination of, the four following factors# First, there is a 
tendency to assign an irrelevant cause for the recovery of the 
sufferer, quite overlooking the obvious and ordinary explana­
tion* Man is prone to "the superstitious habit of attributing 
to a special act of divine volition any event which is not
easily explained by reference to some human will, or by the
1scientific knowledge available at the time*" Secondly, there 
is almost boundless capacity for self-deception* Thirdly, in 
the ready soil of credulity, rumours|||grovir rank and miracles 
tend to multiply* Fourthly, faith-healers themselves are some-
p
times guilty of deliberate fraud, as Perry points out *
There is again no evidence of deliberate fraud at Lourdes* 
Secondly, physical cures nevertheless do occur 
under the aegis of both faith-healing and Roman Catholic 
centres of healing* Perry, who was a member of an investigating 
oomittee which considered fifty test cases, found one actual 
cure due to faith-healing; though other cures were reported, and 
Perry obviously thought that three or four of them were genuine? 
As to Lourdes, "I repeat my own firm conviction that there can­
not be any doubt that real cures of organic diseases have 
taken place" (PRE, 149)*
^Temple, Ghrlatus Veritas* 192•
^Perry, op* cit*. 106» ^Ibid*. 108
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Thirdly, physical healings brought about by such 
methods can occur without being accompanied by spiritual 
healings that is, there is no‘Change in the reXigioua 
outlook of the person or persons involved, the redemptive 
aspect is entirely lacking* In his report Perry writess 
"The majority of those who received or sought healing were 
folk of superficial experience in religion,"^ The healings 
"rested not on strong and intelligent religious experience, 
but upon a washed-out, second-hand faith which was little 
more than superstition." ‘ "The history of various methods 
of healing compels us to admit that healing has occurred in 
an apparently miraculous way apart from faith in God*
Hypnotism and pov/erful suggestion have brought about healing*
Buoh methods may cure psychogenic or possibly even organic
%
diseases, but do not enrich the personality*"*^
Fourthly, physical cures are nevertheless some­
times accompanied by a change in the religious outlook of
been
the person or persons involved: psychological faith hao/trane-
formed Into theological faith* Here the redemptive element 
accompanies the physical recovery# As an instance of this, 
one could cite an episode from the Memories and Experiences
^Perry, on* cit** 108* ^Ibid* 
^Of. Growlesmith, op* cit** 74#
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of the Botaabiaa man of God, Boitgj, which brings out clearly
the connection between external physical healing and an
alteration in the inner life of the person involved *
A young man, who had himself experienced an act of 
God in our house, brought to us a man who had been 
crippled in both feet for the last six years* When 
he was working on the railway, a rail had fallen on 
his back, and had dasifiaged the spinal nerves in such 
a way that both his logs were paralysed# He told how 
the doctor had sent him round to various hospitals 
and spas, but in the end had said that he was incurable, 
but that if he lived in a place where the air suited 
him, he could prolong his life for a couple of years*
Bo he came to us, I discovered at once that he was a 
man of integrity* A few meditations which he attended 
roused him so much that he undertook a complete puri­
fication of conscience and mind, and put right all 
that troubled his conscience* Wherever he had caused 
offence, he sought pardon, and where necessary he made 
restitution* The basis of this honourable integrity 
was undoubtedly his ability to believe the Gospel and 
the promises with childlike simplicity and joy* This 
gave me the pleasure, after a few days of his being 
ih our company, of laying hands on him. and praying for 
him* When we had prayed, he stood up on both feet and 
said? In the name of Jesus I am healed* And he began 
to walk about in his room, and in the dining-room which 
was next to it* Then he sat down and wept for joy, 
and said : Ach God, what have you done to met I am
really curedt The other guests were coming in for 
supper* Because the man had previously been carried 
to and from the table, they were astonished to see that 
he could now come to the table himself. He was so 
moved with joy that he asked them to permit him to tell 
them what the Lord had done to him, for they had seen 
hOY/ he had had to be carried about and now was dble to 
walk for himself* After supper the guesto gathered 
round him and asked him more about what had happened.
He said thattwhile praying he had felt the power of 
God, and had heard the command: Stand up and be healed!
On his return home, he was for ten years a living 
witness to the Lord* He did much work for the Lord in 
1 W  neighbourhood * He was often away for hours at a 
time, leading meetings# He founded a temperance union,
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and built oomiunity houses, until, serene and at peaoe, 
he wae called from hie labours,
Fifthly, there may be redemptive cures without any
accompanying physical healing whataoevor. In an interesting
article, a woman recounta how she took her dying husband
to Lourdes, The wife had been told that her husband was
incurably ill with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, causing a
degeneration of the central nervoua system, Oonfined to
a wheel chair, he was given a year to live. The husband
was an agnostic, having concluded many years before that
no organised religion measured up to his concept of the
gospel, and the wife did not tell,him of the nature or
seriousness of his illness. It was at Lourdes that a change
came over the man: no physical change, but a transformation
of m different kind# Under the influence of the events
at the shrine, the man who was formerly a deeply'depressed
agnostic became a man who was at-:peaoe with his Heavenly
Father and with his fellows about him# He left Lourdes
as he had come, a dying Bian, but redeemed and reconciled
with God and man*"''
The last supernatural contention is that the
same sources that were open to Jesus are open to the
G^.f, Heim, (gSW. I98-.99.
^Vrahnos, "Our Own Miracle of Lourdes", 75-9#
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preeent-day Christian: v/ere we to adopt the attitude of pri­
mitive faith, miracles would again aboundr Indeed, the main 
thesis of Cairns’ book is that nature miracles are within the 
range of faith’s powers* There is undoubtedly scriptural evi­
dence to support this claim* "For truly, I say to you, if 
you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you will say to 
this mountain, ’Move hence to» yonder place,’ and it will move ; 
and nothing will be impossible to you" (Mt* 17*20) * But we 
may properly ask of the supernaturalist: What is to be gained
by this proposed proliferation of prodigies? As we have al­
ready seen, such events will not automatically convert the 
1agnostic, such events will certainly not be termed inexplio-
p
able by any self-rospeoting scientist. It cannot be gainsaid 
that faith could produce marvellous acts any more than it can 
be denied that if Jesus be unique, unique events follow* But 
even granted that both propositions be proved (\#iioh neither 
are), of what profit is it?
Supernaturalism is closely associated with both 
oontranaturalism and preternaturallsm in this: its faith
is fed and nourished with displays of power &md demon­
strations of force* Bupernatural faith’ demands that it 
have something to throw in the face of the agnostic, it 
desires that it have a monstrosity with which to confound
^Of. above, 77f. ^Of. above, 66ff.; 7Xff.
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the scientist ♦ The attitude is not unlike that miong 
Jesus’ own oontemporaries - believing as they did in the 
coming of a Messiah vrith stupendous power# Yet it appears 
that Jesus was quite unlike the Messiah from God they 
expected and wanted* No God of theirs here! "Give us a 
sign" was their cry (Mt* 12*38)* And himself in all his 
divine beauty and love they did not, or could not, see*
"If you are the Ohrist toll us plainly," they demanded 
( Jn* 10.24), And the plain utterance of his life which 
indeed was ’shouting at them’ they did not hear* Their 
preconceived notions of how God ought to visit them blinded 
them to the reality when it lived before their eyes, and 
deafened them to the divine voice v;hen it spoke in their 
ears* And 00 they crucified Jesus* "He saved others; 
he cannot save himself," was their condemnation of such an 
impotent Incarnation! (Mt* 27*42). The Messiahship, the 
divinity of Jesus cannot simply be road off the biblical 
record: the miracle of Jesus himself, like all other
miracles, must be apprehended by faith, lo supernatural1st 
sees this with the saiae clarity as Brunner: the others
tend to try to ’prove* Ohristianity by an appeal to the 
’supranatural’ character of our Lord*
Other elements of the supernatural 1 argument are 
well worthy of emphasis* In the apprehension of a miracle
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faith, that ia to oaay theological faith, ia clearly eagential* 
And the aupernaturaliat* a atreaaing of the redemptive aspect 
of miracle ia an element which v/ill demand more consideration 
later in this v;ork*
Despite some internal inconsistencies and differences, 
the three traditional views presented here in Part One have 
much in common* Though something may be gained from ea.ch 
of these three, on the whole they are found wanting: 
consequently I reject them.
We must now try to state more clearly why the three 
in Part One
traditional views/are found wanting: I must attempt to
say explicitly why I reject those three traditional positions,
In order to do bo, I propose to employ Tillich’s fruitful
and profound ’point of view*, namely, his correlation
1between message and situation*
Tillich points out that "theology moves back and 
forth betY/een two poles, the eternal truth of its founda­
tion and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth
Pmust be, reoeivetl»" ' A soimd -bheology must be ae accurate as 
possible la reoountiug the Biblical message on &ie one hand,
r^illlchj, BT I, 3-8, ^Ibid.. 3,
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in responding (with that message)
arid EBæcuiHfcG ae poasifolo/tQ.' the claims and questions of the
contemporary situation on the other# It is not often that 
a theology is both biblically and eituatiohally’;" sound#
Moot theologies err in regard to one of the faotOre# Some­
time e a theology has ohortoominge on both ooxmtas that, 
indeed, is the double fault of traditional theology*
Wo have already seen how the three positions of 
traditional: ■ theology have boon biblically unsatlcfactory * 
Varlouo aspects of the biblical meoeage have indeed been 
seised upon, but this is to the exclusion of other and 
equally important aspects of that same measage# On the 
Y/hole, t3?aditional theology fails to see the paradox of 
the eternal messages it fails to understand that only
. t '
faith can grasp that mi ancient book is the 'Word of Gods 
it fails to appreciate that only faith can perceive that 
the man Jesus of lasareth ia the Bon of Gods it fails to 
0OHipreh,end that only faith can determine that a natural 
event is a miracle, i*o# an act of God* Because of this 
failure traditional theology attempts to’prove* the validity 
of the eternal message by an appeal to so-called supra- 
natural facts* But the proof turns out to be illusory*
2Ji The appeal to supranatural facts (v;hether they be
contra-, prêter-, or / supernatural) brings traditional 
theology into sharp and painful opposition to the thinking
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of OQntempox'ary man, whose outlook le so largely determined 
by eolentifio methods and attitudes* Ohristianity muet not 
and cannot remove the soapdalon of its faith, but it muot 
not locatè the soandalon in the wrong place: and this
mistalte is perpetrated by traditional theologians # Con­
temporary man cannot agree that a particular period of 
history or a particular group of events is totally outside 
the realm of investigation of the scientists and he quite 
rightly distrusts a so-called proven supranatural when it 
is not proven to him at all#
Traditional theology thus fails on the two vital 
points: it is neither faithful to the tz?uth of the eternal
message nor can it speak meaningfully to the temporal situa­
tion.
In Part Two I consider olgnificant modern theolo­
gical movements which, while not dealing solely with the 
concept of sairaole, are nevertheless of considerable import 
for the concept# She titles of the three chapters in Part 
Two are "She Barthian Theology", "She Form Gritical Movement",
and "She Deiflythological Movement" # At the conclusion of
movements
Part Two we will evaluate these three / ’ in the light of
Sillioh’a ’point of view*#
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PAES TWO - Oontemporay.y Movementa
Ohanter IV# The J3artMan TheolQgv*
"What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with 
the Academy, the Christian with the heretic? # # # I 
have no use for a Btoic or a Platonic or a dialectic 
Christianity#" Tertullian#
"If I have a ’system*, it consists in this, that I always 
keep in mind with the utmost vigour what Kierkegaard has 
called the ’infinite qualitative difference’ between time 
and eternity, and that in both its positive and, negative 
implications# ’God ia in heaven and thou upon earth’#"
Karl Barth*
CD I/l, Barth# K# Church Dogmatics# Vols* X/l
1/2,     1/2
11/1 Il/l
II/2 II/2
lll/l III/I
I?/l I?/l
IV/2 IV/2
.
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It might have been supposed that the views of 
Karl Barth on the concept of miracle could well have found 
a place in one or other of the views presented in this thesis. 
It is true, as we shall see, that he has affinities with more 
than one of these positions* Yet he fits none neatly. Hov/ 
are wë to place Karl Barth? His views on miracle, like his 
theology as a whole, cannot be simply categorized and 
bracketed with any of the views presented in this work.
How are we to place Karl Barth? "To fit Barth into any 
known shheme of theology, orthodox or liberal, is impossible. 
Probably the answer that would satisfy him best would be to 
say: ’Barth is a scandalon. a stumbling-block, a question-
mark, to stir men out of their easy solutions, to disturb
them, it may even be to make them angry, that they may 
begin to thinli again, to think more deeply, and to think in
God, and by the light of God’s Word’
Barth uses the word miracle in at least three 
distinguishable senses. First, there is the use of the word 
miracle as equivalent to, or parallel with, the word reve­
lation. Secondly, there is the use of the word miracle as 
an attribute of revelation: as form is to content, so is
miracle to revelation». Thirdly, there is the use of the
^McConnaohie, The Significance of Karl Barth. 242
- 1 3 9  -
word miracle as referring distinctly to the hew Testament 
events traditionally called miracles* The chapter is there­
fore divided into two main sections* First, Barth’s views 
on miracle (in the three distinguishable senses) are presented 
in a straightforward manner; secondly, there is a critical 
evaluation of Barth’s position*
First of all, Barth often uses the word miracle 
as being equivalent to the word revelation: in many
cases the words are interchangeable• The concept of revela­
tion is central in Barth’s thought, and some attempt must be 
made to explain it. In order to do so, a definition given by 
Barth himself will be expanded and illustrated* The defini­
tion is as follows* "Revelation [is] the self-revelation 
of God, that is. His revelation in Jesus Christ, as the Word 
that is spoken to us, that ia given to us in the witness of 
Holy Scripture* Wherever revelation in the Christian sense 
is known and acknowledged, there the Christian Church is,
The Church is the reality which arises and continues where- 
ever the revelation of God in Jesus Christ has made itself
known, wherever it allows itself to be known of men and
1succeeds in winning their acknowledgement *"
’Revelation is the self-revelation of God*’
Barth, Against The Stream* 225
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"Revelation in the Christian sense is the revelation of 
God. For the Christian there is no need of a special enquiry 
and a special proof to know and to declare who and what God 
is. For the Christian the revelation is itself the proof, 
the proof furnished by God Himself. The Christian ansv/er 
to the question as to who and what God is, is a simple one:
He is the subject who acts in His revelation. This act of 
revelation is a token of His Being and the expression of 
His nature." In this sense, then, "he who says ’God’, says
p
’miracle’#" Revelation is not aided, conditioned or caused 
by any capacity, ability or knowledge of man. Revelations 
is all of God: "a reality to be grounded only in itself"
(CD 1/2, 244). Because it is God alone who is the agent 
and actor in revelation it is possible to speak of "the 
miracle of revelation" (OB 1/2. 268).
’Revelation is the self-revelation of God.’
Such revelation is not an idea, ideal, philosophy or specu­
lation of man. It is of Godi from God, by God and, like 
miracle, "is an event" (OB l/2, 530) # Yet although miracle 
owes its origin and cause to God and to him alone, it is 
for man. Revelation, like miracle, "is an actr of God’s
^Barth, Against The Stream. 208-09. 
^Barth, The Epistle to the Romans. 120.
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1compassion*" "To knovf God in His dealings, vis* in His
deoision in favour of man, means necessarily to know God’s
Pfree mercy* the most incomprehensible of all miracles*"
"The nature of His revelation * * * is that it is grace"
(OP Il/l, 197)* And why is God’s grace so Incomprehensible? 
Because without it man could not know God at all, "We 
begin with the need of man for the miracle of grace* He 
cannot dispense with this miracle* And God will not become 
knowable to him otherwise than in miracle" (OB Il/l* 129)& 
Again, why is God’s grace so incomprehensible? Because 
God loves that which is unloveable* "What He sees when He 
loves is that which is altogether distinct from Himself, 
and as such is lost in itself, and without Him abandoned 
to death* That He throws a bridge out from Himself to this 
abandoned one, that He is light in the darkness, is the miracle 
of the almi^ty love of God" (OB Il/l, 278)* Ho self- 
revelatory act of God is without the essential incompre­
hensible ingredient of mercy: even creation, which might
be thought to be primarily a work of power, is rather pri­
marily a work of compassion* "Creation, too, is already ^ the 
work of the free, fatherly grace and mercy of God" (OB IIl/l,
^Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* 48 
71.
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30). Revelation is the self-revelation of God - of his 
mercy, love, compassion - of his grace. "Grace is the divine 
movement and condescension on the basis of which men belong 
to God and God to men. Whether offered or received, whether 
self-revealing and reconciling or apprehended and active in 
faith,.it is God’s dealing, God’s will and God’s work, God’s 
lordship, God Himself in all His sovereignty. Grace cannot 
be called forth or constrained by any claim or merit, by 
any existing or future condition, on the part of the creature 
Nor can. it be held up or rendered nugatory and ineffective 
by any contradiction or opposition on the part of the crea­
ture. Both in its being and in its operation its necessity 
is within itself. In face of it there is no place for self- 
glorying or the self-praise of the creature. It comes upon 
the creature as absolute miracle, and with absolute power 
and certainty" (OD II/2, 19).
’Revelation is God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.’ 
"Jesus Christ is the elect One, the man who is not only man 
but God. He is the miracle of Grace, in whom= what is im­
possible for any man, is possible for man, i.e. in Him it 
is possible for man to have not merely a part in God but 
to include the fulness of Godhead in himself and be the 
son of God. But it is He and none other who is the miracle
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of g r a c e It is only in Jesus Christ that there is any
revelation at all. "What in fact makes revelation revelation
and miracle miracle is that the Word of God did actually
become a real man and that therefore the life of this real
man was the object and theatre of the acts of God, the li^t
of revelation entering the world" (OB l/2, 147) # Borkouwer
rightly remarks: "Barth’s main concern is to speak of the
2all-conquering grace of God in Christ Jesus." "That the 
true God became true man in Jesus Christ • . • is the miracle 
of all miracles of His divinity, lowhere could God’s love 
or His freedom be greater than in this work" (CD Il/l, 662)» 
Finally, the;; revelation of God in Jesus Christ "is no special 
work. It is far more. It is the work of all works. It is 
no special miracle. It is the miracle of all miracles. And 
as such it is the simplest necessity of nature: even more
necessary than breath to our bodies. But it takes place 
irrespective of any work or wonders of which we are capable" 
(OD 1/2, 392).
that is
’Revelation is the Word/spoken to us*’ "The 
work of the Bon or Word is the presence or manifestation 
of God which, in view of the fact that it is a miraculous
^Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* 75
^Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of 
Karl Barth* ÿgÈ. " ' " " '
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event amid human darkness and despite this darkness, we
can only designate revelation" (OB l/l, 148) * This Word
creates in man a new beginning. The Word or Son creates
in us an absolute new beginning. For the believer in
Jesus Christ there is"an absolute new beginning brought
about by God; an absolute: new beginning of Ms'existence?
an authority which is posited ba-sically and decisively
before all others ; a power which has not only illumined
and al tered and improved hie whole reality but completely
transformed it" (CD IIl/l, 32). Therefore, "let it be
said at once that God’s action, when v/e consider it in
the light of its result in man upon whom God acts, appears
1
as free mercy, as a miracle wrought by God."
’Revelation is the Word tha/b is spoken to ua. ’ 
This is the first time that man - expressed in the phrase 
’to us’ - is specifically mentioned in Earth’s definition 
of revelation which we are currently discussing. Reve­
lation and miracle are all of God and by God and from God. 
Man is simply the unworthy recipient of the Word that is 
spoken: the Word that is spoken in grace, the Word that
is spoken in Jesus Christ. For this reason. Earth insists 
as against Bultmann and the existentialists - that man
# # #
^Barth, Kjiowledae. of god and ihe_Se.r-yioe of God. 74.
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cannot speak of man without first and very concretely having
1spoken of God* Again, as against Bultmann and the existential 
lots, Barth insists that God’s sovereignty is absolutei abso­
lute in the sense that it is not to be measured against the
Pnorm of mere human compréhension# Man - weak, sinful, insig­
nificant man - receives the unmerited gift of the grace of God; 
and only in this sense is he a participant* There is a rela­
tionship between God and man, but an extremely unequal relation­
ship* "Human nature cannot be the work-mate of God* If it 
actually becomes so, it is not because of any attributes it 
possessed already and in itself, but because of what is done to 
it by the divine Word, axià so not because of what it has to do 
or give, but because of what it has to suffer and receive - and 
at the hand of God" (OD 1/2, 188). Again "the miracle of , -in 
Christmas has as one of its elements ihe not at all miraculous zealijy 
of man# If Emmanuel is true the miracle is done upon him*
Barth, Die Mensohliohkeit Gpttes* 19-20* "GowiB; 
dor ExiBtentxaliemus mag uns, indom er uns 
noch einmal geschSrft hat, daB man von Gott 
nioht reden kann, ohne Mens chan 0u redan, noch 
einmal an die uartioula veri der aiteren Schule 
erinnert haben# In den alten Irrtuni, als ob man 
von Mens chan reden kSnne, ohne suerst, und das 
sehr konkret, vom lebendigen Gott geredet au 
haben, wird er uns hoffentlich nioht Burtlckführen. " 
For Bultmann’s views on this înatîtér^cf. Mew, 266f 4a2f/^
^Barth, Rudolf Bultmann. Bin Versuoh ihn au verstehen* SM^ * 
Bullîmann' believ^ ^^  ^ man*" haï"a '"^ ïff'é-
relation’ to the things about which the gospel speaks. 
Of. below, 266ff*
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It is man who is the object of sovereign divine action in 
this event# God Himself and God alone is Master and Lord" 
(OL* 1/2, 186). Yet though revelation is all of God, 
though revelation brings about an absolutely new beginning 
in man, man is not crushed or destroyed in this miracle.
"It [the Christmas event] is not an event in the loneliness 
of God, but an event between God and man. Man is not there 
only in a supplementary capacity# In his own place, his 
own sharply defined manner, he participates in the event 
as one of the principals; not as a cipher or a phantom, but 
as the real man that he is" (OD^l/2, 186). God does not 
contradict his own creation, even in miracle. "God Himself, 
and especially God Himself, will act in such a way in the 
continuation of His creation, in each new miracle of His 
freedom, that he remains faithful to this first work of 
His [the creation]; He will transform the reality of the 
creature, in a transformation which includes death, disso­
lution and new creation, but He will not destroy it; He 
will not take it away again* He will never be alone again 
as He was before creation. Hor v/ill the creature be again 
as it was prior to creation. In all that He will do, God 
will not cease to be the One who has done this first thing" 
(GD IIl/l, 43).
♦Revelation is the Word that is spoken to us.♦
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"The Word of God. is also God’s miracle in reaching its goal 
among men" (CD l/l, 208), Revelation is all of God: uncon­
ditioned, though received, by man. Then what about faith?
Is this not the special prerogative and possession of man? 
Certainly notI Faith, too, is revelation. "Faith is mir­
acle ."^  "The Word creates the fact that we hear the Word. 
Jesus Christ creates the fact that we believe in Jesus 
Christ" (CD 1/2, 247)# Again, "the possibility of knowing 
the Word of God lies in the Word of God and nowhere else.
Its reality can literally only take place, and as a visible 
miracle at that, visible to^ every man, secular or religious, 
Greek or Jew. * . . This miracle is faith" (CD l/l, 255).
"We have to recognise that faith as an irruption into this 
reality and possibility [of man’s capacities] means the 
removing of a barrier in which we can only see and again 
and again see a miracle" (CD 1/2, 506). Once again, faith 
can only be received by man who is himself faithless; faith, 
like all other miracles, arises out of the free grace of 
God alone. "If we have heard and heard again » . • then 
we can only regard this possibility of our hearing as a 
possibility gifted to us, subjectively and objectively, in 
an utterly miraculous way, as the *notwithstanding* of grace,
^Barth, The Epistle to the Romans. 115.
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which has nothing to correspond to it or precondition it"
(QD l/l. 467-68). The impartation ofihith is another element
of the free grace of God# "Faith is the freedom granted to
man by the grace of God. . . . Faith is contiguous with
the free grace of God" (CD IV/2. 242^43)• Faith is granted
by God: this is so even in those miracle stories of the lew
Testament which at first sight seem to imply that man moves
by virtue of his own belief towards Jesus the healer.
There are men who move towards the action of Jesus as 
those who are absolutely needy and poor and suffering 
and in miseiy. The only thing is that they believe in 
Him, and that in this faith in Him they have the freedom 
to move towards Him, towards His action, as though the 
action had already béen fulfilled. They have the free­
dom in a sense to anticipate its happening. This is 
#iat they do. And whence does their freedom derive 
except in the freedom of the grace of God, the grace 
which will work mightily in the occurrence of the 
miracle, but which is already mighty towards and in 
those who only move towards it, so that in their anti­
cipatory faith they are themselves the anticipated, who 
have no option but to look forward with illimitable 
confidence to its occurrence? The real truth is not 
that they themselves anticipate the miracle, but that 
they are anticipated by Jesus who performs the miracle, 
by the God active and revealed in Him. And He anti­
cipates them by.making them free for the faith in 
which they can move forward with irrestible steps 
to the miracle, or rather to the One who performs the 
miracle. He does it by causing it to shine as a light 
within them that He, Jesus, and God in Him, has remembered 
these poor sufferers, and is good and gracious to them 
in all their need and oppression, in alllhé darkness 
and corruption of their existence, without even asking 
who or what they are. The act of their faith is only 
their reaction to the shining of this light. • . . All 
this is not in their own name, but in the name of the 
One who has elected and called them (OD IV/2, 243).
Revelation is given to us in the witness of the
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Holy Scripture"The news of the revelation of God stands 
in Holy Writ, and therefore any reference to it, and announce­
ment of the event of revelation, must follow the bihlioal 
text* To put it quite plainly : what we have come to Imov/
as revelation in the Christian sense is to be found in a
book, in the book of the Old and Hew Testaments* God and
*1
His existence are to be found in this book*" "We are 
speaking of a miracle when we say that the Bible is the 
Word of God" (CD l/2, 528). This does not mean that the 
texts of the Bible are themselves revelations; nor that 
the writers and apostles were themselves particularly gifted 
or peculiarly religious people. "Their relationship to their 
object is the very unequal one of a heavenly treasure to the 
earthly vessels to which it has been entrusted for preser­
vation and impartation. But this relationship is their 
mystery and miracle* It is in this relationship, and only 
in this relationship, that they are inspired and speak the 
Word of God" (CD IIl/l, 93)* Again, "that sinful and erring 
men as such speak the Word of Gods that is the miracle of 
which we speak when we say that the Bible is the Word of 
God" (CD 1/2, 529).
♦Revelation is given to us in the witness of the
1 Barth, Against The Stream* 216.
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Holy Scripture♦* We can hear or apprehend the witness of 
the Holy Scripture; despite the fact that all of the Bible 
is not history in the strict sense of the term. First, some 
of the Scripture is not history in the sense that the dis­
tinctively Christian interpretation of biblical events is 
inaccessible to the historian as such. "Stories of events 
which have taken place between God and men, of course, fall, 
on their human side and therefore particularly in viev/ of 
the data industriously stressed in the Bible, as regards 
their temporal form under the general concept of history.
But they do not fall under it on their divine side" (OB^  l/l, 
375)* Secondly, some of the Scripture is not history in an 
even narrov/er sense: there seems to be a lack of details on
even the temporal side of the events which have taken place 
between God and men. In short, Barth believes that saga 
can witness to the reality of the Word of God. "The viev^ r 
that a Bible story is to be regarded partly or wholly as 
saga or legend need not necessarily attack the substance of 
the Biblical witness. It might merely declare that according 
to the canons by which otherwise and in general historical 
truth is judged, this story is one which more or less eludes 
certain demonstration that it ran the course corresponding 
to the narrative. ’Saga* or ’legend’ can only describe the 
more or less pervasive share of the narrator or narrators in
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the story narrated" (CD l/l, 375-76)* Speoifically, Barth 
eoneiders the question "Whether the serpent in Paradise 
•really* spoke? - I would decidedly oppose characterigring 
this incident as ’myth* # Ho more can I, on the other hand, 
characterise it, in the sense of historical science, as 
•historical*, for a speaking serpent — now, indeed, I am 
as little able to imagine that (apart from anything elsel) 
as anyone* But I should like to;ask;.the dear friends of the 
spealcing serpent whether it would not be better to hold fast 
to the fact that this *is written* and to go on and interest 
themselves in what the serpent spoke? To me they appear to 
be very important and momentous words that I should not like 
under any circumstances to miss from the Bible *"^  Saga and 
legend, as part of the witness of the Holy Scripture, may 
mediate to man the Word of God. But myth cannot witness to 
the revelation of the Word of Gods pure myth is, as a matter 
of fact, entirely absent from the Bible* Myth is man-made, 
about man, for man* As such, it is godless* "What is funda­
mental to myth [is] the contemplation of man and his cosmos 
as self-moving and self-resting, the contemplation of his 
©mergence as one of his own functions" (0^ IIl/l, 86). Myth pur-
.to point
ports/ 4:0 tifeless truth* "The customary definition that
^Barth, Oredo  ^190*
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myth is the story of the gods is only superficial* In myth 
both the gods and the story are not the real point at issue, 
but only point to it. The real object and content of myth 
are the essential principles of the general realities and 
relationships of the natural and spiritual cosmos which, in 
distinction from concrete history, are not confined to definite 
times and places* The clothing of their dialectic and cyclical 
movement in stories of the gods is the form of myth* The 
fairy tale, which is more interested in details than in the 
whole (as are legend and anecdote in relation to saga), and 
which inclines not to concrete history but to all kinds of ' 
general phenomena, truths or even riddles of existence, is 
a degenerate form of myth as are legend and anecdote of 
saga" (OjD IIl/l, 84). Pure myth is absent from the Bibles: 
even in the creation story* "The creation stories of the 
Bible are neither myths nor fairy tales* This is not to 
deny that there are myths, and perhaps in part fairy tales, 
in the materials of which they are constructed" (OD IIl/l, 84). 
But both history and saga witness to the revelation of the 
Word of God* "In the Bible we usually have to reckon with 
both history and saga" (OB IIl/l, 82).
’Revelation is given to us in the witness of the 
Holy Scripture.* Revelation is given to us in the witness of 
the Holy Scripture because - and only because — it witnesses
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to the Word of God, to Jesus Christ* As such, the Holy
Scripture is a miracle: a miracle of grace*
We reckon that the event of the Word of God is not a 
cSntinuation, but the end of all other events that v/e 
know* We reckon that a new series of events has begun. 
Again, the in itself non-miraculous giveimness of the 
Bible as the Y/ord of God, its existence amongst all 
the other facts of our cosmos, will not induce us to 
take any other view but ra,ther to take this view.
Yet in speaking of the act of God in Jesus Christ, it 
does itself speak of the grace of God as a reality 
which cannot be deduced or conceived in the context 
of the human existence which we know, a reality v/hich 
posits the end of all other events and opens up a new 
series of events. That the Y/ord of God is not under 
our control or foresight is proved by the fact that its 
content - and not only its content, but its reality as 
such - is the grace of God, which we have not deserved, 
the occurrence of which we cannot claim' or bring about, 
which we can only accept because God is pleased to be 
gracious to us. If we allow the Bible to say this to 
us, and in so doing to speak the Word of God, how else 
can we think of the Word of God in the Bible except as 
a miracle? (OD 1/2, 528).
•Wherever revelation in the Ohristian sense is 
known and acknowledged^ there the Christian Church is.* 
Revelation is the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
Therefore, "the revelation on which the Church is founded 
is the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and it alone.
Since this is the case, the Church is, ideally at least, all 
of God and all from God. And so it is pi*oper to speak of 
"the miracle of the Church" (CD II/2, 228). "The elected
^Barth, Against The Stream. 226.
—  154-
oommimlty of God, ae the environment of the elected man 
Jeeus of Ha^aroth, ia the place where God*a honour dwells, 
i.e. where this Jeaim la revealed as God’s promise in person, 
where this Jesus is heard, where He is believed, where in 
Him and by Him it comes about, therefore, that God’s self- 
witness, the declaration of His good-will and work for man, 
finds a hearing and faith. The community ia elected in 
relation to the whole world (as reprasentativea of Jesus 
Christ and the deed of divine judgement and mercy aooomplished 
in Him) in order to serve the divine promise that awaits the 
hearing and faith of man# # # # Wherever it lives, it always 
lives in the service of the divine self-witness which man is 
permitted to hear and is called to believe" (01) ïl/2, 233)#
♦The Church is the reality which arises and con­
tinue B wherever the revelation of God in #eeus Christ has 
made itself Imown#’ And "the Church of faith in God’e 
promise [is] founded on the resurrection of Jesus" (CD Xl/2, 
240)* "The content of Easter Day and the Easter season con­
sisted in this, . * • in the appearance of the body of 
Jesus Christ, which embraced their [the disciples’],death : in
its death, their life in its life, their past and their future 
in itself, thus including them all inifcself ♦ As He enooiintorod 
them in this corporeity, the disciples heard addressed to 
themselves as such, to the e.oola.oia which arose in virtue
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of it, the call which is the disclosure of the secret of 
His earthly-historical existence: ’Ye are the body of
Christ’" (CD IV/l, 664)* The resurrection is the turning 
point of history: the end of the old, the beginning of the
new. "God acts in this way - as Hé alone can act - as He 
has reconciled the world to Himself in Jesus Christ: i.e.,
as the One who in His death reveals the end of all creatures, 
and at the same time their new beginning in His resurrection" 
(CD IÏI/I, 28). Ho wonder the resurrection is termed, by 
Barth, "the miracle of all miracles" (CD IIl/l, 77). In 
this event, a man is reconciled to God: reconciliation, too,
is a genuine miracle (CD l/l, 473-74). The resurrection is 
effected from above2 happening in history, but not con­
ditioned by previous history. Speaking of the resurrection 
of the Christian, Barth writes: "The resurrection cuts
clean through the life and death of man, it is salvation—
1history which cleaves its way through all other histories." 
The resurrection is a divine proof to those within the faith, 
though the event of the resurrection has no demonstrable 
value to those without the faith. "There can be no demon­
stration of the event [of the resurrection] which has apolo­
getic value" (CD IV/2, 143). But to the man of faith, the
1Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead. 218.
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resurrection is "an act of divine proof vfhich we can now 
interpret only as a divlnei miracle # This act of divine 
proof is the resurrection of Jesus Christ, The resurrection 
alone is decisive for the truth that, as sinners before God, 
v/e are pronounced righteous" (CD II/2, 758).
’The Church is the reality which arises and con­
tinues wherever the revelation of God in Jesus Christ has 
made itself known#’ And the Christian dhuroh arose by 
virtue of the resurrection of Jesus. Because this is so 
central and so vital in Barth’s theology, consideration must 
be given to it as a fact of history. Does not a deep veil 
hang over the event of the resurrection? Is it not seriously 
open to doubt from a historical point of view? But what, 
according to? Barth, is the historical point of viev;? And 
what, according to Barth, is history? An historical event 
is one which "is accessible to man because it is visible and 
perceptible to him and can be comprehended as history, [which] 
is from the objective standpoint oreaturely history in the 
context of other oreaturely history, as an event prior to 
which and side by side with which there are other events of 
the same basic type with which it can be compared and integ­
rated" (OD IIl/l, 78). Of course history - meuSingful his­
tory - is more than just what is visible and perceptibles 
there is a ’non-historical element’, an interpretative side,
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to history as well. "We oaimot overlook the fact that all 
historical writings become soulless and intolerable to the 
extent that they try to be just historical and nothing 
more" (OD IIl/l, 78). But revelation, and miracle, seem 
to be excluded from history even in this broad, interpretative 
sense: revelation, like miracle, is all of God* Revelation,
like miracle, ’^is an event in this world of ours, yet such 
that it is not grounded upon the continuity of events in 
this world nor is it to be understood in terms of it. It 
is a sign set up Immediately by God, and can only be under­
stood as such" (OD 1/2, 187). Any relationship, which reve­
lation or miracle has to history (even in this broad, inter­
pretative sense) is an apparent relationship only * "History 
subsequent to creation has a oreaturely element, i.e., a 
similarity and relationship with other oreaturely occurrences# 
This relationship may be anything but obvious* It may be 
easily and almost completely obscured. This is particularly 
the case where history assumes the character of miracle. It 
is most apparent at the centre of the history of the covenant 
of grace - in the resurrection of Jesus Ohrist. What does 
it really mean to see and grasp a real miracle? What does 
it mean to perceive and establish a resurrection from the 
dead? In this case the historical element in the event seems 
almost to have disappeared and the ’non-historical’ to have
■ -r;. 158 -
taken the upper hand. Even the human account of it, the 
deecription of the event, seems necessarily to have burst 
through the framework of historical relation. And this is 
what actually takes place" (CD IIl/l, 78-9)* Ooncerning 
the resurrection, Barth concedes that the resurrection of 
Jesus is not an historical fact which can be established by 
the means at the disposal of the historical scientist. But 
from this Barth thinks that it does not follow that it did 
not happen.^. "Can such history, too, not really have taken 
place, and can there not also be a legitimate recognition of 
such history, which certainly for reasom of good taste we 
shall abstain from calling an ’historical fact’, and which 
the ’historian’ in thé modern sense may by all means call ’ saga 
or ’legend’, because it, in fact, escapes the means and methods 
together with the tacit presuppositions of this historian?"
^Barth, Die kirkliohe Dogmatik^IXl/2. 535.
^Ibid. "Kann sioh nioht auoh solche Geschichte wirk- 
lioh ereignet hâben, und kann es nicht eine 
legitime Anerkennung auoh solcher Gesohiohte 
geben, die ’historisches Faktum* zix nennen 
man schon aus GrÜnden des guten Geschmacks 
unterlassen wird, die der ’Historiker* im 
modernen Sinn des Begriffs gut und gerne ’Sage* 
Oder ’Legende’ nennen mag, well sie sioh den 
litteln und Methodon samt den stillschweig- 
enden Vorausset^sungen dieses Historikers in 
der Tat entaieht?"
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Even though the resurrection has but "a slender ’historical* 
margin"^ it is yet one of those events which "have really 
taken place as history in time far more certainly than
p
everything which the ’historian’ as such can establish."
’The Church is wherever the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ allows itself to be known of men and succeeds 
in winning their acknowledgement * ’ The Church is sustained 
by God, sustained by the work of the Holy Bpirit: arid so
it is possible to speak of "the miracle and mystery of the 
Holy Bpirit" (CD IY/2, 340). "To receive the Holy Spirit 
means an exposure of our spiritual helplessness, a recogni­
tion that we do not possess the Holy Spirit# For that reason 
the subjective reality of revelation has the distinctive 
character of a miracle, i.e., it is a reality to be grounded 
only in itself# In the actual subjective reality of revela­
tion it is finally decided that apart from it there is no 
other possibility of being free for God" (OB^  l/2, 244). The 
gift of God in Jesus Christ is received as a revelation, as 
a miracle in the comimznity founded and sustained by God.
^Barth, Die kirkliche Dogmatik^ III/2, 535. "mit 
einem sÆmïen ' ’historiscixen’ Rand."p
"Ibid. "Es kî5mi!te Ereignisse geben, die viel sicherer 
wirklich in der Zeit gesohehon sind als allés, 
was die ’Historiker’ als solche feststellen 
kBnnen."
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Man can only be amazed at the gift of freedom for God.
"When revelation takes place, it never does so by means of 
0U3? insight and skill, but in the freedom of God to be free 
for us and to free us from ourselves, that is to say, to 
let His light shine in our darkness, which as such does not 
comprehend Hie light. In this miracle, which we can only 
aclmowledge as having occurred, which we can only receive 
from the ha,nd of God as it takes place by His hand, His 
kingdom comes for us, and this v/orld passes for us. It is 
in this coming a,nd this passing that there talces place for 
us the movement which Holy Bcripture calls revelation" (CD l/2,
Revelation, like miracle, is the self-revelation of 
God in Christ. Revelation is the Word of God spoken to us, 
given to us in the witness of the Bible, mediated to us by 
the Christian Church. We have seen that Barth uses the word 
miracle as meaning practically the same as the word revela­
tion: this is made clear in the following quotation, which
sums up this first usage of the word miracle, and in which 
the words ’sign’, ’miracle’ and ’revelation’ are quite inter­
changeable #
In His revelation, in Jesus Christ, the hidden God has 
indeed made Himself apprehensible. Hot directly, but 
indirectly.. Not to sight, but to faith. Hot in His 
being, but in sign, lot, then by the dissolution of 
His hiddenness - but apprehensibly* The revelation of
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God is that God has given to the creature whom He has 
chosen and determined for this end the commission and 
the power to talce his place and represent Him, to hear 
witness to Him. The Word was made flesh: this is the
first, original and controlling sign of all signs. In 
relation to this sign, as the sign of this sign, there 
is also oreaturely testimony to His eternal Word, not 
everywhere, but where His eternal Word has chosen, 
called and created for Himself witnessess a testimony 
by the word of the prophets and apostles of this Word; 
by the visible existence of His people, His Ohurch; 
by the Gospel which is delivered and to be heard in it; 
by the sacraments in which this Gospel has also a physi­
cally visible and apprehensible form; and finally, by 
the existence of us who believe this testimony. Jesus 
Christ and His visible kingdom on earth: this is the
great possibility, created by God Himself, of vi-ev/ing 
and conceiving Him, and therefore of speaking about 
Him* For as we men viev/ and conceive Him, so we can 
speak of Him. We cannot do so without this veil, and 
therefore without the reservation of His hiddenness, 
or apart from the miracle of His grace (CD Il/l, 199)•
In spite of the fact that miracle and revelation 
are often interchangeable in Barth's theology, there are other 
places where there is a distinct difference: a difference
which we must now try to point out and explain.
To state the difference briefly, revelation is a 
broader term than miracle. Miracle always accompanies reve­
lation but it is not itself revelation: rather it points to
revelation. "Miracle is an attribute of revelation. As it 
were, it marks off the limits of revelation time from all 
other times. . . . For that reason all attempts at weakening 
or conjuring away the miraculous character of revelation are 
to be rejected on principle" (CD l/2, 64). One of the marks
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of revelation is that it is "a mystery" (OD, 1/2, 178), and
miracle points to the mystery, signifies the revelation.
Miracles are "signs of revelation" (03) l/2, 184). "The
miracle of God . . .  is itself only a sign of God's mystery"
(CD IIl/l, 146). Or again, "miracle is the form of the
reported mystery, the figure of the attested divine act and 
*1
revelation." Miracle is properly a sign. The events
narrated in the creed 'conceived by the Holy Ghost, born
of the Virgin Mary' are signs pointing to the mystery and
the revelation of the Incarnation. "A miracle points to
the mystery of the true divinity and true humanity, the
2miracle of this procreation and of this b i r t h T h e  miracle 
of the empty tomb points to the mystery and the revelation 
of the resurrection. A miracle as "a sign must, of course, 
signify* To do so it must have in itself something of the 
kind of thing it signifies; it must be in analogy with it 
noetically and ontically" (CD 1/2, 182). Yet miracle is 
distinct from revelation, even if miracle always accompanies 
revelation. "Sign is still not the thing signified" (CD l/2, 
183). But iàtillj it is'in the sign that revelation
Barth, Die kirkliche PoCTatik. Ill/4, 363. "Das
Wunüer ist die Form des beriohteten Geheimnisses, 
die Gestglt der bezeugten gCttliohen Tat und 
Offenbarung."
^Barth, Dogmatics in Outline. 98.
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becomes real for man* "Everything in the end depends on 
the one thing, on the mystery of the revelation [the person 
of Jesus Ohrist] speaking and being apprehended through this 
sign [the miracle of the Virgin birth]" (OP l/2, 184). "It 
is the description of this mystery [the vere Peus vero homo 
of Ohrist] that is the purpose of the dogma [of the Virgin 
birth]" (OP 1/2, 178).
Is it possible that revelation or mystery can be 
apprehended apart from recognizing the validity of the 
sign? Theoretically, yes* but practically, no. Theore­
tically "there is certainly nothing to prevent anyone, 
without affirming the doctrine of the Virgin birth, from 
recognizing the mystery of the person of Jesus Ohrist or 
from believing in a perfectly Ohristian way. It is within 
God's counsel and will to make this possible" (OP 1/2, 181)* 
But practically, "when two theologians with apparently the 
sanie conviction confess the mystery of Ohristmas, do they 
mean the same thing by that mystery, if one acknowledges 
and confesses the Virgin: birth to be the sign of the mystery 
while the other dénies it as a mere externality or is ready 
to leave it an open question? Poes the second man really 
acknowledge and confess that in His revelation to us and in
our reconciliation to Him, in our measureless astonishment
tiand in measureless hiddenness the iniation is wholly with
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G-od? Or does he not by his denial or declared indifference 
towards the sign of the Virgin birth at the same time betray 
the fact that with regard to the thing signified by this sign 
he means something quite different? May it not be1he case ihat 
the only one who hears ihe witness ofihe thing is ihe one who 
keeps to the sign by which the witness has actually signified 
it?" (op 1/2, 179"*80), Again, "Jesus Christ was God Himself. 
And our knowledge that this is no dream but the truth, and 
the fact that we have received that knowledge, rest entirely 
on the Easter message literally understood."
Is it possible that any particular revelation might 
have been signified in a way different from the traditional 
way? TheoreticallyI yes: but practically, no. Theoretically,
îîit might have pleased God to let His Son become man in some 
quite different way than in the event of the miracle attested 
as the Virgin birth" (CD IV/l, 207). Practically, "it did 
in fact please Him to let Him become man in this way. • • .
The question is pertinent whether His divine Sonship and the 
mystery of His incarnation are known in any real seriousness 
and depth when these attestations of it are unrecognized or 
denied or explained away" (CjD IV/l, 207).
Sign (miracle) and that signified (revelation or
^Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God. 87-8
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the mystery of revelation) must be distinguished but they 
cannot be divided. "Sign and thing signified, the outward 
and the inward, are, as a rule, strictly distinguished in 
the Bible, and certainly in other connexions we cannot lay 
sufficient stress upon the distinction. But they are never 
separated in such a (’liberal*) way that according to pre­
ference the one may be easily retàinied without the other"
(OB X/2, 179)* As an illustration of this distinction,
Barth never tires of quoting the example in Mk. 2.1-12 (the 
healing of the paralytic). "The forgiveness of sins is 
manifestly the thing signified, while the healing is the 
sign, quite inseparable from, but very significantly related 
to, this thing signified, yet neither identical with it nor 
a condition of it: ’That ye may know. • • .*" (OB 1/2, 189)#
In short, "the mystery does not rest upon the miracle. The 
miracle rests upon the mystery* The miracle bears witness 
to the mystery, and the mystery is attested by the miracle" 
(OB 1/2, 202).
Because the miracles as signs are not the same as 
that signified, are not the same as revelation, they are 
always open to different and non-Ohristian interpretations. 
The interpretation of the sign of the Virgin birth v/ill taîce 
the form of a hypothesis of parthogenesis (OB 1/2. 198). The 
interpretation of the sign of the empty tomb "will take the
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form of a hypothesis of vision or deception or apparent 
death" (OD 1/2. 184)# Other elements of Christianity are 
open to secular interpretations as well* "Thousands may 
have seen and heard the Rabbi of Nazareth. But this historical 
element was not revelation* Even the historical element at 
the resurrection of Christ, the empty grave regarded as an 
element in this event, that might possibly be fixed, was 
certainly not revelation. This historical element, like 
everything historical, is admittedly susceptible of an even 
highly trivial interpretation" (OB l/l. 373). Christian 
signs are open to non-Christian interpretations*
But what is the Christian interpretation of the 
signs or miracles? Briefly, they are to be interpreted as 
being the direct immediate acts of God, and of God alone.
A miracle is "an event in this world of ours, yet such that 
it is not grounded upon the continuity of events in this 
world nor is it to be understood in terras of it. It is a 
sign set up immediately by God, and can only be understood 
as such" (CD l/2, 187). "In the Bible a miracle is not
some event that is hard to conceive, nor yet one that is
simply inconceivable, but one that is highly conceivable, 
but conceivable only as the special new direct act of God 
in time and in history" (CD l/2, 63). A miracle is an
occurrence with "God as its subject, unperturbed by the
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course which it had to take according to the laws which we
know regulate everything that happens."* Miracle, like
revelation, is "an event that from man’s standpoint drops
down vertically from heaven" (OD l/l, 380)# Because miracle
is God’s; act alone, it is impossible for man to accomplish.
"’God cannot* means that He cannot do it on the basis of a
human possibility. ’God can’ means, of course, that He can
on the basis of His own possibility" (OT l/2, 246)# Because
miracle is God’s act alone, it is impossible from man’s
point of view# "That One who was dead should rise from
the dead is something impossible, incomprehensible and un—
2provable", on the basis of any human or natural explanation.
But the Christian knows that God has effected this, with
whom all things are possible* A similar view is taken of
the Virgin birth*
When we regard the Holy Spirit by v/hom Jesus Christ is 
conceived as in the strictest sense God Himself, God 
the Lord, we forestall and eliminate any attempt to 
come to the assistance of the saying about the Virgin 
birth of Christ with any speculation from physics or 
with any more or less genuine scientific information 
of 8, biological sort* In other words, if we are clear 
that with the Holy Spirit God Himself is declared to 
be the author of the sign of the Virgin birth, then we 
know that in acknowledging the reality of this sign 
we have a priori renounced all understanding of it as 
a natural possibility, even when we are tempted to do;
^Barth, Credo# 101#
Barth and Thurneysen, Gome Holy Spirit# 162#
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so by a consideration so inviting as that of natural 
parthogenesis, for example# We are already committed, 
then, to an acknowledgement of a pure, divine beginning, 
of a limiting of all natural possibilities, and this 
forbids us at the very outset to indulge in any feflec- 
tion as to whether and how this reality can be anything 
else but a pure divine beginning (OD 1/2, 197-98)*
Since a miracle is a ’pure divine beginning’, theze can be 
no talk of a miracle being ’impossible* or ’inconceivable’, 
from: the human point of view* As Barth says: "The many
miracles of the Bible are only illustrations of this, the 
miracle [of the resurrection]; the more thfe^y tell the more 
we are av/are of the range of the possibility of the one 
miraculous new order* And they illustrate what the resur­
rection illustrates supremely, that it is beside the point 
even to ask whether they are historical and possible. They 
make no claim to be either* They signalize the unhiatorical, 
the impossible, the new time that is coming. . * . Some 
day people will smile at the pictures of Jesus which we 
have made acceptable to the cultured by purging them of
miracle, even more than our eighteenth and nineteenth cen—
1turios have smiled at the miracle stories." Barth there­
fore emphasizes - in contrast to several theologians cited
p
above - that we cannot say of any event, particularly a
^Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man* 91. 
^0f. above ,5 62f.
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bilblioal miracle, that it is ’impossible* or ’inconceivable* * 
That which is impossible for man, is effected by God in a 
miracle * "When revelation takes place, it never does 
by means of our insight and skill, but in the freedom of 
God to be free for us" (OT l/2, 65). "What will meet us 
contrary to all our own capacity will be a miracle" (CD l/2, 
159).
Miracles are signs of revelation. Miracles are 
effected by God alone. Does this mean that we can and must 
literally accept all the biblical miracles? The answer is: 
no. "The fact that the statement ’God reveals Himself’ is 
the confession of a miracle that has happened certainly does 
not imply a blind credence in all the miracle stories related 
in the Bible. If we confess the miracle, we may very well, 
at least partially and by degrees, accept additional light 
from the miracles as necessary signs of the miracle. But 
even if we confess the miracle, why should we not constantly 
find this or that one of the miracles obscure, why should we 
not constantly be taken aback by them? It is not really 
laid upon us to taîce everything in the Bible as true in globo. 
but it is laid upon us to listen to its testimony when we 
actually hear it. A man might even credit all miracles and 
for that reason not confess the miracle [that ’God reveàls 
Himself’]" (OD l/2, 65). Though he does not expressly say
-  170 -
so, Barth would seem to imply that the genuine Christian can 
and must accept the signs of the Incarnation and the resur­
rection: that is, the miracles of the Virgin birth and the
empty tomb. The Ce two revelations, and these two miracles, 
are of fundamental importance in Barth’s theology. If 
priority be given, then he would say that the resurrection 
is the more important: but there is an intimate connection
between the two, as he so impressively points out. "The 
mystery at the beginning is the basis of the mystery at 
the end; and by the mystery of the end the mystery of the 
beginning becomes active and knowable. And since this is 
so, the same objective content is signified in the one case 
by the miracle of the Virgin birth, in the other by the miracle 
of the empty tomb" (CD 1/2, 183).
Miracle is conceivable only as the exponent of 
the special direct act of God time and ^  history. The 
preposition ’'in’ is of considerable importance* lor although 
a miracle comes from above: although it comes directly
from the hand of God without being pre-conditioned by worldly 
events, yet a miracle happens in history. Miracle happens 
"amid the continuity of the oreaturely world, yet indepen­
dently of it" (gi) 1/2, 182). "The location of this miracle 
[of the Virgin birth] within human reality is stressed by 
the ex Maria" (OD 1/2, 185) * Even creation, v/hich might
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be thought to have been pre-temporal, is yet in time* "The
fact that creation encloses in itself the commencement of
all time does not alter in the very slightest the fact that
it is itself real history and that as such takes its place
in time" (CD IIl/l, 76)# The character of miracle as being
in time, and yet as being from God — i.e., as something
entirely new, a pure divine beginning - is described at
greater length by Barth.
When God speaks and acts and is heard and obeyed by 
men, it is always in the sphere of creation, at some 
point in the context of the life established and 
preserved by creation. Yet in this very sphere and 
context it is something completely new. Although it 
follows some other event and many other events, it does 
not follow from this other event or the sequence of 
all others. On the contrary, at the heart of these 
other events it has the character of a termination of 
all the: rest and at the same time of the beginning 
of something quite different. God’s words and acts, 
and the faith and obedience with which man meets these 
(and the unbelief and disobedience with which he with­
stands them) do take place within the course and develop­
ment of created things, and have the character of these 
things. At the same time, however, they have decisively 
the character of an interruption and annulment of all 
that precedes in favour of a new order. We do not know 
of the Spirit whence He comes or whither He goes. Signs, 
reversals and alterations take place on the same old 
earth and under the same old heaven as everything else, 
and in continuity with everything that precedes, and 
yet at the same time they proclaim a new heaven, a new 
earth and a new continuity (CD Il/l, 509)#
Again, miracle is conceivable only as the exponent 
of the special direct act of God in man himself. The freedom 
given in revelation by the Word of God creates a miracle in 
man himself: a possibility explicable only on the basis of
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the direct act of God, i.e. a miracle. "We have to under­
stand it [the Word Itself in Jesus Christ] as a miracle, 
and not in any sense as a natural freedom and capacity"
(CD 1/2, 265). Yet the miracle of the reception of the 
Word of God "talœs place in man whè ie himself and with 
himself. It is not to a transcendent alter e/>:o (if there 
are such things) that the divine possibility in revelation 
is given to apprehend# It is given to me myself. I am the 
old man and I am also the new man on the basis of this possi­
bility" (CD, 1/2, 266). Since this revelation is given apart 
from, and in spite of, our own capacities and understanding,
"we can only understand it as a miracle. • • • We are a 
riddle to ourselves. We loxow that we are set before God, 
but we do not know how it happened. We do not know how we 
as such can stand and be before God. We do not know how we 
are worthy of it" (CD 1/2, 267-68). And it is only the action 
of God upon us that allows us to be in any sense witnesses 
to the revelation which he has given to us. "The reality, 
the worth and the effectiveness of our witness can never be 
in our power and disposal, but , . . if there is to be a real 
praise of God and love of our neighbour in our activity, 
there has to take place an activity of God which we with our 
activity can only serve, and which from the standpoint ofrour 
activity can only have the character of miracle" (OD l/2, 450).
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Miracle is all of God, and "miracle ceases to be miracle" 
when the recipient falls into arrogance or surrenders him­
self to any kind Of self-assurance (02 1/2, 756),
Now that we have considered twO' of Barth’s uses of 
the word miracle - first, as equivalent to revelation; second­
ly, as an attribute of revelation — we can now discuss his 
third usage of the word: to refer particularly to those
Few Testament events traditionally called miracles.
The miracles of Jesus are the accounts of the
concrete activity of Jesus, distinguishable but inseparable
the
from the words of Jesus, which are/accounts of his concrete 
speech. Word and deed, speech and act: these are the com­
ponents of the life-act of Jesus* "It is not merely in 
fact, but an inner and basic necessity, that the accounts 
of His concrete activity are added to those of His concrete 
speech. It is quite impossible that thfy should not be there. 
His activity was as it were the kindling light of His speech —
the light of the truth of His speech kindling into actuality"
(OD IV/2# 209). The miraculous activity of Jesus "is still
His preaching of the Gospel and teaching and proclamation -
but now in its total, cosmic form" (OD IV/2. 210)* But 
what can be said as to the nature of the miracles themselves?
First of all, as to "the miraculous nature of the 
overwhelming majority of the distinctive acts of Jesus [we
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must admit] their extraordinary, alien and, let us not 
hesitate to say it, supranatural character" (OD 1/2, 187)#
The extraordinary oharacteristio of the miracles is indeed 
"indispensable" (OD l/2, 187)• "They indicate the presence 
0)f an extraordinary reality# * $ * Th^y wer ,^ in a general 
sense, miracles" (gp IV/2# 211)*
But, as Barth hastens to point out, "miraculous 
and marvellous are two different things" (OD l/2, 187)* 
Marvellous things no doubt happened in New Testament times, 
and marvellous things no doubt happen in our own day. If 
we say that the anlracles are marvels only, we are far from 
the biblical view of them. If we look upon them merely as 
marvels, "there appears to be the possibility of explaining 
some of them, many of them, and perhaps even all of them, 
in a way that is at least approximately comprehensible, 
seeing and understanding them as one novelty in ar* series 
of others" ( ^  IV/2, 212). Merely as amrvels they are, of 
course, miracles: but only relative miracles, in line with
other relative miracles, ancient and modern. "Y/hat was done 
by the disciples of the Pharisees and the healings of Bpidauros 
and the marvels reported of Apollonius were not in any sense 
everyday occurrences. . . • For is it when a modern doctor 
of souls really meets with success and someone who suffers 
from genuine hysteria is brought back to reason, or even
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partly back* These things are all completely strange. And 
the acts of Jesus would still have to be called. *3narvols’ 
in this sense even if they belonged to the same order of 
phenomena and oould to that extent be made approximately 
comprehensible. But in that case they would have become 
only relatively extraordinary actions" (03) IV/2. 213). There 
is no necessary connection between such marvels and Christian 
belief, as Kierkegaard had already pointed out. "He [Christ] 
makes it evident that in relation to Him there can be no 
question of any proofs, that a man does not come to Him by 
the help of proofs, that there is no direct transition to 
this thing of becoming a Christian, that at the most the 
proofs might serve to make a man attentive, so that once he 
has become attentive he may arrive at the point of deciding 
whether he will believe or be offended."^ If each of Jesus* 
miracles is merely a marvel, then "the new thing which it 
brings is only a revelation of the depth of the old - a 
depth which was always there and could even be discerned.
Its repudiation of the old means only that the frontiers of
the latter are pushed back a little at this or that point"
(CD IV/2, 216). With the marvel or miracle we still remain
in a this-worldly framework.
TKierkegaard, Training in Christianity. 98
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If we say that the miracles. are marvels only, we 
fall short of the biblical view of them* By way of paren­
thesis, Barth points out that there are symptoms in the 
Bible itself that Jesus* miracles are not merely marvels*
He mentions six of these symptoms, but insists that they are 
symptoms only; which symptoBis do not prove that Jesus* 
miracles are real miracles. First, the New Testament accounts 
of miracle shov; that Jesus was not an ordinary wonder­
worker or miraclS'-maker. "The majority of the miracle** 
stories do not give any indication that Jesus Himself took 
the iniative in their performance ; that He willed to do 
them of Himself; that He acted according to a definite plan.
. • * Jesus did not ’make* miracles. He does them. They 
take place by Him" (OB IV/2, 216). Secondly, the New Testa­
ment accounts of miracle show that Jesus made very sparing 
use of any therapeutic practice. "There is no such thing 
as a technique of healing in any serious sense. He did not 
control any art or craft which he applied to His acts. . * • 
[They are not] characterized by the application of any physi­
cal, magical or psychicbl technique" (OB IV/2, 216). Thirdly, 
the New Testament accounts of miracle show that Jesus did 
not effect miracles to forward His own personality or inter­
ests. "Jesus did not perform any miracles in His own inter­
ests, for the preservation or deliverance of His own per-
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son. « • . He certainly does not expect or receive any 
reward on the part of men. . . . What is expected of those 
who are helped by Him is simply that they should ’give glory 
to God* (LÎC. 17*18) ^ and nothing more" (QD IV/2. 216-17). 
Fourthly, the New Testament accounts of miracle show that 
Jesus did not effect miracles for social, political or econo­
mic reasons. "The miracles of Jesus do not take place in 
the sphere or as the content of even a partial attempt at 
the amelioration of world-conditions or an organized improve­
ment of the human lot* Jesus was not in any sense an acti­
vist. . . . His well-doing never became an institution. . . « 
The acts of Jesus are beginnings with no corresponding contin­
uations" (OP IV/2, 217)* Fifthly, the New Testament accounts 
of miracle show that Jesus saw the miracles as integral to 
the kerygma; there was a vital connection between faith and 
miracle. "The miracles of Jesus are the cosmic actualizations 
of His kerygma. and are performed in this context to summon 
men to faith. They are not independent, but render this 
twofold service to faith and the call to faith* . . . Their 
significance is only as actualizations of His Word, as calls 
to repentance and faith" (CD IV/2, 217). Sixthly, the New 
Testament accounts of miracle show that the evangelists (and 
the early community) saw the miracles as syinbolio actions.
"The Evangelists are not merely wanting to say that this or
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that happened In this or that oonorete aetualization of the 
kingdom of God. They also say that as this or tho,t happened 
in actualization of the kingdom of God Jesus gave us a 
model or original of certain situations in the history of 
the development and being and formation and work of the commu*- 
nity which 1$% His disoipleehip is charged with the oontlni^ ed 
proclamation of the Gospel, the kingdom and His own name.
In this respect, too, the miracles are not accidental but 
meaningful historical acts. . » • While Jesus does actually 
make history in the actions reported they are also parables"
(OD IV/2, 218).
If we say that Jesus’ miracles are marvels only, 
we fall short of the biblical view of them. There are, in­
deed, symptoms that they are more than marvels, but these are 
symptoms only* The evangelists wore well aware that certain 
other men in the ancient world did activities which bore 
strong resemblances to the works of our Lord. "Attention 
should be paid to the complete lack of concern with which 
the Christian tradition sets its accounts of the unusual acts 
of Jesus alongside current records of similar unusual cir­
cumstances. It is obviously well aware of these - but it:”, is 
confident all the same. We cannot ignore or contest the fact 
that it coincides with these records both in the general 
topic of its account and in some of its concrete details* * • •
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But it has no interest at all in them - either positive or 
negative" (OD IV/2# 214)# What then makes Jesus’ aots more 
than marvels or relative miracles? Y/hat makes Jesus* miracles 
real miracles?
What differentiates Jesus* aots from mere marvels 
is that they are absolute miracles : "the incursion and
appearance of something completely new" (OD XV/2. 212),
Jesus* miracles "do not accord any more than His words with 
the normal course of human and earthly things* They repre­
sent a new thing in the face of the usual order and form and 
, development" (01) IV/2;y 210) * As the miraoles "are recounted 
and.attested in the Gospels, they are absolutely new ajid 
different, in their unity with the good news, the teaching, 
the proclamation and therefore the existence of the man Jesus, 
from all other human or cosmic occurrence, usual or unusual, 
ordinary or relatively extraordinaiy. In relation to all 
other normal or abnormal events, they are absolute miraoles 
(for which even the word # * * supranatural is not really 
adequate)* It is only as such that they can be credible in 
the New Testament sense" (OB IV/2, 215)#
What makes Jesus* a.cts really miracles is that they 
are absolute miracles* And what makes them absolute? They 
are absolute because they are pf God: because they arîë mani­
festations of his kingdom* Miraoles are all of God: and
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that fact at once levels all distinctions in this world*
"It is the fact that they are miraoles of the kingdom which 
alone characterizes them as true and absolute miracles as 
opposed to those which took place and still talco place in 
our human antitheses" (03) IV/2, 219)# "According to the pro­
clamation in the Word of Jesus the alien and mira,culous and 
inconceivable thing that takes place in His actions in this 
world, and in defiance of all human being and perception and 
understanding, is nothing other than the kingdom of God* But 
this means that in them there is disclosed an antithesis 
which makes quite insignificant all the antitheses in human 
thinking * . * between the ordinary and the extraordinary, 
the conceivable and the inconceivable, the natural and the 
supranatural, the .earthly and the heavenly, the this-worldly 
and the other-worldly (in the ancient as well as the modern 
sense of these concepts)* All these contrasts are ironed 
out and lose their ultimately improper seriousness in favour 
of the genuinely serious distinction necessarily made by the 
revelation of this very different antithesis" (OB IV/2, 215)* 
But what is the kingdom of God? What do we mean 
when we say that Jesus’ acts are miracles of the kipgclom? 
Barth answers this question by considering the general 
nature of Jesus’ own miraoles*
First, we see that "they are all aots of power
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(dimameis)♦ and are often described as ouch. They are done, 
in fact, with a divine and unconditional freedom, and in 
this respect they are absolutely sovereign, alien, incom­
prehensible, and transcendent in relation to all the orders, 
forms and developments known to men# • • • It is: the power 
of God alone which is the power operative and revealed in 
the miracles of Jesus" (OB IV/2, 219) » But we must remember 
that it is the power of God ; it is not power alone, nor 
jîiere omnipotence # It is the power of God that can be seen 
in the miracles of Jesus# It is the power and compassion, 
the mercy and might, the grace and glory of God. "What 
always takes place in thesn is that in and with them a 
completely new and astonishing light - and in all its 
different manifestations the same light — was oast upon the 
human situation# And in the strict sense it was simply this 
light, and its shining, and the radiance which it shed, that 
encountered men as the unconditional power of God in the 
miracles of Jesus# The light was the genuinely incompre­
hensible, the genuinely miraculous, factor in these miracles# 
It was this that differentiated them from all other curious 
phenomena as absolute miracles, as signs of the kingdom of 
God drawn near and entering the himan situation in the works 
of Jesus as the actualization of His Word" (OB IV/2, 220-21). 
We see this might mediated by mercy, this glory mingled with
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grace, as we further study the accounts of Jesus’ miracles,
Beoondly, we see the grace of God, the light of 
the kingdom, in the miracles of Jesus when wo understand, the 
nature of the anan who is in some sense illuminated hy the 
grace and light of the kingdom of God. What kind of man is 
so illuminated? "The answer is obvious * It is the man with 
whom things are going badly; who is needy and fri^tened and 
harassed. He is one who is in every sense ’unfortunate*# . . • 
Apart from this aspect the miracles of Jesus cannot be brought 
into proper focus and genuinelyi; seen or understood" (OD IV/2, 
221).
Thirdly, we see the grace of God, the light of the 
kingdom, in the miracles of Jesus when we understand that 
"it is with their [men’s] evil existence in itself and as 
such that He is concerned in His aots" (OD IV/2, 222).
Jesus dealt, it is true, with the v/hole man. "But we must 
say, rather more exactly, that it is with the whole man in 
what is almost exclusively his ’natural* existence in the 
narrower sense, his physical existence, his existence as it 
is determined by the external form and force of the cosmos 
to which he belongs # . . , Jesus finds and sees man in the 
shadow of death* His miraculous action to man is to bring 
him out of this shadow, to free him from this prison, to 
remove the need and pain of his cosmic determination. * . .
- 183
He oaa be man again - a whole man in this elemental sense.
His existence as a creature in the natural cosmos is norma­
lized" (OD lY/2f 222)# And Jesus is interested in the 
sufferer as such# "The important thing about them in these 
stories is not that they are sinners but that they are 
sufferers# Jesus does not first look at their past, and 
then at their tragic present in the light of it. But from 
their present He creates for them a new future* He does not 
ask, therefore, concerning their sin# He does not hold it 
against thorn# He does not denounce them because of it# The 
help and blessing that He brings are quite irrespective of 
their sin" (O^ IV/2, 225).
And from these specific considerations of the mir­
acles of Je SUB, and what is invo3-ved in them, Barth goes on 
to note three things which these miraoles illustrate or 
symbolize# These three things may be termed 1) God’s interest 
in man, 2) God’s place beside man, 3) God’s grace to man#
The miracles of Jesus symbolize the fact that 
God is interested in man; and this despite the fact that 
this interest is not warranted or deserved by man# Despite 
man’s disobedience and sinfulness, God yet remains interested
(
in him# God "is interested in him as this specific cosmic  ^
being# He has not forgotten him or left him to himself#
In spite of hia sin He has not given him up# He maintains
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His covenant with him. He ie always faithful to him. He 
takes his sin seriously. But He takes even more seriously, 
with a primary seriousness,, the fact that he is His man even 
as a sinner, and^ ?^hove all that He Himself is the God of even 
this sinful man. # # . VHiere miracle is needed is to reveal 
the living God who has elected and ordained to be the God 
and Creator and Lord and Partner of man" (CD IV/2, 224-'25)* 
The miracles of Jesus symbolize the fact that 
God is with man * that he places himself alongside of man. 
"The God who is operative and revealed in the aots of Jesus 
self-evidintly places Himself at the side of man in this 
respect - that that which oauses suffering to man as Hia 
creature is also and above all painful and alien and anti­
thetical to Himself. As Jesus acts in His commission and 
power, it is dear that God does not will that which troubles 
and torments and disturbs and destroys man. . , . He does 
not will his death, but life* * » * The sorrow which opëhly 
or secretly fills the heart of man is primarily in the heart 
of God" (op IV/g* 22$)* But what causes this sorrow and 
death in man? Sin, sinfulness, disobedience# But God, 
beside man, fights God’s own enemy, and man’s. ’He [God] 
is wrathful against His own true enemy, which is also the 
true enemy of man, when HO is wrathful against sin. . . .
He takes the side of man and enters the field against this
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power of destraotion in all its forms" (OD XV/2, 225)*
Biarth ie able to illustrate this very persuasively in his 
exegesis of the demon-exoroisms, and he oonoludess "The 
activity of Jesus, and revealed in it God Himself and Hie 
kingdom, are a defiance of the power of destruction which 
enslaves man, of phthora in all its forms. They arc not a 
neutral force or omnipotence, hut the oiimipotenoe of mercy — 
not quiet and passive mercy, hut a mercy which is active, 
and therefore hostile to that power on behalf of poor man#
It is v/ith this that we have to do in the miracles of Jesus* 
And it is because we have to do with this that they are 
miracles" (CD IV/2, 232).
The miraoles of Jesus symbolize the fact that 
God’s grace is operative in these acts: grace, again, which
is BO unmerited# "It is gloriously free grace in which the
man Jesus acts and which is active and revealed in His action
as the truth and reality of God Himself# * # * The fact that
man is a sinner and therefore the enemy of God is not taken
into account or imputed to man in these merciful and war­
like actions of Jesus" (OB IV/2, 232)# It is this grace which
plants faith in man’s heart : by virtue of which faith, man
comes to God# Faith, even faith, is all of God* Faith is 
"man’s turning to Jesus and His power upon the basis of the 
fact that Jesus has turned to man in His power" (01) IV/2, 238)
1 8 6  -
From this analysis it is olear that the occurrenoe of miracle 
in itself and as such oould not lead to faith: since faith,
too, comes from the hand of God* And faith in Barth’s sense 
me,ans theological, faith in its strongest terms; "The dis­
tinctive feature of the New Testament faith in miracles is 
that it was faith in Jesus and therefore in God as the faith­
ful and merciful God of the covenant with Isreal; and that
in this way and as such it v/as this confidence in His power"
(OB lV/2,, 236) * "Faith is the freedom granted to man hy the
grace of God# « * • Faith is contiguous with the free grace
of God, and may be called its anthropological counterpart"
(OD,IV/2, 242-453*
And now we pass to the second main part of the
chapters that ia, to a critical examination of Barth’s
position*
How are we to place Karl Barth? Oertainly he has 
affinities with other positions# When he apeaics of miracle 
as ’an absolute miracle’, which he often does, there is a, 
simila,rity to contranaturalism* When he speaks, very rarely, 
of the ’one miraculous new order*, the]ze is a similarity to 
preternaturalism* When he says "the significance of all 
Hie [JeeuB*] acts is finally and decisively to be sought in
the fact that they are His acts" (Cg IV/2, 211) — and he very
often states similar convictions - there is a resemblance to
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GXipermturalism* When he remarks: "In this miracle [of
God in Jesus Christ], which we can only acknowledge as 
having occurred, which we can only receive from the hand of 
God as it takes place by His hand, His kingdom comes for us, 
and thi0 world passes for us* It is in this coming and this 
passing that there takes place for us the movement which the 
Holy Scripture calls revelation" (OD 1/2, 65), there is a 
similarity to the vievf of the existentialists* How are we 
to place Karl Barth? In spite of similarities with some of 
them, he fits conveniently into none of the arguments presented 
in this thesis* Ho probably comes closest to being a contra- 
naturalist! but even here there are fundamental differences* 
First of all, Barth does not agree with the contra- 
naturalist in his conception of an absolute miracle* For 
the contranaturalist, an absolute miracle tended to be an 
event which fell outside of both the regular order of this 
world and the wish and will of God. For Bartji, an absolute 
miracle does not mean this at all; he certainly disagrees
1that any event can happen outside the wish and will of God.
For Barth, an absolute miracle is an event which occurs in 
this world, but which owes its all to the hand of God. Mir­
acles are not primarily characterized by the fact that they
^Of. above, 40*
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are oontranatitral ; "The fact that they break into the 
regular course of events, and therefore break through • . . 
our picture of the law of the divine exercise of omnipotence, 
is of course true, but it is the least important and not 
the decisive element in the essence of biblical miracles"
(CD Il/l, 540) * What makes a miracle a miracle is that it 
comes directly from the hand of God. And this chars^cteristic 
that a miracle comes from the hand of God — sets aside as 
worthless all our distinctions about a nature-supranature 
schema: in this sense Barth is not a supranatural!st of
any sort; he is not a contranaturalist, nor a preternatura- 
list, nor a supernaturalist *
Secondly, Barth does not agree with the contra- 
naturalist in his conception of primary and secondary causa­
tion. In contranaturalism, secondary causation refers to 
the orderly everyday rule of God, primary causation refers 
to the arbitrary occasional intervention of God which can 
set aside, annul or destroy secondary causation* low Barth 
differs from this view# As Barth sees it, the ordinary 
everyday affairs are ruled by God, but only partially, only 
indirectly* Oertainly, "there are no rules or laws distinct 
from the ordinances of God’s own good and free will which 
are established by Him and bound to Him" (OD Il/l, 540)*
Yet in ordinary everyday affairs we get a picture of "the
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lordehip of powers whioh are aot even subservient to God 
and may even wish to rule as gods" (CD Il/l# 540) • Again, 
speaking of ordinary history, ordinary everyday affairs,
Barth says; "The history which follows the beginning of 
oreation is oharaoterlsod by the fact that it is • • • 
mediate to God, i*e., that it takes place simultaneously 
with a pre-history, in connection and in relationship with 
another than God" (OB lïX/l, 77» italics mine)* The impli­
cation is that there is little or no ordinary everyday rale 
of God; and in this sense Barth seems to dispose of secondary 
causation altogether* How where does a miracle differ from 
this state of ordinary everyday affairs? A miracle is "a 
sign set up Imamdlately by God, and can only be understood 
as such" (OB l/2, italics mine)* A miracle is "an event in 
this world of ours, yet such that it is not grounded upon 
the continuity of events in this world nor is it to be under­
stood in terms of it" (CB 1/2, 187)* That is to say, a 
miracle happens in ordinary everyday affairs but it ie not 
conditioned or caused by any of these affairs; it is condi­
tioned and caused by God who is outside this realm* A mir­
acle happens in everyday affairs, without breaking or annul­
ling these affairs* A miracle is inserted into everyday 
affairs, but does not set them aside* To the eontranaturalist, 
a miracle is inserted into everyday affairs, destroying them,
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setting them aside* To Barth, a miraole "is certainly some­
thing fundamentally new in the realm of oreation* But it 
is not for that reason either different or. alien* * * # The 
irruption of miraole does not take place outside this order, 
setting it aside and destroying it, but it belongs to the 
order as. a legitimate element and member in the right func­
tioning of the order" (OB Il/l, 540-41)* It is legitimate
in. the sense that God reaffirms by it that this is his world, 
against the powers in it which defy him* By miracle "it is
made clear to us that all the kingdoms of this y/orld will be
those of God and His Ohrist, and in fact arc this already"
(<ÇjB Il/l, 540) « To Barth, a miraole is inserted into ordi­
nary everyday affairs, has similarities with them, hut is 
not one of them at all*
Miracle takes place in history, it is a member of 
a series, but it is understandable only as the exponent of 
G'od^ s piix^e act* It is in history, but not conditioned by 
history* It is absolutely new, yet it does not destroy the 
old* It is in this last statement that Barth does not seem 
to be really clear* He can speak of a miracle as an inser­
tion, an irruption, an ihWruption, even an annulments yet 
he also says that a miraole does not destroy or set aside 
creation* Gan these alternatives both be meaningfully held? 
On the, one hand, he says that man is the same man both be-
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fore and after a miracle has been receiveds yet on the other 
hand, a miracle is a pure divine beginning* In Barth * s 
theology there seems to be a hipt, from time to time, that 
the world is utterly outside God*s control; alien and anti­
thetical to him* If God does control, he does so only as 
one of many povmrs, albeit the most powerful * God does, it 
is true, assert his sovereignty from time to time through 
the media of miracles; but outside of these random events, 
the world is godless# Man and his world are entirely without 
God, before a miraole takes place * Thus, a miraole "frees 
man from this prison" (CT IY/2, 222)* Man and his world 
are entirely corrupt before a miraoles fallen man is * still 
man and not oat*, as Barth expresses it, but his humanity 
and his world has been so corrupted by sin that no more than 
a cat is he able to hear God*s voice, unless God in a miracle
of sheer omnipotence hurls Ohrist into the human situation*
godless
Man and his world are entirely/before a miracle; and natural
man does not have any legitimate pre-understanding (Vorver-
o
etSndnis) of God * s Word at all* Man and his world are com— 
pletely lost before the coming of a miracle, which is so 
against man and his world that it can only be expressed as
1
Brunner and Barth, latural Theology* 68* 
an opposite opinion, of* below, 264ff,
— 19 2 ™ *
"God* s coup d* ©tat, on earth" (OB IV/2, 224) #
Miraole talces place in history, but it is not of 
history in regard to its ground or condition* Miraole has 
similarities to other events which precede and follow it*
It is objective in the sense that as a sign it looks like 
other events* True, the New Testament miracles have symptoms 
that they are other than ordinary miracles, but these are 
symptoms only# There are stories in ancient antiquity of 
virgin births, and there have been empty tombs before and 
after the time of the empty tomb of our lord* But althou^ 
the New Testament miracles appear in history, they are not 
of it* In a field of wild dandelions a gardener lovingly 
plants yet another* To the observer*s eye, it is similar to 
all the rest# If one examined this particular dandelion very 
minutely, one would probably find symptoms that it was dif*- 
forent; but there v/ould be insufficient evidence to conclude 
that this particular plant originated anyv/here else than in 
the very field in which it is found* Only the gardener and 
those with him know that it originated elsewhere* So it is 
with a miraole* It sits upon earth, but its roots are in 
heaven* And this is the only legitimate v;ay to understand 
it. The scientist may say what he will, but the Christian 
explanation will be completely and utterly different, and 
never the twain shall meet) indeed, they have no point of
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contact, no common ground at all. I do not think that this 
is so. The Christian says more than the scientist about an 
event which the Christian calls a miracle, his explanation 
gots deeper, his interpretation transcends and transforms 
that of the scientist; but it is not completely and utterly 
different, if this mèans " that the scientific explanation 
is utterly alien and worthless* Again, according to Barth, 
the historian* B explanation may be interesting but it is also 
absolutely valueless ; it is to be ruthlessly discarded and 
an absolutely different interpretation adopted* I do not 
thinlc that this is so. To Barth, though God works ^  his­
tory, he in no wise works through history. This interpreta­
tion supports the criticism made above; Barth tends to say 
that history cannot be transcended, deepened or fulfilfedy. 
but rather it must be destroyed, shattered, annuled. The 
Ohristian view has nothing to do at all with a non-Ohristian 
view of history. This in part explains Barth*a ambiguous: 
use of the term *history*. The event of the resurrection 
is not open to the historian, says Barth* But it does not 
follow from this that it did not happen* Bultmann asks;
"My question is, what does Barth understand by *have taken 
place as history* and *history*? What kind of events are 
those about which it can be said that they *have really 
taken plane as history in time far more certainly than every-
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thing which the *historian* can establish as such*? • . .
Yûiat kind of * endowing with faith* is it, if faith is to be 
brought over against the assertion of events which are said 
to have taken place as history in time and history, yet 
cannot be established by the means and methods of historical 
science? And how is such a faith distinguished from a blind
"I
acoeptanoe involving a sacrificium intolleotua?"
According to Barth, the Ohristian answer does not 
transcend or transform or go beyond or fulfil that of the 
historian or scientist ; it is utterly and completely different< 
There seems, in short, to be no point of contact at all* This 
means that Ohristianity must fence off a corpus of events 
and tell the scientist and historian that they have utterly 
nothing of value to say* The scientist and historian, as 
we have already noted, will not agree that a certain number
p
of * sacred events* lie outside their scrutiny or investigation* 
But is this a healthy state of affairs even from a theologi­
cal point of view? It assumes - anShere we come back to the 
same fundamental criticism - that the field of the historian 
and the scientist is outside of, and antithetical to, God's 
interest: the realm of the historian and the scientist is
^Bultmann, GV II, 254~-3î5f EÎ 260-61.
^Cî. above, 66ff.| Jiff.
[I
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ruled by other powers* God works in history, but not 
through it# His work is inserted from above; and when 
it enmeshes with them, it crushes man and his world beneath 
it* Against this interpretation, we must insist on the 
truth of Ohrist*s contention, which is applicable as well 
to this situation: "'Think not that X have come to abolish . *
I have come not to abolish them but to fulfil them" (Mt*
5*17)# To Barth, the paradox of miraole is that in this 
event, which has similarities to other events, God alone 
is at work, to ttie exclusion of all other causes and condi­
tions* God drops his handiwork into history, but this 
handiwork is not part of history*
Miraole takes place in history, but it is not a 
part of history* Eevelation is inserted into history from 
above# It is not therefore surprising that Barth's media 
of revelation are severely restricted to tthe few tradi­
tional ones: Bible, church, worship and the sacraments*
Those alone are God's handiwork in the midst of an alien 
world* God in Jesus Ohrist works only in them* God in 
Jesus Christ drops into history from above in well-defined 
areas, but it is impossible to meet God in Ohrist outside 
of these agencies of salvation* I do not think that this 
is the case* Can we not meet God in and through the persons, 
responsibilities and things of this life? Barth says an
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emphatic Nôî Revelation seems to demand an end, an-annul­
ment and a destruction of all this-woridly things; reve­
lation effects a radical and complete apocalypse which, 
though occurring in history, has nothing to do with history 
at all. '
How are we to place Karl Barth? Is his theology 
not primarily an example of what Paul Tillich calls 'heter- 
onomous * thinlcing? A heteronomous theology is one which ela­
borates an intricate and massive system of dogmatic propo­
sitions which hang together in a beautiful and orderly 
fashion, but when applied to any concrete human situation, 
the theology is found v/anting. It is a theology which pays 
scant attention to the situation; indeed, the situation 
is written off as worthless at the very outset* This is 
my fundamental criticism of Barth's theology, more particu­
larly of his treatment of miracle as revelation, and his 
treatment of miracle as an attribute of revelation. Miraole 
is dropped down from above, looking like Its predecessors 
and followers in a series, but really radically different.
And this miracle seems to break, destroy and annul man, 
man's history end man's world*
How are we to place Karl Barth? Merely as a 
heteronomist? Merely as a theologian whose beautiful system 
in its attempt to be all of God threatens to mean little or
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no thing to man? Barth, is not merely a heteronomist; at 
least, he frequently transcends his own theology, he fre­
quently escapes the, charge of being a heteronomist. As 
Tillich Bays; "Barth's greatness is that he corrects him­
self again and again in the light of the 'situation' and 
that he strenuously tries not to become his ovm follower*"' 
Barth is not merely a hetefonomlst; this is perhaps most 
obvious in the discussion as to Barth's third usage of 
the word miracle, in his powerful, profound and persuasive 
exposition of the miracles of our lord* In this and many 
other regards his theology is, as Gregor Smith says, "a 
theology which is truly human, and filled with compassion, 
because it flows from a coherent faith in the One Triune 
lora."^
In the next chapter we give consideration to an 
important contemporary school of biblical criticism v;hich 
has something to contribute to the discussion and clarifi­
cation of the concept of miracle* The chapter is entitled 
"The Borm Oritioal View"*
^Tillich, ST I, 5* ^Of• Barth, Against The Stream, 11#
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phapter V* The Form Orltical Movement.
"The sacred history is subject to^ the same laws as all 
other narratives of antiquity*" Christoph von Ammon *
GSg. « Bultmann* R. Die Gesohlcltte dex'. gyooptlscfaen .tradition. 
'IG « DlbelluB, M. From tradition to Gospel.
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This chapter is devoted to the study of the school 
of biblical criticism known as formgesoMohte or form 
criticism, especially as that movement affects the concept 
of miracle. Perm criticism may be roughly defined as 
the attempt to apply the conclusions reached by the students 
of folklore literature to the tradition of early Christianity 
preserved in the gospels*
The chapter is divided as follows. First of all, 
the seven basic assumptions of form criticism are given in 
general terms. Secondly, the three basic tabks, largely 
with reference to the concept of miraole, are presented in 
a straightforward manner# Thirdly, these assumptions and 
tasks (the latter in regard to miracle only) are critically 
evaluated. Fourthly, there is an analysis of the contri­
butions of form criticism. Fifthly, because the analysis 
leads naturally into it, there is a discussion of how Jesus 
himself, and of how the early church, viewed his miracles.
Firstly, the seven basic assumptions of form 
criticism are given in general terms.
The form critic assumes, first of all, that before 
the gospels were written there was a period of oral tradition. 
"By reconstruction and analysis, form criticism seeks to 
explain the origin of the tradition about Jesus, and thus 
to penetrate into a period previous to that in which our
. «  2 0 0  —
gospels and their written sources were recorded" (TG, v).
The history of source criticism had tended to point to the 
existence of a period of oral tradjfcion# A century of 
vigorous study had left certain results more or less firmly 
entrenched. These were as follows.^ Firstly, Mark was the 
first of the four gospels. Some short time after its com­
position and publication, copies fell into the hands of 
Matthew and Luke, and they used Mark’s narrative as the 
framework for their accounts. This fact explains the striking 
resemblance amongst the first three gospels. Secondly, in 
addition to Mark, the authors of Matthew and Luke had another 
Greek document as well, from which they drew extensively for 
the words of Jesus. This document is frequently referred 
to by the symbol Q, which stands for the German word Quelle - 
'source*. Thus vm have what is knovm as the * two-document 
hypothesis'* Thirdly, in addition to this source, v/hich 
can be reasonably well identified by the agreements of 
Matthew and Luke, there remains a good deal of material in 
each of these gospels which has no parallel, which must have 
come from some good source. And it is quite possible that 
some even of the parallel materials may have come from 
different overlapping sources. Streeter puts forward one
^Cf. Perry, "The Growth of the Gospels", 62.
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n
Buoh theory #' The tv/o-clooument hypo the ale ie, however, the 
only one whioh firmly eatabliehod# But, scholars aoked,
±Qi it not poBsihlo to go further? "In a eenoe the new
o
movement ie the child of dleappointment *"^
The fom critic asBumos, in the eeoond place, 
that the material of the synoptic goopelo omi be profitably 
compared with $omev;hat similar writings, brought to light 
by the otudonte of comparative religion# The materials 
contained in the gospels have been read in the light of 
contemporary movements outoide Ohrietianity and have been 
oubjeoted to the teste by which all historical writings must 
be judged# This inquiry has been pursued by many scholars; 
much material for the study of the miraole story or tale 
has been uncovered by Woinraich," Beitsenatein, and Flebig,'
In like manner, sayings analogous to those in the gospels 
have been examined in the rabbinic literature, the HermCtio 
writings, bhû the sacred books of the Mandaoan sect# Narra-- 
tives bearing any resemblance to thoso in the gospels have
^Btroeter, The Four Gospels# ^Taylor, The Gospels# 15 
%einreich, Mtike He 
^Eeitsonstein, Hellenistisohe
Viebig,
^eitaltero# Amtike Wimdergesohichton and
S a W r Æ  ■ 0 stamontl iohen
S^ bïtaitoroV ' ' ' '
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been examined in the literature© of Greece, Egypt, India, 
and China# Folk-tale©, Fattot ©toriee, and legends of the 
saint© have been probed in order to dlaoovor law© of popular 
poetry and tradition# Source oritieiom pointed to a period 
of oral tradition, and historical critioiem pointed to some 
of the .methodological apparat! to be used in form. oritioiBiu# 
The form critic aesumec, in the third place, that 
the original tradition v;ao madeimp almost entirely of brief 
©ingle unit© # Schmidt, one of the earliest of the form 
critics, v/as convinced that the outline of event a and the 
connective liîika were not so old or reliable aa the a cone a 
connected# Mark's material oonoiated of detached aoenea 
or, at most, brief complexes of scene©- of which the Passion 
©tory WOB the oldest mià moot certain# In theoo oonvictiono, 
Bohmidt was foreshadowed by both Wredo^ ** and Wollhauoen*^ 
Mark puts his sceneo together like bead© on a string, mid 
the phrase 0 with which he oeemo to bind them really indicate 
the limite of separate oeétions# "Our previous study has 
shown that, strictly speaking, no framework, no design 
was laid out by Mark# Single reporte are loosely strung 
together, in which they appear sometimes with and sometimes
Basjfeâaiaagghslraâ^ ^
‘^'V/ellhausen# Pas Bvmiœlium Matthaei# Pas Evan^^olium 
' Marci# and Pas. Bvamf^elitm Lucae.#
- 203 -
without, place and time settings."^
The form critic aseumoa, fourthly, that the tradi­
tion creates and preserves only the faith and concepts of 
the primitive community* Grobel characterises the gospels 
as "books of faith collected * . . out of faith concerning 
faith for faith fGlaubensbüoher » * » aus dem Glauben Über 
den Glauben fttr den Glauben gesommeltl*" In the faith of 
that primitive community, Dibelius names the needs of 
missionary preaching as the foremost formative factor# 
"Missionary purpose. was the cause and preaching was the 
means of spreading abroad that which the disciples of 
Jesus possessed as recollections" (^, 13). The nearer a 
narrative stands to the sermon, the less is it likely to 
have been altered by legendary and literary influences, 
Bultmann finds the origin of the forms more in the churches' 
controversies and in the need to give instruction in the 
Ohristian way of life to new converts. Particularly forma­
tive in this process were the debates within the Palestinian 
communities like those which took place within rabbinic
"Bohmidt, Per Rahmen der Geschiohte Jesu. 90* "Bnsere 
bisherl^e^ Unt^suohung kat gesYigt, dalB strong 
genommen bel Mîc ko in Rahmen, kein AufriB vorliegt. 
EinselersEhlungen sind lose an.einander gereiht, indem 
sie bald mit, bald ohne Orts- und Beit- angaben 
dastehen*" Of* also GST. 1, 4? TG, 3*
Grobel, Foranges.chichte und ^ynoptigche Quellenanalvse. 9 
Of. aTso Grant".
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oircloB* In these debates the tradition was shaped under 
the influence of apologetic, polemical and dogmatic needs# 
Yifords of Jesus were thus given a narrative framework which 
is ideal in character( GST# .140.) ♦
The form critic assumes, fifthly, that the primitive 
community had no biographical or historical or geographical 
interest. In brief, "primitive Chriatianity did not know 
the interest in history v/hich inspires us to-day." "It 
appears that the outline of the life of Jesus, as it is 
given by Mark and taken over by Matthew and Luke, is an 
editorial oreation, and that as a consequence our actual 
knowledge of the course of Jesus* life is restricted to 
what little can be discovered in the individual scenes
P
constituting the older tradition." Speaking of one of 
his paradigms, Libelius says; "Where it happened, when, 
and in what circumstances is inessential# « # • We can 
see clearly what did not interest the narrator, vis. 
biographical material" (^, 46-9 )•
The form critic assumes, in the sixth place, that 
the traditional^materials can be classjfied according to
■"Fridrichsen, Le Problème du Miracle# 16. "Le
christianisme ptYmf^ l'intérêt que
nous inspire aujourd'hui l'histoire."
p
"Bultmann, "The New Approach to the Synoptic Problem", 343
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form. "It is possible to distinguish in the material of
the synoptic tradition certain specific literary types
*1
which have their own laws of style." These laws of style 
have been discovered in the comparison of the synoptics 
with other literatures of folklore, and in Hellenistic and 
rabbinic analogies. Technically, these literatures of 
folklore are termed 'unliterary* : "unliterary men crea,ted
a definite style" (TG, 37)# That is to say, primitive 
literary expression makes use of more or less fixed literary 
forms. This form or style consists not merely in the choice 
of words and construction of sentences, but in the whole 
manner of presentation which constitutes a literary category. 
The form is produced by the essential needs of the community, 
and steadily evolves, subject to definite internal laws 
that transcend the individual. Form criticism endeavours 
by a study of these forms and their laws of development to 
establish the typical or primitive form of each category,
Gig., the typical tale or miraole story. These primitive 
forms are then used as norms, to shed light on the growth 
of the gospel tradition in general.
The form critic assumes, in the seventh place, 
that the history of the tradition itself (to be distinguished
1Bultmann, "The New Ap%)roach to the Bynoptio Problem", 343#
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from the history it claims to convey) can he discovered 
from the form* This assumption follows closely on the 
preceding one. For "if we oan succeed in identifying a 
particular literary type and its laws of style, we can 
then frequently distinguish an original tradition from 
secondary traditions* We thus obtain a test for determining 
the age of a literary utterance by noting whether it appears 
in the original pure form belonging to this type of litera­
ture or v/hether it shows marks of further stylistic develop— 
1anent."*' The emphasis on the history of the tradition 
accounts for the question of the form critic 'What did 
the primitive community mean by this story?* rather than 
the question 'Did the event really happen as it is recorded?' 
"The less miracle stories as such are historical accounts, 
the more urgent it is to inquire how they have come into 
the evangelical tradition" (GBT. 244)
Wo deal, in this second part of the cha.pter, with 
the three tasks of the form critic, largely with reference
AtiO the concept of miracle «
1Bultmann, "The He?; Approach to the Synoptic Problem", 544*
p
""Je weniger die Wundorgeschiohten ale solohe his-
torisohe Berichte Bind, desto mehr 1st su ffagen, 
wie sie in die evangelischo Tradition hineinge- 
kommen sind." Of. also Fridrichsen, op* cit.. 11.
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Operating on the strength of his assumptions, 
the work of the form critic divides itself into three parts. 
The first task is to classify the synoptic material according 
to form. All the forms are here mentioned, but detailed 
consideration is given only to the miracle story or tale. 
Following classification, the second task of the form critic 
is to try to recover the original form of the material 
during the oral period, and to trace, if possible, the 
subsequent changes which it has undergone. The third task 
is to seek for the Sits im Leben. the life situation out 
Of which the material originated# In these second and 
third tasks, consideration is given only to the miracle story 
or tale.
The first major classification of forms is named 
paradigm by Dibelius (TG. 37-69) and apothegm (Apophthejs:mata) 
by Bultmann (GST. 8-72). In these pericopae a oonvereation 
(usually a dialogue), often controversial, sometimes 
associated with a mira,cle, leads up to a striking statement 
of Jesus which is capable of general application. Bultmann 
distinguishes three types of apothegms: according as the
dialogue is introduced by enemies ( 8treit,g:esprëche ). or by 
friendly inquirers ( Bchulg-eaprâche ). or by an incident 
(biographischen Apophthegmata). A second form critical 
classification contains the sayings of Jesus. Dibelius
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uses the word exiiortation as a descriptive term, in the 
belief that the sayings were oollected for paranetio or 
hortatory rpurposesç,(T£, 233-65). The equivalent group 
is named by Bultmann as sayings of the Lord (Eerrenworte ), 
of which he distinguishes five sub-divisions (GOT, 73-222). 
A third olaBsifioation is termed legend by Dibelihs (TG. 
104-32). Bultmann has no exact equivalent for this, but 
the biographical apothegms (biographischen Apophthegmata) 
closely parallel it (GOT, 26-38, 58-72). Here the interest 
largely centres around secondary personalities of the 
synoptics, such as the apostle Peter, A fourth category 
of the form critics is termed historical narrative and 
legend (Geschiohtsersâhluilg und Legende) by Bultmann; "I 
term legends those narrative parts of the tradition, which 
are not really miracle stories, but neither do they have a
historical, but rather a religiously edifying character"
1 '
(GST, 260-347) # Bultmann includes many narratives in this
category. The same classification is named myth by Libelius, 
containing but three narratives; the Baptism, the Temptation, 
and the Transfiguration (TG# 266-86). A fifth classification 
of form is the Passion story, so named by Libelius (TG,
1 "Als Legenden beseiclme ich die ersâlilenden Stücke 
der Tradition, die nicht eigentlich Wunder- 
geoohichten sind, aber dooh auch keinen gesohicht* 
lichen, sondern x*eligiSs- erbaulichen Gharakter 
haben."
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178-218). But Bultmann Includes it as a special section
of his category termed historical narrative andYegend / and 
believes that it is made up primarily of brief units (GST, 
282-307)* The sixth category is designated tale by Bibelius 
(TG, 70-103), and miracle story (Wunder^gjesohichte) by 
Bultmann (GST, 223-56). This particular category will be 
studied in detail under the topics 1) general considerations, 
and 2) phenomenology of the miracle story or tale*
According to Bultmann, miracles are an essential 
part of the synoptic tradition (GST. 233-36)• They are 
not told a,s noteworthy events, but as the deeds of Jesus. 
Their aim is not biographical, rather they demonstrate 
Jesus* power and might. As a rule Jesus* motives are not 
mentioned or explained, merely his pity, or his desire to 
arouse faith. The miracle; making ability is, as it were, 
something detached from his personal will, functioning 
automatically: this is particularly clear in the story of
the woman with an issue of blood (Mk. 5*25—34) * Further, 
the inner disposition of the person healed is practically 
never discussed. It goes without saying that in the 
healing miracles the faith of those who request the cure 
is a necessary prerequisite* But this faith is not belief 
in Jesus* message or his person in the modern sense; it is 
merely the trust due the wonder-worker# "This faith is the
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tribute due to the great prophet." Nor is faith mentioned 
out of psychological interest Or as a necessai'y psychic 
circumstance for the success of the cure, as is shown by 
the fact that it need not be the faith of the sick person 
himself; that of his intermediaries suffices* Since this 
faith signifies acknowledgement of Jesus* position, all 
light falls upon him, rather than upon the sick person*
Y/hen the miraole has taken place, interest in the person cured 
ceases; the paralytic's gratitude is not recorded (Mt.
2*9ff.) nor that of the father of the possessed boy (Mk.
9.1?ff*). Nor is the synoptic tradition concerned with the 
effects of any miracle on the general outline of Jesus* 
personal history.
Bibelius believes that the tales owe their 
origim and development to a special group within primitive 
Christianity known as story-tellers (TG, ?0-2)* The 
sources are indeed silent about this supposed group; but 
that there were men capable of telling stories from the 
life of Jesus may be concluded from the very existence of 
such stories. That these stories were not intended for 
preaching is evident from their forms their broadness 
renders a pragmatic use impossible, their technique betrays
^Fridriohsen, op. cit., 51* "La foi, o*est tribut 
dû au grand prophet^ îf"
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a certain delight in telling tales, and their phenomenology 
closely approaches the literary species cultivated beyond 
the pale of Christianity. Bibelius agrees with the faith- 
conception of Bultmann* "The content of faith is not the 
conviction that through Christ Cod's call has gone out to 
all mankind, but the confidence that Jesus, the great 
miracle-worker, excelled all other thaumaturges" (TG, 72).
Both Bibelius and Bultmann give much attention to 
the phenomenology of the biblical miracle story or tale, 
and to non-biblical parallels of the same * Since the 
treatment of the miracle story by Bultmann (GST * 236-41) 
is much more detailed than the tale by Bibelius (^ Tg, 72-97), 
Bultmann's analysis is here followed# In general, the 
miracle story contains three elements : the setting or
situation, the story of the healing itself, and the reporting 
of the effect of the miracle.
first of all, the setting or the situation of 
the miracle story is given. The condition of the patient 
is described: the duration of the illness may be narrated,
as in Mk. 5*25 (12 years); Mk. 9#21 (from childhood); or 
the age of the sufferer himself may be given, as in Me. 5*42 
(12 years of age). The dangerous character of the illness 
and the difficulties of the sufferer are often reported, for 
example, the man who brought his son to Jesus describes his
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condition as follows* "He has a dumb spirit; and whenever 
it seizes him, it dashes him down; and he foams and grinds 
his teeth and becomes rigid" (ïÆk. 9.18). Vain attempts 
of doctors may be inserted, as in the story of the woman 
with an issue of blood (Mk. 5.26ff.), "From the ancient 
stories of healing up to modern reports of similar miracles, 
as in Lourdes, it is one of the favourite practicea in such 
narratives to depict the dangerous character of the suffering 
and the failure of all attempts to cure" (TG, 82). Again, 
some of the pericopae occasionally contain doubt as to the 
efficacy of the healer, and scornful remarks or actions 
are directed against him - as in Mi. 5.40 - "and they 
laughed at him". In at least one instance, the ability of 
the Master is contrasted with the inability of the dis­
ciples (Ml. 9#14ff.), When Jesus awakens the young man 
of Main (Lk. 7.llff *), he is reported to have met the 
funeral procession: this particular aspect is paralleled
in many non-biblical sources.
Secondly, the story of the healing is itself 
narrated. Quite often manipulations of the healer are 
recorded, in biblical as in non-biblical sources. "And 
taking him aside from the multitude privately, he put his 
fingers into his ears, and he spat and touched his tongue; 
and looking up to heaven, he sighed, and said to him. ..."
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(Me# 7*33ff*)* But as to this manipulative activity of the 
healer, the biblical pericopae seem much more restrained
and reserved than non-biblical parallels# "But it is
[in the Testament], 
characteristic, how seldom this happens/ while in the
Hellenistic miracle stories it is very often the case"
"1
(GOT, 237)* "In the gospel tales we must recognize a
certain shyness towards such practices" (TG, 86)# But to 
continue, it is charaoteristio that the healer approach 
the patient ; "and he stood over her. # #" (Lk# 4.39).
Contact with the hand or a hand clasp is often reported, 
as in MÎC# 1#31: "and he came up and took her by the hand
and lifted her up. . * #" Sometimes the patient merely 
touches the garment or clothing of the healers "if I 
touch even his gaments, I shall be made well% (Me. 5.28).
A miracle making word is often uttered, such as "^hild 
arise" (Lk. 8.54) # Frequently this miraole vmrking word 
is clothed in foreign, unintelligible garbs "Talitha cumi" 
(Mlc. 5*41) or "Ephphatha" (ECk. 7*34). Bultmann pays par­
ticular attention to demon-exorcisms. Though the expulsion 
of a demon by means of a name is not directly reported of 
Jesus, the method is recognized in the synoptics, as
*1
“"Es 1st aber char ale te r i s oh, wie selten das gosohieht, 
wlHirend das in hellenistisohen Wunderberichten 
sehr oft der Fall 1st#"
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Mk* 9.38 clearly showe# The original idea is that by nieane 
of the miracle-making word the demon, which had given rise 
to the sickness, is threatened, reproved, commanded to 
come out (of# Mk. 1*25,27; m *  9*25; Lk* 4.41). This 
demon-rebuking may well be capable of broader application, 
as in Mk, 4,59 (rebuking of the wind); Lk* 4,39 (rebuking 
the fever)« Demon-exorcisms have the further characteristic 
that the demon often recognises his lord, he knows the 
might of the exorcist (Mk* 1.24; Mk. 5,7); and the demon 
pleads for mercy (Mk. 5.7), In Mk. 5,9 a conversation of 
the exorcist with the demon is recorded. Often in such 
eases there is the command of the exorcist to the demon to 
be silent (Mk. 1.25). Finally, a noteworthy mark of the 
miracle story is that the public is sent away while the 
miracle is being effecteds as in IVIk. 5,40; M-c. 7,33; Mk. 
8.23. Both Bultmann and Dibelius agree that this phenomenon 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the theory of the Messianic 
secret. Bibelius believes that "the miracle worker avoids 
the public because He is not a magician with a propaganda, 
but an envoy, a revealer of God, who does not allow his 
action, i.e. God's action to be seen by proÿane eyes"
(TG, 94), Bultmann partially disagrees# "The original 
meaning is much more this, that man ought not to see the 
miracle, that man ought not to see God at work. So one
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receives God’a message in secret (Jg. 3#19ff,); so the 
divinity works by night ; Lot and those with him v/ex’o not 
able to look upon God’s judgement, and Lot's wife, who 
did look around, was turned into a pillar of salt (Gen# 
19*26)'* (GST, 239)2
In the third part of the typical miracle story, 
emphasis is placed upon the reporting of the effects* Very 
rarely, the effects of the miracle are recorded as happening 
but gradually (Me# 8#24ff$)# Usually, however, the sudden­
ness of the effect of the miracle is stressed (Me# 5*29,42; 
Me# 10*52). Particularl^r marvellous is the phenomenon of 
healing at a distance: Me# 7#29? Mt# 8.13; Jn. 4*50# In
all these causes, it is quite oha,racteristic that the cure 
comenoes at the very hour at which the miraculous word 
was spoken, lot infrequently is it related of the person 
healed that he gave some clear demonstration of the fact; 
the lame man takes up his bed and walks (Me* 2#llff.), the 
restored daughter of Jairus is given something to eat 
c# 5*43)# Following upon the exorcisms of demons, the
1"her ursprungliche Sinn 1st vielmehr dor, dal3 man das 
Wunder nicht schauen, die Gottheit nicht beim Werke 
sehen darf. So empfângt man einen Gottespruch in 
geheimen, Jdo# 3#19ff#; so wirkt die Gottheit bei 
lacht; Lot und die Seinen dttrfen dem Gottesgericht 
nicht susohauen, und Lots Weib, die sioh umschaut, 
wird £3um Salsâule (Gen. 19*26)."
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demonstration often consists in some spiteful and destructive 
act of the departing demons in Mk. 13 the departing demon 
accounts for the sudden frens^ y of the swine who dash over 
a cliff and fall into the sea. Sometimes the demonstration 
takes the form of a command to the healed to the effect 
that he "go home" (Mk. 5.19). Finally, it very frequently 
happens that the wainesses of the marvellous results of the 
miracle break out in exclamations of wonder and approval:
"and they were all amased" (MIc. 1*27). Along side of 
these biblical examples, Bultmann adduces a multitude of 
analogies to illustrate in detail the style of the miracle 
story: the situation, the miraculous deed, its results
(GST, 236-41)• For these parallels, he draws upon many 
sources: thé >^ )ld and New Testaments, the Apocrypha, rabbinic 
stories, ancient Creek and Latin authors and inscriptions,
I
and fairy tales of many lands.
Having considered the first task of the form 
critic - classification (with special reference to the 
miracle story) - it is now possible to consider the second 
task •
The second task of the form critic is to try to 
discover the original form of the material during the 
period of oral tradition, and to trace, if possible, sub­
sequent alterations. Here again, particular attention is
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paid to the iniraole story or tale. Because Bultmann 
believes that there v/as little or no interest in the 
motives and feelings of Jesus and other characters, he 
views certain additions as showing the need for plastic 
presentation, for example, Mk. 10.50 (the blind man)
"and throwing off hismntle, he sprang up and came to 
Jesus"; Ik. 7.14 (the widow's son at Nain) "the bearers 
stood still." Buch features are indeed rare. The mira­
culous interest stirring in such pej?ioopae becomes much 
more active in the further development of the tradition 
as seen in the Apocrypha, but it is manifest in the synoptics 
to a degree. Thus the youth at Main is the only son of 
his mother and she is a widow (Lk. 7#12). This is a 
typical legendary accretion, and a similar process is 
evident in Lk. 9*38, where the possessed boy is made the 
only son of his father, a/fact not known in Mk. 9*17# 
Similarly in Lk. 8.42, the daughter of Jairus has become 
his only daughter, in contrast to Me. 5*23# The ear 
struck off in Gethsemene is the right ear in Lk. 22.50,
Which was not yet remarked upon in Mk. 14*47* Likewise 
the withered hand of Mk* 3*1 has become the right hand in 
Lk. 6.6 (GST, 338ff.).
A certain accentuation of the miraculous is also 
to be noted in many passages. Besides the fact that Matthew
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and Luke narrate some miracles not to be found in Mark 
and Q, this accentuation is illustrated in the editorial 
passages which summarily report Jesus’ miracles: Mk. 1#32-4;
3.7-12; 6.53-6; also Mt. 4.23-5; 9.35ff; 15.29-31. In 
Mt. 14.14; 19.2; 21.14, Jesus’ healing activity is inserted 
into the text. And Matthew and Luke also expand the 
text of Mark with certain accentuating features: thus in
Mk. 1.31 (of. 3.10)y all the sick are brought and many 
healed; in Wit* 8.16 (of. 12.15) many are brought and all 
healed; while in Lk* 4.40ff. all are brought ajad all are 
healed (GST. 243).
As time goes on there is a growing interest in 
the characters of a particular story. This is abundantly 
clear in the name additions to the miracle stories in the 
Apocrypha and in the writings of the Fathers. Yet this 
tendency, too, is already manifest in the synoptics. For 
example, the name of the ruler of the synagogue (whose 
daughter Jesus raised from the dead) is given as Jairus in 
Lk. 8.41, a name which has crept into 11c. 5*22 in many 
manuscripts: and, according to Bultmann, it is not unlikely
that it was added to'complete'the text. For this reason, 
we should be sceptical about the names appearing in other 
places in Mark’s gospel, in lÆk. 10.28,46; 11.21 (GST. 256ff.).
Particularly informative in determining the original
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form of any perioope is the use of direct or indirect 
discourse# Generally speaking, the use of direct discourse 
serves, to report motives and feelings in an indirect way#, 
Ther# is also a tendency to create new sayings for the 
characters involved; partly by filling out their conversa­
tion, partly by recasting the earlier account in direct 
discourse. The request of the Syrophoenician woman is in 
direct discourse in Mt* 15*22,25 in contrast to Me.,7.26; 
the touch of the woman with an issue of blood is merely 
, described in Mlc. 5.30, while it is spoken of by Jesus in 
Lk*' 8*46. Thus of two related passages the one with the 
direct discourse is usually to be judged as secondary.
In popular narratives numbers play a special 
role, especially the number two* This is not due to any 
mythical motif, but to the desire for symmetry. The 
tendency is manifest in the synoptic tradition where tvm 
supernumeraries are presented, though originally there 
was only one or an indefinite number* Thus in Mt. 8*28ff. 
the one Gadarene demoniac of I#c. 5.1 has become two; the 
single blind man of Mk* 10#46ff. has become two in Mt. 
20.29ff.? under the same influence the healing of two 
blind men is recorded in Mt-». 9.2?ff. (GBT* 343-46) *
'Because Bultmann believes that exorcisms were 
of primary importance to the primitive community, the
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exorcist-motif probably accounts for many variants of 
stories ?/hich, from a literary standpoint, do not go back 
to the same account. In many healings, the emphasis is 
laid more on the miracle of the cure than upon the sickness* 
Thus the healing of the deaf and dumb man (I0c. 7*31ff,) 
and of the blind man of Bethsaida (Mlc, 8,22ff,) are obviously 
variants, Mt, 9*27ff. (the two blind men) and 9#32ff, (the 
dumb possessed man) are only variants of motifs drawn from 
Mark, Mlc. 3.Iff, (the man with the withered hand), Lk, 
13.10ff, (the man with dropsy) are but Variants; on the 
theme of Sabbath-healing. The story of the ten lepers 
(Lk. 17.11) is an enhanced variant of Mk, 1.40ff. (the 
leper); and the two cures of people at a distance, 7* 
24ff. (the daughter of the Syrophoenician woman), and 
Mt, 8,5ff. (the servant of the centurion at Oapernaum) 
are also variants (GST, 241ff.). Finally, Bultmann is 
convinced that geographical bjoâ chronological details are 
foreign to the miracle story, and are definitely supplied 
by the editors.(GST, 257ff*)*
Regarding the original form of the tales, Dibelius 
suggests three possibilities. The first is based on the 
existence of intermediate forms: paradigms restyled
after the manner of tales. The best example of this is 
the story of the infirm woman (Lk. 13.IO-I7). This story
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ultimately depends on more or less the same material as 
its paradigmatic parallels: Me. 3,Iff, (the man with the
v/ithered hand), and Lk, 14*lff* (the man with the dropsy).
As in Mark, the synagogue furnishes the scene. As in the 
paradigm from Luke, a discourse follov/s the healing. But 
this particular tale in Luke is more literary than the two 
paradigms and it is more lengthy, though it has the para­
digmatic edifying conclusion or ending and the healing 
itself has been umaietakeahly fashioned into a tale (T£,
97ff *)* Sere then is one possible original form of the 
tale: the development of short paradigms into longer
narratives by the insertion of %  richer miracle topic and 
other elements of the narrative style, e.g, dialogue (TG,
99). This development was not always a literary process#
It could occur automatically as soon as the stories were 
separated from preaching and were told as independent 
tales by men accustomed to narrate in the fashion of the 
familiar miracle story or anecdote. Often, though not 
always, this process meant a further separation of tradition 
from historical reality, inasmuch as it presented the unique 
as the usu8,l, But the details with which the paradigms 
vmre enriched have a certain degree of probability, for the 
schematic form of the healing account would never have 
arisen had not the relation of miracle worker and patient
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followed a recurrent pattern (TG, 100) • Thus a seconcL 
possible original form of the tale may be proposed# Once 
the need was felt to fill out and expand the concise para,- 
digmatic account, not only Christian but also extraneous 
motifs could be employed for this expansion# Finally, as 
a third possibility, the original form of the tale could 
have been in a completely non-Ohristian setting, taken over 
and remoulded by the Christian editors and story-tellers of 
the primitive community#
The third task of the form critic is to define 
the Bits im Leben# the life situation, out of which the 
material springs# What life situation of the primitive 
community accounted for the rise of the miracle story or 
tale? Bultmann’s view is that the miracle stories were 
narrated as proofs of the Messianic power and divine might 
of Jesus (GBT# 234) # In this respect the exorcisms v/ere 
especially important to the community as proofs of the 
Messiaîiship of Jesus. They are particularly prominent in 
the summaries of Jesus’ activities (of# Me# 1.32-4; 1.39; 
3.11; 6,7; Mt# 4*24; 10,8; Lk# 7*21)# As we have seen, 
this exorcist interest accounts for many of the variants 
strewn through the synoptic materials (GBT# 241ff,)# From 
his profuse use of secular parallels, Bultmann is convinced 
that these non-biblical miracle stories illustrate the
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atmosphere, show the motifs and forms, and thus help us 
to understand the entrance of miracle stories into the 
synoptic tradition (G8T# 255)* Bultmann believes that 
miracles were told of Jesus even in Üie Palestinian community. 
This is to be deduced from Mt# 12#27ffwhere Jesus com­
pares his expulsion of demons with that of Jewish exorcists.
It is proved also by the presence of miracles in the apothegms, 
which were probably fashioned in Palestine. Of course, the 
variants oh the theme of Sabbath-healing - the infirm 
woman (Lk# 13*10ff.), the man with the dropsy (Lk. 14.Iff.) 
and other passages - may well have been formulated on Hellen­
istic soil, once the type was there (GST. 254)* In regard 
to miracle stories which are not apothegms, it is more 
difficult to decide. The richness of the Hellenistic 
analogies, however, favours an origin in the Hellenistic 
stage of the tradition. Semitic turns of style prove little; 
they may have penetrated the koine, and the Septuagint had 
much influence on the Hellenistic-Ohristian use of words, 
especially in the literary period. Foreign words, such as 
'TW.itha cumi* and 'Bphphatha' prove nothing; but from its 
content, the account of the leper (itt. 1.40ff,) quite likely 
springs from the Palestinian community, since its "show 
yourself to the priest" etc# could hardly have been formu­
lated on Hellenistic soil# In general, however, the origin
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of the miraole stories may he considered predominantly 
Hellenistic (OST, 253-56).
Even if historical occurrences are at the 
basis of some of the healing narratives, their formation 
was the work of tradition (GST, 245)# Although in some 
small degree the motifs arose spontaneously in the primitive 
community, on the whole both the central and peripheral 
motifs were taken over from popular, perhaps even literary, 
miraole accounts. The precedent of existing miracle stories 
and other anecdotes being applied to a hero (a saviour, even 
a god) is often to be observed in classical literature, 
fairy tales and monastic histories (GST. 244-46), The 
(#listic peculiarities of the synoptic narratives show 
that they arose in the same atmosphere as the Jewish and 
Hellenistic miraole stories: this may be observed by a
study of the exorcisms, healings and resuscitations found 
in these literatures (GOT, 246-49r where analogies cited).
Dibelius believes that the tales, though 
shedding no new light on the message of salvation, did 
help to demonstrate the superiority of the 'Lord Jesus’ 
and 30 helped to eliminate the competition of other cult- 
gods. The importance of the tale in this respect is clear 
if one remembers two facts of Hellenistic religious history: 
the occasional substitution of miraole stories for myths,
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as in the case of Aooleplus and Serapis; and the disappear­
ance of the boundaries between god and god-sent man, as in 
the os.se of Appollonius of Tyana and others. One could 
tell no real myths about Jesus, but there were his deeds 
to furnish propagandistic tales. Their telling served to 
show that this human life was really divine (TG, gSff,),
We have already seen that Dibelius believes 
that some of the tales were taken over from non-Christian 
sources and subsequently remoulded# Two tendencies could 
account for this phenomenon, First of all, Christians 
would narrate many great deeds of their Saviour which 
would proclaim his divinity; and secondly, there was the 
inclination of popular tradition to link any current 
unattached story with the hero of the day. At times such 
a process mpy have been unconscious 2 Jewish-Ohristian 
narrators made Jesus the hero of legends about the prophets 
or the rabbisI converted pagans told of the Christian 
Saviour the remoulded stories of gods and miracle-workers, 
At least two gospel narratives show that this actually 
occurred: one of these is the story of the Gadarene
demoniac (ïëc, 5,1-17)# This story not only lacks the 
gospel ethos, but its conclusion (omitting 18-20) is 
contrary to Jesus' mission. The tale’s nonchalance re­
garding the damage done, and its indifferent a.ooount of
_ 2 2 6  -
the people's desire that Jesus should depart from them,
show that the narratox  ^is oonoerned only with the grandeur
of the miraole# We ean suppose that the story was originally
told of a Jewish exoroiet. The owner of the swine might
then he disregarded, for he would he a Gentile; and the
destruction of the despised animals would form a satisfactory
conclusion for the Jewish narrator# In a similar fashion,
the story of the miracle at Oana (Jn. 2.1-11) was undoubtedly
told by a converted pagan. The story was transferred from
Dionysius or a kindred divinity and applied to Jesus (TG,
lOOff#). Bultmann agrees with Dibelius as to the origin
of the Oana story* "The story is without doubt taken over
1
f3?om a pagan legend and applied to Jesus."
The historical value of any tale depends upon 
the previous question - in which of the three suggested 
ways did the tale originate? In general, this carmot be 
decided. All that can be said is that even under the most 
favourable circmaatances, the tale is further removed from 
historical occurrence than the paradigm# However, if a 
tale is developed from a paradigm, we may conjecture an 
historical basis as a starting point, an,d even the foreign
1 Bultmann, Das Evangelium des Johaniies. 85. "2wei- 
felloe 1st die GesclBLchte aus Kefdnischer Legende 
übernommen u#d auf Jesus übertra.gen worden."
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material adopted by the narrators has been Ohristianized
(TC, 102ff.).
Bo far in this chapter we have disoueeed the
assumptions of form criticism (in general terms) and the
tasks of that movement (with special reference to the miracle
story or tale). It is nov/ possible to pass, in the third
part of this chapter, to a critical evaluation of
this school of biblical criticism*
There is no reasonable doubt that there was a
period of oral tradition before the gospels were written.
But the question is - how long was that period? Both
men, Wth Dibelius' and Bultmann tend to place the composition
(TO, 10)
of Mark about 70 A.,D., though Dibelius/iF*much more explicit 
on this point than Bultmann,^ Matthew and Luke are, of 
course, later and "may be placed in the period from 70 to 
100 Aj,D,, probably nearer 100 than 70."^ Thus in all 
probability the first gospel, Mark, was composed less than 
forty years after Jesus' death, and all were certainly 
written less than seventy years after the crucifixion. 
According to form critics, however, the formation of the
^Bultmann, "The Study of the Synoptic Gospels",
Form Oritloism* 15*
^Ibid*
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synoptic tradition had been completed prior to this: Mark
is merely a collection of units already existing in definite
form* Moreover, the now lost source Q was prosumably in
existence sometime before the gospels of Matthew and Luke
1were composed. Thus it seems highly probable that the;re 
were eye witnesses both within and without the faith when 
the earliest gospel (Mark) was written, and quite possible 
that such was the case when the source Q was composed. The 
point is that it is questionable if the creative period was 
long enough to justify some of the conclusions the form 
critics draw when comparing the synoptics with secular paral; 
lelS:: /the synoptic tradition crystallized quite rapidly 
in comparison with the slow formation of the rabbinic and 
Hellenistic traditions, in which Bultmann and Dibelius so 
constantly seek analogies* It seems much too short a time 
to distinguish sharply and rigidly (as Bultmann does) be­
tween the contribution of the Palestinian oomimnity on the 
one hand, and the Hellenistic communities on the other* 
Therefore, valuable as the researches of students in the 
field of comparative religion are - in the uncovering of 
certain forms and laws of their transmission - this must 
not hide the fact that the period for the transmission of
^Of. Hedlich, Form Qriticism* 25
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the synoptic material is a relatively short one.
Once again, the contention of form criticism 
that the original material was made up almost entirely of 
brief single units is now vfidely accepted. Yet at least 
one category - the Passion story - is partially excluded 
from this general rule by Dibelius, and, to a much lesser 
degree, by Bultmann. And critics of the movement have urged 
that there may vmll be more of such categories. Lightfoot, 
himself a British form critic, writes that "it is possible 
that certain groups of stories were already in existence, 
perhaps in a written form, before St. Mark embodied them 
in his fuller work. A notable example of such a group may
"I
be the five stories in Bîîc. 2.1-3#6." Burney, contending 
that considerable portions of our Lord’s sayings are oast 
in the form of Hebrew poetry, attributes many connected
p
groups of such sayings directly to Jesus himself. The 
contention that the material was made up of brief units 
is complementary to another assumption of form criticism: 
that the context has no value, because the primitive 
community had no geographical, biographical or historical 
interest. It seems clear that the primitive community did
1"Lightfoot, History and Interpretation in 
^Burney, The Poetry of our Lord.
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not entertain the same interest in geography, biography, or 
history as modern man# Yet the assumption that those who 
shaped and transmitted and wrote down the tradition had no 
biographical or historical interest but a purely homiletioal 
and Chrlstologioal interest is "surely an exaggerated 
antithesis#**^
Again, form critics assume that the tradition 
creates and preserves only the faith and concepts of the 
primitive community. This, it seems to me, is one of the 
most questionable assumptions of the whole movement. It 
seems evident that the oomunity did exercise a certain 
emount of selection in the narratives handed down to us.
There ws undoubtedly some schématisation of some of the 
pericopae - the opponents of Jesus became the hated * scribes 
and Pharisees’* The various apologetic needs of the community 
may well have accounted for additions and alterations in 
other ways. No doubt a few pericopae were taken over from 
secular sources and applied to Jesus. But it is doubtful if all 
these have^ been done in the wholesale manner Bultmann 
seems to imply* On the whole, it is more likely that the 
community has preserved rather than created the majority 
of the sayings and deeds of Jesus. "Communities in general
^Baillie, God V/as In Christ. 56.
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1do not create; they shape and conserve." "It seems seldom 
to occur to the form critics that a story may have been 
handed on simply or primarily because it was true, because 
the incident had actually taken place in the ministry of
Jesus, and was therefore of great interest to his followers,
Peven if they sometimes fail to understand it." Form critics 
give no place in their reconstruction of the tradition to 
the dominant personal influence of Jesus himself# Bultmann 
in particular credits the primitive community with an 
extraordinary fertile imagination and at the same time 
an astonishingly slight recollection of Jesus' life*
The form critic emphasizes that the history of 
the tradition itself (to be distinguished from the history 
it claims to convey) can be discovered fx’om the forai. The 
claim does not mean, however, that form criticism supplies 
an automatic method whereby the truth or falsity (the actual 
factualness) of any event may be judged. Form criticism 
is a valuable aid in this process, but it does not in itself 
provide the solo criterion for defining any particular 
narrative as legendary or mythical, if this means that the 
na.rrative has no factual basis in an actual event. Hor 
does the discovery of analogies and parallels in secular
"Feÿry, op. cit.. 71, *^ Baillie, on. cit.. 57*
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literature invalidate the events as narrated in the synoi^ tios - 
urima faoie it vmuld seem to do just the opposites point to 
the substantial truth of those paralleled events* As to 
the myths of Dibelius and the historical narratives and 
legends of Bultmann, I would say that in many of their 
spécifié Instanoes there are mythical or legendary accretions; 
that is to say, apologetic additions not warranted by the 
original event in itself* I would be prepared to say that 
the narratives of the Virgin birth are almost completely 
legendary - that is, entirely the creation of the community 
with no factual be,sis whatsoever other than the obvious one 
that Jesus was born of Mary* But I recognize that these 
decisions - the designation, for example, of the Trans­
figuration as largely legendary, the Baptism as partly 
legendary, the empty tomb narratives as entirely legendary - 
are made but partially on the basis of the findings of 
form criticism* Other considerations - philosophical and 
theological - are very largely responsible for these decisions* 
In short, the form in itself permits no historical value- 
judgements •
The form critic is convinced that the traditional 
materials can be classified according to form. The analogy 
of the synoptics to folklore literature is at least partially 
justified. This is not to say that there were no educated
«  2 3 3  -
people in the primitive oonuaunity from the outset# But it
is extremely probable that these were definitely in the
minority; so that unliterary men did create a style* It
seems to me that in two of the categories - apothegm (or
paradigm) and the lîîlraele story (or tale), the form critic
has made good his case. Yet even in this pair, there is
a difficulty inherent in the method of classification -
the presence of Mischformen or intermediate forms, which
exhibit traits common to two or more categories# Bultmann
can speak of "apothegmatic miracle stories"Tapophthe^matischen
Wundergeschlchten 1 (GOT, 254), and allows that the forms
1are only "more or less fixed#"“ And of eighteen paradigms 
employed in missionary preaching, Dibelius lists ten as 
being of a "less pure type" (TG, 43)# And in other cate­
gories, the movement seems to be much less successful: one
symptom of this is that there is much less agreement between 
Bultmann and Dibelius# It would seem that there are con­
siderable parts of the gospels which do not admit of being 
rigidly subsumed under air-tight forms # And when Bultmann
finds five separate sub-divisions under his 'sayings’ fom^
o
a method has been pushed to ridiculous lisaits# There is
B^ultmann., "The Study of the Synoptic Problem", 
Form Qriticism# 28#
2 Of* Easton, The Gospel before the Gospels# 74*
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a very small measure of agreement In the form Dibelius 
terms myth and Butbmann historical narrative and legend: 
here the form is threatened with completer breakdown.
Working under his several assmiptions, the first 
task of the form critic is to classify the material according 
to form. In the straightforward presentation, special 
attention was given to the miracle story of Bultmann and 
the tale of Dibelius: and in this critical evaluation
consideration is given only to that category#
First of all, one must protest against Bultmann’s 
claim that Jesus’ miraculous healings were involuntary#
It is true that the story of the woman v^ ith an issue of 
blood does point in that direction# But another perioope 
seems to point in the opposite direction. The leper "came 
to Jesus beseeching him, and kneeling said to him, ’If you 
will, you can make me clean.’ Jesus said to him, ’I wills 
be clean’" (Me# l#40ff#, italics mine). It would seem 
from this story that Jesus’ ability did not function 
automatically, but that it was deliberately employed. Y/e 
have a3.ready discussed whether the ’faith ’ mentioned in the 
synoptics is psychological or theological# The conclusion 
there reached was that in the majority of oases it was 
probably only psychological faith, but that on some 
occasions, the faith mentioned could well have been theo-
-  2 3 5  -
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logloa]. in character. And. although the element of pity 
was not a dominant factor in the tradition, it seems rash 
to say that there were absolutely no attempts to portray 
compassion or pity on the part of Jesus* The word 'pity* 
is used about Jesus in connection with miracle stories 
twice (Me. 1.41; Mt. 20.34), and the word •compassion’ 
five times (Me. 6.34; 8.2; Lk. 7.13? 10.331 Mt. 14.14; 
15.32).
The greatest weakness of Dibelius• position is 
his premise that there v/ere a group of story-tellers in 
the primitive community. But the sources themselves are 
completely silent as to the existence of such a group: 
so the premise remains a very doubtful hypothesis. And 
there seems little more evidence that the tales were 
preserved simply and solely for the guidance of primitive 
miracle workers.
The phenomenology of the miracle story is given 
in minute detail by Bultmann, drawing as he does on a 
multitude of biblical and non-biblical sources. The 
only point to note here is that both Bultmann and Dibelius 
are a.ware of the conservative approach of the evangelists 
to novellistic and miraculous manipulations and activities
^Of. above, 124ff#
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reported of Jesus as compared to the same characteristics 
of miracle-workers recorded in non-biblical sources*
The second task of the form critic is to attempt 
to recover the original form of the material during the 
oral period; and to trace, if possible, subsequent altera­
tions in the form. It may be admitted (with qualification) 
that Matthew and Lulce include certain specific details not 
found in Mark, and that the two later gospels relate new 
miracles. But a more detailed style is not necessarily
later or more legendary. A British form critic has come to
1almost the opposite conclusion. Moreover, the gospel of
Mark does contain concrete details: for example, the
detail that the blind beggar near Jericho was "Bartimaeus,
the son of Timaeus," and that "throwing off his mantle he
sprang up and came to Jesus" (Me. 10.46,50). Significantly,
Bultmann feels that the names in this perioope are spurious.
And in at least tm eases the account of Mark is longer and
for instance,
more detailed than that in the later gospels:/ the Gadarene
while
demoniac (Me. 5.1-20; Mt. 8.28-345 Lk. 8.26,-39) ?/the story 
of the deaf and dumb man told so concretely in Me. 7.31-7 
receives in the parallel passage in Matthew only a summary 
(Mt. 15. 29-31). And one perioope listed by Bultmann as
^Cf. below, 238
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among the miracle Btories is found only in Mark: the
blind man of Bethsaida (Me. 8.22ff*).
The addition of names as oral tra.dition proceeds 
may well be granted. But because one name (Jairus, in Me. 
5,22) is deemed spurious, there is little justlfica.tion 
for easting doubt on other names in Mark’s gospel. Nor 
does direct discourse provide an infallible guide for 
judging a perioope: less authentic than its parallel which 
contains no direct discourse: Bultmann. himself recognizes
this. Bultmann also speaks of the inclination of later 
editors to use the number two in the desire for symmetry.
Thus Mark contains but one Gadarene demoniac and one blind 
beggar, while in each case Matthew mentions two. Yet when 
we turn to Lulce, we find in each case that he speaks of 
only one,
Bultmann also holds that the exorcist interest 
of the primitive community accounts for many of the variants 
within the synoptic tradition. In this connection, McGinley 
remarks: "In the study of any literatux’e, the discernment
of variants is a delicate task, and the burden of proof 
always rests on the investigator who claims that two stories, 
with differing details, were originally one. Unless the 
incident can only have occurred once, e.g., the healing of 
the servant’s ear during the arrest in the garden of
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Gethsemene, the balance of probability favours the tradition 
as it stands. Statements that two or even three stories 
are 'obviously' variants prove nothing,"
Dibelius’ test for the authenticity and originality 
of the typical tale is the same as that for any other form: 
proximity to the sermon, Dibelius agrees that anyckind of 
secular accretion^ pragmatic detail/ breadth or ’ colour, 
poiniB to a later perioope. Yet Vincent Taylor, on the basis 
of experiment and observation, comes to an opposite con­
clusion, This writer has conducted experiments which he 
believes to be helpful in determining which of the mira.ole 
stories are closest to eye witness accounts. The experiments 
show that longer miraole stories, which are not the products 
of literary art., stand nearer the records of eye witnesses; 
and that the shorter and more conventional stories have
passed through many hands before they were committed to 
2
writing. The decision as to which of these approaches 
(that of Bultmann and Dibelius on the one hand, and of 
Taylor on the other) is the correct one depends on another 
decision: whether or not the primitive community created,
1
McGinley, Form Qriticism eft the Synoptic Healing 
Narrative's'^ . T  am mucE in&bted W  MoGinley 
throughout this chapter.
^Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition. 124ff#5 
202-09.
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or merely conserved, the primitive tradition#
The third task of the form critic is to determine 
the Bitz im Lehen# the life situation, out of which the 
material arose* Both Bultmann and Bibelius agree that the 
miracle stories were told to illustrate the divine might and 
Messianic power of Jesus, or to show the superiority of the 
Lord Jesus over other thaumaturges* In this regard, Bultmann 
holds that the exorcisms were particularly important to 
the community as proofs of the Messiah ship, and that this 
phenomenon is particularly clear in the summaries of Jesus* 
activities* These summaries hear closer examination*
Mark contains five such summaries: twice Jesus is mentioned
aa healing and exorcising, twice as merely healing, once as 
merely exorcising# In Matthew (the tendency should increase 
with time according to the form critic), there are ten such 
summaries : twice Jesus is pictured as healing and exorcising,
eight times as merely healing, never as merely exorcising.^
In the gospel of Luke there are seven such summaries in 
all: four times our Lord is portrayed as healing and
exorcising, three times as merely healing, never as merely
^Of. MoG-inley, op. clt«. 69.
1*32-41 1.3§'? 3.713-125 6.1-6at 6.53-6.
hn. 4.23-5; 8.16-7: 9.35-8; 11.2-6; 12.15b-21;
14.13-4; 14.34-6; 15.29-31; 19.1-2; 21.14-7
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1exorcising* Thus, out of twenty-three such summaries
preserved in the synoptic tradition, Jesus is described
fourteen times as merely healing, and only once, in Mark.
as merely exorcising* And of the total times exorcism is
mentioned, whereas Luke contains more mention of this than
Mark (four to three), Matthew contains less reference than
Mark (two to the three in Mark)*
Both Bultmann and Bibelius believe that the study
of analogies show that those v/ho told miracle stories vieve
anxious to prove that their particular hero v/as omnipotent,
and that the evangelists themselves illustrate this motif
in their selection of pericopae# Yet these same evangelists
that
report Jesus as saying to his generation/”no sign shall be 
given to it except the sign of Jonah"(Lk* 11.29 = Mt. 12.39)* 
Again, these evangelists have recorded Jesus as saying that 
"false Ohrists and false prophets" can do miracles (Mt.
24*24): if miracles prove Jesus* Messiahship how are these
and similar passages to be explained? It is not enough to
say that these passages are not truly the words of Jesus -
let us for the moment admit that they are not - but why
has the primitive community preserved or created these
H k .  4 .4 0 -1 ; 5 .1 5 -6 ; 6 .1 7 -9 ; 7 .21 : 7 .1 8 -2 3 ; 8 .2 -3 ;  g . u .
^  2 4-1 "
particular sayings at all? Again, according to the
recognized
evangelists, Jesus himself/the power and ability of other 
exorcists (Me. 9.38ff.). And, if the community wished to 
demonstrate Jesus* divine might, why did they not insert 
novellistic and miraculous manipulations and activities 
which, as Bultmann and Bihelius readily admit, are absent 
from the synoptic tradition? "We must ask why such stories 
as these do not appear in the Gospels, if Bultmann is 
fight.Therefore, if the evangelists preserved the 
miracle stories to i prove the Messiahship of Jesus, 
or to show the superiority of the Lord Jesus, thay have 
also preserved other pericopae illustrating contradictory 
motifs#
Both Bultmarm and Bibelius stress the value of 
non-biblioal parallels and analogies. Three things may 
be said about this use of parallels* First of all, though 
the literature of folklore may be valuable in exliibiting 
different forms or classifications of material, this 
literature must be cautiously employed when discussing the 
the Sitg im Leben* It is surely dangerous to discuss 
analogies drawn from sources distant in time and place 
from primitive Christianity: Indian stories, modern fairy
^Of* Taylor, op. cit.. 130*
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tales, Iranslsoan chronicles or the legend of Doctor Faust#
In only two literatures, rabbinic and Hellenistic, can we
seek for an atmosphere comparable to that of the synoptic
tradition, valuable though other literatures may be in
other regards# Secondly, although there are numerous
analogies l'or the various individual Iforms and pericopae
found in the gdspels, there is no parallel to the trans-
mission of the tradition as a whole. The best comparison
Bibelius can find is a collection of sayings and anecdotes
concerning the Fathers of the desert known as the Apophthegm
mata Patrum? yet even here, Bibelius warns us, we must
"take notice of essential differences" (TG# 173). After
considering various traditions from Aesop’s fables to
Fransisoan legends and from Jewish apocalyptic literature 
the legend of
to/Boctor Faust, Bultmann makes the following significant 
remark. "It appears to me, that helpful as the analogies 
are for the individual parts of the synoptic tradition, so 
much less are they for the gospel ,,as a whole. The analogies 
to hand only bring to the fore more clearly the peculia,rity 
of the gospels" (GST. 399)*^ Thirdly, admitting the reality
n
"'"Mir scheint, so sehr wir sum Veretândnis der Einzel- 
stücke der synoptischen Tradition der Analogien 
bedttrfen, so wenig für dae Bvangelium als Ganzes. 
Die etwa vorhandenen Analogien lassen nur die 
Eigenart des Evangeliuma urn so deutlicher hervor- 
treten."
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of parallels, the question is ’What do they signify?’ 
Bultmann’s answer is that they illustrate the atmosphere, 
show the motifs and help us to understand the entrance of 
mlraiole stories into the synoptic tradition* But is it 
not possible that the parallels have a different signi­
ficance? KShler, for instance, suggests: "Bo they not
primarily prove merely this, which is not at all new, 
that healing stories are everywhere narrated in the same 
manner, because they everywhere take pretty much the same
course# A healing is not uhhietorical because it has 
1parallels»"' The conclusion, then, is not that Jesus did 
not perform marvellous deeds, but that Jesus was by no 
means the sole worker of these marvellous deeds# There 
were other miracle workers in the ancient world, and, as 
we have seen, Jesus himself was quite aware of that#
The great weakness of the form critic’s analysis 
of the Bits im Leben is the refusal to see any of the 
pericopae as due to the dominant influence of Jesus him­
self# Let it be granted that the community created vast 
numbers of paradigms, miracle stories, sayings, myths, and 
so on# Yet the question remains: Why were all these
foisted upon Jesus of Hazareth? What was there about
^Gf# Taylor, op. cit#^ 128
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this man that called forth the creative powers of the
primitive community? Even if the primitive community was
not primarily interested in a biography of Jesus, hie
personal influence must have been the dominant factor in
the growth of the tradition#
One matter tremains:..4 for clarification and
criticism» In a previous chapter Bultmann., along with a
number of others, v/ae criticized for what was termed his
pseudo-scientific attitudes his claim that certain events
1are ’impossible’ or’inconceivable’♦ In regard to his 
work as a form critic, the some attitude appears from time 
to time# Regarding the cure of the ten lepers and the 
withering of the fig tree "nothing need be said Fbedarf 
es keines Wortes1**(GBT# 60)» Oonoerning the healing of 
the servant of the centurion at Capernaum, "scarcely 
anyone will plead for the historicity of healings at a 
distance FAuch wird sich kaum Jemand für die Geachioht- 
lichkeit der Fernheilungen einsetzénl"(GST# 39)# Whenever           tmmrn' 'ow.M J ^
Bultmann denies the historic worth of a passage because 
he considers it ’impossible’, he has ceased to be a form 
critic, or even a historian evaluating sources# He is in 
the realm of philosophy, and his criteria can have no
1
Of. above, 62f.
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value in the study of the gospel text#
What is the net result of this presentation and
criticism of the assumptions and tasks of form criticism?
Here, in the fourth part of this chapter, there is an
analysis of the contribution of form criticism as far as 
it affects the concept of miracle#
First of all, the form critics are wrong in their 
refusal to place any biographical interest in the life of 
Jesus in the primitive community# Interest in Jesus was 
the major factor and the dominating influence affecting 
the situation of the primitive community# Secondly, form 
critics admit that Jesus did some so-called miraculous 
deeds, but as to how many or which ones, we no longer 
know# We conclude that the study of form in itself does 
not permit any historioallvalue-judgements# Thirdly, 
building on the results of studies in the field of com­
parative religion, form criticism brings to light the fact 
that Jesus was not the only miracle worker in the ancient 
world# Though the form critics do not explicitly say so, 
it seems obvious that both Jesus and the evangelists 
recognized this fact.
It would not be unprofitable to ask at this 
juncture ’How did Jesus himself regard the mlra.cles which 
he perforraed?' To attempt an ansv/er may be to embark on
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the high eea of conjecture, hut a few hypotheses may be
advanced? and this attempt is the fifth and concluding
part of this chapter*
To'/begin with,:. Jesus preached the gospel of the
Kingdom of God: that is how Mark characterizes the message
of Jesus (Mk. 1*15)* How did Jesus see his healings,
exorcisms, and other unusual deeds in relation to this,
his fundamental message? Some authors, notably Dodd,
interpret the miracles as signs of a realized ©schatology,
as signs that with the appearanoe of Jesus the kingdom of
God has already come, that in his miracles Jesus is conscious'
1ly acting as Messiah*' By these miracles, the "arm of the 
Lord is laid bare *"  ^ But others (and we take as représenta- 
tlvcoFuller) interpret the miracles of Jesus as the fore­
runners of a yet-to-be realized eschatology, and that to 
Jesus himself they are signs that demand the insight of 
faith that they are indeed signs of that coming kingdom*'^ 
Thus, on the one hand, the miracles are interpreted as 
proofs that the kingdom had already arrived, on the other 
they are interpreted as signs of the drawing nigh of that
^Dodd, "Miracles in the Gospels", 504-09*
^Bodd, History and the Gospel* 93*
■^ Fuller, The Mission and Achievement of Jesus# 38ff*
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kingdom* It seems to me that the second of these inter­
pretations is the most sound*
To establish his contention, Fuller selects two 
passages as being crucial for Jesus’ understanding of his 
own miracles: the reply to John in prison and the Beelzebub
controversy •
As to the reply to John (Mt* 11*2-6 - I/k* 7*18—22),
Fuller believes that tiis passage and two separate passages
from Isaiah (Is* 35*5-6 and Is* 61.1) a.reudefinitely related :
and when the parallel passages (in Greek) are placed one
beside the other, the resemblaxace seems unmistakable, in
spite of the fact that there is no direct quotation* It is
pointed out that Isaiah 35 presents the Messianic salvation
as a process. First, there is the journey through the
paralleled
wilderness, (whlcli. is / by the miraculous healings .of Mt. 11.
5 and 6}, Following that - as the decisive culminating
event, as the fulfillment of the Messianic salvation -
comes the return to 2iion in verse 10* That is, the return
from exile has not yet taken place, but things are moving
in that direction* Gyrus is already winning his preliminary
victories: God is thus at work and the decisive event is
In like manner, 
just around the corner./"the miraculous healings * ‘ ; *
are not so much signs that the Messianic age’has dawned’,
as signs that it ’is darning’* The distinction may seem
^ 248 -
subtle, and somewhat overdrawn, but nevertheless it is of 
greatest importance when applied to the miracles of Jesus. 
For, in applying Isaiah 35 to his own works of healing, end 
claiming, not that the age of salvation has already oomeycd 
but rather that it ’is dawning’, Jesus places the decisive 
event, the fulfillment of the Messianic salvation, ih thé 
future.”^
Similar treatment is afforded the Beelzebub
controversy (Lk. 11.17-22 and parallels). The crucial
saying of the pericope is;"If it is by the finger of God
that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come
upon you" (Lk. 11.20). Fuller believes, with many others,
that the phrase ’the finger of God’ is an allusion to
Ex. 8.19# He goes on to say that the plagues of Egypt,
wrought by the finder of Rod, were preliminary demonstrations
of power pointing forward to the decisive act of God, the
Exodus itself, which in Ex. 15.6 is attributed to the
ri^ht hand of God. The plagues v/ere not themselves the
great event, but signs (for the eye of faith) pointing to
2that future event.
Fuller concludes that, in the mind of Jesus 
himself, the miracles were signs of the coming of the
'^Fuller, op. cit.. 36. %bM... ,37—B,>
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kingdom of God, signs that it was davming* But a major
difficulty remains: Jesus himself never applies the word
’sign’ to his miraculous activity in the synoptic gospels*
On the contrary, he uses the word in a depreciating sense*
In Mark, Jesus absolutely refuses to give any sign to the
Pharisees who demanded it: "V/hy does this generation seek
a sign? Truly, I say to you, no sign shall be given to
this generation" (Mk* 8.12) * In asking their question, the
Pharisees are said to be ’testing’ or ’tempting’ Jesus.
The same verb is used to describe the activity of the
devil in the Temptation narrative (Mt* 4#3ff. and parallels),
where Jesus is ’tempted* to use his miraculous powers to
point to himself* "Therefore, while Jesus’ absolute refusal
to give a sign in Mk* 8*11 is no proof that Jesus did not
regard his miracles as signs pointing forward to the
coming eschatological Kingdom it does appear to prove
conclusively that he refused to interpret them as signs of
1an already existing Messiahship."
The miracles are signs of the coming of the 
kingdom: and , ) John so seems to interpret them. We may
take as an example the first sign, the changing of the 
water into wine (Jn. 2.1-11). The clue to the interpreta-
^Fuller, OP. cit.. 39.
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tion of this sign lies in verse 4b » "my hour has not yet
oome" and in verse 6: "for the Jewishritea of purification".
The episode points forward to the ’hour’ (Jn. 12.13; 13.1;
17*1) of the gloz^ification of Jesus on the cross, when the
eschatological purification from sin will he accomplished*
Until that time his actions are signs of what is to he.
Although Jesus is said to have "manifested his glory" (Jn,
2*11), John does not mean us to understand that the miracle
is an independent manifestation of the Messianic glory. For
the ëye of faith, it is a glimpse in advance of that glory,
which will he finally and decisively manifested in the
1death and exaltation of Jesus.
The miracles are signs of the coming of the kingdom.
And as such they are an integral part of all that Jesus did
probably most
and said and was. This is/clearly implied in the reply to 
John, where the preaching of the gospel to the poor is 
maintained alongside the healings: both are signs of the
coming of the kingdom. "What are the signs of the time?
He himselfÎ His presence* his deeds* his messaget . . .
All that does not mean that God’s Eeim is already here ;
p
but it does mean that it is dawning."
^Fuller, OP. cit.* 42-3*
^Bultmann, Theology of the lew Testament. I, 7
^  2 5 1  -
But another important question remains: How
could Jesus see his miracles as signs of the coming of the 
Kingdom when other men did comparable miracles? This same 
question could be asked in two other forms; How could 
Jesus see his words as signs of the coming of the Kingdom 
when what he said was not unique? How could Jesus see 
himself as a sign of the coming of the Kingdom when he was 
only one man amongst many? His marvels, his words, his 
being may have been unusual, but to the eye of the spectator 
he was not unique in any of these respects* Hot his marvels, 
nor his words, nor hie being, were manifestly or obviously 
from above or from God* It was only by faith: that is,
in and through his marvels, his words, his being - by the 
conviction of things not seen - that anyone could believe 
that all these were signs of the coming Kingdom* In them­
selves, his words, and works and person were ambiguous, 
demanding the insight of faith in order to be able to say 
that they came from God*
Even as Jesus himself was aware of the ability of 
other miracle-workers, so also was the early church* Simon 
(Acts 8*9ff*) and Elymas the sorcerer (Acts 13*6ff*) performed 
acts analogous to the healing and exorcist work of the 
primitive preachers and missionaries* Therefore the miracles 
v/rought by the early Christians likewise demanded the
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insight of faith.
But what about the kesurreotion - is not the arm 
of the Lord laid bare in this event? Is not this an 
unambigious happening - one in which the spectator is 
constrained to see the activity of God? Certainly this is 
the <3him of traditional theology - whether of a contra-, , 
prater-, or supernatural variety. As Headlam says: "The
disciples believed in Him because they believed in a miracle,, 
namely, the Resurrection, and they had good grounds for 
their belief, « , « The fact remains that only by a miracle, 
and because of a miracle, had they courage to believe."
And Richardson: "In the last resort it was the sign of the
resurrection which authenticated all Jesus’ other signs and
p
the claims which they involved." * Yet how certain is that 
ground? Even in the biblical accounts there appear to be 
conflicting elements: on the one hand, Jesus was able to
pass through closed doors (Jn. 20.26); on the other, men 
could ’handle’ and ’see’ him, and he could eat physical 
food (Lk. 24*39,49)* Then again, he appeared only to the 
disciples. As early as the second century 0elsus had 
seized upon this point. Arguing against the resurrection
^Headlam, The Miracles of the Hew Testament. 347# 
^Hicterdson, MSG, 132.
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of Jesus, he maintained: "He ought to have ap%)eared to
those who had ill-treated him, and to him who had condemned
1him, and to all men universallyLikewise Spinoza: "I
shall only ask you to observe," he wrote to Oldenburg, "that
Christ did not appear personally either to the Council, or
to Pilate, or to any incredulous or indifferent person, but
pto believers only."
But does not the open grave prove the reality
of the resurrection? Does not the empty tomb point irresia-
t&bly to the laying bare of the arm of the Lord? The
gospel narratives, in spite of their divergencies, yield,
it has been said, "a, uniform and very impressive tradition
%
that the grave was empty on Easter Day. " Yet even were 
the narrative© of the empty tomb extremely trustworthy - 
which is open to doubt - one factor is missing: that is,
no one is reported to have seen Jesus leave the tomb.^
Once again, only the faithful experienced the presence of 
the living Lord. To the eye of the spectator, to the eye
1
Of. Origen, The Writings of Orijgcen. II, 65.
^Of. Willis, Benedict de Sninoza. 265.
^Simpson, The Résurrection and Modern Thought,. 26.
"^Interestingly enough, the apocryphal Gospel of Peter 
does contain a report of this event. But this 
gospel lies outside the canon, much of it is 
manife stly legendary *
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of unbelief, it was quite possible that someone had taken 
the body of Jesus away. Men oould be told that someone 
"came by night and stole him away while we were asleep"
(Mt. 28.13). As such, the whole episode oould be dismissed 
as "an idle tale" (lk. 24*10). The miracles of Jesus, the 
resurrection, the empty tomb (if all be admitted as literally 
true) are yet ambiguous events: all can be explained in 
earth-bound terms; only the insight of faith can interpret 
them as the acts of God.
This ambiguity of biblical events is one of the 
topics discussed in the next chapter, which is entitled 
"The Bemythologioal View".
2 5 5
Olmpter VI# The Bemvthological Movement#
"In the person and acta of Jcaua no aupranaturalism shall 
be suffered to remain*" Stx'auae*
JGM « ■ Bultmann, E* Jeaua Ohrlat and Mythology #
M  ss Bartach, H (ed#)# 'Eoxygma. and ^ Myth# ( M  always refera
to essaya in this bo3E by Bultmann)#
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This chapter is devoted to an. examination of the 
movement known as Bntmythologisierung or demythologizing, 
especially as that movement affects the concept of miracle* 
The demythologist is convinced that the message of redemption 
in Jesus Christ, as it is contained in the New Testament 
writings, is embodied in a mythological language and in a 
framework of conceptions of a mythological character which 
can neither be fitted into the world view of modern man, nor 
do justice to the message of redemption itself. Thus, the 
demythologist sees it as his task to interpret the Christian 
message in order to make it understandable to modern man, 
and to present the gospel in terms which are in agreement 
with the basic insights of the message itself.
The chapter is divided as follows, first of all, 
the assumptions or convictions of the demythologist (seven 
in number) are presented in a straightforward manner. 
Secondly, the reasons why Bultmann wishes to demythologize 
miracle are critically considered. Thirdly, the method of 
interpreting the miracles is evaluated within the larger 
question of the relationship between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of faith.
first, the demythologist is convinced that the 
message of the New Testament is couched in mythological 
terminology which makes no meaningful impact upon modern
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man. Indeed, the redemptive message of the New Testament 
itself is set on the stage of a mythical cosmology. Presented 
there is a three-tierêd universe; the upper tier being the 
habitation of God and his angels, the lower tier the place 
of hell. The earth, midv/ay between, is the battleground 
between God and his angels on the one hand, and Satan and 
demonic powers on the other. These forces are at constant 
warfare with one another, and both man and nature may be 
possessed and controlled by alternative and alien elements.
But because God is the sole Absolute, this state of affairs 
cannot long continue. The Adjuticator will come at the 
last day to destroy the stage and props, judge the actors 
and assign them to heaven or to hell.
The Christian apostles proclaimed that the last 
time had now come: the new age had been instituted by
God’s very son, Jesus Ohrist. This Christ v/alked the shores
of Galilee - he was a man, yet God Incarnate. He was crucified
as a sinner; yet in this act he atoned for the sin of his 
fellowmen. His resurrection announced the new age. The 
powers - death, sin and Satan -were defeated; the decisive 
battle had been won by God in-Ohrist. The resurrected Ohrist had
têen exalted as Lord and King to God’s right hand. He WOUld
come soon to exterminate finally the demonic powers. By 
their baptism into the Christian church, men'v^ res assured
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of resurrection to life: indeed they enjojieÆiaguarantee
of that akea% in that the Spirit ms even tuéin work within 
them •
The event of redemption is itself clothed in 
mythical language: language shared by Gnosticism and
Jewish apocalypse* To modern man, such a mythical way of 
speaking is outworn. When we preach, do we demand that our 
listeners believe in a mythical setting as well as the kerygma 
itself? Or do we think that the Nev/ Testament has a kerygma 
apart from myth?
Obviously it is Impossible to ask a man to believe 
in the mythical world of the Mew Testament. He cannot 
change his world outlook at will. True, his world outlook 
may change: but only when a new set of facts compelshit.
Mor is there anything particularly Christian about the Hew 
Testament cosmology: it is neither Christian nor non-
Christian, but pre-ocientifio* Of course, myth may embody 
truths which any particular cosmological view v/ill disregard. 
This may be true of certain Hew Testament myths. But it is 
still true that modern man cannot change his world outlook 
willy-nilly. Modern man’s views are largely moulded by 
scientific attitudes: and to accept the Hew Testament cos­
mology would be insincere and irrational.for him# 
f In point of fact, no one to-day accepts the Hew
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Testament view of the world# Bo it is useless to say 
’descended into hell’ when to think of hell as a specifically 
located place underneath the earth is absurd. Nor do we 
believe in a locally restricted God, nor in spirits good or 
bad. Binoe modern man is aware of the principle of causa­
tion, it is impossible to ask him to attribute sickness to 
demonic pov/ers. The miracles of the Hew Testament are no 
longer miracles and^  when we attempt to explain them on 
scientific grounds, we admit as much. The mythical escha­
tology is untenable, for the world did not come to an end 
as Jesus and the disciples proclaimed. If wo do expect the 
end of the world, we expect it as a natural catastrophe, not 
as a mythical event# Modern man understands himself as 
essentially a unit: that is, responsible for his own thinking,
feeling, and willing. He is not a pawn in the handsrof powers. 
If he achieves a personality which is integrated internally 
and externally, he alone is the artificer# If there is a 
separation or breakdown he does not attribute it to demonic 
powers, but calls it schizophrenia. Biology and psychology 
rightly claim that man is a highly dependent being : but this
does not mean that his self-mastery has been handed over to 
anything outside himself. And any dependence he feels is 
inseparable from nature itself# Once a man sees this, he 
can recover his self-mastery and plan his life on a rational
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basis# If a man recognizes himself as a spirit, he knows 
that however much he is conditioned by his physical makeup 
he himself is distinguished from it, with responsible mastery 
over it# In short, modern science has made it impossible 
for contemporary man to accept as true the cosmology of the 
New Testament.
That is why many biblical statements fall on un­
responsive ears* The Spirit, the sacraments, death as the 
punishment of sin, the doctrine of the atonement, the resur­
rection, heaven and hell - all these and other phrases are 
meaningless to contemporary man, whether he be a naturalist 
or an idealist. In short, the redemptive message must be 
demythologized (KM* 1-8). And in this dexnythologizing, v/e 
must not pick and chooses "in Bultmann’s case it is not a 
question of a mechanical selection of equal terms, i.e, 
reject some, accept something else* There is a consistent 
unity is his method of interpretation* He rejects a peri­
pheral element in order to be able to throw light on that 
which is central* The miracles have to step aside for the 
gospel."^
Secondly, the demythologist is convinced that the 
redemptive message must be interpreted. If all the above-
^Wingren, TheoloCT in Conflict# xx-xxi.
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mentioned conceptions are mythological, what can be done 
about it? Gan these conceptions be cast aside in the interests 
of modernising the gospel? If this v/ere the case Bultmann 
could simply be bracketed with Harnaok and the idealists, 
or with Troeltschh and the religio-historioal school, as one 
who is accomodating the gospel to a passing phase of scep­
ticism# Buttais is clearly not Bultmann’s intention# He 
intends to interpret, rather than to eliminate, mythological 
statements* "We must ask whether the mythological statements 
as a whole contain a still deeper meaning v/hieh is concealed 
under the cover of mythology* If that is so, let us a,bandon 
the mythological conceptions precisely because we want to 
retain this deeper meaning* « « « This method of interpreta­
tion of the Hew Testament which tries to recover the deeper 
meaning behind the mythological conceptions I call de­
my tholo^i zing » # . • Its aim is not to eliminate the mytho­
logical statements but to interpret them" (JQM* 18)* That 
is to say, there is a deeper truth in all of these mythological 
statements which cannot be dismissed# ?/© to-day must try to 
describe and express our faith in Jesus Ohrist by means of 
our own language, our own images and our own pictures* We 
should do this, however, without changing the reality of 
Jesus Christ, without limiting his significance, without even 
moderating the nature of the Ohrist-event♦ Bultmann is not
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trying to eliminate the scandal or stumbling-^hlock of 
Christianity, but he is trying to locate that scandal and 
that stumbling-block in the proper i)lace* Christ, his sig­
nificance as our Lord, his crucifixion and resurrection as 
the redemptive action of God, must remain the intrinsic 
stumbling-block (I Cor* 1*23; Gal* 5*11). But the danger 
has arisen that to-day not Christ himself, but the diction 
of the Bible, the language of the church, the fomulae of 
the creeds, the text of the hymns represent the stumbling- 
block* In order to recover and reveal the stumbling-block, 
the mythology must be interpreted* for example, in mytholo­
gical thinking, heaven is lookediiupon as God’s abode or 
dwelling place* The truth intended to be expressed by this 
is that God does not belong to this earthly worlds he is 
superior to it, beyond it, he is transcendent• But mytholo­
gical thinking assumes that it is possible to express God’s 
transcendence by using spatial thought forms of infinite 
distance, of a place high above us* The question now arises 
whether it is not necessary to express the trutb contained 
in the thought of God’s transcendence in other thought forras, 
for modern man has ceased to think mythologically* If this 
is done, such a man may then understand what is meant when 
the Bible speaks about God in heaven, and about Christ’s 
ascension and sitting at the right hand of God* In the
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same way, the mythologioal concept of hell aims at expressing 
the transcendent power of evil and the transcendence of 
man’s lost state when is without God* But mythological 
thinking does this with the aid of mi inadequate spatial . 
image, in which the transcendence of God is localized in 
the depths* ’ By the use of the expression ’heaven* we see 
that tLie soul or intention of the myth is to express the 
transcendence of God, hut the body or actualization of that 
intention is clothed in a ’this-woflj^ly’ presentation*
Thirdly, the demythologist is convinced that de- 
mythologizing is an hermeneutic method, that is, a method of 
interpretation* "’Hermeneutics’ means the art of exegesis"
( JQM, 45) * Bultmmin insists that "every interpreter brings 
with him certain conoeptiona # * * as presuppositions of 
his exegesis" (JQM, 48)* It is impossible to interpret 
without any presuppositions. Nor does the text itself 
-provide the conceptions of exegesis* But then, which con­
ceptions and which presuppositions are right and adequate?
It is true that our exegesis must be without presuppositions 
with regard to the results of oxa* exegesis. But there is a 
fundamental difference between presuppositions with regard 
to results* and presuppostions with regard to method* And
^Of. Bultmann, "What is Bemythologising?", 217#
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the method is nothing other than a kind of questioning, a 
way of putting questions î I cannot understand a given text
* '  “ (U —
without asking certain questions of it* And if I ask certain 
questions of a text, I already have a certain understanding 
of it, I have already formed (perhaps unconsciously) con- 
oeptions and presuppositions ahout which the text will 
speak to me. So the corresponding presuppoBitioii of exegesis 
is that I have a relation to the suhjeot-matter (Sache) about 
which I interrogate a given text# Bultmann calls this the 
•life-relation%  In this life-relation I have a certain 
understanding of the matter in question, and from this under­
standing gi'ow: the conceptions of exegesis. Prom reading the 
texts I will learn, and my understanding will he enriched 
and corrected* Without such a relation and such previous 
understanding (VorverstSndnis) it is impossible to under­
stand any text (JGM, 49ff*)# Interpretation, therefore, 
alv/ays presupposes a living relationship to the aub.ieots which 
are directly or indirectly expressed in the text. I only 
understand a text dealing with music if and in so far as I 
have a relationship to music . . .  - and I only miderstand 
a mathematical text if I have a relationship to mathematics, 
and an historical representation in so far as historical life 
is familiar to me - in so far as I know [in] my own life 
What a state is, and what life in a state and its potentialities
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are - or a novel, because I know from my own life what, for
example, family and vocation, are - and so on, That is
to say, my own relation to the subject matter prompts the
questions I bring to text and elicits the type of
answers I obtain from the text. With regard to historical
interpretation, there are two distinct relations a person
can bring to a text, First of all, my interest may be simply
to give a picture of a past era, to reconstruct a decade or
a century of a by-gone age; and secondly, my interest may
be to learn from historical documents what I need for my
practical every-day life, For example, "you can interpret
Plato as an interesting figure of the culture of fifth-
century Athenian Greece, but you can also interpret Plato
to learn through him the truth about hmtian life. In the
latter case your interpretation is not motivated by interest
in a past epoch of history, but by your search for truth"
(JOM, 51), And in each of these two ways the Bible may be
read. In the first instance, it can be used as a source to
reconstruct a past epoch, or to determine the character of
David or Peter or John, Again in the first instance, the
folklore
Bible may be read as an example of . / ' literature, and
various strata be uncovered in the material at hand (as in
/
^Bultmann, GT II, 218-19} KÏ 242-43.
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form critiolem) 5 or the Bib3,e can be read to furnish evidence 
of a divine man (as in supernaturalism). But over against all 
these ways, and as a second way, Ihe Bible can be read to hear 
what the text has to say about my own life and existence now.
In the fourth place, the demythologist is convinced 
that man (• natural man* ) has a * lif e-relation* to the sub­
ject matter about which the biblical text speaks* Some 
theologians - Barth, for example — seem; to clearly say that 
since the theme of the Bible is the revelation of God, we 
can gain a relation to God only by his revelation and not in 
advance of it. Bultmann believes, on the other hand, that 
man does have in advance a relation to God, and that this 
contention is borne out by Augustine * s dictum; ’Thou hast 
made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it 
finds its rest in Thee**’ Man does have a knowledge of God 
in advance, though not of the revelation of God, that is, 
of his revela,tion in Ohrist* Man has a relation to God in 
his search for God, whether that search be conscious or 
unconscious. "Man*s life is moved by the search for God 
because it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, 
by the question of his own personal existence. The question 
of God and the question of myself are identical" (JOM, 53)#
^Of, above, 145; igif
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We have thus found the correct hermeneutical ques­
tion by means of which the secrets of the Bible may be 
unlocked» And this question is ; BTow is man* s existence 
understood in the Bible? And with this question, a similar 
one can be formulated as the key to the kerygma of any 
biblical myth» *What does the myth say about man*s relation 
to God in the midst of the world? * The tradition and 
preaching of the church tells us that we are to hear in 
the Bible authoritative words about our existence? more than 
that, that the Bible becomes for the individual man a word 
addressed personally to him, giving him real existence. The 
Bible does not teach a man a particular cosmology or tell of 
new aspects of the ViTorld*s structure, but it does reveal 
what the Ohrist-event means for a man’s own personal relation 
to God and for his own existence in the midst of history» 
Therefore the qtiestion must be ’Does the biblical mythology 
contain a new conception of my situation before God?* or 
*What possibility of understanding my own existence is shown 
and offered in each document of the Bible?* If it is true 
that the right questions are concerned with the possibilities 
of tmderstanding human existence, then it is necessary to 
discover the adequate conceptions by which such understanding 
is to be expressed* To discover these conceptions is the 
task of philosophy* And the philosophy which is best suited
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for this task is existentialism, more strictly, the axis-
1tential philosophy of Martin Heidegger.
A note as to the meaning of the words * existentialism*,
* existential *, * existentiell* and * existentialist * 
as they are used throughout this thesis.
The word existentialism (a noun) is used as a 
term which designates a philosophy: a philosophy
which purports to give an analysis of the human 
predicament; a philosophy which has human existence 
as its direct object.
The word existential (an adjective, and a trans­
lation of the German word existential) is used as 
a general term applicable to^ th'e prInciples of the 
philosophy of existentialism. The word existential 
is a term used to express that which belongs to the 
particular philosophical system called existential^.B 
ism: thex'efore, existential philosophy « existen­
tialism.
The word existentiell (an adjective, and a 
translation of the German word existentiell) is used 
as a term which has reference to a particular con­
crete situation v/hich is handled in a way compatible 
with or in agreement with the philosophy of exis­
tentialism# The word existentiell is a term used to 
express that which belongs to existence as such*
The word existentialist (a noun) is used as 
a term which applies to one who is a proponent or 
disciple of existential philosoî^hy. For instance, 
Heidegger and Sartre are existentialists, in the 
broad meaning of that term. More specifically, 
within this thesis, it applies to a smaller group 
of theologians, of whom Tillich and Bultmann are 
representatives.
If any apology be necessary for this interpreta­
tion (with which Greig partially agrees in his trans­
lation of Bultmann*s GV II, see BT 236), it can be 
said that it has the advantage that the word exis­
tentialist is retained for sole use as a substantive; 
it correctly designates one who is a follower of 
existential philosophy. Therefore, with the excep­
tion of book and article titles, I reserve the 
right to alter the translation of other authors (e.g. 
laoquarrie) into the above schema.
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Thus, in the fifth place, the demythologist is 
cohvinced that demythologising is existential interpretation. 
Here Bultmann employs the philosophy of existence of Martin 
Heidegger. In his philosophy, Heidegger distinguishes 
between the being of persons, Basein. and the being of things, 
Vorhandenheit * In his analysis of the being of persons, or 
of human existence, Heidegger sees three things as funda­
mental. The first of these elements is possibility. One*s 
life is never complete, the future is open, one*s being is 
becomings there are possibilities ahead of a person from 
amongstriwMdh he must choose. Secondly, there is the element 
of facticity. Certain factors in life are imposed upon me 
without regard for my desires, and these factors limit my 
possibilities. The word Heidegger uses is Geworfenheit - 
thrownness - the metaphor coming from the throw of dice.
This thrownnesB-faCbr is present to each one of us. I 
cannot help the fact that I am a Canadian, living in the 
twentieth century, having two particular people as my parents. 
This combination of possibility and facticity, of freedom 
and finitude, gives rise to the state of Angst or dread or 
despair. Out of this state of dread there arises the third 
element in human existence, fallenness. Unable to bear 
the situation brought about by the combination of facticity 
and possibility, the self runs away from itself into the
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world. It bases its life upon the visible, finds security
in that Which is in its control: material possessions or
1its own aohievements.
Bultmann is aware of the fact that there is no 
right philosophy in the sense of an absolutely perfect system, 
an.swering all questions and solving all problems. But since 
we approach the Bible with the question of human existence, 
that philosophy which ha,s human existence as its direct object 
would presumably be of considerable help. That philosophy 
to-day is existentialism (JGM. 55f$)* At the same time, 
this existential philosophy does not offer an ideal pattern 
of human existence, that is, it does not say 'you must exist 
in such and such a way* ; it says only *you must existé, it 
shows one what it means to exist# Existentialism attempts 
to show what existence means by distinguishing between the 
person's being as •existence* and the being of all worldly 
beings which are not 'existing* but only • extant* (vorhanden) * 
As an existing being, possibilities are open to man; his 
being is becoming, he truly exists. "Only men can have an 
existence, because they are historical beings* That is to 
say, every man has his own history. Always his present comes
'For this exposition of these elements of Heidegger's 
philosophy, I am indebted to some unpublished 
material by Professor Ian Henderson.
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out of his past and leads into his future* He realises his 
existence if he is aware that each 'now* is the moment of 
free decision" (£0M, 56)* Existential philosophy throws 
the burden or the responsibility of existing upon the indivi­
dual persons it does not secure for that person a self- 
understanding of his own existence in the sense of providing 
a system whereby all problems are solved. But just this 
existential emphasis on personal responsibility helps to 
make the word of the Bible clear and open to a person. 
Existential analysis emphasises the necessity of personal 
decision, the decision *you must exist*. "Without this 
decision, without the readiness to be a human being, a 
person who in responsibility takes it upon himself to be, 
no one can understand a single word of the Bible as speaking 
to his own personal existence. • . • Thus does it become 
clear that the hearing of the word of the Bible can take 
place only in personal decision" (JGM. 57)# By deraytholo- 
gizing — by the existential interpretation of the New Testa­
ment - Bultmann hopes to challenge man to a genuine exis­
tentiell decision (KM, 16).
In the sixth place, the demythologist employs the 
terms myth and mythology in a number of different ways.
"It seems fair to say that Bultmann groups together a number 
of not particularly homogeneous elements under the heading
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of the mythological." There are at least three mea.nings 
which Bultmann attachée to the concept 'myth* or 'mytholo­
gical*. Fiz’st of all, the mythological is characterized 
as primitive science - the belief that the world is governed
by supranatural powers, by gods and demons who rule the
o
history of men and nature #^  Secondly, a myth confuses the 
categories of Vorhandenheit and Dasein, treating spiritual 
factors as if they were natural entities. Or, to put the 
same definition in slightly different terms, myth speaks 
about transcendence in terms of this world, in figures that 
picture immanent phenomena: transcendent action is assimi­
lated to *this-worldly' action. "Mythology is the use of 
imagery to express the other worldly in terms of world and 
the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms 
of this side" (KM, 10). Though this definition expresses 
the narrow and strict sense of the term myth, Bultmann usee 
myth in a third way; myth seems to indicate, vaguely, every 
kind of divine intervention in the human sphere.
In the seventh place, the demythologist is con­
vinced that miracle is one element of the biblical message 
which must be demythologized. It is important to note here
1Henderson, Myth in the Hew Testament. 46.
Of* Dinkier, "Existentialist Interpretation of the 
New Testament", 89#
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how Bultmann sees miracle in its un-demythologized meaning.
In traditional theology (as Bultmann aees it), a miracle is
a sensible operation of a supranatural power in conflict
with the powers of the lower region. Such miracles are
n of course
"Durohbrtiche". Though Bultmann does not/say so, such a
definition of miracle would fit into one of the traditional 
ways of understaixding the term as these ways are presented 
in this thesis; that is, in a contra-, prêter-, or super­
natural manner. Such a miracle is an unambiguous event, by 
means of which the spectator is cowed and constrained into 
belief. We, in our own day, need only believe that such an 
event actually happened; belief tends to be an intellectual 
assent to events long since past. It is to be noted that 
the tenor of this present thesis has been to reject just 
this conception of the term miracle. We now critically ask 
the demy thologist tv/o things; firsf|;- j he considers this 
traditional concept of miracle to be mythological; and 
secondly, how he interprets the miracles.
Why is a miracle mÿthologica.1? To answer this 
question, vre must consider the different definitions of 
the term myth in relation to the concept of miracle*
First of all, the mythological is characterized
1 So Bultmann quotes Wellhausen in GST, 234.
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as primitive science - the belief that the world is governed 
by supranatural powers, by gods and demons. It is this 
conception of myth which inspires the already-quoted remark 
of Bultmann * s to the effect that it is impossible to make 
use of electric lights and radio and in case of illness to 
lay claim to modern medical and clinical methods and at the 
same time to believe in the Mew Testament world of spirits 
and miracles (KM. 5). There are three things to be said 
about this statement.
First, Bultmann is right when he says that modem 
man, influenced as he is by scientific methods, refuses to 
believe that any event, however unusual, is thereby auto­
matically designated as due to the activity of God. The 
scientist and the historian, as we have already seen, refuse 
to bring in an illegitimate supranatural factor when faced 
with an apparently inexplicable fact. The modern man 
faces phenomena with the confidence that such events are 
explicable in terms of natural law. Bultmann has rightly 
understood the outlook of modern man in this regard. Man 
no longer sees himself as confronted by supranatural powers 
which can intervene directly in his affairs; he does not 
see demons at work in an epileptic, nor an act of God in a
^Cf. above, 66ff,; 71ff.
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war or an economic depression. But rather he sees his 
world as an intricate web of forces which can bo handled and 
dealt with by means of certain semi-autonomous scientific 
techniques. The techniques are relative, of course, and 
none of them is final. But the method itself does not 
change. Bultmann is right in rejecting a God of the scien­
tific gaps. As Gregor Smith says: "The real God does not
reside in the interstices left by science. He is not to 
be found on the sandbank of a diminishing mystery. He 
does not lurk in that kind of mystery at all. . • « Thou#i 
the mythological thought-world does contain an element of 
rational thought, it seems to me a mere illusion if you 
think that the whole field of religious thought and experience 
can simply be fenced off ♦ * • and closed to trespassers."
Secondly, Bultmann is wrong when he seems to imply 
that because men no longer see supranatural powers inter­
vening directly, then the events called miracles did not 
happen. We have already seen that Bultmann is loath to
admit the veracity of some events because he thinks that
2
such things are impossible or inconceivable. We may readily 
grant that unusual events need not be attributed to the
^Smith, "Some Implications of Demythologizihg", 260 
^Of. above, 63; 244-
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direct activity of God, but that is not to say that unusual 
events did not happen. Bultmann correctly understands the 
basic principles and methods of the natural scientist, but 
he is out of date with his conception of wha/k is possible 
or conceivable. One has the feeling that Bultmann thinks 
that if certain events were admitted as actually true, one 
would be compelled to admit that these events were caused 
by God. This seems to me to be one element in his refusal
to admit a literal resurrection: it is termed "an abso­
lutely mythical event" (M, 39)* But we need only recall
/
Huxley's words to see the falsity of this contention. "In 
truth, if a dead man did come to life, the fact would be 
evidence, not that any law of nature had been violated, but 
that those laws, even when they express the results of a 
very long and uniform experience, are necessarily based on 
incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only as grounds
p
of more or less justifiable expectation."
I object to Bultmann's narrov/ conception of what
he considers to be possible or conceivable. I object to
Bultmann's bowing to what he imagines to be the reality 
criteria of modern man. He tends to stamp out any alleged 
event which he falsely believes modern man cannot accept.
^Gf. below, 4G8., ^Huxley, Hume. 133
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But there is another side to this argument: and this brings
me to the third point. As v/e have seen, there were plenty
of miracle-workers in antiquity, and the unusual deeds
ascribed to Jesus were no stumbling-block to the large
majority of men of the first few centuries of the Christian
era. In short, in regard to working miracles, Jesus acted
like any other religious leader: in this respect one could
say that he did what men demand of any religious leader.
"It is therefore quite possible that theology is 'bowing to
the reality criteria of natural man* just as much in accepting
1the miracles as in rejecting them."
Myth confuses the categories of Vorhandenheit and 
Basein, treating spiritual factors as if they were natural 
entities. In an unusual event, mythological thought attri­
butes the causation to God. God is thereby placed on a 
level with all other worldly causes, even though he occupies 
an exalted place on that level. God is thus understood as 
a sort of supra-entity, an abnormal block of being: but in
just this way the old ontology falsely objectifies God.
In no particular act, however unusual, can the casual observer 
state that God is the necessary cause* No man can ever 
isolate God's activity and present it as an object for
1 Gogarten, BemythologizinjE^  and History. 87
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observation. "God's handiwork cannot be labelled and 
docketed like the works of an artist or an engineer" (KM, 
121). God's act is perceptible by faith and by faith alone. 
"To every other eye than the eye of faith the action of 
God is hidden. Only the natural happening is generally 
visible and ascertainable• In it is accomplished the hidden 
act of God" (KM, 197)# Miracle, as the activity of God, is 
never ascertainable on a mere spectator basis. If that were 
so, all the believer in miracle does is to consult evidence 
and draw a conclusion; he need not make an act of personal 
faith, belief in a miracle would be thus no more than 
intellectual assent. A miracle cannot prove to a sceptic 
the fact of the existence of God and his sovereignty. For 
in that case "the assertion of God's sovereignty would be 
seen as a universal truth which can by logical reasoning be 
made intelligible to everyone; the miracle would then be 
regarded as a universally accredited, extraordinary event, 
from which the conclusion may be drawn that it depends upon 
a divine cause* On the contrary, miracle as such means the 
activity of God; therefore the understanding of an event as 
a miracle is not a conclusion from what is perceived,but 
the perception itself apprehends the miracle. Hence only 
the faith which arises simultaneously with the sight bf "
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1miracle is true faith." In a mythological miracle, God 
is relegated to a position (albeit an elevated one) amongst 
objects, "the transcendence of God is reduced to immanence" 
(KM, 44). In the interpretation of miracles, Bultmann feels 
that they must be removed from the world of objects to the 
world of subjects, from the sphere of Vorhandenheit to the 
sphere of Basein. That is, we go to the Bible not asking 
the question of its cosmology, but the question of the 
possibilities it opens up for our own existence. Hon- 
existential statements - like the undemythologized miracles, 
which give not a possibility of existence but a certain ob­
solete world viev/ - are mythological : that is, in need of
existential interpretation*
Again, myth speaks about transcendence in terms 
of this world, in figures that picture immanent phenomena; 
transcendent action is assimilated with this-worldly 
action. "Bultmann is at one with Kierkegaard and Barth in 
his desire to stress God's transcendence. He shares their 
horror of any system of ideas that tends towards the iden­
tification of God with the world. • • . God must be con­
ceived 0.8 the 'Other', the Creator, the One of whom the 
prophet said: '-My; thoughts are not year thoughts, neither
^Bultmann, Jesus and the V/ord. 177
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are .lÿ;our?/ays my waye* (is. 55*8)." When the speotatoz* 
or observer v/eighs the evidence and comes to the conclusion 
that in the series ABO, 0 can only be caused by God, his 
conclusion is one of intellectual insight. In such a process, 
the element of faith is entirely lacking. Faith by its very 
nature is belief in "things not seen" (Heb. 11.1). Once 
again, mythology (and in particular mythological miracle) 
vulgarizes God, secularizes him, relegates him to the world 
of things. ITndemythologized miracle suggests that God 
operates in this world in the same way as forces of this 
world. Miracle presents the action of God as a process 
which both interrupts and prolongs funterbricht und doch
o
gleichzeitig verkettetTthe natural course of history ; it 
introduces a eupranatuxml cause into the natural causality 
of this world. Certainly God does act and certainly God 
is involved in history, and certainly God transforms history 
(for the eye of faith) into meaningful history (Geschichte). 
but God does not transform this history in a miraculous 
manner - if this means that the spectator could demonstratively 
see God's activity. "In a word, God and his saving actions
1Owen, Revelation and Existence. 20-1.
PBartsoh, (Hrsgr.), Kerygma und EvthoB, II, 184.
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are not evident to the objective gaze."^ And it is faith, 
not the exigencies of the modern scientific point of viev/, 
which necesdit@Ltes this convicti©n. - "If the challenge of 
deraythologisring was first raised by the conflict between 
the mythological cosmology of the Bible and the modern 
scientific world-view, it at once becomes evident that the 
restatement of Biythology ie a requirement of faith itself*
For faith needs to be emancipated from its associations 
with a world-view expressed in objective terms, v/hether it 
be a mythical or scientific one" (KM, 210)* This is an 
important and significant statement* Starting with an 
avowed apologetic interest - to render the gospel intelligible 
to modern man - Bultmann is led to say that the gospel it­
self demands interpretation or demythologizing*
A third way in which Bultmann uses the word myth 
is to indicate, in a rather vague way, every kind of divine 
intervention in the himan sphere* The key v/ord in this 
definition is 'intervention'• For if God's activity be under­
stood as somdhing which shoulders in, cuts a path, and 
departs, leaving a sv/athe which any casual observer can 
see - then such a concept is mythological* Of course,
Bultmann does not deny that God acts, but he is firmly con-
1 Mai eve z, The Ohrist Ian Message and I#j:h, 102
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Tinced that this activity la seen only by the inward eye of 
faith. This also means that we do not know who God is in him­
self, but only how he« acts towards us* And this means not 
that God and his aotivity have no reality, but that this reali'b 
is only vouchsafed by God, it is revealed only in faith. Triere 
is a divine act, a real act, but it is for faith and in faith: 
the encounter with God exists only within the sphere of faith. 
The foundation and the object of faith are the one and same 
thing. The transcendence, the "invisibility of God excludes 
every myth which tries to males him and his acts visible" (KM. 
210)’* That is why miracles, in their present mythological form 
must be interpreted. They must be utterly removed from the 
sphere of Vorhandenlieit. and transferred to the sphere of 
Base in* The body of miraole-myth can only be looked upon as un 
fortunate: it must be spiritualized. But beforeihisds done
we must ask, What da the intention cf ihe gospel writers in telling 
miracle stories? What Is %e kerygmatio hitention of tie stories? 
Bultmann, as a form critic, was convinced that
the miracles were regarded as proofs of the divinity of 
1Jesus* ’ But as a demythologist, this conviction is slightly 
altered: in brief, the miracles "point to the fact that 
the Revelation is no worldly occurrehoe, but an other-
^Cf. above, 209} 222; 239f,
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1worldly one# They are pictures, symbols#" They are signs 
that Jesus is not of this world, that his power is other­
worldly: though this other-worldly power is visible only
to the eye of faith# The accounts of miracles are like 
the statements concerning the deity or divinity of Ohrist.
"I think that we can say that in the Hew Testament at least 
a parte -potiori. the pronouncements about Jesus' divinity 
or deity are not, in fact, pronouncements of his nature 
but seek to give expression to his significance; pronounce­
ments which confess that what he says and what he is do 
not have their origin within the world, and are not human 
ideas or events in the world, but that God speaks to us in 
them and acts towards us and for us. Ohrist is the power 
and wisdom of God; he became the wisdom of God, righteousness 
and sanctification and redemption for us (I Oor. 1.30)."
But hov/ can the miracles, which in mythological 
thinîcing belong to Historié and Yorhandenheit be interpreted 
into terms of Geschichte and Dasein? "We can see meaning 
in them only vdien we ask what God is trying to say to each 
Che of us" (KM. 35). The unusual events reported of Jesus 
have no ultimate meaning unless there is an existentiell
1
Bultmann, Theology of the Hew Testament. II, 44# 
^Bultmann, GV I I ,  252-53} BÎ 280-81,
- 284 -
decision in the person of the reader. "We must show that
a miracle is a phenomenon of the spiritual [geschlchtlichl
life, not one of nature" (M, 121). But what is God trying
to say to each one of us in the miracles? How can a miracle
he a phenomenon of the spiritual ( schi oh11i oh) life?
The same question can he aslced in somewhat broader terms:
How can the Jesus of history become the Christ of faith?
To what extent is Christianity dependent upon
historical research? There is a definite cleavage of
opinion amongst scholars on this point* "The Christian
religion is not merely open to historical investigation, but
demands it, and its piety depends upon it. Inadequate or
false reconstruction of Jesus of Nazareth cuts at the heart
*1
of Christianity." But Bultmann strongly rejects the 
effort "to tie our faith in the Word of God to the results 
of historical research" (KM, 41)# Can these two views be 
reconciled? What is the relationship between faith and 
history? Is the nature of Christianity exhausted by the 
certain establishment of a history of Jesus of Nazareth?
Is Jesus of Nazareth an essential part of the Christian 
message? To what extent, if any, is faith dependent upon 
historical research? It is here that the distinction
1 Hoskyns and Davey, The Riddle of the New Testament. 10.
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between fact and interpretation may be of considerable 
assistance# It should first of all be noted that this 
distinction between fact and interpretation is merely a 
Wtical. one* We do not start with fact and add interpretation, 
any more than we start with body and add soul, in order to 
make a concrete whole: rather the two occur alv/ays and
everywhere in strict conjunction. Admitting that, however, 
the distinction may still be of great service.
In every event of religious significance there is
fact plus interpretation. The person Jesus of Nazareth is
the f8,otual side of the event under consideration. But
existentiell
only v/hen interpreted as the Christ in an/ decision
is the event religiously significant. Tillich writes:
"Jesus as the Ohrist is both an historical fact and a 
subject of believing reception. One cannot speak the truth 
about the event on which Christianity is based without 
asserting both sides. Many theological mistakes could 
have been avoided if these two sides of the 'Christian event* 
had been emphasized with equal strength." But suppose, as 
Tillich conjectures, it could be almost certainly proved that 
a Jesus of Nazareth never really existed. We cannot be 
absolutely certain that historical research could not
; above, 28; 76. . ^Tillich, S$ II, 113.
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prove such a thing* Suppose a primitive but reliable 
voters' list v/as unearthed along with the Dead Sea scrolls* 
Suppose that it could be almost certainly shown that there 
was no Jesus born in Bethlehem, that no Jesus lived in 
Nazareth, that no Pontius Pilate ever ruled as Roman 
governor. Would faith then be destroyed? Certainly not.
"No historical criticism can question the immediate aware­
ness of those who find themselves transformed into the state 
of f a i t h . O n e  recalls the Cartesian dictum 'I thinlc, 
therefore I am' ; and likewise, to the Christian, 'I believe, 
therefore I participate in the New Being'. But this con­
viction, in turn, necessitates a life in which the New Being 
has conquered the old, though it does not necessarily demand 
that this be the life of Jesus of Nazareth. But 'I partici­
pate in the New Being, therefore the New Being must have 
existed'. "One must say that participation, not historical 
argument, guarantees the reality of the event upon which 
Christianity is based. It guarantees a personal life in 
which the New Being has conquered the old being. But it 
does not guarantee his name to be Jesus of Nazareth. His­
torical doubt concerning the existence and life of someone 
with this name cannot be overruled. He might have had
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another name# (This is an historically absurd, but logically
necessary, consequence of the historical method.) Whatever
his n£ime the New Being was and is actual in this man."
Buch a hypothetical state of affairs recalls Kierkegaard's
statement» "If the contemporary generation had left behind
them nothing but the words 'we have believed that in such
and such a year God appeared among us in the hmblo figure .
of a servant, that He lived and taught in our community, and
pfinally died', it would be more than enough." Buch a faith 
does not demand that the person be Jesus of Nazareth, 
appearing in the years 1 to 30, but it does demand a per­
sonal life living somewhere at some particular juncture of 
history. Even this radical historical criticism does not 
negate the value for faith of a particular 'personal life* 
or 'servant' who lived in 'such and such a year*, faith 
is therefore irrevocably and irresistibly tied to an 
historical figure: and this is the substratum without
which faith could not exist; this is the irreducilie factum 
without which Christianity would be a mockery. But is it 
enough just to know that a personal life once existed which 
conquered the old being? Is this really 'more than enough' %
ST I I ,  113.
Kierkegaard, Philosophical frampents. 87
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la it, in fact, at all sufficient? It is not, and for at 
least three reasons. It ia insufficient for the historian, 
the theologian and the man in the situation of faith.
The historian is constrained to give some account 
of the rise of the religious movement emanating from Jesus 
of Nazareth. At the very least, it would seem that the 
historian is hound to admit that there dwelt in this parti­
cular figure attributes and abilities of an unusual nature*
And if the historian admits the historical reality of the 
person Jesus of Nazareth, he must also admit that he must 
have been sufficiently notable to found the Christian religion. 
There must have been some distinctive features about this 
Jesus of Nazareth to account for the church which bears his 
name. "There must have been something about the historical 
Jesus at the time at which He was on earth, to make the New 
Testament witnesses summon men to decide for or against him."
So Bultmann's reconstruction of the history of Jesus of 
Nazareth is not sufficient for the pure historical scientist. 
"It is very doubtful whether the Christian faith could have 
been built upon the foundation of a historic Jesus who, as 
Bultmann presents him, wa,a little more that a, teacher of 
practical philosophy with certain resemblances to existen-
1Henderson, on. cit.. 49
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tialiem and wîio 1b stripped of all the nminouo character**
istics which the Gospels ascribe to him."^ W3.iile admitting
that Jesus was an unusual individual, the historian will
treat such a founder on the same basis as any other religious
leader, The historian may well say that this particular
founder •* Jesus of Magiareth ** was an unusual figure. He
will not say that he was unique, He may conclude, with Karl
Barth, that Jesus Christ is ^^ one whose activity is so easily
commonplace alongside more than one other founder of a
religion and even alongside many later representatives of
2
His own * religion ’ ,** And were the growth of Christianity 
the only propelling factor forcing the historian to con­
clusions, he could not even say tha,t this particular reli­
gious leader was necessarily either a morally good or an 
intellectually brilliant person. After all, the phenomenal 
growth of Christian Boience seems quite disproportionate 
to the methods, meditations and muddled metaphysics of its 
founder, Mrs, Eddy &
And if the historian treats Jesus as one among 
many religious founders, he will treat Jesus• miracles on 
the same basis: as events accruing to him, as to all religious
1
“Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, 23 
CD l/l, 188.
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leaders, To the historian, '*critioism of one claes of 
’miracles’ must be applicable to all, from the Incarnation, 
Joshua’s prolonged daylight, and the Resurrection, to the 
’calm* of Dunkirk," If the historian admits the validity 
of the five principles outlined in chapter three' for 
investigating the phenomena of faith-healing and Roman
o
Catholic centres of healing, he will apply these principles 
to the biblical miracles as well, and no one should be 
surprised if the results are similar.
The theologian is bound to give some account of 
the rise of dogma surrounding the person Jesus of laaaroth* 
It la clearly insufficient to say that the early church 
fabricated the doctrines v/hich were associated with Jesus, 
Were there no elements in this life, in this Historié, which 
through faith could be ehangedvinto belief, intoj Geschichte?
If there was nothiUi^  there, then we have re-introduced the 
old contranatural position: faith becomes an arbitrary,
unmediated, vertical miracle, which could as well have been 
accomplished (had it pleased God) by a cat. Does the fact 
Jesus of Masareth in any way warrant the interpretation 
that he is the Christ? Puller remarks: "To believe that
Jesus of Eazareth and his fate are the saving act of God
^Myers, "Miracles", 2?6, ^Of, above, 127ff
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in history involves a particular interpretation of a par­
ticular track of history, and it is therefore of primary 
importance for the decision of faith to know whether tha.t 
history can hear that interpretation, V&fas that interpretation 
imposed arbitrarily upon those events by the first Christians, 
or was that history such as to demand that interpretation?
, , # Why should the church have selected this particular 
track,of history and proclaimed it to be the redemptive aot 
of God? % y  not — a very pertinent question, in view of 
the nature of Bultmann’s reconstruction of the history of 
Jesus - the history of John the Baptist, who was also an 
esohatological prophet and died a martyr’s d e a t h ? O r ,
"if we cannot validly find any revelation of God in the 
portrait of Jesus as an historical person, how are we èver
p
to reach and accept those dogmas ëbout him?" On the other 
hand, the acceptance of the picture of Jesus of Harareth 
in no way necessitates the particular interpretation that 
Jesus is the Christ# Adaixitting the fact (the Jesus of 
history) as true, the particular interpretation (that Jesus 
is the Christ) by no means follows* The ability to make 
that interpretation is, traditionally speaking, the v;ork
'in* Mil I II " -rr— itT r" • "n— — ti— t— Y— T~^-"îtTt^-"itr-itn--- 1— irn-frr^ nir i'rti-tnTfinn"i<iifiipiiiiritnrr'n>Ti iTiiiiirir^"nii*iiiii #
1
Duller, The Mission and Achievexîient of Jesus, 15
^  '  > 11— i  p m  I I  n i i M i i t  I H I      ■ ' # 11,11 i w i i i r .  *
‘^"Baillie, God Was In Christ. 50#
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of tliQ Holy Spirit* But without the fact the particular 
Christian interpretation cannot follow* At the same time, 
the fact without the ezistentiell Christian interpretation 
is religiously ba5?ren, personally meaningless* "Christianity 
was horn, not with the birth of the man who is called ’Jesus’, 
but in the moment in which one of his followers was driven 
to say to him, ’Thou art the Christ’# And Christianity will 
live as long as there are people who repeat this asser­
tion.
’Without the fact the partioular Christian inter­
pretation cannot follow’ • This points to a danger in 
Bultmann’s treatment of the resurrection* At times he 
seems to imply of the lèoeurreotion that nothing haxxpened in 
the realm of events or Vorhandenheit (whether it be a 
literal resurrection, a réanimation of a corpse, or a 
psyohological experience)# Bo Mal eves;, expounding Bhltmann* s 
thought on this point, interprets Bultmami as meaning that
God simply created the belief in the resurrection in the
Pminds of the disciples.” Buoh a be3-iof is apparently 
unrelated to any worldly happening, tinmediated by any event# 
If this is a correct interpretation of Bultmann’s thought, 
the experience known as the ÿesurreotion was unmediated,
»,ii>.>!TT'Wi«ffit .i!w— iiia m ita Ka'H'iiWnaitaeamtiititni K .w iiiH iM onmiii i —  ii;a .i:iiiin immi— n
OT I I ,  112. ^Of, MaloTea, op. o i t . . 85
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arbitrary, a bolt from the blue, contranatural in the
.strictest sense of the term^ As against this, we must Insist
that something happened in the world of Vorhandenlieit, some
event which shared the ambiguity of the sphere of Yorha.nd.en-
Mi;!, some happening which demanded from the participant
the insight of faith in order to apprehend the activity
of God* The logic of faith.demands that something happened,
though it by no means informs us as to exactly what did
happen* Of course, some expositors of Bultmann’è:^ thought
in regard to #ie resurrection think that he does admiit
something like a psychological experience* Duller so seems
to interpret him: "Bultmann is prepared to concede the
historicity of the Resurrection appearances as subjective
1experiences of the first disciples*""” If this is what 
Bultmann means by the V-esixrreotiôn (a psychological experi­
ence), then the objection here mentioned is overcome* But 
he ie by no means clear on this point*
The person in the situation of faith is bound to 
give some account of the way in which Jesus is the Ohrist; 
some account of the way in vAiieh the reoo.nciler is also the 
model* The person in the situation of faith is bound to 
give, some account of the manner in v;hich he, as a partiel—
^Puller, 17'
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pator, le (in some measure) a transformed person* We may 
frankly admit that no purely historical account of the Jesus 
of history can he given* Yet it was men who encountered 
Jesus v/ho were transformed, who were enabled (by faith) to 
call him the Ohrist, who have conserved for us the picture 
of Jesus, the Christ* Ho particular trait of that picture 
can be verified with complete certainty* But it is the 
picture as a whole which has mediated and which does mediate 
the transforming pov/er of Christ * "The concrete biblical 
material is not guaranteed by faith in respect to empirical 
factuality, but it is guaranteed as an adequate expression of 
the transforming power in the Hew Being as the Christ* Only 
in this sense does faith guarantee the biblical picture of 
Jesus. * * * The picture has creative power, because the 
power of the Hew Being is expressed in and through it*"^ 
Because the person in the situation of faith experiences 
moments of transforming power through the Hew Being, he is 
aware that Christ is one with the Bather* In this sense, 
and in that moment, he is aware of the sinlessness of Christ. 
Such a person is assured of the unity of the Bather and the 
Son through faith : and this assurance is his in the face 
of historical statements which seem to contradict it. Such
^Tillich, SÏ II, 132-33.
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a person realities that moral purity and unity v/ith God cannot 
he ’read off* any historical document, nor could these char­
acteristics <^en he determined by the contemporaries of
1Jesus himself*
Bo for the historian, the theologian, and the man in
the situation of faith, Kierkegaard * s statement of belief is
not sufficient* And Kierkegaard himself seems to have
recognised this* In a section entitled ’Ohrist as Model -
and as Reconciler’, Kierkegaard places priority upon the
aspect of reconciliation, but recognises the necessity of
Ohrist as model as well*
If there should be talk about a difference between 
the gospels and the epistles, then it must consist in 
that Ohrist is specially eraphasisîed in the epistles as 
the Reconciler, with his reconciling death, and grace: 
in the gospels Ohrist is more a Model*
How one can also say, that if Ohrist was merely a 
Reconciler, then his death was the chief thing, then he 
did not need to live so long on the earth, did not need 
to be born a child, to grow up and so on*
However it must be noted that in order that he should 
be a sacrifice there was always need for some time, for 
his death must also at the same time be man’s guilt, so 
that some time was necessary in order to bring about the 
situation that the race of man put him to death*
In so far as one can say that in the gospels the 
Model is more emphasised, this is counterbalanced by 
the fact that concerning the whole of the rest of his 
life there is nothing really related which would have 
been more important if he had been emphasized specially 
as a Model* And on the other hand, the three years 
he lived in public, in which he is a Model or en­
dures being a Model, these three years are
^Cf* above, ll6ff.
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indeed about the shortest time meceÈsàry, in historic 
proportion, to bring about the catastrophe which 
\m3 his death or reconciliation * He therefore does 
not exist in any of these years solely as a Model., 
but his existing is related to the catastrophe in 
which he was placed# which he was etex’nally destined 
for, as Reconciler*
Kierkegaard, Panirer Z/5* xlv, 49*
"Slmlde der vaere Tale cm en Borskjel mellem 
’Hvangelierne* og ’Brevene*, jnaatte det vaere den , 
at i ’Brevene* er Ohristus isaer fremhaevet som 
Borsoneren, hans forsonende B^d, Haadenj i 
Bvangeliet er Ohriatus mere som Borbilledet.
Man kan nu ogsaa sige, at dersom Ohristus 
blot var Borsoneren, saa hans D^d var Hovedsagen, 
saa havde han ikke beh/vet at leve saa la,enge 
paa Jordan, ikke beh/zfvet at lade sig f/de som 
Barn, at voxe o: s: vs
Imidlertid maa dog bamaerkes, at for at 
han kunde blive Offret, vilde der dog altid 
behaves nogen Tid, thi hans B/rfd maatte jo dog 
tillige vaere Menneskenes Slcyld, saa der alt id 
beh/ves nogen Tid for at tilveiebringe Bituationen, 
at Blaegten slog ham ihjel*
Borsaavidt man da kan sige, at i Evangelierne 
er "Borbilledet" mere fremtraedende, da contra- 
balanceres dette dog derved, at der cm hole hans 
/vrlge Liv ©gentlig Intet fortaelles, hvilkot 
vilde have vaeret af Vigtighed, hvis han saerligen 
skulde fremhaeves som Borbilledet* Og paa den 
anden Side: de tre .Aar han lever for Allés ^ine,
disse tre Aar, hvori han er Borbilledet eller 
udholder det at vaere Borbilledet, disse 3 Aar 
ere vel omtrent den korteste Tid der beh/vedes for, 
i historik Proportion, at tilveiebringe den 
Katastrophe, der blev hans Borsonings Bjgfd* Han 
existerer altsaa ikke i noget af disse tre Aars 
j^ieblikke ene og alene som Borbilledet, men hans 
Existeren er forholdende sig til Katastrophen, i 
hvilken han saa er, hvad han evig var bestemt til 
og frit havde bestemt sig til, Borsonen."
This section was drawn to my attention, and trans­
lated, by Professor H* Gregor Smith*
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Thus Kierkegaard does emphasize that the true Christian
1
witness is the imitator of Christ,
It is logically conceivahle, though historically 
improbable, that Christianity could be maintained if the 
Christian knew only that there was once a person who was 
called the Ohrist by his followers* But for the historian, 
the theologian, and the man in the situation of faith, more 
than this is clearly necessary* Ho biography of the historical 
Jesus can indeed be written, no single event of the Hew 
Testament can certainly be proved as true, but the broad 
picture of Jesus who was called the Christ, conserved by 
those who did so call him, is essential for the faith: in
that this picture mediatôs the power of the Hew Being* The
veracaty of that picture does not guarantee faith, but with­
out the picture there is no faith*
The analysis yields no clear results: the Jesus
of history is essential to Christianity, but Christianity is 
clearly not exhausted by the establishing of a real historical 
figure, Jesus of Hazareth* Ho more, therefore, has the
analysis of this problem pin-pointed the procedure by which
the miracles are to be transferred from Vorhandenheit to 
Dasein* from Hietorie to Gesohicht©* We return to this
"^Of* Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard* 186*
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problem in chapter nine*^
But one thing does seem reasonably clear at this 
point; that the key to biblical understanding lies in the 
questions we ask of the Bible # Even if one disagrees with 
Bultmann’s particular question (of personal existence), or 
if one refuses to regard this question b.b the only one, it 
is clear that questions must be asked if the Bible is to 
answer meaningfully* We can read the Bible with the question 
of the attributes of a divine man (as in supernaturalism), 
or we can read the Bible with the question of ancient folklore 
literature (as in form criticism)# Both of these approaches 
are interesting and informative, but it can hardly be said 
that either is of particular religious significance* And 
further, it seems clear that if in reading the Bible we are 
simply interested in reconstructing a biography of a past 
historical figure - Jesus of Nazareth, detemining what he 
said and did (or whether and in what way the miracles happened) 
the results may be intriguing and stimulating, but such a 
study in itself will not lead one to the Ohrist of faith.
A much better question would therefore seem to be ’Lord, 
what hast Thou to say to mo in this text? ’ If such a question 
is asked of a recorded miracle, it only becomes religiously
^Gf* below, 446f.
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signlfioant if in and through the biblical report God 
speaks to me. Only then has that recorded event become 
religiously meaningful, and an act of God to me and for 
me, i.e., a miracle.
Yet such an interpretation would seem to exclude 
the possibility of an ’objective* miracle, one which any 
reasonable person would have to admit as due to the direct 
activity of God. In the next two chapters (the first two of 
Part Three) we examine two different attempts - both of which 
are modern and profound - to-explain to the satisfaction 
of the scientist, the philosopher and the Ohristian how God 
acts in a miracle. The Chapters are entitled "The Rational 
View" and "The Lingual View"• But before passing to a 
presentation of these arguments, we stop to criticize the three 
WoyemehtB * of Part Two in the light of Tillich’s ’point of 
view’.
At the end of Part One we drew attention to 
Tillich’s ’point of view’ and suggested that his correlation 
of message and situation was a sa.tisfactory way of judging 
whether or not a particular theological position v;as sound.
On the one hand, it is possible for a theology to be 
soripturally accurate and yet be biblically unsound if the 
claims and questions of the situation go unnoticed. It is
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possible for a theologian to be literally faithful to 
Holy Scripture and yet be spiritually faithless to the Bible 
if the claims and questions of the situation go unnoticed*
A man may be a great and profound biblioist and yet be no 
theologian if he is oblivious #  the claims and questions 
of the situation* On the other hand, a theology which is 
only aware of the claims and questions of the situation 
cannot answer these questions, cannot fulfil these claims; 
such is a meaningless and barren theology; such, in fact, 
is no theology at all* The three traditional views failed 
both with regard to fidelity to the eternal message and with 
regard to ability to speak meaningfully to the contemporary 
situation. Using this same critical apparatus, what is to 
be said about the three arguments presented in Part Two?
Y/hat are we to say of the theology of Karl Barth?
I think we can say that Barth earnestly tries to give a 
view of miracle with consideration only to the eternal truth 
of the message itself* Barth’s vievfs on miracle are in no 
way apologetic; he considers miracle neither in relation 
to nature (as do all the traditional views in Part One) 
nor with consideration to the views of contemporary philosophy 
and science (as do all the contemporary viev/s in Part Three)* 
Barth clearly does justice to the truth of the eternal 
message: in other words, he is soripturally accurate. Despite
3 0 1  ™
superficial similarities with traditional theology, Barth 
sees and emphasizes (as traditional theology does not) the 
paradox of faith ; he does not try to ’prove’ Christianity 
apart from the essential catalyst of faith# But at the 
same time, Barth turns his hack on the temporal situation# 
Before he commences his theology, Barth devalues the situation 
of any claim and of any question# The situation is pronolmced 
worthless and useless at the very outset# Ba,rth attempts 
to he solely a hihlioist# But as we have already pointed 
out, this is an over-simplification of the genius of Barth#
We must go on to say that time and time again he does alter 
his theology in the light of the situation. His devotion 
to the letter is never quite complete, so that he often 
oasts light on the spirit as well# In spite of his dis­
claimers, he does in fact often take account of the situations 
and thus he fulfils what I have described as one of the
necessary prerequisites of any genuine theology# But all
as it were,
this he does/against his ovm better intention, as he sees it#
Wo have therefore the right to demand, with Tillich, that
the theology of Barth "give up its exclusive transcendence and take
seriously tie attempt of ^ ologetio tieology in answer the questions
"1
put before it by the contemporary situation#"
^Tillich, ST I, 7
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Y/îien it comes to a discussion of form critioism, 
our criticism is somewhat similar, hut from an entirely 
different direction* If Barth’s theology is spoiled by an 
excessive attention to the message, form criticism is 
spoiled by an excessive attention to the situation. Despite 
the scholarly, profuse, and detailed work of its disciples, 
form criticism in itself seems to give no answers to the 
questions of the situation at all* It is helpful in clari­
fying the situâtiôn: it is helpful in pointing out that the
Bible is a human book, written by certain specific men at 
certain specific historical junctures# Dorm criticism 
marks an advance in biblical research, and it must certainly 
be taken up and considered by any modern theologian# Yet 
while helpful in clarifying the situation, form criticiem 
in itself does little or nothing in promulgating the truth 
of the eternal! message*
Is the demythological movement not somewha,t similar, 
l.e# BO interested in and tied to the temporal situation 
that the eternal tazuth of the message is negated, if not 
entirely lost? Certainly this is an oft-repeated and popular 
criticism of the movement# I do not believe that a careful 
ooiiside3?ation of demythologising will sustain this somewhat 
superficial judgement# Two factors seem to be at work in 
rendering the popular and superficial judgement possible#
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One factor is that Bultmann repeatedly attacks many tradi­
tional forms of expression of the faith: many of these
attacks are, in my opinion, quite justifiable# The other 
factor is that Bultmann often fails to understand properly 
the scientific attitude, particularly with regard to what 
he considers to be ’possible’ or ’conceivable»* here his 
position is quite weak and indefensible# Yet essentially 
the demythologist attempts to be faithful to the eternal 
message and to speak meaningfully to the temporal situation. 
Bultmann himself significantly says* "If the challenge of 
demythologizing was first raised by the conflict between 
the mythological cosmology of the Bible and the modern 
scientific world view, it at once became evident that the
"I
restatement of mythology is a requirement of faith itself."
The deraythologioal movement, as it is presented 
in chapter six, seems essentially negative in character. It 
needs, as Bultmann recognizes, the more positive construction of 
#e existential view (given in chapter nine)# If demythologizing 
be merely an a-ttack on obsolete forms of expression it can 
clear away unnecessary edifices, but cannot replace them 
with any structures of its own. If demythologising be merely 
an. onslaught on obsolete traditionalism, it may be a necessary
^Bartsoh (ed.), KM, 210.'  ^ f ÉwmwiWM /
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theological purgative, but it oan hardly be maintained as 
a steady diet# One of the great merits of demythologizing 
is that it points out clearly that the key to biblical 
understanding lies in the questions we ask of the Bible#
In this way it is emphasized afresh that in a sound theology 
the answers of the eternal message are meaningfully related 
to the claims and questions of the temporal situation.
In Part Three I examine truly contemporary views 
of the concept of miracle which, while trying to remain 
faithful to the fundamental insights of the Bible, yet 
also attempt to render the concept of miracle intelligible 
and meaningful to modern man. The titles of the three 
chapters in Part Three are "The Rational View", "The 
Lingual View", and "The Existential View". And at the end 
of Part Three we will again evaluate these three positions 
in the light of Tillich’s ’point of view’.
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PART THREE - Oontemporary Views
Chapter VII* The Rat 1 o n a l - ,,.
"Cod work© the sensible and vielble things which He wills, 
in order to signify end manifest Himself in them, as He 
Himself knows it to be fitting, without any appearing of 
His very substance itself* * & #" Augustine.
sa Heim, K« Ohristian Daith and latural Science
TBWV » * The Transformation of the Scientific
.
Darmer, H* H# The World, .and God»
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The rationalist is oonvinoed that the concept of 
miracle can only be meaningfully discussed if one keeps two 
things in mind* Dirst of all, one should see that a com­
prehensive religious world-pioture must be constructed, 
Secondly, ore should understand that, seen from within, 
nature is a war of living wills.
The chapter is divided as follows, Dirst, the 
two basic,, assumptions, with their corollaries, are presented 
in a straightforward manner. Secondly, the rationalist’s 
specific treatment of miracle is discussed. Thirdly, the 
basic assumptions and the specific treatment of miracle are 
critically considered.
The rationalist oomiences by saying that the word 
miracle is clear only in the context of a complete religious 
understanding, or a comprehensive Christian world-pioture,
The concept of miracle cannot be approached from a merely 
scientific or philosophical,standpoint * Thus Farmer oayss 
"Miracle being fundamentally a religious category and not a 
scientific or philosophic one, the proper place to begin 
is within the sphere of living religion itself" (WG, 108).
We can understand miracle only if we approach the "whole 
question from the angle of religious life itself" (WG, 109)* 
Likewise Heim, who sees miracle as a genuine problem for the 
scientist, says: "If we wish to investigate the relation
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between faith in God and the theses of modern natural 
soienoe, we require an origin from whioh to plot the enquiry, 
just as a oirol© must have its origin immovably fixed in 
order that its oiroumferenoe may be plotted in a given 
plane. The fixed point from which we must begin can be 
none other than God" (TBWV» 11). Yet in saying this - 
that the concept of miracle is understandable only in the 
context of a complete religious understanding - the rationalist 
does not postulate the religious situation or the existence
of God and, with this as an irrefragable premise, go on to
1discuss and expound the meaning of miracle. The question 
is, How is one to understand the religious situation? How 
can one intelligently postulate the existence of God? It 
is just this problem to which farmer and Heim attempt to 
give an answer.
The rationalist is an avowed apologete, and he 
is particularly concerned about the cleavage between the 
findings of science and the assertions of Christianity. 
Christian dogmatists must wake up to the fact that both 
the lew Testament writers and the Protestant Reformers
^Of. 0ouison, Bcience and Christian Belief. 17# 
where jusT'WIW"'ckarge" is ' l a W 'against Heim.
But to do so would be to entirely ignore Heim’s 
earlier works.
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lived in an anthropooentric Universe, where the earth (and 
consequently man) was thought of as being right in the centre 
of things, for such a world and such a man, history could 
easily be imagined as having begun in 4004 B.O. But to-day 
we know that our solar system is only a segment of the lens­
shaped island which is our galaxy and whioh has a diameter 
of about 100,000 light years (the velocity of light being 
calculated at 186,282 miles per second). As for time, if 
we accept the scientifically held view that the earth is 
2880 million years old and if we think of this period as a 
day of 24 hours, then man appeared only at 22 seconds to 
midnight? further, world history occurred only in the last 
three-tenths of a second before midnight. Dor that reason 
it is obvious that the various propositions about Christi­
anity - that God, the author of the universe, is revealed 
in a man, Jesus Christ - appear differently against this new 
scientific background. Theology and the theologians should 
take notice of this difference. But in the main, theology 
and the theologians have done nothing of the kind, with the 
result that while a minority of thinking people hold on to 
the affirmations of the Ohristian faith as disclosing the 
meaning of the universe, the vast majority of mankind take 
these assertions as mere relics of an obsolete era (ODTO, 
llff.). "When we utter the word God, we are in the presence
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of a reality whioh, for the minority, for those who are said 
to be ’religiously anchored’, is reality tout court, the 
most real reality of all# . # # While the others eannot 
understand what this is all about, and what it is that is 
regarded by a certain group of people as the ens realisaimum. 
the most real reality of all" ( ODIB# 152-53)# But how can 
this pitiful cleavage be overcome? In brief, by the erection 
of a world-picture whioh satisfies both the solentist and 
the man of faith#
Thus Heim believes that it is necessary to formu­
late a philosophy, a W el tan a chauun^ %. in which various levels 
and perspectives - scientific, philosophical and theological - 
have a place# "We are concerned with forming a comprehensive 
picture of reality" (GW'B. 82)# Suoh a philosophy needs 
and demands formulation for two reasons# First of all, it 
is only too true that the old anthropocentricism of the Bible 
and the Reformers has collapsed about our ears# Heim tells 
about the church that was almost completely destroyed in a 
bombing raid during the war* In fact, all that was left 
standing of the onoe-magnifioent structure was a fragment 
of a doorway on whioh were ascribed the wordss ’Repent ye; 
for the Kingdom of heaven is at hand1’ But this ruin from 
the past could not be left standing like that permanently # 
Either it could be built up again into a complete church of
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a design which suited the doorway, or the fragment could be 
pulled down and the ground cleared away# What Heim suggests 
is that we need to build anew, creating a philosophic fabric 
into which all threads may be woven# If this is not done, 
the Christian message will be cleared away from the modern 
world# The old system is beyond repair, which makes it all 
the more urgent that we oonatruct a new system, (Q M S# 27)#
But there is a second reason why it is necessary to formu­
late suoh a philosophy: secularism itself is now providing
world-piotures to replace the obsolete anthropocentricism# 
These so-ca.lled philosophies altogether leave out God, who 
for the Christian is the most real reality of all# In the 
place of these pagan philosophies, apologetics must provide 
a world-pioture whioh is catholic and comprehensive, doing 
justice to all levels of reality* "We are confronted with 
an overall picture of reality which is imposingly compre­
hensive and coherent# We can counter this overall conception 
only by proposing a different overall conception, whioh, 
just like the world-picture of secularism, comprises the 
entire reality of the universe as we see it to-day, from the 
spiral nebulae down to the electrons" (03MB# 26)* The world- 
piotures that secularism has postulated receive detailed end 
critical treatment in one of Heim’s v/orks (of# T8WV ) » The 
faiths in terms of which vmrld-pictures have been constructed
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are 1) faith in the absolute object, 2) faith in absolute 
time and space, and 3) faith in absolute determiniom in 
natural events* "Wherever,in the description of nature, an 
absolute is posited which needs no other magnitude through 
whioh it exists, but which existe only through itself, or 
whenever a form of existence is presupposed which needs no 
other form of existence to which it is relative, but which 
has validity solely through Itself, there faith breaks into 
scientific description, though the word ’faith’ or the word 
’God’ does not occur" (T8WV, 21-2)* Heim criticizes all 
three faiths and shows that they are really pseudo-faiths. 
"One after another of the absolutes * * • have collapsed 
together, and not by reason of any theoretical reflections 
of the kind which were advanced in the earlier period of 
scepticism and relativism, but rather through facts of 
experience verified experimentally, and not to be denied, 
although they were in clear contradiction to dogmatic prin­
ciples with whiOivmen had hitherto approached the study of 
nature, and although the experiments by which they were 
established were of an unlooked-for kind" (T.swy* 24). But 
what is the result of the dioeetablishing of these faiths? 
Briefly, "the collapse of a causal-mechanical world-picture 
has again made room for God* . * • The line approach from 
nature to God « * * which was blocked in the age of causal
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meclianlSHi, is now open again following upon the breakdown 
of the causal-meohanioal worl4-«vlew’* 17) * "Boience
[is] on the road to religion" (p M B . 32).
Heim' believes that a comprehensive world-picture 
can be developed by employing the concept of space or dimen­
sion. But what is a space? "A space is every interminable 
continuum with which a manifold of different contents may 
be distinguished according to the special law of its struc­
ture ."^  "Bach space possesses a structure which is funda­
mentally different from the structure of all other spaces" 
(Q W B , 169)* Bince each space has its own laws or principles, 
there are different spaces: and moreover, the same thing
may be in more than one space# The result of this is that 
what is paradoxical and indeed impossible in one space be­
comes quite possible when another space is brought in to 
transform the situation* Thus, in two-dimensional space 
only one line can be dra\m at right angles to a given line 
at a given point# But if three-dimensional space be intro­
duced, an infinite number of such lines can be drawn# Buch 
a conception of space does not mean that the spaces or 
dimensions are exclusive, but ra.ther that they interpenetrate# 
How many spaces or dimensions are there? \Yhat are the oon-
Heim, God Transcendent# 60#
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tenta of each apace? What are the iav/B or principles holding 
in each space?
The first dimension is called the I-It apace and 
refera to the objective world. The objective world is that 
"with which in the natural sciencea we are exclusively 
concerned, the world which we can illuminate and investi­
gate with the microscope and the telescope" (ODEB, 106),
This is the sphere of objects, things, Vorhandenheit. We 
commonly think of such phenomena as objects standing outside 
of us and over against us, but not threatening our existence: 
inactive, inanimate, their form already determined, and in 
this sense, past. They are what they are, with no inherent 
possibility in the future open to them# "If we consider 
Time in the concrete sense of lived Time, dominated as 
that is by the contrast between Becoming and Already-become, 
then we find nothing surprising in our being able to set 
down the equations The objective v/orld is in the state of 
having already become. We ourselves, the Bubjeots, who 
must speak of ourselves in the first person, stand in the 
first condition, in which there is a Real fresent and deci­
sions are to be made. The relation ’I-It’ is therefore the 
relation in which the world of the Already-accomplished 
stands over against the Real Present in retrospect. The 
’It’-world is the picture got from the standpoint of the
«w 3x4
Real Rreseniî, shov/ing the Already^heoome» the Unalterahle * “ 
’^Science deal a, in fact» only with phenomena inihe atriotnaage 
of the term, with reality as it appears or presents itself to a 
certain point of view** (TO, 154) • And the prinoiple governing 
the I-It spaoe is usually expressed in the tem natural law.
The second space is the I«-Thou dimension. This 
space is like the I-*It world in that it deals with the 
whole of reality, hut from a different point of view.
**There exists simultaneously [with the l-lt space] a second 
space, which, together with the whole of reality, we traverse 
at every instant and which surrounds us from all sides jUst 
as the, space of objectivity docs# This ia the non-objective 
space in which the I and the Thou encounter one another**
(OPHB. 108). "Thero is then, we affirm, in certain circum­
stances a direct awareness of psp^ sonal entities other than 
ourselves, with whom wo stand in an order, or dimension, of 
personal relationships** (TO, 15)* Boienoe is not at all 
concerned with this I-Thou dimension* Heim brings this out
P
by pointing to two of the Heideggerean existentiell elements,
•X
Jemeini^keit and Qeworfenhelt. ^ Jcmeinigkeit refers to the
^Heim, (y'od Transcendent. 123-24*
for the meaning of this and similar terms used through­
out this chapter, of* above, 268.
*^ Rorihe distinction betweenihese two terms, I mi again in­
debted to unpublished materially Professor Henderson.
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reality of iiiy own ego; the active subject in all knowing, 
soientifio and otherwise# The experience of the ego must 
be presupposed if natural science ia to be at all possible. 
And, "I stand with respect to a certain quite definite, 
concrete and clearly distinguishable and circumscribable 
content of the objective world of experience in the rela­
tion which we express with the word *my *. • « • I myself 
am neither in my body nor above it nor beside it. I am 
on this side of all objectivity, and consequently outside 
all three-dimensional space. The relation here comes into 
force, which Heidegger has called *each-mlne-ness* (Jemeinig- 
keit). which ia absolutely opposed to all objective relations 
and presents no analogy whatever with any of them" (OOTB. 38)# 
As we have seen from a previous chapter, Geworfènhcit is 
the way in which the dice has turned up for us in this life : 
the facts, for instance, that we are born in the twentieth 
century, with certain IQ’s and certain physiques* "I did 
not choose this position myself. . . .  I simply find myself 
in this position; my attachment to this body, this genetic 
nexus, this nation and homeland, all is imposed upon me 
either as an unmerited good fortune or as an inescapable 
burden, as the case may be. My being cast into this posi-
^Of. above, 26$^
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tion Is quite independent of all my own deoisiona. My 
lot hae been decided here without any intervention on my 
part" (2H[§> 48)* In theOe two Heideggerean exietentiell 
elements, science is not the least interested: yet they are
of crucial significance in the I-Thou dimension* Therefore,
I myself am non-objective, yet bound to the objective worlds 
situated in a definite place at a definite time in the 
history of mankind pnd of the world*
Moreover, in the I-Thou space, I am in relationship 
with other persons, who, like myself, are non-objective and 
yet bound to the world# What are the characteristics of this 
rela.tionship? I'irst, "there is always some awareness of 
purpose or will or self-activity, however it may be called, 
coming forth from the other man and meeting ours, within a 
common situation, in a certain peculiar and irreducible 
tension or resistance" (W£, 21)* This conflict or tension 
follows "from the mutually exclusive claims of the I and the 
Thou# Hither I, subject A, am; the central pivot of the 
world, or else you, subject B, are that centre" (CTIB# 184)* 
This tension can be resolved in one of two ways# One of 
the subjects may dominate, suppress or manipulate the other, 
thus reducing the subjected one to the level of an object 
and using him as an object* "Most sensitive people feel 
that the attempt to manipulate the activity of an individual
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apart from his own genuine insight into, and acceptance of,
the ends in view is what they call *an abuse of personality*#
# # * A man who is unduly aubmissive to another’s purposea
ia mid to have no personality, to be a non-entity, a ’rubber
stamp’" (WG-.t 22)# The other way of resolving this tension
is that each of the subjects treats the other as a Thou, a
true gerson, so that a relationship of trust and confidence
is established# "Trust in the fullest sense is only possible
between two beings who are implicitly, if not explicitly,
aware of one another as personalities, or moral subjects,
that is to say, as conscious beings who are enabled to stand
above the flux of process because both are inwardly under
the rule of the same world of final value" (WG, 20-1)* In
the analyses of the I-It and the X-Thou dimensions, it is
at once obvious how greatly indebted both Harmer and Helm
1
are to Martin Buber#
Heim has now established the reality of the I-It 
objective dimension and the reality of the non-objective 
X-Thou personal dimension# Yet in spite of their differences, 
both these dimensions belong to polar spaces that is, each 
component in each space is at once limited and conditioned 
by other components in that 8pa.ce # In the I-It space the
"I
"In particular, of# Buber, I and Thou,
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objects stand over against eacîa other, excluding and limiting 
one another* In the I-Thou dimension the other ego threatens 
the very existence of my own ego* "The fundamental law of 
polarity governs the relationships of the spatial-temporal 
world of objects. . . * The non-objective relations too, 
which are present within the polar space, are subject to 
the same fundamental law" (OfIS# 156-57)* But does the 
explication of these two spaces exhaust the whole of reality? 
01 early, for the Ohriatian, such is not the case. Bo> the 
question arises; "Is there some other form of existence in 
addition to polarity?" (OITO. 160)* The rationalist attempts 
to meet this need by the construction of a suprapolar space.
Heim is convinced that God’s existence, trans­
cendence and omnipresence can best be explained by postu­
lating a suprapolar space. This suprapolar:’.space does not 
"stand behind us as a paradise lost nor lie before us as a 
• wishful dream.‘ [neither does this suprapolar space] hover 
high above us in spatial transcendency merely as a distant 
beyond, ’up there in heaven*" (0MB, l6l). Again, "the 
presence of God is not an upper story of the one cosmic 
space, but a separate all-embracing space by itself, so 
that the polar and the suprapolar worlds do not stand with 
respect to one another in the same relation as two floors 
of the same house but in the relation of two spaces" (OFIS,
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172)# Therefore God, like the ego, is non-objective and 
excluded from Boientifio investigation* God is a "reality 
which is beyond the reach of soientifio investigation"
(0 M B * 33)* Thus the suprapolar space is "just as all­
present and all-embracing and just as inclusive of the whole 
of reality as is the case with the polar form of being within 
which we are confined" (0 M B * 162). By employing the con­
cept of space, the rationalist has given expression to the 
most important level of reality in a meaningful nmnner : and
more than that the concept of space is intelligible and 
aooeptab3.e to the scientist# "A concept has boon found 
which bridges the gulf that gapes betvmen the polar and the 
suprapolar gones. This is the concept of space, which is 
here applied to the suprapolar realm but is at the same- 
time one of the fundamental concepts with which modern 
physics works" (0 M B * 162)# lor is the notion of a supra­
polar space an attempt on the part of the rationalist to 
enmesh God, to reduce him to the dimensions and concepts 
of this world# God remains the wholly other, totally in­
comprehensible * But in the suprapolar space, in the relation 
in that dimension, God is accessible to me as a subject*
"When we refer to the suprapolar space, we cannot be referring 
to the eternal reality of God itself, but only to one aspect, 
a side which is turned towards us, the only side from which
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God can be accessa‘.bXe to us, to you and me, if He is willing 
to disclose Himself at all" (OCTB* I64)* The rationalist 
also believes that the concept of suprapolar space does full 
justice to the omnipresence of God# "We can escape from any 
reality, any person or any thing, which la contained Y/ithin 
a space, simply by removing ourselves to anoüier part of 
the space, where this person or thing is not present* It 
is only the space itself that we cannot escape* Go where 
we may, we shall still run into it* That is why there is 
no other form of expression for the presence of the inescap­
able God than space" (0 M B * 167)* Again, "God’s omnipresence 
is the space filling everything, into which the spaces of 
this world are fitted" (TBWV, 160). Moreover, the insight 
into the positive existence of this dimension is a gifts no 
merely intellectual endeavour will allow us to grasp the 
reality of the suprapolar space - such insight is the reve­
lation of God alone* Access to : the suprapolar space "can 
only be granted to us through grace, and the response to 
this gift of grace can only consist in this, that we sur­
render ourselves to it with our Y/hole heart, that we love it 
Y/ith our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole 
strength, and with all our pov/era" (TSWV, 15) *
The second fundamental rational assumption is that, 
seen from within, nature is a war of living wills* But like
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the first aesimption - that Biiraele can be explained only 
within the context of a complete religious world-pioture - 
this second^sumption is not thrown down in a take-it-or- 
leave-it fashion# Bather the rationalist, and particularly 
Heim, attempts to point to the truth of this assimption.
And he begins by looking at himself #
The rationalist is oonvinoed of the non-objective 
reality of his own person, of his ego, of his will# There 
is "a reality which presents itself to each one of us, in­
cluding the natural sciontiat, even before we begin to 
observe, experiment and calculate# This reality is my 
personal ego, the I of which I am always aware before any 
objective knowledge enters my mind" (G M B # 47) * This non- 
objective ego is not open to scientific investigations 
"the anatomist and even the psychologist see nothing of 
our essential selves" (C M S # 56) • But the rationalist 
goes on to say that the will belongs to the ego, and like 
the ego, is Gssentia,lly non-objective. "I do not, and 
cannot, thinic of my will as something which in reality is 
other than v/hat it immediately declares itself to be 
(namely, my will), and which I merely treat ’as if’ it v/ere 
my own. Indeed it is in a sense Y/rong to talk of it as 
my will, as though it were an object which 1 attach to my­
self; it is myself, an ultimate, irreducible self-activity,
-  322 »
which produces phenomena, hut :1b not itself a mere pheno­
menon of some unknown reality which is other than I, and 
Yfhich is aceesBlhle to my control" (TO, 160) * If this is 
BO, "the will belongs to the non-objeotive space to v/hich 
the Ggo belongs, the space in which the encounter takes 
place between the 1 and the Thou" (C M S # 66), Or, "’will’ 
moans ’persoh"'(WG, 24). And since we recognise the Thou 
as a non-objective ego, we recognise the Thou also as will* 
Moreover, we experience this ego-wili of the Thou Y/hen a 
state of polarity or tension grows up between myself and 
the Thou* The will is the underlying characteristic of the 
I-Thou relationship* "Hothing is clearer in our everyday 
life than the distinction betv/eon dealing with a person and 
dealing with a thing" (WG* 13)#
The rationalist is convinced of the reality of 
God and sees this reality as being predominantly chax*ao- 
torlBod by personal will# We must begrlrt with "the awareness 
of God as personal will which lies somewhere near the 
heart of all living religion" (WG* 160)# Again, "the 
Christian teaching about God and His relationship with men 
is perBonalistic through and th)?ou0i* Christianity says 
that Y/hatever else may be true of God, and much else no 
doubt is true, it certainly is true that He is personal#
And whatever else may be true of ua as men, and much else
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no doubt ia true, it certainly ia true that God haa created 
UB peraona and has set us in a world of personal relation- 
ship both to Himself and to one anothe]?#" And Heim declares
that "the centre of the suprapolar space is the personal
God" (TBWy0 229)# Moreover, "everything depends upon the 
ansYrer to the question [of] our belief in the personal
nature of God" (OMS, 203).
The ra.tionalist is convinced that even the so- 
called objective world, if seen on its inner side, wou3,d 
reveal wi3.1 in some sense or other# Although this convic­
tion is by no means absent in Farmer, it is Heim who has 
devoted most study to it# And Heim gives at least four 
reasons for this conviction#
First of all, Heim believes that the objective 
world is animate through the argument of analogical inference. 
As we have already seen, there is an innermost area to 
which X alone have direot access, and into which nobody 
else can look* I alone know v/hat I suffer and what joys 
I experience# It is tru.e %.at another person can f03:'m an 
’outside picture’ of what I am like, but he can penetrate 
into my ’inner picture’ only by analogy and only partially, 
and that only beoaAise he can look into himself and knovf
^Parmer, 33.
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Immediately the experieiaoea which he imagines that ; I r 
experienceu' But we cannot stop thei*e. The analogical 
Inference from the visible outBide picture to the invisible 
inner picture is by no means confined to our relations with 
fellow human beings. We cannot help extending the analo- 
gioa-1 inference to include other beings, which are somev/hat 
further removed from us but with whom we still possess a 
certain similarity Thu^, tu bejgih'. withy we extend the 
inference to the higher mammals which closely resemble 
human beings in their nervous system, bona structure, 
blood circulation, heart, respiratory organs and digestive 
apparatus* But even at this point we cannot stops whether 
vfo like it or not *’Y/e must extend the procedure to include 
all the rest of the animal world, not excepting the birds, 
insects and worms and even the simplest bacteria and bacilli 
which at first sight seem to have no more in common with us 
than the fact that they too seek nourislment, defend them­
selves, and reproduce" (Q M S . 87-6)* We cannot help feeling 
a real affinity with all the members of the animal world,
"When the drones soar up from the beehive into the blue
sky on their marriage and death flight, when a fly is caught
in the web and struggles desperately to escape the threads
in which the spider has enmeshed it, when the chickens 
crowd together trembling v/hile the goshawk circles above
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them, or when the father Xion plays tenderly with his cubs, 
then we suspect that behind all these various sounds and 
movements lie fears, desires and erotic passions such as 
we know in our own inner life" (0 M B , 88). Yet still we 
must press on with the analogical inference: and we are
constrained to say that we have certain resemblances even 
to the life of plants. For, of course, the line dividing 
iglant life from animal life is a very uncertain demarca­
tion# The plant as well as the animal takes its nourish­
ment from its environment, defends itself against its 
enemies with dangerous weapons such as thorns and barbs, 
and has a highly developed sexual life with male and female 
organs. And even here the rationalist Heim does not stop 
nor rest content: we must now shove over the boundary
marking the organic from the inorganic* Bven here "we must 
reckon with the possibility that behind inorganic na,ture 
too there is something v/hich in some way resembles our own 
soul-life" (CFHB* 91). Hothing is inanimate, the rationalist 
is a panpsychiet: and Heim summarises his construction of
panpsyohism in the following terms* "The more closely any 
structure in the world around me resembles my human body in 
its organiisation and expressions, the more indications I 
shall have upon which to base my analogical inferences and 
the fuller will be the picture which I form of its inner life*
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ConverBely, the leas closely such a struoture resemblea 
my body, the fainter and vaguer its ’inner picture’ will 
become for me, and the 'more the inner life will appear to 
me as a Boulless sleep or a semi^animate twilight" (0MB, 90-).
Secondly, Heim believes that the objective world 
is animate through the argument from the nature of time#
Two examples which Heim employs help to explicate and to 
illustrate this argument# He points out that we experience 
a sense of crisis very intensely at times when fateful 
decisions are being taken in which everything is at Stake. 
Oonoider, for example, the hours just before the outbreak 
of war. In such a situation we are almost physically aware 
of a painful tension at the dividing line between the decided 
and the undecided condition of the world# Before this line 
is reached, all possibilities are still open# The war may 
still be averted. Diplomate exchange telegrams. One 
alarming report follows close on the heels of another# The 
air is alive with rumours, the atmosphere electrically 
charged* The situation seems almost desperate# But the 
tide may still turn. Ho matter how dark things look, until 
the time is reached, the war may well be averted (G|TO, 65)* 
The second example concerns the report of the reaction of 
a group of visitors to the Krupp works* There the visitors 
were shown a huge steam-hammer which came down with tremen-
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doue force when a certain knob was preaaed, and It v/as 
guaranteed to flatten any object beneath it. The mechaniam 
of the hammer was so arranged that the engineer could stop 
the hammer at any point he chose. If a watch or a glass 
tumbler v;ere placed beneath it, the hammer would plunge with 
all its v/eight and force towards the object, yet stop just 
short of it. But the interesting part of the report came 
when the engineer aaids ’Bow see for yourselves whether I 
am- right. Put your hand on the platform and we will have a 
practical demonstration that the machine v/orks properly’.
Hot a single visitor dared to accept the challenge* "The 
episode is interesting because it sheds a lurid light on what 
is involved in every instance of a transition from a past 
to a future event* « * # Always [any event] is only possible, 
potential, in the beet cases probable, perhaps very probable, 
but never absolutely certain" (TOTY, 121-22). Even the 
objective world is only truly objective when it is past, 
when its conformation is decided. "If I enter into a rela­
tion with this substance at this stage of undeoidedness, it 
is still in a non-objective state* It is thus together 
v/ith me in the same .aphere in v/hich the encounter takes 
place between the I and the Thou" (OFBS, 69)# "The world, 
in its inmost nature, that is to say, in ; its primary indeter­
minate nature, is Will, and only afterwards, when it objecti-
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fies itself, does it beoome the visible and tangible world
1of substanoe, as we behold it*" In its indeterminate 
stage, the I-It world is really an I-Thou world, beoause, 
on its inner side, the objective world is really a conflict 
of living wills*
Thirdly, Heim believes that the objective v/orld 
is animate through the experiments of modern physicists*
This branch of knowledge has tended to undermine the 
classical theory of knowledge, whereby the absolute object 
is distinguished from the observing subject* Modern physics 
has emphaslEied that interaction between the ’subject’ or 
’spectator’ and the ’object’ is essential* Heim quotes 
von WeisîsSckex* on this matter* "The kind of interaction 
between, observer and object which is necessary if certain 
properties of the object (e*g* its position) are to be dis­
played, cannot take place simultaneously with the inter­
action which is necessary if certain other properties (e*g* 
its momentum) are to be displayed* * * * The central part 
of quantum mechanics is therefore the refusal to describe atoic 
objects as structures in themselves to which properties such 
as appear in acts of observation can be described independently 
of the act of observation itself" (TBWY* 132-33)# Heim
%oim, The Hew Divine Order* 40
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therefore concludes s "Since atomic phyeicB has resolved 
the rigidity of lifeless matter into infinitesimal spaces 
in which elemental particles execute purposeful movements 
at enormous velocities like living Individuals, the last 
possible reason .'has been eliminated for regarding the inor- 
gallic world as an unconscious inanimate mass" (O M B # 101) #
Fourthly, Heim sees the objective world as animate.o 
through the experiments in modern biology# Heim describes 
the fascinating experiments by which biologists have attempted 
to settle the old mechanistic-vitalistic controversy as to 
the nature of organic life. But Heim would break down 
the barrier between organic and inox’ganic,. between ’live’ 
and ’dead’ matter. He shows that so-called ’dead’ matter 
acts very like matter which is alive: indeed elements of 
both show the same #icleness-^tendency, "In every fundamental 
structure, everything possible happens in order to build 
up the form appropriate to the structure in question, to - . 
maintain it and to diversify it at a higher level" (TSWV,
229)# "Everywhere, outside organic life, we are confronted 
with mysterious wholenesses which construct themselves on 
principles akin to those of life. If we want to express 
in a single phrase the attitude to which we have been 
brought, we may call it a total neo-vitalism" (TBV/V, 22?).
The rationalist Heim has thus established a
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paapsyohio worlds a "whole animate universe" (TBWV, 214). 
Farmer reaches the same conclusion by a somewhat shorter 
route # "We would suggest that in the ultimate order of things 
there stand human personalities, as created creators, set 
in a dimension of personal relationship with the Eternal 
Personal* Hanging down from the personal there are relatively 
independent creative entities, all of them, even on the 
lowest levels of a fundamentally mental kind, and all of 
them also in a continuous relationship or rapport with God, 
though not in a personal vmy # * * * All these and their 
relationships to God, are the ultimates of the real world, 
and through them the process goes on* Their activity is in 
what we, who can only think in the time-process, must call 
the creative present* Mature as it presents itself to us 
is a sort of depositum of this activity as It passes from 
the creative present into the past, and so becomes, on the 
one hand, a relatively settled routine on which future creati­
vity must rest, but by which it is never complotely determined" 
(WG, 175)*
It is against this background of the two funda­
mental rational convictions - the necessity of a compre­
hensive world-picture and that seen from within, nature is 
a struggle of living powers of will - that we go on to 
discuss the specifically rational view of the concept of
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miracle «
The rational view opposes the traditional supra- 
natu5?al view of miracle. It is true that if transcendence 
he pictured as being literally above, then a miracle, is an 
intervention or a suspension of natural law: "God could at
any moment tear open the causal nexus like a piece of cloth"
(TBWV, 170)* "Bo long as we have not become av/are that the 
presence of God is a space, encompassing the whole of reality 
just as the three-dimensional spaoe does, so long, that is 
to say, as we conceive the world of God only as the upper 
story of the cosmic spaco^ ,: so long will God’s activity, too, 
always be a force v/hich affeots earthly events only from 
above" (TBWV* 171) # But by transferring the transcendence 
of God to suprapolar‘space, this great difficulty is over­
come! since suprapolar sp0.ce is :the ground of, and smbraoea, 
all other relative world spaces. God, being a free personal 
will, can thus act at any point in any space. Butihis 
action is always ffom within*
God’s activity, enacted from within, is only 
possible if ho has ra.pport with all levels of reality in 
the world. And, as we have already seen, the rationalist 
has established a panpsychic universe* "Miraculous events 
are only understandable on the hypothesis that the process 
of nature in its deepest essence ia not a dead mech8,nism
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Y/ho a 0 oours© ia laid down in fixed,:.; terms, hut that it is 
something whioh inisome aehae laoalive ; something which 
, man may influence by the interposition of the will in the 
same way in which he can affect a human opponent" (TBIV. 174) 
The world, is a conflict of living wills.
There is an essential element of faith in the 
exercise of will* That is to say, I have faith in my own 
willI if I tell myself to get out of bed, I believe that 
I can, do it - there is no doubt here at all. let my will 
is not something which I can see, eo my believing relation­
ship to my will is an act of faith* I have a ’doubt-not-. 
only-believe’ attitude in relation to my own will# Similarly, 
in the method known as suggestion, someone outside of me 
places this *doubt-not-only-believe* attitude in mes or 
better atill,someone enables me to adopt this attitude* 
"Alterations can take place within the human body to a 
quite extensive degree # whioh are not induced from outside 
either by stimulus of the nerves or muscles, or by the 
effect of Biedicine, but solely through the certainty of 
successful achievement" (TBW?* 184)* Therefore, in the 
power of suggestion there is faith, a faith lacking sight, 
"by which we know in advance by a clairvoyant certainty 
that successful obedience will follow" (TBWT* 186)* We 
have faith in our own wills, and we can place reliance upon
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other wills# In this regard, the rationalist points out 
that there are destroying, deathridden, demonic wills, just 
as there are creative, life-giving wills: and one can place
reliano© upon either kind# Faith in the activity of God 
is hut an extension of this basic principle* Faith belongs, 
then, to the inner structure of the act of v/ill # But since 
we can place reliance upon anyone, upon any will, how can 
we know that any particular event is due to faith in the 
will of God? "It is only when God has encountered us per­
sonally, and we live with Him in the fellowship of prayer, 
that we are able to ’discern the spirits’* Then we are 
able to trace at once whether the healing power under whoso 
influence we stand comes from below and therefore makes us 
dependent upon men or upon demonic powers which draw us 
away from God and hurl us down into the awful depths of 
godlessness, or v/hether this healing power comes from above 
and brings us into closer relationship with God and deepens 
and strengthens our fellowship with Him in prayer" (TSWY* 
193)* In such an event, in such a miracle, when it is seen 
from within, "a higher will intervenes in the conflict of 
- living wills# God encounters the destroying powers which 
permeate the created world" (TSWY# 191)*
The rationalist emphasises that a miracle is not 
an incontestable event by whioh a spectator could be con-
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vinoed of God’s activity# "It is not, possible to fin d  in 
miracle an experimental proof of God’s existenoe" (TBIJ* 191)# 
like the insight into the existence of the suprapolar space, 
Biiraole is an xmmerited gift from the hand of God# Farmer 
says that miracle, like revelation, "is God speaking to the 
individual personally, that is to say, in a way that is 
relevant to, and only understandable in terms of the indi­
vidual ’s own concrete situation# * « * And it is impossible 
to talce up a personal situation into a general proposition 
or ayllogism without its concrete historical livingly per­
sonal quality vanishing in  a cloud of abstractions" (TC, 114) ^
The rational analysis explains v/hy what is a 
miracle to one man ia not to another# As we have seen, in 
two-dimensional space only one line can be drawn at right 
angles to a given line at a given point* But in three- 
dimensional space an infinite number of such lines can be 
traced# To a person without the Insight into suprapolar 
space, a so-called miracle is only another event in one of 
the two polar spaces#
farmer goes on to discuss the phenomenology of 
miracle in relation to other aspects of the Christian’s 
experience «
Farmer is convinced that miracle and revelation 
belong together, that there is an in tim ate connection
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between the tv/o* What then is the difference? V/hy retain 
the vrord miracle at all? The answer is that miracle refers 
to one particular aspect of revelation* All miracles are 
revelations, but not all revelations are miracles* In his 
preliminary definition of revelation, Farmer identifies tv;o 
elements in every revelatory situation! the element of 
demand and the element of succour# But "the relative pro­
minence of the element of demand and the element of succour 
in the total awareness of God may vary considerably according 
to Ithe situation" (TO, 89)* It is Farmer’s contention 
that in miracle, whioh is a revelatory event and so contains 
both elements, the succour element is the stronger* Thus 
"a miracle for the religious mind is pre-eminently an event 
in v/hich God is apprehended as entering sucoouringly into 
a situation" (WG, 116). Or, "the more intensely personal 
and individual the succour of God is felt to be. the more
,HI               ,     , ,   «
appropriate/andjinevitable the word miracle becomes on the 
religious man’s lips" (WG, 116).
A miracle is different from what may be called 
general providence. A man surveying a piece of art or 
watching a sunset may be struck by the beauty of nature and 
the ultimate goodness of God* This is indeed revelation, 
but it would be wrong to apply the term miracle to it: it
has not the spontaneity one usually associates with that word.
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Moreover, carried to its logical conclusion, it could mean 
that everything is a miracle in that everything has something 
of mystery about it, and thus the term is robbed of any dis­
tinctive meaning. "The word miracle on the religious man’s 
lips indicates something distinctive which is not applicable, 
even after reflection, to all events indiscriminately.
' In other words, the more generalized the awareness of God’s 
goodness and succour, the less the word miracle is appli­
cable" (WG, 119).
Miracle is also different from v;hat may be called 
special providence. At a particular moment of his life, 
the Christian may become aware of a thread or pattern in 
his existence* separate past events, having no particular 
meaning at the time they happened, now appear to fit to­
gether significantly, and the Christian is bound to ascribe 
this direction in his life to the hand of God. Although 
this experience of special providence is closer to what is 
meant by miracle, it is not yet precise; "we seem not yet 
to have reached the moot spontaneous, inevitable, and 
typical usage of the word" (WG. 121).
Meither the experiencei of general providence nor 
of special providence iso applicable to the experience of 
miracle. Vfhat experience comes closest to the Christian 
experience of miracle? "The answer is, in that relationship
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which we call prayer" (WG. 122). Farmer cites an episode 
which came under his direct observation to explicate and 
illustrate this connectioabetween miracle and prayer. "A 
mother was informed by the doctors that, eo far as medical 
science could judge, her baby could not possibly recover from 
sickness; whereupon she called a friend, who, like herself, 
was a Christian believer, and asked him to pray v/ith her that 
God would restore the child# So they prayed, and within a 
few hours the child was on the way to a recovery which con­
founded all the experience of the doctors, as they v/ere frank 
to admit, even including one v/hose v/hole philosophy tended 
to profound scorn of ’all that sort of thing’♦ . . . The 
word which came instantly to the lips of the two people who 
had prayed, both of whom were intelligent and cultured, was 
•miracle’. They did not say ’this is providential’; they 
said' ’this is a miracle’, and no other word seemed appropriate 
to the awed sense of having transaction with the succouring 
will of God in a personal situation of critical need" (TO, 122)# 
Farmer goes on to draw three conclusions as to the connection 
between prayer and miracle #
First of all, in both miracle and prayer, "there 
is an awareness of serious crisis or need or threat of dis­
aster in the personal life, and of helplessness to deal with 
it adequately and victoriously through the exercise of
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ordinary unaided human powers" (TO, 123)* It can be said 
that in the everyëâyyflow of events, man feels at home in 
the world, in essential harmony with nature about him.
But sometimes the opposite is the case, oooasions do arise 
when "the mind of man is oonoentrated in a peculiarly intense 
way on his own fate and destiny as an individual seeking a 
significance for his own being over against those natural 
forces which seem to have him entirely in their grip" (TO,
124). What seems about to happen is not God’s will, or, the 
situation looks as if it will not evolve as God wills# Other­
wise, prayer in such a situation would be hopeless and futile*
Secondly, in both miro,ole and prayer, "there is a 
more or less conscious and explicit turning to God for assis­
tance" (TO, 123). In a situation like this, the matter is 
elevated above the ordinary run of affairs# In the religious 
man’s awareness of the personality of God, it is recognized 
that God is not chained to the wheel of cause and effect, 
but that his v/ill is free to act and to react with the will 
of the faithful believer* Bo the believer can cry to God 
for help #
Thirdly, in both miracle and prayer, "there is an 
awareness of an ad hoc response of God to the situation and 
to man’s petitioning inadequacy in it, so that the crisis 
is met, the need satisfied, the danger averted, in an event.
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or combination of eventB# v^ rhich would not have taken place
had man not so petitioned and God so acted’^ (WG# 123).
It is now poBBible to pass to a critical evaluation
of the x*ational argxment# As we have seexif the rationalist
is convinced that a complete religious world-picture must
be erected. The old supranatural world^pioture has come
crashing down, and aoience is now providing secular world**
pictures of its own. fhe Ohriatian Weltanschauung proposed
by Heim is to replace the obsolete supranaturaliam and be a
more comprehensive view than any of those supplied by science.
fwo criticisms are necessary at this point*
first of all, soienoe in itself does not and cannot
provide a world#*pioture. The task of the scientist is (as
we have seen in chapter two),to define, describe and classify
with the faith that there is an intercomiection between the
1phenomena which science investigates. It is true that cer­
tain philosophies claiming a scientific baslB have from time 
to time been put forward; philosophies providing more or 
less comprehensive world-picturea* Yet always these philo­
sophies have gone beyond what science itself has established 
2as certain* Secondly, because these peeudo-eoientifio 
faiths (in the absolute object, absolute space and time,
’^Of. sibove, 64ff* above, TBf.
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absolute causal detbrMxniem) have been shown to be inadequate, 
it ia false to go on to say that there is *again room for 
God * $ Because various pseudo-scientific absolutes are 
proven bankrupt, it is surely presumptuous to oonolude that 
•science is on the road to religion*. Other absolutes may 
well enter to fill this vacuuîn*
Is it really possible to build up a world-picture 
adequate enough to accojjpdate all faoets of reality, channeling 
faith and encompassing God in a #pace however commodious?
Heim seems to be aware of this difficulty, for on the one 
hand he wishes to establish *a reality which is beyond the 
reach of scientific investigation^ and on the other hand, 
as he 00 constantly reiterates, the insight into the exis­
tence of supx’apolar space comes only as a gift. Again, if 
it is possible to build up such a world-picture, the person 
who has onoe^ined insight into suprapolar space should be 
able to reoogniBo a miracle every time one happens, Yet 
Heim emphasizes that this ia not possible.
The second rational assumption - that the world 
is essentially a battle of wills - is powerful at first 
eight. Yet does not this assumption undermine the concept 
of space or dimension which was so fundamental to the first 
rational assumption? There, each space had certain definite 
contents arranged in accord with certain definite principles.
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But the assumption that this ia a panpsychic universe blurs
the lines separating the dimensions, and tends to malte the
one set of principles equally applicable to all. In other
words, after erecting a fine structural world-pioture with
the concept of space, the rationalist tops it off with a
panpsychic roof which the previous structure seems hardly
able to support. The argument from the nature of time
which Heim only introduces to support his space theories,
seems, after all, to be the more fundamental concept or idea*
It is the division between past and future rather than the
difference between spaces which is detenainative for Heim.
This is a logical or philosophical criticism.
?rom the scientific point of view, not every
physicist would agree that ♦since atomic physios has resolved
the rigidity of lifeless matter into infinitesimal spaces in
vfhich elemental particles execute purposeful movements at
enormous velocities like living individuals, the last possible
reason has been eliminated for regarding the inorganic world
as an unconscious inanimate mass*. Heisenberg's Hncertainty
Principle must be employed with great care, as the following
quotation would seem to indicate.
When in 1926 Heisenberg contributed his principle of 
Inde10rminacy to the development of the theory of 
quantum physios, a new epoch opened in popular philo­
sophy. What was intended to be a specialized theoretical 
contribution to a restricted field of physics was (quickly
w. 3 4 2  -
twisted by certain popularlzers of science and by 
delighted oXergyjnen into meaning the ' general overthrow 
of the laws of strict causality. The 19th oentuiy 
view of the Universe as a great machine was suddenly 
seen to be hazy in fine detail, there was still room 
j‘ for freewill, for miracles and the intervention of 
. the hand of God; for once, modern science had been 
compelled to grant living space to religion - thus 
ran the new popular* philosophy. It was a philosophy 
based on a misunderstanding at its scientific root. 
Heisenberg had been concerned to point out that we 
cannot by the nature of our metho'ds measure simul- 
tmieoualy both the velocity and the position of an 
’ atomic particle; thereby stimulating closer scientific 
scrutiny of methodology in physios* But he said 
nothing about the behaviour of particles being cause­
less, or any need to abandon belief^in causalitys 
this was added by the popularizers.
ïheologioally, I would agree with Heim’s world- 
picture - with its separation into various spaces and its 
universal panpsyohism ^ were a tremendous 'as if held over the 
whole philosophy. Our relation with the objective v/orld is 
♦as if• . . . Our relation with the Thou is 'as if* . . .
Our relation with God is 'as if* . « . But since this is 
manifestly a Weltanschauung. the ’as if’ is removed in the
p
interests of a unified and comprehensive world-pllcture *
^Crammer, "Editorial", 7#
O
Parmer seems more complacent with regard to the 
necessity of an air-tight philosophy or world- 
picture. "It is not necessary for bur purpose 
to attempt to set forth a complete metaphysic, 
which shall be argumentatively established against 
all possible demurrers or alternative yiçws» (t o, 
158) * ‘farmer's philosophy is thus only "one 
possible theory" (WG, 159)#
- 3 4 3  -
The specific rational treatment of the concept of 
miracle suffers from -.the same disability as the whole 
structural fabric. In particular, Heim's panpsychism allows 
him to postula,to the existence of a plethora, of demonic 
forces g belief in which is, in nij opinion, obsolete. I 
would question as well his use of the word faiths as he 
employs the term it seems to imply almost solely psycholo­
gical faith which ia 'hoisted ' from time to time^ to theolo­
gical faith* Parmer's differentiation between miracle and 
other expressions of Christian experience ia most helpful| 
though his tying of the term mira,ole to prayer is open to
question and critioism. Certainly in both there is a sense
disrupted
of crisis, we feel /in an existentiell ;way ' though this 
sense, of crisis would seem to be much less conscious in the 
experience of miracle than in'; the experience of prayer.
For is it the case in miracle, as it is in true pr@,yer, that 
there is necessarily a conscious turning towards God* Cer­
tainly in true miracle, as in true prayer, there is an 
aWiarenesB of an . Sdjhoc response on the part of God*
The rationalist is a profound and sensitive apolo- 
gete, and his system truly a work of love. Add to that - in 
Heim's ca.ee in particular - a facile pen, a prodigious 
scientific knowledge, and an apt use of simile, metaphor 
and example, and one is left with a work of no mean importance
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Yet even this gallant effort does not save the Bupgc'astruoture
from some Inner InoonoistenoieB* The two fundamental
rational asBumptions are not really in harmony ; the second
(panpsychism) tends to undermine the first (a comprehensive
world-pioture built up on the concept of space) # The two
basic pillars do not fit together perfectly * so it is not
surprising that the whole building has some rather obvious
flaws* But as an apologetic structure, the building is quit©
serviceable* Many men, scientists and others, may væll find
it a suitable temporary refuge until more adequate and oommo- 
tn
dious accomodation is found elsewhere*
The question has been asked : Is it possible to
erect a suprastructure adéquat©(to house all aspects of real­
ity, including God? If we were to look at the rational 
structure only, the answer v/ould be in the negative* But 
are there not other projects worthy of our attention and 
examination? There is at least one other, and in the next 
chapter we investigate another world-pioture or, more explÎT ^
oitly, a word-picture, for the chapter is entitled "The
•</
Lingual View"* Like the rational attempt it is both modern 
and profound* Like the rational attempt it is inspired 
by apologetic needs : to make the message of the gospel
meaningful and intelligible to contemporary man* Starting 
from a different site, and with a slightly different clientele
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in mind, tlais project is well worthy of our careful in­
spection*
34-6
Ohapter VIII . The Lingu^- .View.i. ,
"I am content to be employed as an under-labourer in 
clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the 
rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge." John Locke*
"One is often told that the prooese of analysis is 
falsification, and that when you analyse any given concrete 
whole you falsify it, and that the results of analysis 
are not true* I do not thinïc that is a right view*"
Bertrand Bussell#
Mir « Ramsev* I*T* Miracles*
,11 111 .
EL «Î
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The limgulet le convinced that the contemporary
philosophical interest in language can be so developed as
to provide a novel inroad into the problems and controversies
of theology, illuminating its claims and reforming its
apologetic. The tasks of the linguist are 1) to clarify
the logic of theological language (including the concept of
miracle), and 2) to provide a logical structure which relates
religious key-words to all language logics*
The chapter is divided as follows. First of all,
there is a. brief historical summary of the movement leading
to logical empiricism. Secondly, there is a straightforward
presentation of the three fundamental lingual assumptions,
1and the specifically lingual approe.ch to the concept of 
miracle. Thirdly, the assumptions and the treatment of 
miracle are critically evaluated*
The linguist is an apologete: he earnestly wishes
to do "justice to the churchmen of the past and our own 
circfimetanoes in the present" (HI», 186) * He decries the
One of the meanings of the word lingual is "per­
taining to language or languages." I use the 
term ’lingual' in preference td the perhaps more 
usual 'linguistic', though both words come from 
the same root* In this regard of. Onions (ed.), 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. I, 1148. 
The" worS'" who holds the 
lingual view. ‘ '
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attitude of the theologian who buries his head in the sand
in the faoe of contemporary soientifio and philosophical
discoveries. We must never give up "all idea of integrating
the Christian faith with philosophical speculation and
1culture whether humanist or scientific," In particular, 
the linguist is disturbed by the cleavage between the 
findings of logical empirical philosophy and the dogmatic 
assertions of Christianity, We have already seen how Heim, 
being a scientist and a Christian, attempted to formulate 
the faith in terms congenial to the scientist. Likewise 
the linguist, a philosopher and a Christian, attempts to 
formulate the faith in terms congenial to the logical empi­
ricist# But what is logical empiricism? Earnsey tries to 
show its nature by a brief historical sketch, and in this 
sketch he distinguishes three steps (EL, 11-3)#
First of all, it seems clear that logical empiricism 
goes back to the philosophical interest in language which 
dates from the turn of the century when men like G#E. Moore 
and Bertrand Eussell began to protest against the fluffy 
phrases and woolly ways of expression of the then-current 
philosophy; epitomized in the works of the idealist British 
philosopher F,H. Bradlpy, To Eussell and Moore the key word
1Hamsoy, "Editor's-Introduction", The Reasonablenees 
of Christianity [by John L o c k e ïgt'.
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was ’clarify', and the oft-repeated question was '%at 
precisely do yoU mean by such and such?'
Secondly, the rather anamotlous movement received 
a more formal structure with the introduction into British 
philosophy of the works and findings of the Vienna Oircle: 
amongst whom Garnap, Sohlick and Wittgenstein were most 
prominent* The members of this circle were impressed by 
the experiments of physios which resulted in the elimination 
of unobservables from physical theory. For instance, the 
notion of 'the ether' which had found a place in the tradi­
tional statements of physical theory proved to be an empty 
concept* This programme of eliminating unobservables from 
physics-1 theory seemed to promise immense gains in clarity 
and economy of statement* This process the Vienna Oircle 
wished to extend into a definition of meaning in general* 
and the Verification Principle was the result - 'the meaning 
of a statement is the method of its verification’• "To 
say what a statement means is simply to say wha,t observations 
or experiments would show it to be true or false* If a
statement refers to what is unobservable end outside the
1scope of experiment, then it has no meaning," Any propo­
sition which cannot be verified by sense experience - by
1MacIntyre, "The logical Status of Religious Belief", 
MetaphvBioal Beliefs* 170#
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what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, and smelt - is to be 
termed meaningless. The connection between the new movement 
in philosophy and contemporary science is most interesting, 
as Oopleston points out. "The immense growth of empirical 
science and the great and tangible benefits brought to 
civilization by applied science * . • has created an atmos­
phere or mental climate which is reflected in logical posi­
tivism. Once philosophy was regarded as the 'handmaid of 
theology's now it has tended to become the 'handmaid of 
science *• As all that can be known can be known by means 
of science, what is more reasonable than that the philosopher 
should devote himself to an analysis of the meaning of 
certain terms used by scientists and to an inquiry into 
the presuppositions of the scientific method? The philoso­
pher will not increase human knowledge in the sense of 
extending our factual Imowledge of reality; but he will 
perform the humbler, though useful, task of clarifying the
meaning of terms and showing what they denote in terms of
1immediate experience."
This second stage - the logical positivist stage - 
received its most popular form in the book Language. Truth 
and Logic by A.J. Ayer, first published in 1935. In this
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work, Ayer divides propositions into three olassifioations. 
First of all, there are the statements of logic and mathe­
matics, ultimately tautologous combinations of symbols, 
whose factual truth is guaranteed by the symbols involved. 
Secondly, there are the factual assertions of science and 
common-sense, verified or falsified by relevant sense 
experience* And thirdly, there are utterances which express 
emotions and attitudes, but have no factual meaning. Into 
this third category fall many ethical, metaphysical and 
theological assertions, such as the assertion that 'there 
is a God'. "Ho statement which refers to a 'reality' trans­
cending the limits of all possible sense-experience can 
possibly have any literal signifioanooThe linguist ia 
well aware of this problem: the problem of tryirgto prove
that the proposition 'God exists' is logically significant. 
"Gan 'God' sentences ever be falsified and if not are they 
even meaningful, let alone true? If events follow a regular 
pattern (it is said) we speak of God's 'constant control'$
It might be expected then that should any irregularity occur, 
the assertion would be falsified. But not so. When events 
show irregularity, we speak of God's miraculous 'intervention' 
as well# The result is a quite useless 'hypothesis' without
hyer, 17*
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any empirical relevance* The G-od hypothesis (the story
continues) has a *heads-I-win.tt tails-yoti-loso^ character
about it; there can be no genuine falsification; no genuine
discussion, about it; no genuine meaning in it# What is the
cash-value, it is asked, of this concept ’God* which is
retained even when compromised by the most contradictory
qualifications? Oome what may, the argument says, all sorts
of stories - including inconsistent ones - will be told, but
the word *God* will be retained# * God* is everywhere, only
because *God* means nothing anywhere" (Mir. 9)#
As we have seen, the Verification Principle tended
to dismiss any statement which could not be verified by
sense experience # The method was carried to its logical
conclusion by Eussell who tried to formulate a perfect
language, a language which should be free of all ambiguity,
and in no way misleading* Russell believed that his quest
had succeeded with the discovery of what he called sense-
data, which could lead to * atomic * propositions, which by
a complex construction could give rise to all the compound
1sentences of ordinary language#
This second stage - the logical positivist stage - 
broke dovm under pressures from several sources* Por one
and Logic# 145ff*
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thing, the ooncept * electron’ has no observable correlate, 
yet this concept occurs In theories which, taken as a whole, 
are verified or falsified by experiment and observation* 
A^ain, the statement ’Charles I was executed in 1649’ is 
one which is verified by consulting the relevant documents* 
But the meaning of the statement is not, if you read and 
consult those documents, that you will there x^ ead that 
Charles I was executed in 1649* The meaning of the statement 
is that a certain individual lost his head in the past; not 
that certain words can be read in the future # Again, a 
number of people still talked about ethics, metaphysics and 
theology: ’meaningless* aceording to logical positivist
analysis* And finally, what of the Verification Principle 
itself? "It must have an odd enough status, for as pre­
supposed by all meaningful statements it oannot itself be 
meaningful in the same sense" (EL, 12)# Thus the bres.kdo\m 
of strict logical positivism opened the way for logical 
empiricism#
The fact of logical empiricism brings us up to 
the present time, and is the third step in its own historical 
development# But what is the task of logical empiricism?
"It has fallen to this movement to emphasise the variety 
of forms that human utterance may take# Philosophers have 
ceased to believe that we can lay down a priori standa.rds
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of meaningfulness which must he satisfied loj every utterance
Instead philosophy has become the patient description and
classification of all those.ways of using language that are
1of logical importance Again, "the view arises that
apparently homogeneous language may exhibit all kinds of
logical differences" (EL, 15)*
The logical positivist had already shown that
sentences with the same grammatical construction have in
fact different logical meanings# It had been pointed out
that while words are symbols, many of the words used in the
English language are ambiguous symbols* Take, for example,
the word ’is** "If we v/ere guided merely by the form of
the sign, we should assume that the ’is’ which occurs in
the sentence ’He is the author of that book’ was the b&mo
symbol as the ’is’ v/hioh occurs in the sentence ’A cat is a 
2mammal’*" But when we have analysed the two sentences 
in such a way as to reveal their logical structure, we find 
that ’is* means something different in each case# Thus, 
the first sentence "is equivalent to ’He and no one else 
wrote that book’, and the second to ’The class of mammals 
contains the class of oats’ Theologians, too, need to
H I "  9»
'^MacIntyre, op* cit*# 171-72* 
^Ayer, 72.
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madorstand the differences in logical structure of statements 
which have parallel grammatical form# "If anyone supposes 
that ’God is omnipotent’ has a logical structure like ’Lord 
Beaverbrook is all-powerful*; if anyone supposes that ’I
trust my Bather in Heaven’is logically homogeneous with ’I
1
trust my father in Hull’, there is no limit to the insuperable
1problems he will generate»" Thus the aim of logical empi­
ricism, as of logical positivism, "is analytic; it is so 
to analyse sentences and to examine the usage of words 
that thought is clarified and a new approach is rendered 
possible to the traditional problems of philosophical 
discussion."^ The main difference is that while logical 
positivism assumed a,priori that there was only one meaning­
ful logical structure, logical empiricism tries instead to 
describe and classify all those ways of using language that 
are of logical importance# The linguist sees it as his 
particula,r task to clarify the logic of theological language* 
"It: is plain that contemporary philosophy lays on us an 
urgent task and duty, vis# to elucidate the logic of theolo­
gical assertions; • # # to state case for religious 
language; to try to elucidate the logic of some of its
^Ramsey, "Review", 414*p
"Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism. 21
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charaoterlatlQ claims" (EL, 14)*
In order to carry out this task of clarification 
the linguist asks ; To what kind of situation does religion 
appeal? or What kind of empirical anchorage have theolo­
gical words? Religious situations are characterised by 
two associated elements# Birst of all, religious situations 
involve a discernment which goes beyond the mere observation 
of an objective fact; ©nd secondly, they involve a commitment 
which arises by way of an appropriate response to the dis­
cernment# A religious situation is charaoterijsed by a 
disoernment-oommitmentÎ this is the first assumption of 
the linguist# But what specifically does the linguist mean 
by discernment and by commitment?
without
Discernment is that virtue/which "no distinctive 
theology v/ill ever be possible; a ’self-awareness* that is 
more than ’body awareness* and not exhausted by spatio- 
temporal ’objects’. Buoh a discernment lies at the basis 
of religion, whose characteristic claim is that there are 
situations which are spatio-temporal and more* Without such 
’depth’; without this ’unseen*, no religion will be pos- * 
slble" (EL, 15)# In a religious situation, this discernment 
goes beyond the mere noting of an objective fact# Con­
sequently, "religious language is no set of labels for a 
group of hard objective ’facta* glanced at by passive ob-
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servers" (EL. 26)# In such a religious situation, with 
such a discernment, the only appropriate response is 
commitment - total commitment, Involving a personal revo­
lution# "We see religious commitment as a total commitment 
to the whole universe; something in relation to which argu­
ment has only a very odd function; its purpose being to 
tell such a tale as evokes the ’insight’, the ’discernment’ 
from which the commitment follows as a response# Purther, 
religious commitment is something bound up with key words 
whose logic no doubt resembles that of the words which 
characterise personal loyalty as well as that of the axioms 
of mathematics, and somehow combines features of both, 
being what might be called ’specially resistant’ posits, 
’final’ end-ponts of explanation, ley-words suited to the 
whole job of living - ’apex’ words" (EL, 37)* And such a 
’key’ or ’apex* word is ’God’*
The religious situation is oharacteri£îed as a 
discerment-oommitment * This means that such situations 
are complicated - even ’odd’ - when compared v/ith othen. 
situations in life# Gonsequently, the linguist believes 
that the language which applies to a religious situation 
will be appropriately odd in its logical structure, even if 
grammatically it appears similar to ordinary factual logic# 
That religious language does exhibit a .suitably odd logical
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structure Is the second fundamental assumption of the 
linguist. And religious language is logically odd in at 
least two ways.
Birst, if religious language ho,s to talk about 
situations which are perceptual with a difference, percep­
tual and more : that is to say,, object language which has
been given very special qualifications, object language 
v/hioh shows logical peouliarities# then we should expect 
that language to be appropriately odd in logical structure*
But have we any general guide to this logical peculiarity? 
"Does not the way in which distinctively personal situations 
closely parallel those lAioh are characteristioallv religious, 
suggest/close logical kinship between ’I’ and ’God*? Both, 
by the standards of observational language, are odd in 
their logical behaviour" (EL, 58)* The true ’I’ is some­
thing more than my body, my actions, even my thinlcing*
The true ’I* - and here the linguist agrees with the rationa­
list - escapes the oa.tegories of objective language, thou^ 
the ’I’ is at the same time tied to this language* And, 
Ramsey argues, the word ’God’ stands in much the same rela­
tion to world-language as the word ’I’ stands to body- 
language* "The central problem of theology is how to use, 
how to qualify, observational language so as to be suitable 
currency for what in part exceeds it - the situations in
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which theology le founded* At any rate, ’I’ will never 
eease to be a useful guide for ue when we are confronted 
with-pu^0les about ’god’" (HL, 58)# The second character­
istic of religious language is that it contains significant 
tautologies 2 "tautologies whose function is to command 
those key words - those ultimates of explanation - which 
.arise iho connection with religious language, and especially 
with its character as a commitment" (BL, 40) * Such a tauto­
logy is ’God is Love’* "We all know the phrase ’God is 
Love* has been criticised ,aa being a platitude, because it 
la alleged to say nothing*. But may not this be because it 
has the logical form of a tautology? If so, we misunder­
stand it if we do not see it as a eimiifioant tautology 
labelling a commitment" (EL* 46)*
What the linguist is saying is that the religious 
situation demands and needs a logic of its own, and the 
linguist sees it as his task to formulate this religious 
logic* But he goes on to say more than this* As we have 
noted, Ramsey believes that religious language deals par­
ticularly with apex or key words, key words suited to the 
whole job of living. And the key ' key-word is, of course,. 
•God’* So while the linguist constantly reiterates that 
the concept ’God’ has no place in strict scientific language,, 
yet ’God’ can act "in the sens© of ’answering’ lim itin g
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questions" not only In the field of science but in all 
other fields as well (Mir* 13)» In other words, what is 
needed is a logical structure vdiich relates the key or 
apez words to all language logics# Eamsey examines the 
language of science and the language of history and believes 
that "they each require, though in different ways, words 
with a different logic altogether# * # * It is the task 
of metaphysics both to organise the supply of all these 
supplementary words and at the same time to collect the 
simplest number of them to fulfill their task as ultimate 
co-ordinators, and then to offer the resultant group as à 
sort of index to the total language scheme, v/hich comprises 
the index and the subordinate languages with their several 
logics" (Mir, 13-4)* Thus the task of the linguist is - - 
two-fold I first, to clarify the logic of theological 
language; secondly, to provide a logical structure which 
relates such a key-word as ’God’ to all language logics# 
tinder the second task, Eamsey sees it b.b his duty to estab­
lish "’God’s activity’ on our language map" (Mir# 18) and 
so "to unite all the various languages of acienoe" (Mir# 13)* 
O^ his metaphysical or meta-logical element, while not absent 
from RL, is given much clearer expression in Mir.
Having established that the religious situation 
is characterised as a discernment-coimnitment, Ramsey goes
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oil to consider some of the traditional ways of talking 
about God. Typical of such language are tthe elements 
known as models and qualifiers* Bor example, in the phrase 
’infinitely wise’, we have a model, ’v/isdom*, taken from 
our experience of people whom we know as moxfeor less wise.
But the qualifier, ’infinitely’, shows that the model has 
in this case an odd currency - it is to be developed until 
•the penny drops’ or ’the situation comes alive* - until 
the typically religious discernment is evoked and the 
response of total commitment effected# The linguist also 
uses the discernment-commitment characterisation of the 
religious situation in talking, about the language of the 
Bible and the language of Ohristian doctrine. It is the 
former of these - the language of the Bible - which is of 
particular importance for our discussion.
O’he third lingual assumption is that the language 
of the Bible has an odd logical structure. Since the Bible 
records religioue situations, we qbjxi expect a oorrespondingny 
odd language formulation# This does not mean that the 
gospel and epistle writers were all logical empiricists.
But they were writing about religious situations — about 
diBcernment-commitment situations - and therefore the language 
of # 63Bible is vfritten in an appropriately odd logical manner. 
"They could not help giving their language an odd structure
if it was to bo appropriate currency for their significant 
situations" (RL, 92). Of course, many of the biblica.1 
reports are ostensibly, or grammatically, straightforward 
factual accounts. But this does not mean that the Bible 
is logically simple and straightforward. In fact,many of 
the attempts to render the Bible meaningful and significant 
have failed just because scholars have not realised that 
the Bible is couched in an odd logical framev/ork. Much 
biblical criticism approached the Scripture: with the tacit 
assumption that the logic employed was the same as ordinary 
observational logic. "Let us recognise that, when biblical 
criticism was in full swing, there lay behind the scientific 
approach to the Bible the desire to establish biblical facts 
as inoontrovertibly as those facts talked of by science.
There was, in short, the desire to find, by means of science, 
a firm foundation in fact for the religion of the Bible"
(RL, 97)# This mood Inspired the search for the historical 
Jesus, and this search has failed. With this failure went 
the accompanying attempt to subject the Bible to the logical 
structure suitable only to science. "We have now oome to 
see, by the development of biblical criticism itself, that 
the empirical anchorage of the Christian faith is not the 
kind of situation with which any scientific language, as 
such, could adequately deal" (RL, 97)# "As source-criticism
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(with its BOientifio a,pproach) yielded to form-critioism 
(with its literary approach) may not the time he opportune 
for form-criticism to give place to a logical approach?"
(EL, 122). Eamsey discusses three ways in which scholars 
have attempted to give a suitably odd logical structure to 
biblical events*
Eirst of 8,11, there is the ’fact plus interpreta­
tion’ theory, suggested in one part of Dodd’s v/ork on the
1fourth gospel* This view holds that the same ’facts’ were 
paraded before both believers and unbelievers; both saw the 
same ’objects’ * But the distinctive thing about biblical 
history in comparison with secular history lies in the ’in­
terpretation’ put upon the ’facts’ by the writers of the 
gospels and the epistles* "The point may be put in another 
way, and from the standpoint of language* If we say that 
the facts of the gospels are ’history plus interpretation’, 
the' language of the gospels would only be ’odd’ in the 
sense that it was a, rather complicated version of a simpler 
language, vis* the ’plainest’ history" (EL, 99)* Valuable 
as this attempt may seem, the concept ’fact’ seems to rest 
upon an epistemology with a history dating from the time of 
Lockes an epistemology which holds that knowledge is
^Dodd, The Interpretation of the kourth Gospel* 447*53
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acquired by minds which scrutiniKe isolated and objective 
•facts*, peering at them from a distance* And the concept 
•interpretation* reminds one of nineteenth century idealism* 
But the philosophies of which these two concepts form a 
part are now obsolete. "The moral is not to separate facts 
and interpretation so sharply. * . « The situations to 
which Christianity appeals are ontological curiosities; they 
are odd" (BL» 102)*
Secondly, there is the * existential* theory pro-- 
pounded by Bultmann and his followers*^ Here the deter­
mining factor is the division between the objective-historical 
and the existontiell-historical elements of Christianity.
The Qbjeotive-historioal element refers to the events 
associated with the Jesus of history: his birth, ministry^
message, miracles, crucifixion and riesurreotion* This 
objective-historical element is open to historical criticism* 
But the existentiell-hiatorical element is my total response 
to Cod in Christ at the present moment, and this element is 
not open to historical criticism# True, this present deci­
sion is linked in some way with the events which occurred 
in Palestine some two thousand years ago, but the connection
1Of* Maoquarrie, An Bxistentialist Theology# Here 
Macquarrie*s wording is" slightly altered in line 
with the schema noted above, 268.
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is somewhat tenuous : the existentiell-historioal is related
to the objective-historical only problematically*. "On this 
view, the situations to which the gospels appeal are odd 
enough to be called •existentiell-historioal* where this 
description implies a situation which can neither be identified 
with, nor made wholly* independent of, the •objective-his­
torical* . An existential approach may be helpful in em­
phasizing the fact of these characteristics, but to do that, 
it compromises, and may even exclude any reasonable account 
of the other, and there we must part company" (RL, 106).
Thirdly, there is the 'significant event* theory,
accepted as most satisfactory by the linguist, though it
was suggested in the first place by Dodd in the above-cited
book. Dodd points out that "the events narrated in the
fourth gospel are intended to be understood as significant
events, semeia. . . .  To a writer with the philosophical
presuppositions of the evangelist there is no reason why a
narrative should not be at the same time factually true and
symbolic of a deeper truth, since things and events in this
world derive what reality they possess from the eternal
1Ideas they embody." Such a view of 'significant events' 
involves a fundamental We 1 tansohauung. as both Dodd and
^Dodd, OP. cit.. 142-45*
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Ramsey rëcognize. "What we have clone then . , . has been to 
show that the claim that the Bible is 'history* is only 
substantiated if 'history* refers to situations as odd as 
those which are referred to by that paradigm of the fourth 
gospels 'the Word became flesh'" (RB, 103). It is this 
third 'significant event' theory of the Bible which overcomes 
the difficulties of the first two theories, and best points 
to the logically odd structure of the biblical history.
"The 'facts' of the gospels in particular are never facts 
for which science is appropriate currency, or history is 
appropriate currency" (RL, 106).
Before passing to what Ramsey has to say specifi­
cally about the concept of miracle, consideration may well 
be given to his treatment of the Resurrection. Ramsey points 
out that the question 'Did the resurrection ocour?' sounds 
very lik# the question 'Did Queen Anne's death occur?'
But a moment's reflection will show that the similarity is 
but superficial. If the word Resurrection refers to such 
events as an empty tomb, visions and so on, all these may 
not only have happened but be believed in, without in any 
sense there being a Christian belief in the Resurrection: 
that is, without the total commitment which the Resurrection 
surely implies. Again, the question 'Did the Resurrection 
occur?' has not the same logical form as the question 'Did
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the empty tomb occur?', for the second can be affirmed, 
while the first is denied# There are even some who deny 
the empty tomb, and yet affirm the reality of the Resurrection^ 
Actually, the question 'Did the Resurrection occur' is 
closely related logically to the question 'Is that a case 
of duty?' or to the question 'Is that a case of genuine 
personal devotion?' Think for a moment of the spectator 
who sees a man jump into a deep river in order to save a 
child. On the face of it, the action of the man looks like 
a heroic deed# But there are - to the spectator - other 
possible explanations of the action* The man may have 
wanted only the reward, or the fame and publicity resulting 
from such a rescue. "Here again we have a question, for the 
answering of which evidence is relevant; but the evidence 
might all be believed without the question itself being
answered in the affirmative. In both the case of the drowning
child and the case of the Resurrection, 'evidence' has a 
strange empirical reference. It must certainly be examined,
and is undoubtedly relevant. But in each case the puzzle
arises that no amount of 'evidence' alone guarantees that 
in relation to which it is considered, namely, the 'Resurrec­
tion' on the one hand, or 'duty' on the other" (RL, 128).
For that reason, it is impossible to 'date* the Resurrection 
in the same way as one can date Queen Anne's death. The
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language of the Resurrection applies to a situation which 
is indeed spatio-temporal, but which is also more than this.
We are now in a position to examine the specifically 
lingual view of the concept of miracle *
What is a miracle? "Our answer must start from 
the point that a miracle is a non-conforming event, a 
miraoulum whose non-conformity, whose oddness, evokes, gives 
rise to, what we have called a characteristically theolo­
gical situation* With a miracle, a situation 'comes alive*, 
the light dawns, the penny drops" (Rl, 144)# The linguist 
hastens to add that this non-conformity cannot be spoken 
of as a breach or suspension of natural law. Miracle itself 
is not a scientific category, it is a term excluded from the 
logic of science. "Vife could never conclude more than that 
'miracle* had no place in scientific language. Indeed, there 
is no 'conclusion' about it; the scientist is bound, as a 
condition of using scientific words, to exclude 'miracle' 
from the start" (Mir. 8). It is scientifically meaningless 
to say that God caused such and such an act. "The word 'God* 
does not work as a high-grade scientific word at all. It 
is not g 'hypothesis'. God-sentences do not belong to the 
logic of science"(Mir. 9). The man using the logic of 
science can say: "Whether such events as are commonly
designated as miracles have ever actually occurred is a
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question into which there is here no need to enter* For,
even if they did occur, their occurrence would prove, not
that the operation of the relevant laws could he suspended
by a 'higher power', but simply that we were wrong in
supposing them to be universal laws; and then we should
be left with the task of trying to find some other laws
1to put in their place." Thus the phrase 'breach of natural 
law' has no special religious significance, if it be con­
sidered as belonging only to the logic of science•
But what structure must the phrase 'breach of 
natural law' have, and what sort of event will it talk 
about, if it is to be theologically significent? Ramsey 
points out that this phrase 'breach of natural law' can 
be taken as a qualified model: 'natural law' being a model
taken from the natural sciences, and 'breach' being a 
qualifying operator. Then we consider a law, contemplate 
circumstances to break it, reformulate the law, create a 
new situation to break it, and so on. The result is that 
one has the sequence: law, break, reformulate, break, re­
formulate, and so on. If at any time in this procedure we 
gain the insight that no scientific law, however often re­
formulated, ever gives an exhaustive explanation - that
1 Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. 208-09
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something more is needed: a metaphysical apex or key word
to answer a limiting question; that the- concept 'God* must 
he introduced to give an ultimate explanation - then one 
is in a characteristically religious situation (HL, 45)*
But considered as terms of scientific logic, neither 
'miracle* nor 'breach of law'- have any meaningful sig­
nificance whatsoever.
Well then, has the concept of miracle any place 
in the logic of history? That depends, of course, on what 
one means by history. And Hamsey commences by saying that 
the language of history is concerned above all with persons. 
"We suggest that historical language is a technique for 
naming and organizing at a concrete level of personal en­
counter* such a, selection of facts as endeavours to repeat 
certain 'events as they occurred.*, and thus to bring them 
into relation with contemporary experience. True, there 
are. several varieties of history, economic and social 
history, constitutional history, historical geography and 
so on, but I would still assert that what is most distinctive 
about historical language, what distinguishes it from law 
or economics or geography, when the distinctive features 
of those languages have been severally elucidated, is that 
history is pre-eminently concerned with persons. Its dis­
tinctive feature is to use person-words as part of its
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technique for oomprehenaiveneas, to use peraon-pstterna in I W  
aearch for conoreteneBB" (Mir# 11), Therefore, the logic of 
hietory, with its interest in persona, #Cema better suited than 
the logic of science to give meaningful expression to the con­
cept of miracle: for "in a miracle story 'God* has been
inserted into a language-frame from which a 'person* word 
has been deleted* Miracle stories are thus stories of a 
characteristically personal activity, with 'God' substituted 
for a person-word" (EL, 145)#
But what do we mean by a person-word, by a'person'?
What person do I know best? Why X, mysejf * And as we have 
already seen, the linguist believes that 'I* cannot be 
talked about in terms of objective language. 'I* elude 
public gaze, yesterday, tc^day, and tomorrow. "But 
itfchat, it will be said, does 'I* refer to? If 'I* can 
never be 'objectified* — but always (if the question is 
raised) distinguished from an objective 'me' - surely it 
can never be talked about. Hardly. All we can say is, it 
cannot be talked about in terms of language of ordinary 
'observational* logic* * * « It will belong to a language 
of curious logic indeed; but there is nothing disreputable 
about that if this language is necessitated by the facts"
(Mir. 15). The relation between 'I* and* 'me* is the first 
stage in the lingual meta-logical system.
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We are now prepared for a further step* As we 
have already noted, the word ♦God* acta in relation to 
all world logics in the same way that *1* acts in relation 
to *me* logic* îEherefore, the full meta-logical map looks 
something like this,
[♦Apex* word]
actively
related
actively
related
' persons
people*
various observational logics
[Words with the 
same index 
status]
[Words of the 
same language 
level]
(Mir. 17 and 18).
Oan a place for the concept of miracle be found 
on this meta^logical map? l^ he linguist replies that "the 
question; Oan we place * miracle' anywhere on our language 
map? becomes; Oan we place 'God*s activity* anywhere on out 
language map?" (Mir. 18), And since we have located God*s
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activity, theie should he no difficulty in locating miracle, 
especially when we remember that "in a miracle story *God* 
has been inserted into a language from which a *person* word 
has been deleted" (RL« 145), In a miracle, "we should be 
making the claim (to take as an example the simplest case 
of nature miracles) that there are groups of empirical facts 
to which the word ‘person’ is not normally applied which 
nevertheless demand for their description the word ’person* 
an.d in particular the word * God* " (Mir, 22), In a miracle, 
we discern God’s activity, to \Miich the appropriate response 
is total commitment. It is true that not everyone ma,y gain 
this insight, any more than that in the total language map 
everyone can find a meaningful- place for ’God* or'God’s 
activity's there is, in some sense, a paradox about miracle. 
"Miracle stories are endeavours in terms of public language 
to express the fact that certain situations possess obser­
vable factors of a non«*personal kind which by their odd 
pattern are nevertheless expressive of a characteristically 
personal activity" (EJ^ , 150) »
But now the question is askeds Is God only active 
in those situations which demand a ’person* word td make the 
event intelligible? Of course, replies the linguist, this 
is not so. Ramsey makes an empirical distinction between 
two orders of God’s activity* "God’s ’first-order’ activity
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would be that activity for whose description the logic of 
science is appropriate* His ’second-order’ (or personal) 
activity, if and when it occurred, would need rather, we 
should expect, the logic of history, and be indicated in 
the empirical patterns appropriate to, and suggested by, 
historical techniques" (Mir# 20)# This conception of different 
orders of God’s activity may be schematised in the following 
manner*
The Phrase % belongs to;
1 * Me-active scientific
language
In relation to which must be placed;
God ’generally’ active;
God’s ’first-order* activity » 
’providence’, a word in the 
theological supplement to science*
2. I-active metaphysical God ’personally’ active;
language God’s ’second-order’ activity :
’miracle’, a word of 
(metaphysical) history*
(Mir* 21).
The linguist goes on to say that the question 
’Ho miracles happen?’ when regarded as a question of 
historical language is no doubt better formulated thus:
’On such and such an occasion did a miracle'’M’ occur?’
If this is to be answered affirmatively, three things must 
be kept in mind*
Hirst, if to the question ’On such and such an 
occasion did a miracle *M* occur?* we are to receive an 
affirmative answer, we must adduce evidence for ’M*. But 
v/e must also remember that we are looking at ’M* from a
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historical and not from a scientific point of view. So, 
in looking at the historical evidence for *M’, we should 
keep in mind the twoi factors - 1) its historical selection 
and 2) its historical extension. This means that "the bare 
question as to whether some event did, or did not occur, 
is to be answered more, or less, affirmatively according as 
to whether. ’K  does or does not, give a stable historical 
insight which never loses, but gains significance and 
relevance as other events (of course in other settings) 
are adduced" (Mir# 22). As X understand this conception 
of historical selection and extension, it means that any 
alleged miracle ’M* must be tested as to its appropriateness 
with other events of which it forms an integral whole. In 
brief, Is ’M’ suitable in the whole context? Does the 
changing of the water into wine ’fit’ the character of our 
Lord? Is the blasting of the fig tree ’congenial’ with 
the personality of Jesus? This whole conception recalls 
Lewis' test of appropriateness; "Each miracle writes for 
us in small letters something that God has already written^ 
or will write, in letters almost too large to be noticed, 
across the whole canvass of Mature, . . . Their authenticity 
is attested by their style."
^Lewis, M, 13.
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Secondly, if to the question 'On such and such 
an occasion did a miracle 'M' occur?' we are to receive an 
affirmative answer, we must presuppose a meta-logical map 
where God has his rightful place; we must presuppose a 
fundamental Weltanschauung ihWudh God is a meaningful term. 
"Ultimately the defense of miracle is the metaphysical 
defense of a personally active God. They stand or fall 
together" (Mir, 23)* "In saying of an event that it is a 
'miracle ' we are in part commending a map which includes 
metaphysical words, and in particular the phrase 'God's 
second-order (or personal) activity'" (Mir, 22),
Thirdly, if to the question 'On such and such 
an occasion did a miracle 'M* occur?' we are to receive 
an affirmative answer, we must see in the event that the 
word 'God' has been inserted into a language from which a 
'person* word has been deleted. Ramsey gives a number of 
biblical illustrations of this (RL, 145-46), For instance, 
the most characteristically personal activity is probably 
human reproduction; and so the Bible records stories of 
miraculous births, as in Gen# 21.7 (Sarah giving birth to 
Isaac).
We are now in a position to pass to a critical 
evaluation of the lingual argument. The attempt to make 
religious language logically significant is clearly a
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worthy and necessary attempt. And Hamsey has shown that 
many traditional controversies could have been avoided had 
the disputants recognized different levels of language 
logic: and, in particular, had theologians recognized
that biblical and doctrinal languages have appropriately 
odd logical structures* For this reason, Hamsey*s dis­
cussion of the Besurreotion is most illuminating. So too 
are his criticisms of the 'fact plus interpretation' and 
'existential' theories: he has rightly seen the difficulties
involved in both of these attempts to explicate religious 
language# It is doubtful, however, if his own proffered 
solution is much better. For one thing, he does not seem 
to have a consistent understanding of history. This is 
illustrated in his discussion of the concept of miracle.
In his smlloT earlier work, Hamsey believes that
he has justified "a use for the word 'miracle* which gives
it a distinctive place in historical language" (Mir# 23).
In the sans book, he says that "'miracle' [is] a word of
(metaphysical) history" (Mir. 21), a very significant altera­
tion. And in his later book he declares categorically that 
"the 'facts' of the gospels in particular are never facts 
for 1/siiich # . . history is appropriate currency" (HL, 106), 
yet among these facts are the biblical miracles. His con­
fusion over the place of the concept of miracle in history
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goes back, it seems to me, to a more fundamental problem:
the relevance of a particular V/eltanschauung*
'In replacing the 'fact plus interpretation* and
the 'existential* ways of explicating biblical language,
Hamsey substitutes his own 'significant event' theory,
which theory demands a fundamental Wei tan s chauung. as he
readily admits (RL, 102)* But what is the nature of this
(RL),
We 1 tansohauung? In his later book/ Ramsey only hints at
its nature, saying that 'God* is a key or apex word. It is
(Mir)
in his earlier work/that the exact nature of the We1tanschauung 
comes more sharply into focus. There it is pointed out that 
if 'miracle* is to have meaning, 'God* and 'God's activity* 
must be placed somewhere on the language map. And the 
linguist feels that if 'I* can be placed on the ms.p, so 
too can 'God'* There is "a close logical kinship betv/een 
'I* and 'God*. • » • Take *1*. • . • The same is true 
about 'God'" (RL, 38, italics mine). If 'I* is a signifi­
cant term, then the term 'God* is equally significant : so
runs the lingual argument. This contention is open to 
question* True, we can extend the meaning of 'I* to the 
meaning of 'God', but we do so by analogy only: we must
recognize that the two are not exactly the same logically.
In other words, in going from 'I* to 'God* we are taking 
not on absolutely certain, but at most a highly probable,
3'79 ”
step*^
One would feel much happier about the whole 
lingual approach if a tremendous 'as if were held over it.
The way the term 'God* works can be likened to , • * The 
event of a 'miracle * appears in history ,'a.s if * . . . But 
the interests of a complete3,y logical and inclusive Weltan­
schauung Æ^ bids such an analogical interpretation.: lAnd again, 
canv.e conveniently place God at the top of a logical hier­
archy any more .than house him in suprapolarity?
The .treatment of miracle suffers from the linguist's 
ambiguous understanding of history. In his ea,rlier book. (Mir), 
Hamsey lays down a schema whereby anyone oan recognize a 
miracle ; accept the overall map and details of the land­
scape (like the concept of miracle) will automatically and 
easily follow. And one will be enabled to recognize the 
difference betv/een God's first-order and second-order activity. 
This particular conception - a dressed-up version of primary
imà secondary causation - has already been unfavourably 
Pcriticized. Moreover, the determination of a miracle by , 
means of inserting the term 'God* where a person-v/ord has 
been deleted is a procedure which anyone can understand and 
effect, once the index or key to the whole logical structure
.^ Of. above, 79. ^Of. above, 40f#
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has been accepted and mastered* In all these ways,
'miracle* is a concept which any* spectator can recognize, 
handle and manipulate* Yet there is a second and contra­
dictory strain in Ramsey's thought in regard to this con­
cept* He points out that the Bible, by its logically odd 
structure, seeks to arouse in its readers the religious 
situation; characterized by discernment and commitment*
One may hope that the 'light will dawn' or that the 'situ­
ation come alive' when one reads the Bible, yet no one can 
guarantee that this will in fact take place* Therefore, 
on the one hand, a miracle is an event which demands for 
its description the word 'God' (Mir, 22); on the other hand, 
miracle can only come as an 'insight* of what is spatio- 
temporal and more ; and the insight is in some sense a gift.
The theological implications of the lingual view 
are much the same as those of the rational view* The 
linguist's structure, like the rationalist's, finds a 
place for God. But what is wrong with that? Just this: 
that it is impossible to house God in a space however commo­
dious, or to place him in an exalted position on a language 
map, no matter how extensive that map ma,y be. In both the 
rational and lingual views, God is compressed within a , . 
metaphysical structure or systems and in this regard both 
positions are akin to traditional supranaturalism (whether
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that he construed in contra-, prêter-, or supernatural
terms)* "Theologians often behave as if their natural
al3,ies in philosophy were to be found among the meta-
physiG.iàns. « , . ho thing could, be further from the truth.
Metaphysics might almost be described as a sustained attempt
to replace conversion by argument *
And now, having cut the final anchor tying us
purports; to
to metaphysics, we venture to expound a position which/have 
this as one of its merits - the merit of being free from a 
metaphysical system# The chapter is entitled "The Existential 
View" •
'MacIntyre, op. cit., 210.
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Chapter IX* The ExistentialiVicwl'iT'/' ,
"Earth's crammed with heaven 
And every common huah aflame with God;
But only he who sees takes off his shoes}
The rest stand round and pluck hlaokherries *"
GV I «5 Bultmann, H* Glatxhen und Verstehen* 
II
E*B# Browning
BSndc II 
II.
I
II
Tillich, p
(ET ea English Translation). 
Systematic Theology. Vols. I,
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To the existentialist,^ a miracle is an event in 
which the activity of God in Christ becomes evident to the 
faithful participant. Because the two representatives of 
this existential^ view have such diverse terminologies, their 
views on this subject are presented separately; first of 
all, Bultmann's view of the concept of miracle and then, 
secondly, Tillich's view of the same subject* This is 
followed by a comparison, where the respective analyses are 
critically evaluated.
A. Bultmann's View of Miracle.
In his essay on the subject of miracle (GV I ,  214-28), 
Bultmann makes a distinction between the German words Miradcel 
and Wunder. While he is able to find a qualified place in 
his theology for Wunder (usually translated by the word 
miracle), the ..team Mirakel (also translated by the word 
miracle) is utterly rejected. This being the case, there 
is first of all a discussion of Bultmann's rejection of the 
concept of Mirakel» Secondly, there is an analysis of 
objectionable elements in the Wunder concept. Thirdly, there 
is a presentation of Bultmann's positive approach to the 
concept of Wunder or miracle*
What does Bultmann mean by the term Mirakel? The
For the meaning of this and similar words throughout 
this chapter of* above, 268.
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briefest description of Mirakel would run something like 
this, A Mirakel is a surprising and marvellous event which 
has no apparent causes this being so, one assumes that God 
is the cause, A Mirakel is, first of all, "an event, which 
encounters us on the ground of nature or history, and has as 
its essential characteristic, that it makes the impression 
on the spectator of unusualness; that for human comprehension 
it falls outside the frame of the usual course of things in 
nature and history, and thereby becomes a problem for human 
reflection,*^ So, secondly, a Mirakel is that which "cannot 
be explained by the empirical laws of the prevailing world 
system, and therefore in this inexplicability contains the 
moment, which is suitable to bring the directness of divine
p
working to men's consciousness," A Mirakel is an extra-
"I
Jelke, Die Y/under Jesu, 13, "ein Ereignis, das uns 
ebenso auif dem Boden der latur wie der Geschiehte 
begegnet, und das sein eigentliches Kennzeichen 
darin hat, da£ es auf den Beobachter den Bindruck 
des AuBergewohnlichen macht, daB es fîlr die iriensch- 
liche Auf fas sung aus dem Hahmen des gewohnten 
Verlaufes der Dinge in Natur und Geschiehte heraus- 
fSllt und daher dem mens chi ichen Hachdenlcen zum 
Problem wird."P
Ibid,, 19* "[daB es] aus den erfalirung'smâBigen
’"™™™Gesetzen des bisherigen Weltlaufs nicht erklSrt 
werden kann und also in dieeer ünerklârbarkeit 
das Moment enthâlt, das geeignet ist, den Menschen 
die TJnmittelbarkeit des gottliohen Wirkens zum 
BevmBtsein zu bringen,"
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ordinary event, the causation of which is attributed to
God because there is no other apparent cause* As such,
any one - any observer or spectator - oan agree with this
abfe
Mirakel concept? Mirakel "is an established event" fein 
kdnstatierbarea Erei^nisl (GV I, 220) * Such 'establiahià^^ 
events' make no essential difference to the observer* **Por 
we ourselves remain the same, whether we affirm or deny 
them."^ "We can say about belief in the miracles of the 
Hew TeataBient what Paul said concerning the eating of flesh 
offered to idols# 'We are no worse off if we do not believe, 
and no better off if we do' (I Cor# 8*8)*"^  But why must we 
drop the Mirakel concept? Bultmann gives three reasons* 
First of all, to find God in a Mirakel would be 
incompatible with the uniformity of causation# By this, 
Bultmann does not mean that science, in and by itself - 
its stressing of the interconnection of events - has made 
the Mirakel concept impossible. Hor does Bultmann mean that
1Herrmann, Offenbarung und Wunder* 7* "Bonn wir 
selbst^'TIeiSen'^ieæ wir ihnen
zustimmen oder sie ablehnen."
^Bultmann, Maybug^er Pre.dlgten. 140. "Jedenfalls
dttrfen wir mit llhnlichen Worten, wie der Apostel 
Paulus ttber das Essen des GBtzenopferfleisches 
sagt, auoh vom Glauben an die Wundergeschichten 
des Heuen Testaments sagen? 'Glauben wir sie, 
so werden wir darum nicht besser sein, glauben 
wir Bie nicht, so vmrden wir darum nicht weniger 
Bein' (I Kor# 8.8)."
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causal uniformity is based on empirical generalization.
Rather the uniformity of causation is pre-soientific and
ontological because it "is given with our existence in the
world [1st mit unserem Daaein in der Welt g0gebenV*(GV I, 215) #
Lotze expressed the same. idea* "The annulling of a law
of Nature, if it were to take place for a moment, would . * •
set in confuBion all the rest of the vmrld, whose orderly
1and regular continued existence we presupposedAnd the
uniformity of causation is pre-scientific, as Raven points
out* "The process of experiment, of the observation and
testing of its results# and the subsequent repetition and
checking and defining, is as Old as human nature. No one
can have discovered the use of a wheel or the structure of
an arch, the growing of corn or the baking of a cake, except
by an identical.sequence of actions# It is nothing but
what we call common sense; and every child uses it when he
builds a house of cards or discovers that,wood floats on
0
water and iron sinks * " And science has but sharpened this 
pre-scientific and ontological notion of the lawfulness in 
natural events* "The notion of regularity, of the regular 
connection of nature, is not in the first ,plaoe a notion
^Lotzè, Miorooosmus.' I, 451*
p ■
Haven, Qhristianitv and Science* 20
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of modern soienoe, but on the contrary - since it belongs 
to existence itself - it is a quite primitive notion, which 
has only been developed and radically thought out in science" 
(GV I, 215).^ This does not mean, of course, that we
completely understand all aspects of the regular connection 
of nature# True, science is working on these parts of 
nature, so that the unknown may be made known, so that the 
world may come more completely under man's control# But, 
as Bultmann readily recognizes, this process will never be 
completely carried out* lew riddles shall always confront 
us in the world of nature# And in our human life we must 
always be prepared for the unexpected and the unusual* But 
we cannot call the unusual and the inexplicable the mira­
culous (as the preternaturalists do)2 this is not faith in
p
genuine miracle*
But there ie a second reason why it is impossible 
to find God in a Mirakel* A Mirakel - in the sense of an 
event which suspends or aete aside the natural order of 
things - is always ambiguous * The question can always be
n
"her Gedanlce der Geeetzmâiigkeit, des gesetzmâBigen 
^usmmmnhangs der latur, 1st nicht etwa erst ein 
gedanke moderner Wissensohaft, sondern er 1st, da 
or zum Basein selbst gehUrt, ein gang primitiver 
Gedanke, der in der WisCensohaft nur auegebildet 
und radikal gedaoht ist."
^Gf. Bultmann, Marburger Bredigten* 138*
^  3 8 8  -
raised - Is it good or bad? Does it proceed from God or 
from Satan?. Supranatural power "may proceed as much from 
the devil as from God, a fact which the later church found
•p
very embai;#ssing, and we are no more 'impressed* by the 
record of alleged wonders « • * than were the Pharisees who 
declared that Jesus 'cast out devils by Beelzebub*
Bultmann believes that certain biblical events can only be 
termed Mirakeln* But this la due to the unconscious assump­
tions of the biblical writers: they had not clearly seen
the consequences of this faulty Mirakel conception* Yet 
"the authority of the text has not been abandoned, v;hen the 
Mirakel notion has been abandoned*! (GV I, 217)*^ For this
reason - that a Mirakel oan be traced to Batan as well as 
to God - Mirakel enshrines an unworthy conception of the 
activity of God,
The third reason for rejecting the Mirakel concept 
is the most fundamental. Basically, Bultmann believes that 
it is a sin for man to look for a Mirakel in the orderly 
course of nature* He begins by considering the specific 
case of the Jews* Why did the Jews seek for signs? Because
W l I'MMIW WW WII'
^Rynd, "Bishop Gore on Miracles", 123-24,
""[daB] aber die AutoritSt der Sohrift nicht preis* 
gegeben wird, wenn der Mirake1gedanke preis- 
gegeben wird."
«=* 3 8 9
their approach to Gro d  was a radically sinful one* Q?he Jews 
sought to justify themselves in the face of God by their 
achievements* "They understand themselves from what they 
achieve, and understand the other from* what he achieves*
And as they prove themselves before God by their achievements, 
so must God prove himself before them by his achievement"
(GY I, 221)* But this is just the basic sin of mankinds
man attempts to justify himself, to found his security upon 
his past deeds and achievements* This is self**centred 
righteousness, the most deadly sin of all* And when a man 
justifies himself on the basis of his past acts, he is prone 
to look at God and God*s work in exactly the same sinful 
light* Because the one attitude is wrong, so also is the 
other* To look for a Miralcel in nature is as sinful as to 
congratulate oneself on one*a goodness* But how can man 
properly regard his works, his own self, and so be in a 
proper position to regard the activity of God?
Bultmama draws a distinction between the two ways 
of looking at what man does* Man*s doings can either be 
viewed as work (v/erk) or achievement (iGietum^) or else as
Bie verstehen sich aus dem, was eie leisten, und 
verstehen den Anderen aus dem, was er leistet. 
Wie Bio sich duroh Ihre Beistung vor Gott aus- 
weisen wollen, so muB Gott sich vor ihnon duroh 
seine Belstung ausweisen*”
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action (Tun or Tat)♦ In the first case man * s doing is 
thought of as external to himself - he could well have 
left it undone - and still remained essentially as he was*
In the second place, man’s doing is thought of as integral 
to himself; his actions make him wha/fc he is* Man is not 
being, he is becoming* Existence precedes essence, A 
man’s actions make him what he is* And Bultmann would seem 
to say the same about God: therefore he is unwilling to
ascribe to God causation of an event which could have proceeded 
equally as well from the devil, But to place oui? trust in 
past achievements is a sinful procedure* In so doing, 
we view the world as our world, we see ourselves as oree^ tors, 
we refuse to recognise the finitude of our lives# Yet in 
all this way of existing, we are uneasy, we realise that it 
is in some sense a wrong view, and consequently our lives 
are characterised by fear* But a Mirakel is of no help to 
US in this tragic situation*
But if it is sinful to look for God in a Mirakel* 
may we speak of God’s activity in a Wunder? We may, but 
even here misunderstandings may develop* The concept of 
Wunder itself must be clarified: and in three ways.
First of all, when the Mirakel^  concept is dropped, 
funder adherents may say ’But, you see, God is found in 
every event, each happening is a Wunder’ * This ma,y be
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called a philosophical defence of the concept of Wunder.
%
But if this is the case, why retain the term Wunder at 
all? "If every happening is miraculous, then in truth 
none is, and God and the world are placed on an equal 
footing* God, creation and Wimder are then only edifying 
names for circumstances which meet me in my factual exis­
tence quite otherwise, namely as the scientifically fathomable, 
infinite connection of all happenings: as nature and
natural event" (GV I, 218)*^ Bultmann is anxious to avoid
this meaning of Wunder: he wishes to dissociate Wunder
2from pantheism.
Secondly, when the Mirakel concept is dropped, 
Wunder adherents may say ’But if God is omnipotent, there 
can be no conceivable objection to the occurrence of a 
Wunder’* This may be called a dogmatic defence of the 
concept of Wunder * But the fact is, replies Bultmann, that 
there is nothing in the realm of nature or the world, in 
Mirakel or in Wunder* to tell us in and by itself that God
"Wenn allés Geschehen wunderbarrist, so 1st es in 
Wahrheit koines mehr, und Gott und Welt sind 
gleiohgesetst* Gott, SohGpfung und Wunder sind 
dann nur nooh erbauliche Kamen für Sachverhalte, 
die mir in meinen faktischen Leben gang anders 
begegnen, nâmlioh als dor wlssenschaftlich erforsoh- 
bare, unendliche Zusammenhang allés Geschehens, 
als latur und Baturereignis."
^Of* also above, 33^f.
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is omnipotent. "The omnipotenoe which man rightly ascribes 
to God does not confront man in the v/orld at all in such a 
way that he can recognise it and submit himself to it* . * # 
Nothing within the world is omnipotent, not even the world 
as a whole" (GV II, 86; ET 9B-9)* The Christian knows 
indeed that God is omnipotent : but he recognizes that he
does not have this as a scientific hypothesis on the ba^ sis 
of which other phenomena may be explained. The insight 
into God’s omnipotence comes only in the moment, and must 
be won over and over again. In order to understand that 
God is omnipotent, two things must be kept in mind. First 
of all, man must despair of seeing God the omnipotent in 
nature. "Man, thinking he sees in nature God’s omnipotence, 
to which he can freely surrender himself, has not as yet 
seen the real power of nature at all, nor recognized its 
uncanny nature, and its ambiguity: for in his inner being
he is constantly exposed to this power, so that at the 
deepest level he is powerless. Hot until he has become a 
stranger to himself, and begins to take fright at himself, 
does he become aware of the real power of nature, yet also 
in doing so, of the impossibility of seeing God in nature. 
Ho is looking rather for an omnipotence which will free him 
from himself" (CT II, 89; ET 101-02). And how can man have 
such a sense of God’s omnipotence granted to him? Only in
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and through Jesus Christ: and this is the second thing man
must understand if he would know that God is omnipotent.
"God has made his grace appear through Jesus Christ. • . •
In this revelation Jesus Christ is really God made manifest; 
for in it God is, in fact, manifest as the Omnipotent, Holy 
and Eternal One - by virtue of this fact, of course, that 
the grace which he bestows in Christ is nothing other than 
the forgiveness of sin. The real reason for natural man’s 
inability to see in God the Omnipotent, Holy Eternal One is, 
in fact, that man, cannot free himself from himself. Only 
in the Word of divine grace is God’s omnipotence taken 
seriously. In this Word man’s finitude is seen with all 
its logical implications as his enslavement to himself.
The Word of forgiving grace breaks through this boundary and 
does liberate man from himself; and in this it exercises a 
power which nothing else in the world possesses, apart from 
divine omnipotence" (GV II, 95--6; ET 109)*
Thirdly, when the Mirakel concept is dropped, 
Wunder adherents may say ’But if you agree that God is the 
Creator, there can be no conceivable objection to the occur­
rence of a miracle*. For "the creation of the world [is]
1the miracle of all miracles." This is another dogmatic
^Frank, Philosophical Endorstanding and Religious Truth. 5S
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defence of the concept of Wunder; Again, according to 
Bultmann, there is nothing in nature or in the world to 
tell us that God created the universe; "The creation notion 
helps here not at all; because it also simply suspends the 
notion of an orderly nature; In this, the world happening 
is miderstood as one in infinite time and space" (GV I, 218); 
Once again, the creation notion is not a scientific hypothesis 
on the basis of which all phenomena can be explained. For ■
"the creation notion . . ; as a faith notion differs from a 
scientific notion, not that man approaches it in a curious, 
irrational manner, that is, through its origin (so far as 
origin is understood as a cause and a fact of the past), 
but on the contrary in this way, that it cannot become 
possessed and employed as a scientific notion" (GV I, 218).^ 
Like the omnipotence of God^ the creative activity of God
"Per SchSpfungsgedanke hilft dabei gar nichts; denn 
" ' a%h"'er'"Eebt' 'den Gedanken der gesetzmSBigen Hatur 
einfach auf. In diesem n&ilich 1st das Welt- 
gOBchehen als ein in Eaum> und ^eit unendliches 
verstanden."
BDer Scht5pfungsgedanke . • « untersoheidet sich von 
einem wissensohafÏ1 ichen Gedanken als Glauben- 
gedanke nicht etwa dadurch, daJ3 man auf cine 
merkwürdige, unrationale Weise zu ihm kommt, 
also durch seinen Ursprung (sofern Ursprung als 
causa verstanden und also zu einem Faktum der 
Vergangenheit wird), sondern dadurch, daB er 
nicht wie ein wissenschaftlicher Gedanke besessen 
und angewendet warden kann."
*“ 395 “
can only be perceived in the moment and must be continually 
rewon. "I can only speak about God’s creative act, if I 
recognize myself now as a creature of God" (CT I, 218).
And only in Jesus Ohrist can we see the creative activity of
We have seen that Bultmann has utterly rejected 
the concept of Mirakel. and has stated some objections which 
often accrue to the concept of V/under. But what else can be 
said about Wunder? What is Bultmann’s positive approach to 
the concept of miracle?
First of all, a miracle "signifies God’s act as 
distinguished from a world happening" (GY I, 2 1 ? ) But 
wh^t does he mean by v/orld hs^ ppening? Vifhat does he mean 
by world? Bultmann does not moan the world of nature, as 
opposed to a supranatural realm. By world, Bultmann means 
an understanding of the world. "Here world signifies not 
pilààrily hature, as the regular connection of all happenings,
3
but the reality in which I live, my world" (GV I, 219)*
"Ioh kann von Gottes SchSpfertat nur reden, wenn ich 
mi oh jetzt ale GeschSpf Got tee v/eiB."
P
"[daB] er Got tee Tun im Unterschied von Wei tge schehen 
bedeutet
"'"Hier bedeutet Welt nicht primSr die Natur, als 
gesetzmâBigen Zusammenhang allés Geschehens, 
sondern die Wirklichkeit, in der ich lobe, 
meine Welt."
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Instead of seeing the world as God’s creation, I usually 
look upon it as my world, a world whichiobserve and can — 
to some extent at least - control. I look upon the world 
as past and decided, the sphere of my achievements and 
accomplishments, the world upon which I base my security 
and in which I place my trust# "In the everyday arrange­
ment of my work, in the disposition of my time, etc. I 
regard the v/orld as standing at my disposal. The world and 
my deed in it is from the outset godless" (GV I, 218-19)
The attitude of the spectator or observer is in some 
respects useful and even necessary, but as a godless atti­
tude it is not an ultimate view and it is not the attitude 
one can take up towards God. Man can understand himself on 
the basis of his past activity (sin) or upon his present act 
(grace and obedience). And "miracle directs the critical 
question at man, how far he understands the world aright, 
if he understands it as the available work-world for him­
self; how far he understands himself aright, if he under­
stands himself by what he does, and if he will guarantee 
himself by what he does. The concept of miracle radically 
abolishes the character of the world as the available work-
"In der Allt^glichkeit meiner Arbeit, in der Disposi­
tion meiner Zeit usw# sehe ich die Welt an als mir 
zur Verfügung stehend. Die V/elt und mein Tun in 
ihr ist von vornherein gottlos."
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world, since it abolishes man’s understanding of himself as 
guaranteed by what he does" (CT I, 222)
Secondly, faith in God and faith in miracle sig­
nify the same thing* Because this is so, it is impossible 
to say that because God is omnipotent, therefore miracles 
happen: it is impossible to say that because God is Creator,
therefore miracles happen* For though we may well have the 
conceptB of omnipotence and creation, we do not know God 
the omnipotent nor God the creator apart from miracle*
" I  can well have the notion of God’s omnipotence, that is 
to say I  can represent God to myself as an omnipotent being 
(the godless man can also do this); but I  do not thereby yet 
have God, the Omnipotent, whom I  nowhere and never have save in 
miracle" (OT X, 219)*^ Again, since faith in God and faith 
in miracle signify the same thing, every kind of theistio
* "[Aber] das Wunder riohtet an den Menschen die kritisohe 
frage, wie wait er die Welt riohtig versteht, wenn 
er sic als die ihm verfügbare Arbeitswelt versteht; 
wie welt er sich selbst riohtig versteht, wenn er 
sich aua aeinem Work versteht und duroh sein Work 
sichern will* her Wundergedanke hebt den Gharakter 
der Welt als der verfügbaren Arbeitswelt deshalb 
radikal auf, well er daa YerstEndnis des Menschen 
seiner selbst als duroh sein Werk gosichert auf- 
hebt*"9
"her Gedanken von Gott as Allmaoht kann ich wohl haben, 
dTETT^oHTcann mir Gott ale ein allmâohtiges We sen 
vorstellen (das kann much der Gottlose); aber 
damit habe ich Gott* den AllmSohtigfn, no eh nicht, 
den ich nie und nirgends habe als im Wunder,"
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WeitanBohauungç (on the basis of which miracle could be 
explained) is ruled out, "Such a view of the world is 
no Weltanschauung, that is to say, no theory concerning the 
world in general" (GY I, 225)*^ Once again, because faith
in God and faith in miracle signify the same- thing, "Miracle 
as miracle is hidden, hidden for him, who does not see God 
in it" (GY I, 220),^ It is impossible to separate God and
miracle, for then one establishes miracle in the world, and 
God cannot be established in the world, A miracle is not 
a miracle unless one sees in and through it the activity 
of God, So the event which to one man is a miracle is to 
the other an event solidly entrenched within the causal 
nexus, "For the eye of unbelief the act of God is a past 
v/orld event" (GV I, 225)*'^  "A miracle - i,e, an act of God - 
is not visible or ascertainable like worldly events. The 
only way to preserve the unworldly, transcendent character of 
the divine activity, is to regard it not as an interference 
in worldly happenings, but something accomplished in them in 
such a way that the closed web of history is left undisturbed
^"Soloher Bliok in die Welt let keine Weltanschauung, 
d,h, keine Theorie fiber die" Welt in allgemeinen,"
^"Das Wunder ist als Wunder verborTOn, verborgen für 
den, der nicht in ihm Gott sieht,"
^"Für das Auge des ITnglaubens let auch Gottes Tun ein 
ge s cheHene s ' Wei t ©re ’**“
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To every other eye than the eye of faith the action, of God
is hidden. Only the ’natural* happening is generally visible
and ascertainable. In it is accomplished the hidden act of
God. , • , When I am encountered by such an event, I can
in faith accept it as the gift of God or as his judgement,
€ilthough I can also see it within its context in nature or
history. In faith I can understand a thought or resolve as
something which is the work of God without necessarily
removing it from its place in the chain of cause and 
*)
effect,"*’ Thus, in the ’natural’ happening, God is hidden,
< Therefore faith in miracle can only be expressed in the form
of a paradox: "it understands an ascertainable event in
its context in nature and history as the act of God, Faith
2cannot dispense with its ’nevertheless’ A miracle is 
an event "through which we become aware that in spite of 
everything, in spite of all the mystery of the world and 
destiny, in spit© of the torment of self-judgement, God has 
acted graciously," In the natural happening, God is hidden. 
This does not mean that God is hidden in general; it means
B^ar-bsoh (ed.)» KM, 197. 199.
^Bultmann, Marburger Predigten, 144# "durch das
wir dessen Inne werden, daB uns trots alledem, 
trotz aller EStsel von Welt und ÏÏcEicksal, 
trotg aller Quai der Selbstverurteilung Gott 
gnS&Tg geschaffen hat,"
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that for me God is not apprehended in the world event $
"God’s Qone©aiment aignifies not his invisibility in general,
it signifies not primarily that he is inaocessible to the
senses or to experiment, but on the contrary that he is
hidden from me" (GV I, 221),^
Thirdly, miracle signifies God’s revelation in
God’s act of forgiveness* As v/e have seen, man tends to
look upon himself as creator# As Barth says: "Man can
regard himself and treat himself as the measure of all
things, just as if he were Creator or free or Lord like Him
to whom he owes his being* He can therefore think that
ha dare not abs^ ndon himself but must serve and worship
himself, and that he can therefore put his hope of salvation
in himself, V/ithout denying God, man can consider himself
as having power over God* And not only can man do this
2but he actually does it." Buoh a man bases his security 
on hie past achievements* He is irresistibly and irretrievably 
tied to the past* And when man prides himself on his own 
righteousness and goodness, he engages in the most deadly 
form of sin* Man can only recognize that all his achieve-
1"Gottes Verborgenheit bedeutet nicht seine Unsicht- 
barkext xm allgemeinen; sie bedeutet nicht priraâr, 
daB er den Sinnen, dem Experiment unzugllnglioh 
ist, sondern daB er mir verborgen ist,"
^Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* 17*
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ments are in vains he oan only despair of his own accomp­
lishments* A miracle is a revelation, an act of forgiveness, 
in that man is forgiven his past, (delivered from fear, 
freed for the future, for obedience, and for love* "There 
is only one miracle* therefore, that of revelation* But 
this means forgiveness, revelation of the grace of God for 
the godless* But it is to be understood strictly aa an 
event * not as an idea of forgiveness, a notion of the grace 
of God as belonging to God’s being, but as God’s act" (GV I, 
221). Or again, "God frees us from ourselves, as we are, 
that is to say, he frees us from our past and points us to
p
the future" (GV I, 223). Only when we are free from our
past, oan we be free to act in obedience and in love. But 
how can we ever be free from our past? "There is only one 
possibility to become free from the past for a clear 
hearing of the claim which comes to us in the present: 
that freedom be given to us through fortsciveness* For we 
cannot as temporal beings truly escape from our past so
1"Bs gibt aber also nur ©in Wunder % das dor Offenbarung. 
Das aber bedeutet: Offenbarung der Gnade Gottes'
für den Gottlosen, Verbegung. Aber strong ver­
standen als Ereignis. nicht als eine Idee von 
Vergebung, eihe G©5a^ von der Gnade Gottes als 
sum Wesen Gottes^'gehorïg, sondern als Gottes Tat."
"Denn er reiBt uns von uns selbst loo, so wie wir
sind, d.h. er reiBt uns los von unserer Vergangen­
heit und weist uns in die Zukunft."
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that it is simply erased and ignored, so that we might 
receive such a thing as a new nature, in which we in any 
case would not maintain ourselves* We come always into 
our present out of our past and with our past* # * * But 
the question is, is our past in us at the present time as 
a sinful or as a forgiven past? If sin is for us forgiven, 
this signifies that we have freedom for the future, that 
we really hear God’s claim, and that we can place ourselves 
at his disposal (Rom, 6 , 1 2 f f 224).^
fourthly, we cannot speak about miracle as an 
act of God without speaking about ourselves at the same time* 
"To speak about miracle is to speak of my own existence; to 
say, in fact, that God has become apparent in my own life; 
and therefore to speak not of a general manifestation of
1
"Es gibt nur eine iSglichkeit, yon der Vergangenheit 
frei zu werden m  ©in^reinen lWreh"'%s' Ahsprudhs, 
der im Jetzt an uns vergeht : daB uns freiheit 
geschenkt wird duroh Vergebung* Denn so. künnen 
wir als zeitliche Weseir^IS ihr loskommen,
daB die Vergangenheit einfach durchgestrichon 
und ignoriert wird, daB wir so etwas wie eine 
neue latur erhielten, in der wir uns ja auch 
gar nicht würden halten kSnnen* Wir komraen 
immer in unser Jetzt aus unserer Vergangenheit 
und mit unserer Vergangenheit* * * . Aber die 
frage ist, ob unsere Vergangenheit in uns gegen- 
wârtlg ist als sttndige oder als vergebene* 1st 
uns die Sttnda vergeben, so bedeutet das, daJB 
wir freiheit haben fttr die Zukunft, daB wir 
Gottes Anepruoh wirklioh hSren und une ihm 
zur Verfügung stellen kdnnen (R8m* 6*12ff*)."
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God, but of his revelation" (GY I, 2 2 1 ) Or, "the action
of God $s?npt to be conceived as a worldly phenomenon capalble
of being apprehended apart from its existentiell reference,
it can only be spoken of by speaking simultaneously of
concerned
uQTseXf as the person who is / in an 'existentiell way.. To
speak of the act of God means to speak at the same time of
9
my existence*" The Christian will be continuàlly tempted 
to see this present act of God as a past accomplishment, 
something on which he may safely rely# Against this 
temptation, Bultmann believes that the experience of for­
giveness as an act of God must be won over and over again: 
by the renunciation of any claim upon our past and throwing 
ourselves wholly upon the mercy of God. "Each miracle is 
only evident on the ground of a miracle of forgiveness*
But this is not a fact of the past, on the contrary I have 
it as forgiveness always only as newly accepted" (GV I, 226).^ 
And because this is so, "the Christian really has the
1"Tom Wunder heiBt, von der eigenen Existons reden, 
d.h. davon, da.i in meinen Leben Gott siohtbar 
geworden 1st, also reden nicht von einer all­
gemeinen Sichtbarkeit Gottes, sondern von seiner 
Offenbarung*" translation
Bartsch (ed*), KM, 196* Fuller’s/is here slightly altered,
^"Jedes Wunder [ist] ja immer nur siehtbar auf Grund 
des einen Wunders der Vergebung* Meee aber ist 
nicht ein Faktum der Vergangenheit, sondern ich 
habe sie als Vergebung immer mutr als h&u) e r g r i f f "
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possibility to see even new miracles* The world happening, 
v/hiqh must appea-r to the unbelieving eye as the orderly 
lapse, of events, takes on for him the character of a 
world in which God acts" (GV I, 226)
Fifthly, but most fundamentally, miracle signifies 
God’s acts that is, God’s act in Jesus Christ. The real 
miracle for man is this present meeting with God in Christ, 
freeing man from the past and consequently imparting to him 
new possibilities for his existence* God’s act of forgive­
ness, of grace, is revealed only in Christ* "God has revealed 
himself in the cross of Christ as the God of forgiving grace, 
Christ is the Word of forgiving grace* * • • The meaning of 
the Christian doctrine of justification of the sinner is 
quite simply this ; that the sinner is justified; that God 
takes a man who is not as he is for the man that he is meant 
to be, and the man who really is such because God takes him 
to be so. It is in this wav that the forgiving grace of 
God frees man from himself, his past, and what he has made 
of himself, And it is in this way that it makes him a
1
"Steht es aber so, dann hat der Christ v/irklich 
die MCgliohkeit, immer neue Wunder zu sehen* 
Dies Weltgeschehen,' Was Auge
als gesetzmÜBiger Ablauf von Ereignissen 
erscheinen muB, gewinnt für ihn den Gharakter 
einer Welt, in der Gott handelt."
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’new creature*" (GV II, I4I1 IT 160)* Because man is b o  
freed from his past by Ohrist, Jesus Ohrist is the escha,to- 
logical event * "According to the Hew Testament, Jesus Ohrist 
is the esQhatological event* the action of God by which God 
has set an end to the old world. * . * The old world has 
reached its end for the believer, he is ’a new creature in 
Christ * * For the old world has reached its end with the 
fact that he himself as ’the old man’ has reached its end 
and is now ’a new man’, a free man#"^ The possibility of 
becoming a new man, a new creature, comes to the individual 
through grace or forgiveness# "Only those who are loved 
are capable of loving# Only those who have received con­
fidence as a gift oan show confidence to others* Only those 
who Imow what self-commitment is by experience can a,dopt
that attitude themselves* We are free to give ourselves to
2God because he has given up himself for us*" We are given 
the possibility of becoming new creatures in the "faith that 
the unseen, intangible reality actually confronts uo as 
love, opening up our future and signifying not âèath but 
life*"^ But "the demand for faith is the demand that the 
world surrender the understanding it has had of itself
3Bultmann, History and Esohatologv* 151. 
^Bartsoh (ed,), KM, 32-3» 19
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hitherto - that it let the whole structure of its security 
which it has erected in presumptuous independence of the 
Creator fall to ruins. • # , Faith is turning away from the 
world, the act of de se oulari zat ion, the surrender of all 
seeming security and every pretense, the willingness to live 
by the strength of the invisible and uncontrollable* It 
means accepting completely different standards as to what is 
to be called death and what life* * * * Faith, then, is 
the overcoming of the ’offense’ - the offense that life meets
Y- r i ' f r r r -  T n # ^' iinnnnimTM'rrinTr'im' - in r f irr'Tm 'ri-rrrfr- ' T l'rfflfr""r--Tr-rT‘"~nn""fr“'rTir— r -  'Ti" '"i' ' "
man only in the word addressed to him by a mere man - Jesus
of Hazareth* It is >the offense rsdsed by a man who claims,
without being able to make it credible to the world, that
God is encountering the world in him* It is the offense of
1’the word became flesh*#" The only real miracle - the 
present encounter with God in Ohrist - makes man a new 
creature* As Gregor Smith says: "This is the kind of
conversion which lifts the subject out of himself, out of 
his fears and sins, into a forgiven life# Thenceforth he is 
open to the world and to others, he is at peace# He is no 
longer confident in himself, boasting in the flesh; but 
his confidence is in the eternal Thou, recurrent in each 
personal situation of responsibility * This is the meeting
^Bultmann, TheolOCT of the New Testament. II, 75-»6.
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of man with God which takes place, in faithful response, in
1human history
There are two corollaries flowing from this funda­
mental oonviotion that the only miracle is the meeting with 
God in Ohrist in the present First, there is -little or no 
point in speaking about ao-oalled pagan miracles: the
important element Is the fact that man is encountered by God 
in Christ here and now* "It is therefore * * , false to state 
a distinction between Christian and pagan miracle notions*
Both oan be thought of primitively and both oan be thought 
of radically; both oan cling to Mirakel* and in both can the 
notion of God’s act be clearly developed* The difference 
between Christianity and %)ag#nism lies not in the diverse 
miracle notions, any more than in the diverse God notions 
generally; but only herein - that Christianity speaks about 
the real God, because it oan speak about the real miracle 
[that is, forgiveness in Christ]" (GV I* 226)*^ Beoondly,
S^Biith, The lew Man* 90*—————————————
"Eb ist also fais oh,, abgesehen hiervon einen Unterechied 
zwisohen dem ohriatlichen und dem^  heidnisohen Wunder- 
gedanken. zu koiisWileren l&e'lc%nnen'''3^
radikal gedaoht sein; beide kSnnen 
am Mirakel haft on, und in beiden kann der Gedanlce 
des Tuns Gottes rein entwickelt BOin# her Unter— 
sohied von Ohristentum und Heidentum liegt nicht im 
verschiedenen Wundergedanken, so wenig wie im ver- 
echiedenen Gottesgedanken fîberhaupt, sondern nur 
darin, daB daa Ohristentum vom wirklichen Gott redot, 
weil es vom wirklichen Wunder reden kann*"
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■because the only miracle is the present encounter with God
in Ohrist, Bultmann has a very restricted use for the
miracles of the Hew Testament# On the one hand, he dismisses
them outright, and for two reasons * First, the miracles of
Jesus are termed Mirakeln* and are consequently of no value
events
to faith, This terming of certain Hew Testament/ as Mirakeln 
connects with the attitude we have already noted in Bultmann’s 
thought: namely, he seems to thinlc that if certain events
he admitted as factually true, God must he admitted as 
cause * ‘ But there is a second reason why the Hew Testament 
miracles are of no concern to faiths they are happenings of 
the past, "As the work of a man of the past they [the miracles 
of Jesus ] have nothing to do with us immediately # So seen, 
they are no works of Ohrist, in so far as we understand 
under the work of Christ the work of salvation" (GV I, 227,
p
italics mine)# And because these events are past, "it is 
necessary to emphasize with all sharpness, that simply no 
advantages accrue to the Christian faith, to prove the 
possibility or the reality of the miracles of Jesus as
^Gf# above, Zl6*p
"[daB] sie als Werke eines Menschen der Vergan­
genheit uns unmittelbar nichts angehen# So 
ge sehen, sind sie keine Werke Chris ti, sofern 
wir unter dem Werk Ohristi das Werk der Erl8sung 
verstehen » "
— 409 "
event© of the past, that on the contrary, this 1© only a 
eonfuBion" (GV I, 227)»^ Herrmann state© the oame conviction*
"Our faith oan only recognize miracle when in an event within 
our own experience we recognize the impact upon our life 
of a power not ouroelve©# Hence comes our attitude to the 
hihllcal miracle©; He who ask© himself whether he find© in 
the Scripture© unquestionable fact© which he experiences 
aa God’s working upon him will scarcely be able to give an 
affirmative answer. From this it follows that for every 
Ohristian the importance of these miraculous event© of 
tradition must be entirely overshadowed by that which in 
his own life impreseee him a© a miracle of God* The word 
of God which we apprehend a© addressed to ub personally must 
be more important to us than anything else* He who refuses
P ,
to admit this refuse© obedience to God," But on the other 
hand, Bultmann is prepared to find a limited place for the 
Hew Testament event© which ho usually terms Mjrakeln» If 
they have nothing to do with the faith directly or immediately, 
perhaps they have something to do with it indirectly or
3"Bb ist mit aller GchSrfe zu betonen, daB sohleoh- 
terdingB kein InteresBO für den christliohen 
Glaube be steht , die MSglielikeit oder Wirklioh- 
keit der Wunder Jesu als Ereignisso der Ver­
gangenheit nachzuweisen, daB im Gegonteil die© 
nur eine Verirrung würe*"
PHerrmann, Systematic Theology, 85*
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mediately* "If Ohrist booomes present to ns as the preaohed
Ohrist, then the miraoles of Jesus can only come in question
as Miey belong to the proclamation of Ohrist, that is, as
testimony" ( ^  1, 227) But now, in this statement, the
Mirakeln have become die Wunder Jesu* And as such "they
make clear the whole ambiguity of the Christian proclamation" 
p(GY I, 227)*^ Like Jesus himself, the mira,oles can be
nor the miraoles
considered as past events, and as such neither/can be the 
means of showing God’s grace or forgiveness, God’s present 
act* "For Jesus Christ is for the unbeliever an attestable 
fact of the past, in a particular place in the past, his­
torically circumscribed and historically tinderstandable"
(GV I, 227*^ 28) But for the believer this past event ie 
the most present reality* "The unique event of past history 
[the cross of Ohrist] is an over-present reality*""^ ' To put 
the matter in Jfeicquarrie*s terms, the ’objective-historical’
"I
'"Wird Ghristus uns sur Gegenwart als der gepredigte 
Christus, so kSnnen die Wunder Jesu nur in 
Frage komraen, sofern sie zur Predigt von Ghristus 
gehSren, also als Zeugnisse*"
p
"Und zwar insofern, als sie die ganz Zw© id eu ti^keit 
der christliohen Predigt verdeutliohen*"
"^ "Denn Jesus Christus ist für den Unglaubén;...i ein
konstatierbares Faktum der Vergangenheit, an einer 
bestimmten Stelle der Vergange.nheit historisch 
einztigliedern und historisch verstândlich*"
B^artscli (ed,). M, 110.
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has become the ’existentiell-Mstorioal* • The miracles are 
open to the same analysis and interpretation. They are past 
events * Even to some contemporaries of Jesus, they were past 
events - historically circumscribed and historically under­
standable s that is to say, some of these contemporaries saw 
I
these events as issuing from Satan# And they are past events 
to us now: if we look upon them as unusual, but historically 
circumscribed and historically determined happenings of the 
past. Yet these ’objective-historical’ events are also 
capable of becoming ’existentiell-historical’ actions: as
the word of grace and forgiveness spoken by God now. But the 
ability to see these events as miracles demands the renunci­
ation of the self, cessation of all self-glorying: throwing
oneself in isolation, in trust, in obedience upon the grace 
of God# "The doubter, who claims to have at his disposal a cri­
terion by which he can prove whether God exists or not, will 
never see miracles; miracles can only by the doubter
who despairs of his own ability and strength to see God if God 
does not reveal Himself, but who is ready to let God speak to 
him’. • • • God is distant, wholly other in so far as everyday
occurrences hide Him from the unbeliever, fiod is near for
Ïthe believer who sees his activity,"
1 Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, 178,
- 412 -
B,. Tlllioh’ B View of Miracle *
Tillich’© views on miracle may he grouped around 
six statements# A miracle is an event which 1) is astonishing, 
unusual, shaking; 2) does not contradict the rational struc­
ture of reality; 3) points to the mystery of being; 4) ex­
presses the relation of the mystery of being to us in a 
definite way; 5) is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic 
experience; 6) is given only to those who receive it in 
faith# Of course, these six statements are not exclusive 
or independent, but rather complementary and interdependent#
At the same time, these definitions do serve as appropriate 
schema around which to summarize Tillich’s views on this 
subject#
A miracle is an event which is astonishing, unusual, 
and shaking# The occurrence of a miracle is that ’which 
produces astonishment’ - the original meaning of the word 
miracle# A miracle is unusual in the sense that for the 
participant the normal subject-objeot relationship is 
transcended# "In many miracle stories there is a descrip­
tion of the ’numinous’ dread which grasps those who are 
participators in the miraculous event# There is the feeling 
that the solid ground of ordinary reality has been taken 
’out from under’ their feet" (ST I, 129). In a miracle, a 
constellation of events occur in such a way as to shake the
- 413 ™
observer or participant# A miracle is shaking in the sense 
that it is significant in an ultimate way# A miracle is 
astonishing in the sense that, like all revelatory experiences, 
it is the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately# 
Knowledge about history or nature, about individuals, about 
hidden things and happenings cannot be described as mira­
culous, because such things are not matters of ultimate 
concern# And although a miracle is astonishing, unusual and 
shaking, it does not contradict the rational structure of 
reality*
A miracle is an event which does not contradict
the ^ rational structure of reality# Tillich declares that
a
"miraoles cannot be interpreted in terms o:g/ supranatural 
interference in natural processes. If such an interpretation 
were true, the manifestation of the ground of being would 
destroy the structure of being; God would be split within 
himself, as religious dualism has asserted# It would be more 
adequate to call such a miracle ’demonic’, not because it 
was produced by ’demons’, but because it discloses a 
’structure of destruction’" I* 129)# And similarly,
"the term ’ecstatic’ in the phrase ’ecstatic idea of God’ 
points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary 
experience without removing it" II, 8). The relation 
of revelation to reason is expressed in the same way:
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revelation tranecends, goes beyond reason; but it does not
thereby negate orsfu^ press reason# Tillich believes that
the rational structure of reality is manifestly broken by
some Hew Testament miracles - he mentions the stories of
the empty tomb, the Virgin birth, and the bodily ascension
(8% II, 145)# "Rationalistic periods make the negation of
natural laws themin point in miracle stories# # . # The
more impossible, the more revelatoryI Already in the Hew
Testament one can observe that, the later the tradition, the
more the antinatural element is emphasized over against the
sign element" (ST I, 128). But another factor is at work
TEEis namely,
besides that of/antinatural attitudle': / popular piety#
And popular piety is wrong in "wanting a God, walking on
earth, participating in history, but not involved in the
conflicts of existence and the ambiguities of life# Popular
piety does not want a paradox, but a ’miracle’" (§2 II, 166).
A miracle is an event which does not contradict 
the rational structure of reality* Yet anything within 
that structure of reality, by pointing beyond itself to 
the ground of being, can convey revelation. This is so 
because "within itself, the finite world points beyond 
itself. In other words, it is self-transcendent" (ST II, 8). 
"There is no reality, thing, or event which cannot become 
a bearer of the mystery of being and enter into a revelatory
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correlation" I, 131)# A stone or a person, by entering 
into a revelatory constellation, may become miraculous#
But there is a great difference between the stone and the 
person with respect to the significance and truth of the 
revelations mediated through them. Whereas the atone 
represents a rather limited number of qualities which are 
able to point to the ground of being, the person represents 
the central qualities which can point to the mystery of 
existence I, 131)# But the natural world cannot be 
eradicated from a miraculous constellation theoretically or 
practically# "Contemplâtihg the mystery of the divine 
ground, considering the infinity of the divine life, in­
tuiting the marvel of divine creativity, adoring the in­
exhaustible meaning of the divine self-manifestation^-aall 
these experiences are related to God" (ST I, 320)# Persons
or objects can enter into a revelatory constellation, can
sense
become .the bearers of revelation î in this/transcending) but 
not violating or negating,the rational structure of reality 
Such miracles point to the mystery of being#
A miracle is an event which points to the mystery 
of being# In Tillich’s terminology, God is called the 
ground of being, Christ the Few Being# In a miracle, the- 
ground^ of being):%6esWt beeomfe a matter of knowledges that 
which is essentially mysterious remains so* In a miracle.
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we know nothing more about the ground of being, nor about 
the world of subjeot**objeot relationships• "Whatever is 
essentially mysterious cannot lose its mySeriousness even 
When it is revealed# Otherwise something which only seemed 
to be mysterious would be revealed, and not that which is 
essentially mysterious# But is it not a contradiction in 
terms to speak of the revelation of something which remains 
a mystery in its very revelation? It is just this seeming 
paradox which is asserted by religion and theology# Wherever 
the two propositions are maintained, that God has revealed 
himself and that God is an infinite pystery for those to 
whom he has revealed himself, the paradox is stated implicitly 
But this is not a real paradox, for revelation includes 
cognitive elements# . # . Something more is known of the 
mystery after it has become manifest in revelation# # # #
But revelation does not dissolve the mystery into Imowledge" 
(8T I, 121)#
Further clarification of the term ’mystery’ is 
necessary# Mystery should not be applied to something which 
is known (i#e# ceases to be a mystery) after it has been 
shown or revelaed# IVhat is not known now but may well be 
known in the future cannot be called a mystery# The genuine 
mystery appears when reason transcends itself, when it is 
driven beyond itself# When the question is asked ’Why
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something and not nothing?* reason is peering beyond her 
own borders with sightless eyes# When finitude is recognized 
with a shock, reason is driven beyond itself, and seeks to 
know the unknowable* This negative aspect of mystery must 
always be present; it is a necessary element in revelation# 
"Without the *I am undom* of Isaiah in his vocational vision, 
God cannot be experienced (Is# 6.5)# Without the * dark 
night of the soul*, the mystic cannot experience the mystery 
of the ground" (§2 I# 122)*
But the negative side of mystery - best illustrated 
by the experience of finitude and non-being - is taken up 
in the revelation of mystery without losing its negative 
characteristics. "Hence the mystery appears as ground and 
not as abyss* It appears as the power of being, conquering 
non-being* It appears as our ultimate concern" (§^ I, 122).
A miracle is shaking and astonishing in the sense that the 
participant recognizes his own finitude, the possibility of 
non-being, the abyss of nothingness* These elements are 
taken up in the actual miracle where ground conquers abyss, 
being non-being, infinity finitude*
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation 
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way. In a 
miracle, man is grasped by his ultimate concern* An objec­
tive miracle is a contradiction in terms# "Christianity
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was born, not with the birth of the man who is called 
’Jesus*, but in the moment in which one of his followers was 
driven to say to him, ’Thou art the Ohrist’* And Christianity 
will live as long as there are people who repeat this asser­
tion. For the event on which Christianity is based has 
two sidess the fact which is called ’Jesus of Nazareth’ 
and the reception of this fact by those who received him 
as the Christ" (ST II, 112)# "Jesus as the Ohrist is both 
an historical fact and a subject of believing reception.
One cajmot speak about the event on which Christianity is 
based without asserting both sides" (ST II, 113). Because 
a miracle is an event which expresses the relation of being 
to us in a definite way, there is no such thing as revelation 
in general. There is no such thing as natural theology or 
natural religion. "Revelation grasps an individual or a 
group, usually a group through an individuals it has 
revealing power only in this connection* Revelations 
received outside the concrete situation can be apprehended 
only as reports about revelations which other groups assert 
that they have received" (ST I, 123)* In a miracle, somdhing 
must happen (the factual side), and something must be 
received (the receptive side). "Revelation is always a 
subjective and an objective event in strict interdependence * 
Someone is grasped by thé manifestation of the mystery;
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that is the subjective side of the event. Something ocours 
through which the mystery of revelation grasps someone; this 
is the objective side. These two sides cannot be separated. 
If nothing happens objectively, nothing is revealed. If 
no one receives what happens objectively, the event fails 
to reveal anything. . « # The mystery appears objectively 
in terms of what has been called ’miracle’" (8T I, 123-24)# 
The objective side has but a logical priority# Thus "the 
objective reality of the New Being precedes the subject 
participating in it” (8% II, 204)#
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation 
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way. The term 
’miracle* belongs to revelation, and in some senses the two 
words are interchangeable. Tillich makes a distinction 
between original and dependent revelations and so between 
original and dependent miracle. "An original revelation is 
a revelation which occurs in a constellation that did not 
exist before. This miracle and this ecstasy are joined 
for the first time. Both sides are original" (§2 I, 140). 
Dependent revelation differs from this. The original event 
in its occurrence and reception is now the objective side 
of a dependent miracle. But the miracle does not become 
such until it has been receiveds this is the subjective 
Bide of a dependent miracle. When we peruse the account of
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a biblical miracle, the original constellation and its 
reception is object to us; only when it becomes subject in 
us - when we receive it in ecstasy - can the v;ord miracle 
be properly employed# "Bvery revelation occurs in a corre­
lation of ecstasy and miracle" (ST I* 152)# The ’correlation* 
concept is fundamental in this, as in all areas, of Tillich’s 
theology# "The method of correlation explains the contents 
of the Ohristian faith through existentiell questions and 
theological answers in mutual interdependence” (§2 I, 68). 
There is a correlation between past events and present 
miracles# "There are many healing stories in the gospels, 
a stumbling-block for echolars and preachers and teachers, 
because they take them as miracle stories of the past
instead of taking them as healing stories of the present.
1For this they are.” Again, "the word ’resurrection* has 
for many people the connotation of dead bodies leaving 
their graves or other fanciful images.. But • . . resurrection
p
happens now, or it does not happen at all." The original 
constellation and its reception must be received anew in 
ecstasy. "A dependent revelatory situation exists in every 
moment in which the divine Spirit grasps, shakes, and moves 
the human spirit. Every prayer and medikition, if it fulfils
The Hew Being. 57. ^Ibld.. 24
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its meaning, namely to reunite the creature with its creative 
ground, is revelatory in this sense. The marks of revelation - 
mystery, miracle and ecstasy - are present in every true 
prayer. Speaking to God and receiving an answer is an 
ecstatic and miraculous experience; it transcends all 
ordinary structures of subjective and objective reason.
It is the presence of the mystery of being and an actualiza­
tion of our ultimate concern" (ST I, 141)*
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way. Miracle
the
occurs to a man in a concrete situation. But what is /concrete, 
existentiell situation of modern man? "It is not an exag­
geration to say that to-day man experiences his present 
situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, 
meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life. . . .
The question arising out of this experience is not, as in 
the Reformation, the question of a merciful God and the 
forgiveness of sins; nor is it, as in the early Greek church, 
the question of finitude, of death and error; nor is it the 
question of the personal religious life or of the Ohristian- 
ization of culture and society. It is the question of a 
reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is 
overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creati­
vity, meaning and hope" (BT I, 55). So revelation and
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miracle can toelreceivcd èhlÿ' in the depths of a personal 
life, in its struggles and decisions, in self-surrender*
Of course, "the depth of the personal life will not itself 
produce revelation or miracle"(ST II, 14). But no con­
stellation of events is a miracle for me unless I receive 
it under the conditions of estrangement and finitude.
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation 
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way. Yet this 
does not mean that a miracle is received by a man, simply 
for that man himself. If a man receives a miracle, "he 
receives it for his group, and implicitly for all groups, 
for mankind as a whole" (ST I, 141)# This original miracle 
(constellation of events and reception) can be received by 
individuals and by groups "who enter into the correlation 
of revelation in a dependent way" (8T I, 142). Only as an 
individual receives the revelation or the miracle in this 
dependent way, is the original revelation of any meaning 
for him. "The knowledge of revelation can be received only 
in the situation of revelation, and it can be communicated - 
in contrast to ordinary knowledge - only to those who 
participate in this situation" (ST I, 143).
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation 
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way. In such a 
miracle, being conquers non-being, infinity finitude, divine
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power existentiell destruction# All miracles must be so 
interpreted. "It is understandable that, as early as the 
New Testament, a rationalization takes place which expressed 
itself in the desire to emphasize the antinatural element 
in the stories instead of their power to point to the 
presence of the divine power overcoming existentiell des­
truction" (BT II, 186). Thus a miracle is a healing events 
reuniting the existentiell destructivenesB of the partici­
pant with the ground of being, in a measure at least#
"Healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a 
centre to that which is split, overcoming the split between 
God and man, man and his world, man and himself" (STl II# 192). 
In brief, "salvation is healing." One of the elements of 
a miracle is its healing power, though this is probably most 
evident in the healing miracles themselves. "In all the 
miracles performed by Jesus, some of the evils of existentiell 
self-destruction are conquered. They are not finally conquered, 
for the people to whom miracles happened were again subject 
to sickness and death and to the vicissitudes of nature.
But what happened to them was a representative anticipation 
of the victory of the New Being over existent self-destruction. 
Miracles are performed by Jesus because he fully
^Tillich, The lew Being. 37
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participates in the misery of the human situation and tries 
to overcome it wherever the occasion offers itself. In a 
special way the healing stories show the superiority of the 
lew Being in him over mental possession and its bodily con­
sequences. . ♦ • God’s presence and power should not be 
sought in the eupranatural interference in the ordinary course 
of events but in the power of the New Being to overcome the ■ 
self-rdèàtructive consequences of existentiell estrangement 
in and through created structures of reality” (BT. II#
A miracle is an event which expresses the relation 
of the mystery of being to us in a definite way* The cruci­
fixion and the resurrection are meaningless as reports about 
revelatory experiences: they must be received in the way of
dependent revelation. But how are we to explain the resur­
rection? Does it not seem to contradict the rational struc­
ture of reality? Tillich faces these problems with charac­
teristic courage. The cross of Ohrist and the resurrection 
of Christ are both fact and symbol, and the two events are 
interdependentÎ they cannot be separated without losing 
their meaning. And "if Gross and Resurrection are inter­
dependent, they must be both reality and symbol. In both 
oases something happened within existence" (BT II, 177)*
But between the two events there is a great difference, for 
"while the stories of the Cross probably point to an event
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that took place in the full light of historical observation, 
the stories of the Resurrection spread a deep veil over the 
event" (§2.11» 177) # Well, can the symbol of the iteeurrection 
be retained without any kind of objective reality? lot so* 
"The character of this event remains in darkness, even in 
the poetic rationalization of the Easter story. But one 
thing is obvious. In the days in which the certainty of 
his Resurrection grasped the small, dispersed and despairing 
group of his followers, the church was born, and, since the 
Ohrist is not the Ohrist without the church, he has become 
the Ohrist. The certainty that he who is the bringer of the 
new aeon cannot finally have succumbed to the powers of the 
old aeon made the experience of the Resurrection the decisive 
test of the Ohrist-oharacter of Jesus of Nazareth. A real 
experience made it possible for the disciples to apply the 
known symbol of Resurrection to Jesus, thus acknowledging 
him definitely as the Christ" (BT II, 178). And again,
"the factual element is a necessary implication of the symbol 
of the Resurrection,. as it is of the symbol of the Cross"
(ST II, 179).
But what in this case constitutes the ’factual 
element’? What was the objective constellation awaiting 
the reception of the first disciples? Tillich rejects 
several theories which try to make the objective constellation
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plausible* These reepectiTe theories he terms the physical,
the spiritual, and the psyohologioal theories of the resur-
of the
reotion* Tillich introduces his own hypothesis. / resurrection:
and claims no greater status for it #ian just that* He
calls it the restitution theory, claiming I Oor* 15 as his
scriptural corroboration*
In order to describe it [the Resurrection], we must 
look at the negativity which is overcome in it. Certainly 
it is not the death of an individual man, no matter 
how important* Therefore, the revival of an individual 
man or his reappearance as a spirit cannot be the event 
of the Hesurreotion. The negativity which is overcome 
in the Resurrection is that of the disappearance of 
him who was the lew Being. It la the overcoming of 
his disappearance from^  present experience and his con­
sequent transition into the past except for the limits 
of memory* And, since the conquest of such traneitori- 
ness is essential for the Mew Being, Jesus, it appeared, 
could not have been its bearer# At the same time, the 
power of his being had Impressed itself indelibly upon 
the diaolples as the power of the Mew Being* In this 
tension something unique happened* In an ecstatic 
experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth 
became indissolubly united with the reality of the 
Mew Being* He is present wherever the lew Being is 
present. Death was not able to push him into the past.
But hie presence does not have the character of a 
revived (and transmuted) body, nor does it have the 
character of the appearance of an individual soul; 
it has the character of a spiritual presence* He 
"is the Spirit" and we "know him now" only because he 
is the Spirit. In this way the concrete individual 
life of the man Jesus of lazareth is raised above 
transitoriness into the eternal presence of God as 
Spirit. This event happened first to some of his 
followers who had fled to Galilee in the hours of his 
execution; then to all those who in every period experience 
hie living presence here and now* This is the event 
(# II, 180-81).
’In an ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of
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Nazareth became indiaaolubly united with the reality of 
the Hew 33eimg’ *
A miraole is an event which is received as a 
eign-event in an ecstatic experience# The word ’event’ 
refera to the objective oonatell8,tion which is one necessary 
aide of every miracle * The term’sign’ has already been 
adequately discussed in relation to the third point? a 
miracle is an event which points ta the mystery of being#
The part which demands particular attention is the term 
’ecstatic experience* or ’ecstasy’# What does Tillich 
mean by these phrases?
In the experience of ecstasy, mind is transcended, 
but not violated# "’Ecstasy’ (’standing outside one’s 
self’) points to a state of mind whioh is extraordinary 
in the Sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situation. 
Ecstasy la not a negation of reason, it is the state of mind 
in whioh reason is beyond itself, that is, beyond its 
subject-objeot structure" I, 124) # Ecstasy is not 
enthusiasm, a kind of pulling one’s self up by the bootstraps, 
it is not subjective in that sense# Bather "ecstasy occurs 
only if the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the 
, ground of being and mystery" (Bf. I, 124) # There is no 
revel€ition, no miracle, without the experience of ecstasy# 
Eoatasy indeed involve© psychological factors, but is not
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oirottraeoribed by these factors# "Bostaey is the form in 
which that which oonoerns ua ultimately manifests itself 
within the whole of our psychological conditions” (BT I, 125-2^ 
In the state of ecstasy - in revelation or in miracle - 
the ground of being grasps the receiving participant#
Emotions and thought are transcended in this experience? 
reason is transcended in this experience# And this means 
that faith is an essential element in the experience of 
revelation or miracle #
A miracle is an event which is given only to those 
who receive it in faith# "This is emphasized in the synoptic 
records of the miracles of Jesus* Miracles are given only 
to those for whom they are sign-evants, to those who receive 
them in faith" (BT I, 130) * For "faith is not a human
üHrtiwiP#' I
act, although it happens in man# faith la the work of the 
divine Spirit" (ST^  XI, 205)* And because faith la an 
indispensable dement in miracle, miracle - being a revelatory 
experience - will make an existentiell difference to the 
participant# "The certitude of faith is ’existentiell’, 
meaning that the whole existence of man is involved#" The 
experience of miracle, like the experience of faith, affects 
the total man*
^Tillich, The Dynamics of faith# 34#
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A miracle la an event which ia given only to 
those who receive it in faith* Are such sign-eventa 
reserved only for those under the ijt%fluence of the Hew 
Being? Are miracles the exclusive property of Ohriatians 
only? Tillich would answer negatively to both of these 
questions* Miraole can occur outside of Ohriatianity, 
just as revelation can occur outside of Ohristianity*
"There la a history of revelation, the centre of which 
is the event Jesus the Ohrist; but the centre is not 
without a line which leads to it (preparatory revelation) 
and a line which leads from it (receiving revelation)" 
(£21,11» 192)* We must not deny the reality of preparatory 
revelation* "To assert that a revelation is final reve­
lation vfithout pointing to a history of revelation in which 
there has been a preparation for it dehumanizes man and 
demonizes God" (BT, X, 155)# But all preparatory revelations» 
and all preparatory miracles» are judged and fulfilled in 
the final revelation and the final miracle? the Hew Being 
in Jesus the Ohrist# "The final revelation» like every 
revelation» occurs in a correlation of ecstasy and miracle * 
The revelatory event is Jesus as the Ohrist* He is the 
miracle of the final revelation» and his reception is the 
ecstasy of the final revelation* * * * The final revelation, 
the revelation im Jesus as the Ohrist, is universally valid,
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because it ino3.udee the criterion of every revelation 
and is the finie or teloo (intrinsic aim) of all of them#
The final revelation la the criterion of ©very revelation 
whioh precedes or foilowe * It is the criterion of every 
religion and every culture, not only of the culture and 
religion in and through which it has appeared* It is valid 
for the social existenc© of every human group and for the 
personal existence of every individual. It is valid for 
manlcind as such, and in an indescribable way, it has 
meaning for the universe also. Nothing less than this 
should be asserted by Ohristian theology" (Bf I, 152).
for all of these reasons, Tillich is convinced 
that %  genuine miracle is . . . an ©vent which is unusual, 
astonishing, shaking, without contradicting the rational 
structure of reality* . . .  It is an event which points 
to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us 
in a definite way. . . .  It is an occurrence which is 
received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience* * * . 
Miracles are given only to those * • who receive them 
in faith" (ST I, 130).
Bo far in this chapter we have presented Bultmann’i 
views on miracle and Tillich’s views on miracle * We now 
pass to a comparison where Bultmann's and Tillich’s analyse© 
are critically evaluated*
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0. OompariBon and Oritloism.
In spite of a great difference in terminology,'; , 
Tillich and Bultmann are in essential agreement with regard 
to the concept of miraole# 33ut even on wider issues, there 
is a large measure of accord.
Tillich, for instance, declares that God does 
not have or possess existence* "The being of God is being- 
itself* The being of God cannot be understood as the exis­
tence of a being alongside others or above others# If God 
is a being, he is subject to kthe categories of finitude, 
especially as to space and substance; • • # When apphed to 
God, superlatives become diminutives. They place him on 
the level of other beings while elevating him above all of 
them. Many theologians who have used the term ’highest being* 
ought to have known better# # « « The question of the exis­
tence of God can helncitlier asked nor ansv/ered* If asked, 
it is a question about that whioh by its very nature is 
above existence, and therefore the answer - v/hether negative 
or affirmative - implicitly denies the nature of God. It is 
as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny 
it, God is being-itself, not a being" (ST I, 261, 263)#
And Bultmann declares that God is not an object among other 
objectB. "If a man believes that to speak ’of God’ means 
to speak’concerning God’# such a way of speaking has no
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meaning, for the moment in whioh it happens, it ha© lost 
its object, God# For whenever the notion of ’God’ is thought, 
this purports to mean the Omnipotent, that is to say, the 
All-determining reality. But this notion is not thought of 
at all, if I speak concerning God, that is to say, when I 
see God as an object of thoughts concerning which I can 
orient myself, when I take up a standpoint, from which I 
stand neutral concerning the question of God, raise considera­
tions about God’s reality and nature, whioh X can reject, 
or, if they are enlightening, can accept" (CT I, 26).
Again, Bultmann believes that Ohristianity is not a Welt­
anschauung» on the basis of which the Christian can explain 
all phenomena. And Tillich is convinced that Ohristianity 
is not a ’religion’? stressing, like Bultmann, the elements 
of danger and risk in faith. In short, both theologians
"Versteht man unter ’von Gott’ redeh*über Gott’ reden#
BO hat solchea Eeden ttberhaupt keinen..... .denn
in dem Moment, wo es geschieht, hat ea aeinem 
Gegenstand, Gott, verloren* Bonn wo ttberhaupt 
der Gedanke ’Gott’ gedaoht ist, besagt or, daB 
Gott der Ailmttchtige, d.h# die Allés beatimmonde 
Wirkliohkeit soi. Pieser Gedanke 1st aber 
ttberhaupt nicht gedaoht, wenn ich ttber Gott 
redo, d.h. wonn ich Gott ale ein oEJeEt dee 
Pehkens ansehe, ttber das ich mioh orientierten 
kann, wenn ich einon Gtandpunkt einnehme, von 
dem aus ich neutral zur Gottesfrage stehe, ttber 
Gottes Wirkliohkeit und eein Wesen Erwttgungen 
anstelle, die ich ablehnen odor, wenn sie ein— 
leuohtend sind, akzeptloren kann."
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utterly reject the eupranaturalism of traditional theology. 
Tillioh writes, and Bultmann would surely agree? "The main 
argument against it [ eupranàturaliam] is that ItiranefomB 
the infinity of God into a finitone©a whioh is only an 
extension of the categories of finitude * This is done in 
respect to Bpaco by eetahliohing a eupranatural divine 
world alongside the natural human world; in respect to 
timeeby determining a beginning and an end of God’e oreati- 
vity; in respect to cauealit^ »' by making God a cause alongside 
other causes;' in respect to substance by attributing individual 
substance to him# Against this kind of ©upr ana tural ism the 
arguments of naturalism are valid, and, as such, represent 
the true concern of religion, the infinity of the infinite, 
and the inviolability of the created structures of the 
finite" (§£ II, 6-7)* Finally both theologians are apolo- 
getea? anxious to present the gospel in terms meaningful 
to modern man, while doing full justice to the inherent 
acandalon of the Christian faith* "Both men [Bultmann and 
Tillich], in their separate ways, are continuing the mediating, 
reconciling approach in theology, though Bultmann does not 
broaden his apologetic to include as many areas as Tillich 
surveys# Both theologians are speaking to the challenges 
offered Christianity by science and philosophy. Tillich’s 
theology is more receptive to philosophy than Bultmann’ a
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and, oonaeq.dontly, he extend© hie reeonciling task to
Ï
cover many diaciplmnee, though the primary purpose of
clarifying the Ghrietian message remains central in his
1philosophical theology»"
On the specific subject of the concept of miraole, 
the two theologians are in agreement on many fundamental 
issues? though there are some areas in whioh disagreement 
is quit© pronounced*
first of all, when Bultmann declares that a 
miraole is an event in opposition to a world happening, 
Tillich expresses the same idea by saying that in the 
experience of a miracle the normal Bubject-objeot rela­
tionship is transcended, and by saying that a miraole is a 
sign-event received in an ecstatic experience. Bultmann*© 
discussion of the ’world happening* or the normal ’subject— 
object relationship’ is fuller and more satisfactory than 
that of Tillich. Tillich adds that such an event is shaking, 
unusual, astonishing? though he interprets these tefmb"'" 
quite carefully. Bultmann’© analysis lacks such descriptive 
adjectives altogether, yet he would agree that a miracle 
is astonishing, unusual and shaking in the sense that an 
act of God which frees man from his past and frees him for
1
‘ McClendon, The Development of the Ooncepts ’ICvth* and
^  ■' “  -■■■    f ..................... T-~ " “ — .— i' i t ‘ r n ri~ iTrT^TlTr^^ — n'm  n lllj iiftii rTiin~iiidnTrnii'rmtfi~n—r ifn ii iihht
«Hiatorÿ^lrom Hekel to Wtmann. 760.
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the future, is an aet of grace and forgiveness ; and in this
sense a miracle is unusual, "The need for forgiveness of sins
has been felt by multitudes in circumstances which outwardly at
least have been far less dramatic than those of the helpless
paralytic who lay at Jesus* feet# These events in which the
majority of Ohristians have believed themselves to have been
touched by the hand of God have only been ordinary in the
sense that there w^e no question of any violation of natural
law. Otherwise, for the believer himself, the occurrence
1is most extraordinary*"
Secondly, both theologians reject an ’objective’ 
miracle# Bultmann’s distinction between Mirakel and Wunder 
is helpful in that it clarifies the nature of an ’objective’ 
miracle* Here again, his analysis is longer and more fruit*^  
ful than Tillich’s, who nevertheless is in full agreement? 
an ’objective’ miracle is a contradiction in terms# In 
both authors there is a tendency to dismiss altogether 
Bome New Testament events traditionally called miracles? 
either because they are Mirakeln (demanding as their cause 
the activity of God, or of Satan), or because they contra­
dict the rational structure of reality* But as we have
1Dew, "Natural and Supernatural in the Miracles", 37» 
As terms are used in this thesis, Dew’s article 
actually refers to ’Natural and Supranatural in 
the Miracles’# In this regard, of, above, 3.
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eeen, no event, however unusual, needs to be attributed 
necessarily to the causality of God.^ And who is to say 
what event does, and what event does not, contradict the 
rational structure of reality? Tillich himself says?
"The historical method [does not] approach the miraole 
stories * , . with the assumption that they have not happened 
because" such events would contradict the laws of natureV 
(8T II, 119)# Foz' the phrase ’the laws of nature’ we could 
well substitute ’the rational structure of reality’. But 
it seems that Tillich has approached some miracle stories 
with just this assumption? the assumption that certain 
miracle stories have not happened because they contradict 
the rational structure of reality# Therefore, in both 
theologians, there is an unfortunate hang-over of the 
pseudo-scientific philosophy which falsely tends to say
p
that certain events are ’inconceivable’ or ’impossible’.
Thirdly, both see in miraole an act of salvation 
or an act of forgiveness# Bultmann says that man is freed 
from himself, from his past, so that he so that he ie 
open for the future and for love; he is made a ’new creature*. 
And furthermore, the experience of miracle is not the
^Of. above, 66ff,} lift.
^Cf. above, 61£f.; 244f.J 275ff.
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exclusive right of the recipient alone. "His [the Christian’©]
act is, if it springs out of the experienced love of God,
itself an act of love, and so the Ohristian has the power
to testify and to make distinct to other men the love of
God. A man, whose being and actions are carried on a
cheerful love, is for other men a miracle# And in such a
sense are we all called not only to see God’s miracle, but
1
also to work miracles on our own part."* Tillich believes 
that in a, miracle a healing process takes place, demonic 
structures are negativized, man is reunited with the creative 
ground of being: in short, he receives ’new life’. Moreover,
man never receives a miracle for himself alone - it is for 
his group, and implicitly for all groups, for mankind as 
a whole. To put this matter in terms common to neither, 
but acceptable to both: in a miracle God’s grace is received
which enables a man to live as he is intended to live - to 
glorify God and to enjoy him forever#
1Bultmann, Marburger Predigten# 147 # "3ein Tun
aber ist, wenn es aus der erfahrenen Iiiebe 
Gottes entspringt, selber ein Tun der Liebe, 
und so hat er die Macht, auch für andere Mensohen 
Gottes Liebe zu bezeugen und vernehmlich zu 
machen# Ein Mens oh, dessen Wesen und Tun von 
heiterer Liebe getragen ist, ist für andere 
Mensohen ein Wunder# Und in solohem Binne 
sind wir alle aufgerufen, nicht nur Gottes 
Wunder zu sohauen, sondern auch an unserm Tell 
Wunder zu wirken."
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Fourthly, both theologians etrees the receptive 
side of the experience of miracle# Tillich believes that 
a miraole expreBses the mystery of being to us in a definite 
way? miraole always happens in a concrete situation, it 
must be received inwaz'dly to be a genuine miracle* Bultmann 
is convinced that we cannot apeak of a true miracle without 
speaking simultaneously of ourselves* Tillich strongly 
emphasizes that the activity of God can be received in any 
constellation of events# Bultmann seems to give priority 
to preaching and the encounter between person and person 
as the most likely media for the activity of God and so for 
the occurrence of miracle * "1 miraole is every deed * • #
and every event that comes to pass- where Jesus rules*
And where does he rule? Where the #ord of the gospel is 
preached and h e a r d , A n d  "a man learns what God wants of 
him immediately out of his own situation in the encounter
p
with his neighbour," Yet Bultmann is prepared to admit 
other media as well ? the experience of being in a Russian 
prison camp could well be the situation in whioh icohe WO'Wd,
'^Bultmann, Mar burger Bredigten* 94# "Ein Wunder
iat jede Tat , # , und jedesEreignis, das sioh 
da ereignet wo Jesus waltet* Und wo waltet er? 
Wo dae Wort des Evangelluma gepredigt und gehBrt 
wird,"
^Bultmann, Theology of the lew Testament* I, 24*
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experience an act of God - i#e#$ a miracle#^ And, **cer­
tainly there may he moments given in our lives, when we 
believe, when we are aware of God*s creative rule; moments 
in which his miraculous action is strikingly present* 
Perhaps by a view of a beautiful and impressive natural 
scene, in being caught up by a great piece of art, by the 
experience of a highly gifted destiny or in the shock
through an historical event, which we must understand as
Pthe judgement of God *
In the fifth place, there is at least partial 
agreement as to the status of lew Testament miracles* We 
have already noted the ambiguity in Bultmann^s treatment of 
the miracles of Jesus * On the one hand, they are past 
events and they are Mirakeln* and as such they may be 
dismissed without further ado* On the other hand, they are 
die Wunder Jesu* and share the same ambl^ ;uity as Jesus
^Bartsoh KM, 198.
^Bultmaim, mrb%rger . Pr 141-42. "Wohl mag
es uneerm ieben Augenblieke geben, da wir glauben, 
des: BohSpferwaXtens Gottea irme su warden; Augen- 
blick<% in denéxa uns sein Wunder tun eindruokevoll 
gegenwârtlg 1st* Etwa beim Anblick achiner 
und erhabener latur, in der Krgriffenheit durch 
ein groies Kunatwerk, beim Irleben eines begnadeten 
Schlcksala oder in der Irs’chütterung durch 
ein geschichtlloheB Breignia, das wir meinen 
ala Gerioht Gottes veratehen zix mtîssen*"
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himself: to be understood either as events of the past or
as esohatologioal events - that is, acts of God in the here 
and now* This ambiguity in Bultmann's treatment of miracles 
ia at one with his treatment of the Jesus of history* On 
the on© hand, the Jesus of history - an objective-historical 
fact - has little or nothing to do with ua at the present 
time? yet, on the other hand, Ohriat - God*a word - can 
confront us here and now# The objeotive-historioal fact 
has become an oxistentiell-historical event# But both 
theologians agree that as past events the lew Testament 
miracles are meaningless? only if man sees in them now 
the present activity of God are they miracles in the 
genuine sense#
But in another sense, the two theologians are 
in disagreement ae to the status of lew Testament miracles. 
Tillich uses the phrases ’original revelation* and ’dependent 
revelation’, and so ’original’ and ’dependent* miracle.
There seems to be.nothing in.:Bultmann*s theology which 
corresponds exactly with these phrases# Binoe the only 
miracle is the present gift of God in Christ, any talk of 
original and dependent miracle is meaningless# To Tillich, 
the miracle of Christ is in some sense a standard, in the 
light of which all other miracles are to be judged* But 
to Bultmann, man can only recognise the miracle of God in
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Ohriat now - it either happens or it does not - there are 
no gradations in miracle apologetic? the ’standard’ or 
’original’ miracle is received now, there ia no other*
Bor that reason, there ia little agreement as 
to the place of secular or pagan or non-Christian miracles* 
This disagreement goes back to the more fundamental discord 
as to what Tillich calls ’preparatory revelation’» Bultmann 
la indeed prepared to admit that there is a preparation 
for revelation, ’natural man’ has a ’life-relation’ to the 
gospel message, otherwise it would be completely meaningless 
to him*^ "The fact that the Christian proclamation, when it 
encounters a man, is capable of bein^ understood by him, 
shows that he has a pre-understanding of it" (GV I, 295)#^ 
But the role of any such preparatory revelation seems to 
be essentially empjbÿ, if not negative, ’latural man’ can 
only see that he and his past acta are as nothing. He can 
only despair of seeing or knowing God by his ovm efforts# 
"God’s action in the first place brings to nothing the 
man it seeks to make alive" (CT II, 119; ET 135, italics 
mine). Or, "Cod becomes manifest in history only to such as
^Cf* above, 264; 266.
^"Bie Tat sache, dalB die ohrietliche Verkandi^una:.
wonn si© einen lensohen trifft, von ihm verstanden 
v/erden teann. seigt, daB er ein 
von%ErhaW. "
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allow themselves to he broken by him" (CT II, 102; ET 116) * 
Yet ’natural man’ seems unable to grasp this necesaity, he 
imagines not that he la a creature, but rather :beMeves 
himself to be creator# He looks upon the world as hie, 
he places his trust in his own achievements. "God’s action 
conflicts with man, and with man in his religion at that, 
in which he seeks to safeguard himself and to assez’t himself 
over against the world which oppresses him, and to soothe 
his cares and fears. Every self-abasement and self-sacrifice 
which takes place in the name of religion is in reality 
rebellion against God just as for Paul Jewish service of 
the law is simply a means of achieving one’s own glory*
God’s grace ia to man grace in such a thoroughgoing sense 
that it supports the whole of man’s existence, and can only 
be conceived of as grace by those who surrender their whole 
existence and let themselves fall into the unfathomable, 
dl0sy depths without seeking for something to hold on to.
The revelation of God is God’s conflict with man in his 
religion" (f? II, 119-20; ET 135-36). In other words,
"man’s sin is the point of contact for the contradicting 
Word of grace" (GV II, 120; IT 137)# "Hnbelief is dis- 
obedience" (GY I, 304)# Bo preparatory revelation is
1 "Hnglauhe 1st Ungehorsam."
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empty: indeed it is negative and illusory in charaoter,
though this negativity is the point of contact* "The new 
is understood from the old, just when it is its negation"
(GY I, 296). At best, such preparatory revelation can only 
bring a man to his knees, and this does not often happen#
"In the light of the Ohriatian belief everything that is 
specified as God’s revelation is indéed shown to be illusory 
Ohristian belief knows that only God’s grace which forgives 
sin can be designated as the revelation of God* * . * This 
finally is the significance, therefore, of the revelation 
in nature and historys it constantly refers us to the 
revelation of the forgiving grace of God in Christ# But it 
is only in doing this that it is revelation for us; and that 
means that, apart from Christ, it is not a revelation for 
us. But when we do start from Christ, the whole of the 
world in nature and history can receive the illumination of 
revelation" (GY II, 100, 103-04; ET 114, 118).
Tillich has a place for preparatory revelation,
a place which seems to be more fruitful and positive » He 
first,
insistsythat there is what he terms ’universal revelation’* 
By this, he does not mean general revelation. "Hevelation
1 "Auoh dann aber wird das Heuo vom Altein her ver­
st and en, gerade wonn es seine legation iet."
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ooours or it teee not occur; but it certainly does not occur
’generally*. . . * ’Universal’, as diétinguiahed from
’general’ means (or can mean) a special event with an all—
secondly,
embracing claim" (Bf, I, 154)# lor/is universal revelation 
to be confused with natural revelation. "As we have seen, 
there is no natural revelation* Only revelation through 
nature can be aaaerted. And revelation through nature ia 
special and concrete" (8T,I, 154)# Thirdly, universal 
revelation must not be confused with the assumption that 
revelation ia occurring always and everywhere. "Nothing 
like this can be aaid in view of the marks of revelation 
and its existontiell character" I, 154)# But there is 
universal revelation, and its content is positive and 
fruitful* "Only on the wide basis of universal revelation 
could the final revelation occur and be received. Without 
the symbols created by universal revelation the final reve­
lation would not be understandable, Without the religious 
experience created by universal revelation no categories 
and forms would exist to receive the final revelation. The 
biblical teminology is full of words whose meaning and 
connotations would be completely strange to listeners and 
readers if there had been no preceding revelations in Judaism 
©M well as in paganism. Missions could not have reached 
anyone if there had not been a preparation for the Ohristian
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message in universal revelation* The question of the
final revelation would not have been asked| therefore, the
answer could not have been received" I, 154--55)*
Can this disagreement between the two theologians
be overcome? Bultmann’a analysis is very powerful, especially
as he constructs hie argument on Pauline theology, and
on
in particular/the first eight chapters of Homans* Theoretic : 
oally, man G an despair of himself and his world, and open 
himself to God: practically, this has hot been done,
especially in the x*eligion of religions itself, namely, 
Judaism# The good Gentile following his pagan moral values 
and the devout Jew jealous of the law, are both alike under 
condemnation, sin and death# The only release is God’s 
act in Ohriat, for one as for the other* Yet there is 
considerable merit in Tillich’s contention that the Ohristian 
cannot speak of a final revelation or an eschatological 
event at all, unless he is willing to grant the existence 
of a fruitful, if fragmentary, preparatory revelation*
And the Epistle to the Hebrews would seem to bear out this 
contention, "These all died in faith, not having received 
what was promised, but having seen it and greeted it from 
afar# * * *" (leb# 11*13)# "Since the final revelation is 
the criterion of every revelation, the criterion of finality 
must have been envisaged and applied, though fragmentarily,
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and by anticipation" (BT^  I, 158)#
Therefore, I myself conclude that there is no 
revelation apart from God in Ohrists but that this act of 
God in Christ is open to those of faith, though they never 
hear of Jesus of la^areth# That iS' to say, God’s act in 
Christ is open, at least frapientarily and by anticipation, 
to those who despair of themselvea and their works and 
oast themselves utterly on the mercy of God.
There are two matters which demand criticism in 
the existential approach# First, an oft-repeated criticisms 
the existentialists are clearly wrong in rejecting the 
historicity of certain events because such things are said 
to be impossible or inconceivable# Secondly, the relation­
ship between past events and present miracles seems to have 
been dea^t^with in an Inadequate manner# This problem hae 
already/encountered in the chapter devoted to the demytho— 
logical movement. There the question was: How can the
miracles be transferred from the sphere of YorhandeiHxeit to 
the sphere of Das ein? How does the Jesus of history become
the Ohriat of faith? How does the objeotive-hiatorical
1become the existentiell-historical? In this chapter we 
have a similar and allied problems Exactly how do the
^Of. above, 283ff.; 297f
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the Mirakeln Jesu become the Wunder Chrlsti? Why does 
the existentialist not explain explicitly how past events 
become present miracles?
This is one of the questions upon which I seek 
to throw light in the conclusion» And there it will be 
obvious that this existential view is the position t.with 
which I find myself in greatest accord* But before passing 
to that conclusion, we stop to consider the three arguments 
in Part Three in the light of Tillich’s ’point of view’*
A sound theology attempts to be faithful to the 
truth of the eternal message and at the same time to speak 
meaningfully to the temporal situation* Traditional theology, 
or Bupranaturalism, no longer does either* Barth’s exclusive 
concern with the eternal message blunts the impact of his 
theology upon the temporal situation* Form criticism’s 
exclusive concern with the situation seems at times to 
negate and forget the truth of the eternal message* And 
as it is presented in chapter six - that is, in its merely 
negative form - demythologiiaing might be said to be open to 
the same charge* lîp to this gtàgè Tillich’s ’point of vlevf’
has served rather well: we have had relatively little
trouble'.diagnosing the faulty part or parts of each of 
the theological arguments* But now the situation ia different,
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and much more diffioult# And this difficulty is not due 
to any fault in the diagnostic apparatus s rather the fact 
of the matter is that all the contemporary views presented 
in Part Three seem to me to he both sound and healthy#
All threec are sound in that they are re a lly  
theological, really hihlioal, really apologetic. They 
honestly attempt to maintain the uneasy balance between 
message and situation# And any theology which is not con­
cerned with both is not really biblical, is not really 
apologetic, is not really theological# All three views 
are healthy in that they cast interesting insights into the 
eternal message ; and all are aware of, and attempt to 
apea]  ^ meaningfully to, the contemporary situation. A ll 
three are good# But in my opinion the last of the three - 
the existential view - is better than the former two - 
the rational and the lingual views: the existential posi­
tion is better in that it is  more faithful to the truth of 
the eternal message while being equally cognisant of the
contemporary situation*
the
In both/rational. ? i and lingual:VBv% the transcendence
of God is not taken really seriously* As we have already
seen, God and his activity are trapped and enmeshed in a
thlB-worldly setting* And as we have already noted, the
the
philosophies of both/rationaliati and%® would be
*449 ""
greatly enlianoed were a tremendous ’as if’ held over them* 
Yet the Interests of a broad aid Inclusive g eltana ohauung 
thoroughly rule out this possibility* And with the intro­
duction of a world -view there is the implicit danger that 
one can ^ understand* miracle in a this-worldly setting* All 
these faults are avoided in the existential view, which 
is marred only by the exiatentiallet’s narrow views as to 
what is possible or conceivable#
In the conclusion, I put forward my own positive 
views of the concept of miracle#
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" I t  aoQ3 HO'fcj, o f course I iava lifla te  a process of rsasoaing 
that i t  has beea use# by a sceptic, but i t  does raise a 
leg itim ate  doubt whether such reasoning can be of much
service to fa ith » " A#B, Bruce.
" I  would ra th er hear wisdom from Balaeia’ s ass or from a 
philosopher against h is w il l  than from an .angel or an 
àpéstle ," J,G . Hamann.
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"We may conclude that the Christian religion was 
not only at first attended with miracles hut even at this 
day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. 
Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; 
and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of 
a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all 
the principles of his understanding and gives him a deter­
mination to believe what is most contrary to custom and 
1experience." I propose to employ this statement by Hume 
as a suitable framework for stating my own conclusions 
concerning the concept of miracle. It is to be noted that 
in so doing, I am stating my own convictions, and I malce 
no attempt to expound Hume’s own arguments, except inciden­
tally. At the same time, it is my conviction that this con­
clusion contains most insights necessary to any adequate 
understanding of the concept of miracle* This is not td 
deny that the interpretation here given is different from, 
if not entirely opposed to, Hume’s own views. In what 
follows, I repeat that I am giving my own views, and often 
Hume is (as Hamann says) ’the philosopher speaking against 
his will’.
intend to
Having explained how l/use it, Hume’s conclusion
Hume, An Inquiry Ooncerning Human Understanding, x, 14O-4;
"452 »
may be conveniently broken into six separate statements, 
around which my own beliefs may be clustered and îplarlfie4/ . 
We may conclude that 1) the Ohristian religion was at first 
attended with miracles; 2) even at this day the Christian 
religion cannot be believed by any reasonable person without 
a miracle; 3) mere reason ia insufficient to convince us of 
the veracity of the Christian religion; 4) whoever is moved 
by faith to assent to the Christian religion is conscious 
of a continued miracle in his own person; 5) this continued 
miracle subverts all the principles of a person’s under­
standing; 6) this continued miracle gives a person a 
determination to believe what is most contrary to custom 
and experience.
’We may conclude that the Christian religion was 
at first attended with miracles’. By this, I mean two 
different things.
First of all, if miracle were to mean simply ’an 
unusual event* then Christianity was at first attended with 
’miracles’. It is quite true that we do not know to-day 
how many of the events traditionally called miracles actually 
did occur. Probably a few of them actually did happen. Per­
haps many of them. Possibly all of them. Opinions here 
will vary. It seems quite likely that Jesus actually did 
some quite unusual things. Jesus was an unusual man. But
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there was no single activity which he performed that proved 
conclusively that he was unique. It ie not true to say that 
the ancient world wa,s full of miraole-workers, any more than 
it is true to say that the twentieth/century is full of 
statesmen. Nevertheless, the number of miraole-workers in 
the first century was considerable, just as the number of 
statesmen in the twentieth century is considerable. The 
title ’miracle-worker’ in the first century was no greater, 
and no lesser, claim to fame than the term ’statesman’ ie 
in the twentieth. I believe that Jesus performed some 
very unusual deeds. But I do not think that any single 
event (or the events taken together), in and by itself (or 
themselves) proved to anyone that Jesus was the Son of 
God, or that he was not of this world, or that in the 
flesh of this man dwelt the Word of God.
Secondly, if by miracle is meant ’an event in 
which the activity of God becomes apparent to a particular 
person’, then Christianity was at first attended with 
’miracles’. There can be no doubt that through the media 
of certain events, men and women were transformed, changed, 
converted* There can be no doubt that by means of certain 
happenings, individuals were convinced of the presence, . 
compassion, forgiveness and love of God. There can be no 
doubt that in and through certain occurrences, individuals
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were convinced that they had been reformed and reshaped by 
the redeeming hand of a loving Heavenly father* But now 
the question arises: Were these certain events, in and
through which men felt the activity of God the ’unusual 
events’ referred to above? In some instances, this was 
undoubtedly the case* But what I wish to point out is 
that there is no necessary connection between the two. 
low, as then, a person may become aware of the activity of 
God in an unusual, marvellous or extraordinary event, but 
that person does not necessarily see the activity of God 
in that particular event. An unusual worldly event does 
not, in and by itself, either prove the existence of God 
or point to his presence. On the other hand, a very ordinary 
event may point to the presence and activity of God, thou^ 
again, this is not necessarily the case. The miraoulum in 
miracle does not refer to its unusualness as a worldly 
event. The miraoulum refers rather to the gracious activity 
of God towards/man who realises that he does not deserve 
this act' of grace and love; and moreover, this gracious 
love may become apparent to him in the most ordinary or 
the most extraordinary world event. As Brunner says: "Both
the ’ordinary*, and the ’extraordinary’ action of God, is 
equally wonderful; for everything that God does is wonder-
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fui, for those vfho see that it is God who does it
. We oonclude that the Ohristian religion was at
first attended with miracles; in the sense of ’unusual events’
and in the sense of men heooming aware of * the activity of
God’* And it is clearly the second definition which comes
closer j to what I mean hy miracle* The Ohristian faith was
at first attended with miracles, hut what about now?
■ that
’We conclude/even at this day the Christian religion
cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle’*
Unless there is one event, or a obmplex of events, or a
series of events in and through which one feels or sees dr
is convinced of the activity of God, one cannot believe in
the Ohristian religion. I believe that this is the case.
And one must first point out that this present activity of
God has little to do with anything that happened in the
2first century* It is not enough to be convinced that Jesus 
was an unusual man. It is not enough to be assured that 
certain mens’ lives were transformed in the first century.
It is not enough to be certain that specific individuals 
long ago became aware of the activity of God. No event is 
a miracle for me unless in and through this event I feel 
the activity of: God in the here and now* The only meaning-
^Brunner, D II, 160, %ut of. below.
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fui miracle is the one that takes place in the present.
Of course, a particular report or passage of the Bible may 
be the means of mediating God’s activity to a person in the 
here and now* The church indeed proclàims this; that the 
Bible can aud does mediate the activity of God. When through 
an event or a passage of the biblical message, I become 
aware of the activity of God, then the Bible is the Yiford 
of God to me and for me in that moment* In the Bible we 
are presented with a gospel, a redemptive message, awaiting 
the response of the person moved by fàith. But more than 
God’s activity is mediated through the Bible : rather God’s
activity in Christ is mediated through the Bible. The Bible 
mediates God’s activity in Christ. Preaching mediates the 
kerygma. The sacraments mediate the gospel. Whereas we 
may properly say that the Bible, the tradition, the liturgy 
and the worship of the church are the chief mediators of 
God’s activity in Christ, they are not the sole mediators. 
Anyy event may mediate God’s activity in Christ. For the 
distinctive thing about God’s activity in Christ is that it 
occurs to-day, now, at the present time in and through the 
encounters, things, responsibilities and decisions which 
confront one in everyday life* Christ is the ever-living, 
ever-present Bord of life* Thus, any event which mediates 
God’s activity in Christ to me and for me at the present time
- 457 "
is a miracle. We conclude that even at this day the Ohristian 
religion cannot he believed by any reasonable person without 
a miracle: that is to say, one must be convinced of God’s
a.otivity in Christ in one’s own life, in the here and now - 
else Christianity is meaningless. And this point is sharpened 
in the following paragraph.
’We may conclude that mere reason is insufficient 
to convince us of the veracity of the Christian religion’•
No compilation of the facts of Christianity will itself 
coerce one into belief* No chronology of the lives of the 
saints, however glowingly presented, will itself lead to 
belief. No recitation of the facts of the history of Christen­
dom, however favourably presented, will itself prove God’s 
activity* No string of arguments, however persuasively 
cited, will itself convince the sceptic. Mere reason is 
insufficient to convince us of the presence or existence of 
God: Hume himself clearly saw this. "What a noble privilege
is it of human reason to attain the knowledge of the supreme 
Being; and from the visible works of nature, be enabled 
to infer so sublime a principle as its supreme Creator? But 
turn the reverse of the medal. Survey most nations and most 
ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact 
prevailed in the world* You will scarcely be persuaded, 
that they are anything but sick men’ s dreams ; Or perhaps
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you will regard them more as the playeome whimsies of 
monkies in human shape, than the serious, positive, dogma­
tical asservations of a being, who dignifies himself with 
the name rational. * * * The whole is a riddle, an enigma, 
an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of 
judgement appear the only result of our most accurate 
scrutiny, concerning this subject." And again, "look 
round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, 
animated and organized, sensible and activeI You admire 
this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little 
more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth 
regarding. How hostile and destructive to each otherÎ How 
insufficient all of them for their own happinesst How 
contemptuous or odious to the spectator* The whole presents 
nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a 
great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, 
without discernment or parent#. oa.re, her maimed and abor-
p
tive children." Mere reason is insufficient, in and by 
itself. But then, is scepticism in regard to reason equi­
valent to unbelief? This seems to have been Hume’s position?
!
hardened into a rather dispirited resignation. I should
^Hume, The Natural history of Religion, xv, 75-6.
%ume, Dialogues Oonoerning Natural Religion, xi, 259-60
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say rather that scepticism in regard to reason is a pre­
condition of belief. It is the experience of the shook of 
finltude,? thei recognition of, or better,, still, the insight 
into, limits - limits of both being and knowing. It is a 
recognition that in and by himself man cannot find God, or 
reason his way to him, or create him in man’s own image.
It is a recognition that man in himself does not know @od, 
except. God reveal himself* Man cries out for that which he 
cannot attain. , Reason peers over her borders with sightless; 
eyes. The thirst for God can be quenched by God alone.
Yet even this thirst is a contact^ even the cry of deapair 
a communication, even the black night of scepticism a medium 
of God’s presence. "You have to reason the faith that is 
inoipiently in you: you can seldom be reasoned into faith,
if it is not already genuinely there, ’lord, I believes 
help thou my unbelief’. You are not really asking for 
knowledge^ but for understanding of what you already perceive 
and know. Hence to-day, it ie not a religious expertise
that, people are really seeking, but rather an ars spiritualis.
1a far more difficult task."
’We may conclude that mere reason is insufficient 
to convince us of the veracity of the Ohristian religion’•
^MoOulloch, "Integrity and the Parson", 336.
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That is why I reject the attempt to accomodate God in 
Buprapolarity (as in the rational view), or to place him 
in an exalted slot on a language framework (as in the 
lingual view), Terms like ’God’, ’faith’, miracle*, cannot 
he categorized and placed in a suitable niche of a Weltan­
schauung . We cannot construct a world-pioture and then 
explain miracle in terms of it# At best, we can only say 
’God’s activity in Ohriat is like # * •’ ’A miracle works 
as if . * #’ We speak falterihgly about such things, we 
speak by analogy only# We must resist the natural impulse 
and tendency to force God into a philosophical system, or 
to find an impervious metaphysical method by which to explain 
miracle# ’God acts’# ’But exactly how does God act?* ’I
confess that I do not know exactly how - God’s activity 
cannot be precisely pin-pointed in this manner - but he acts 
as if . # .’ All this analogical way of speaking does not 
mean that God works rationally, irrationally or non-rationally 
It is a confession that such terms are not to be termed false, 
but rather that such terms are totally inadequate to express 
God’s activity. It is a confession that all our categories 
and ways of expression can but hint at his ways; that none 
of them circumvent or adequately speak about his nature.
Nor does this analogical way of expression mea,p that our 
response to the activity of God is an irrational or non—
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rational responseî but it also means that if we said only 
th4t it was a rational response, we should be saying con­
siderably less thmh the facts of the experience actually 
demand.: , The activity of God in Christ confronts or 
encounters the whole man. (and not just his intellect, though 
this is included), releasing him from the bondage of sin,
■ -j
demanding and malting possible a total existentiell response 
in obedience and in love,
’We may conclude that mere reason is insufficient 
to convince us of the veracity of the Ohristian religion’ •
It goes without saying that he who has faith in the veracity 
and efficacy of mere reason as an absolute will be unable 
to see in any event the activity of God. I should say that 
this is the continual temptation of the man under the influence 
of the scientific attitude and the scientific method: the
temptation to say or to think that when one has explained 
BIX event scientifically everything meaningful has been said 
about that event. Thus, anything outside of a strictly 
scientifi^ o explanation is ruled out a priori. This position - 
the decision to regard the scientific explanation as the 
only meaningful one - is, of course, a philosophical, and 
not a scientific, position. Basically, there is no conflict 
between science and theology. Conflicts do arise between a 
eoientist and a theologian when either man does not recognize
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the value of the other disoipline and the limita of his om.
The acientiet has a right to demand respect for the scientific 
explanation of eveiy single event. Yet the scientist will 
recognize that his is not the solo or ultimate explanation*
If he does fail to recognize this, he ceases to be a scientist 
and at the mme time, rune the risk of offending the theologian. 
Again,, the scientist, as scientist, cannot be expected to 
support, defend, follow or criticize the theologian in his 
interpretation; though since the scientist’s own explanation 
is not the sole or ultimate one, he may have a varying degree 
of respect for the interpretation of the theologian* There­
fore, the scientist maywell salute the theologian’s inter­
pretation, though he cannot (as a scientist) speak of it.
On the other hand, the theologian must not attempt to stay
a
the heuristic passion of the scientist, or to mark oui/ realm of 
so-called sacred events as utterly beyond the comprehension 
and explanation of the scientist* This, it seems to me, is 
what Barth tends to do. In other words, the theologian will 
respect the scientist’s explanation, although he will also 
insist that it is not the sole or ultimate explanation;.,
’We may conclude that mere reason is insufficient 
to convince us of the veracity of the Ohristian religion’*
A miracle mediates the divine mystery, which is ultimately 
beyond the range of human comprehension. It is impossible,
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therefore, to explain miracle - as God’s act - on a par 
with worldy acts* It is therefore false to say that God’s 
activity is against nature (as in oontranaturalisra), beyond 
our present knowledge of nature (as in preternaturalism), 
a new: suoraorganio level in nature (as in supernaturalism)* 
As I^se© it, all attempts to explain God’s activity in 
worldly terms (whether against nature, beyond nature or 
above nature) are not really explanationsi largely because 
such attempts are not speaking about God at all* We can 
only say that God’s activity transcends the activity of this 
world, confess that ’activity* and ’transcends’ are only 
analogous ways of expression# And if we go on further to 
discuss God’s activity, we must freely and fully recognize 
that we speak only by analogy: and that our best analogies
are inaccurate* We must hold a tremendous8’as if’ over all 
our pronouncements about God’s activity. That is the fault 
of the rational and the lingual views: God is categorized.
Thus all the faults of traditional eupranatural theology 
tend to be repeated, save that these faults are dressed in 
modern verbiage. In short, I do not think that miracle can 
be ’explained* at all, our comprehension is inadequate to 
enable us to pin-point God’s activity in a manner acceptable 
to ’mere reason’, there must be the essential catalyst and 
ingredient of faith*
m  ^
We cannot ’explain* or'define* a miracle - since
such an event mediates mystery, since faith is necessary,
(the term miracle)
since it/seeks to give expression to the activity of Q*od.
Ho more can one * explain* hov/ the events of two thousand 
years ago become now the media of God*s present act* We 
have already noted how the extentialists have failed, on 
the whole, to explain the relationship between past events 
and present miracle®# Bultmann does not ♦explain* how the 
Mirakeln Je su become the Wunder Qhrietl* he does not •explain* 
how the Jesus of history becomes the Christ: of faith# 
Macquarri© * s analysis suffers from the same lack of pre­
cision in his discussion of the connection between the
objective-historical and existentiell-historical elements
2of Christianity* In each case there is an uncomfortable 
hiatus of explanation. We must now ask the question: Is
this hiatus a lack of clear thinking on the part of the 
existentialists? Is this hiatus a failure to follow argu­
ments to their logical conclusions? Or Is this seeming 
lack of clarity demanded by the facts of the case befoie the 
Christian? Is this hiatus essential to an adequate statement 
of the faith? For myself, I feel that the latter alternative 
is the case# For we cannot explain in any other than analogous
^Of* above, B83f f * ; 408f f. ; . ^Of# above, 364f.; 377*
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terms how God works ; how the Jesus of history is also 
' the ever-living lord. Any attempt to 'explain* how past 
events heeome present miracles cannot satisfy the claims of 
'mere reason' # It would he folly to think that any attempt 
could do so ; the folly, incidentally, that traditional 
theology tries to commit#
'We may conclude that whoever is moved by faith 
to assent to the Christian religion is conscious of a 
continued miracle in his own person'« The phrase 'whoever 
is moved by faith' points to the fact that the insight which
' f-
enables a man to recognize in an event the activity of God, 
is a gift from God himself# "Flesh and blood has not revealed 
this to you, but my Father who is in heaven" (Mt# 16#17) 
were the words of Jesus to Peter when this apostle recognized 
Jesus as the Christ# lo be moved by faith to assent to the 
Christian religion is to be given grace to believe, and this 
grace is imparted by the Heavenly Father* Barth shares with 
the existentialists this clear emphasis upon the fact that 
true faith is a God-given insight : that in this sense
genuine faith is theological, rather than psychological, in 
character. Moreover, this ' assent ' is not the mere deter­
mination to accept in an uncritical fashion a corpus of 
Christian doctrine: which seems to have been Hume's inter­
pretation of the verb 'to assent'# *0?o assent', as here
—  4 6 6  —•
interpreted, means rather a total existentiell response on 
the part of man to the unmerited gift of God in Christ Jesus*
Ho argument or metaphysics can conjure up this gift of grace*
Ï  . . .
It is given only to him who despairs of getting it himself, 
it is granted only to him who knows that he cannot seek God 
out, but throws himself unreservedly on the mercy of God#
Xet if one 'assents* to the Christian religion, 
is one conscious of a continued miracle in his own person?
As we have seen, the ability to assent is given by God 
himself. In other words, the faith to assent to the Christian 
religion demands in itself a miracle* Is one miracle enough 
to sustain one in the Christian religion? Can one live the 
Christian life on the basis of one experience of the activity 
of God? I should say that one miracle is clearly insufficient| 
though the first time one consciously experiences God's 
activity may be not only dramatic, but formative and to some 
extent determinative in all those which follow* One miracle 
does not suffice for tthe person living the Christian way: 
he must despair over and over again of his own abilities 
and virtues, throw himself on the mercy of God, and so be 
open to God's gracious activity* But is a miracle the only 
form of God's activity? What about prayer, providence and 
other forms of revelation? Hot too much is gained by trying 
to draw a sharp and rigid line separating miracle from
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other forms of Christian cxperienee, though the differentia­
tion between miracle and other aspects of Christian revelation 
as given and expounded by Farmer, seems to me to be both 
scholarly and profound* He points out that when in any 
event of complex of events, one is aware of the compassion 
and grace of God's activity in Christ, then that is a miracle 
for that particular person# The more immediate the presence
of God is felt to be, the more likely is the Christian to
1employ and use the word miracle# Beyond that it is probably 
unnecessary to proceed: the essence of miracle runs through
all forms of revelation* .
Hhme's phrase 'in his own person' points out two 
further elemtots necessary in any adequate statement of the 
concept of miracle# First, a. miracle is an event in and 
through which a particular person becomes aware of the 
activity of God in Christ. At best, any event can only 
mediate God's activity# Without a particulari person to 
become aware of God's activity in and through an event, 
miracle is a meaningless term# In a miracle, a particular 
person sees the activity of God in Christ* In a miracle, 
a particulars person becomes aware that God is entering into 
his own personal situation# An event is not a miracle for me
^Cf é above, 33 4ff
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unless % am perBonanily  ^aware of God's graoious activity in 
Ohrist, Secondly, although in a miracle a particular person 
becomes aware of God's activity, this miracle is not received 
exclusively for that person's own Indiddual benefit* But 
rather, God's gift in Christ is to be shared with those in 
the situation of faith* And the experience is to bh used 
in speaking to those outside the situation of j^ ithj that 
they too, .,by faith, may experience the gift of God* We 
may éonclude that whoever is moved by faith to assent to 
the Christian religion is aware that if he is to continually 
see God's activity in Christ, he must despair over and over 
^ain of hie own abilities and achievements, and so open 
himself to that activity of God's in Christ Jesus*
'We may conclude that this continued miracle 
subverts all the principles of a person's understanding'•
This is undoubtedly the 'hardest' of all Hume's conclusions 
concerning the concept of miracle* Yet properly understood, 
it enshrines a basic insight into this same concept. The 
traditional supranatural view of miracle (whether it be 
oontranaturalism, ;pr e:t erna turalism or sup er natural ism) 
attempts to expound this insight by saying that an extra­
ordinary event which hasr, no apparent natural cause must 
be attributed - by default, as it were - to the causality 
of God# As we have already noted, such a view has some very
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obvious flaws from logical, soientific and theological 
standpoints. The rationalist Heim attempts to expound this 
insight by saying that the existence of suprapclarity sub­
verts ihe principles of a person's understanding* But this 
is a Wei tans ohauung. in terms of which miracle can be 
understood* The lingual approach suffers from the same 
basic fault. It is the merit of the existential view that 
it expounds this Hum!an insight in a meaningful smd acceptable 
way* The exposition goes something like this# In ordinary 
everyday affairs, I look upon this world as mine, the sphere 
of my aohievements, the realm in which I am creator and 
king# And because this is a godless attitude, this world 
becomes, consequently, the scene of anxiety, fear and hatred.
In a miracle this ordinary everyday relationship is trans­
cended: I am no longer the centre end b o u I c * of this sphere ;
God is recognized as Creator, upon whom I throw myself, from 
whom I receive freedom from this world and from my sinful 
past, to whom I now owe the glad obedience of love. Con­
sequently, in that moment I am truly free, free to be ray self, 
free to love. In this sense# we may conclude that a miracle 
subverts all the principles of a person's understanding. 80
explained, the interpretation of the word 'subverts' could 
be much better rendered by the word 'transcends'# A mirack.3 
does not demand (as Hume seems to have thought and Barth seems
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to imply) a sacrifioiiim' intelleotus# Rather, as we have 
already acted, worldly relatioaships are traasceaded, though 
act destroyed, in the experience of miracle.
•We may;; conclude that this continued miracle 
gives a person a determination to believe what is most 
contrary to custom and experience'. A man without the 
insight into God's activity — that is to say, a mi ran le - 
see Si this world as his own. He sees it as the sphere for 
his conquests and his achievements* Though this attitude 
is quite necessary in many of man's activities, it is not 
an ultimate attitudes and it is clearly not the one to adopt 
towards God* Moreover, the constant pursuit of this worldly 
attitude leads one into unhappiness s the more one gets 
the more one^  wants, the mom man accoanplishes, the more he 
runs away from his true existence* Only when he despairs 
of being himself, thrusts himself utterly upon God, can 
God apeak to him. In a miracle, man recognizes that this 
is not his world - the sphere of his own achievements, howeverI    ^ y
good - but God's world* the sphere of obedience, the realm 
of love. Buell a man is forgiven, healed, redeemed. A 
miracle, as God's activity in Ohrlst, always contains this 
redemptive element* Man's past no longer shrouds him as 
guilt, but is forgiven and truly pasts hence man is now 
free, free to be himself, free to love. The other is no
“ 471 »
longer my adversary, but a man for whom Ohriet dledu The 
world has ceased to be mine, and is now the sphere of joyous 
obedience to the Heavenly Father. For this reason, one 
cannot speak about a genuine miracle without at the same 
time spealcing about oneself s one is now a new creature in 
Christ, the old Adam and the old reign has passed away.
One is empowered to: live, to be free, to ^  in a genuine 
way* In this sense. a miracle gives a person a deter­
mination to believe what is most contrary to custom and 
experience. Man now lives in the world, but he is not of 
it* God is the most real being of all. One lives in the 
light of things invisible* In a miracle — an event in 
which God's activity is apparent to faith-filled persons - 
we are certain that nothing can "separate us from the love 
of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Horn. 8.39)*
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